# Hopf Bifurcations in Delayed Rock-Paper-Scissors Replicator Dynamics 

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#### Abstract

We investigate the dynamics of three-strategy (rock-paper-scissors) replicator equations in which the fitness of each strategy is a function of the population frequencies delayed by a time interval $T$. Taking $T$ as a bifurcation parameter, we demonstrate the existence of (non-degenerate) Hopf bifurcations in these systems and present an analysis of the resulting limit cycles using Lindstedt's method.


Keywords Replicator • Delay • Hopf bifurcation • Limit cycle • Lindstedt

## 1 Introduction

The field of evolutionary dynamics uses both game theory and differential equations to model population shifts among competing adaptive strategies. There are two main approaches: population models (e.g., Lotka-Volterra) and frequency models such as the replicator equation,

$$
\begin{equation*}
\dot{x}_{i}=x_{i}\left(f_{i}-\phi\right), \quad i=1, \ldots, n \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $x_{i}$ is the frequency or relative abundance and $f_{i}\left(x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}\right)$ is the fitness of strategy $i$, and $\phi=\sum f_{i} x_{i}$ is the average fitness. Note that since the variables $x_{i}$ represent population frequencies, we have $\sum x_{i}=1$.

Hofbauer and Sigmund [3] have shown that the Lotka-Volterra equation with $n-1$ species is equivalent to the replicator equation with $n$ strategies, but the proof requires a rescaling of time, and the correspondence between species and strategies is clearly not one to one.

[^0]In "Appendix 1", we show that the replicator equation can be derived from the (continuous) population growth model

$$
\begin{equation*}
\dot{\xi}_{i}=\xi_{i} g_{i}, \quad i=1, \ldots, n \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $\xi_{i}$ is the population and $g_{i}\left(\xi_{1}, \ldots, \xi_{n}\right)$ the fitness of strategy $i$. The equivalence simply uses the change of variables $x_{i}=\xi_{i} / p$ where $p$ is the total population, with the assumption that the fitness functions depend only on the frequencies and not on the populations directly.

The game-theoretic component of the replicator model lies in the choice of fitness functions. Take the payoff matrix $A=\left(a_{i j}\right)$, where $a_{i j}$ is the expected reward for strategy $i$ when it competes with strategy $j$. Then, the fitness $f_{i}$ is the total expected payoff of strategy $i$ versus all strategies, weighted by their frequency:

$$
\begin{equation*}
f_{i}=(A \cdot \mathbf{x})_{i} . \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

where

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mathbf{x}=\left(x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}\right) \tag{4}
\end{equation*}
$$

In this work, we generalize the replicator model to systems in which the fitness of each strategy depends only on the expected payoffs at time $t-T$, as in $[4,8]$. If we write $\bar{x}_{i} \equiv x_{i}(t-T)$ and define

$$
\begin{equation*}
\overline{\mathbf{x}} \equiv\left(\bar{x}_{1}, \ldots, \bar{x}_{n}\right) \tag{5}
\end{equation*}
$$

then the total expected payoff-i.e., the fitness-for strategy $i$ is given by

$$
\begin{equation*}
f_{i}=(A \cdot \overline{\mathbf{x}})_{i} \tag{6}
\end{equation*}
$$

The use of delayed fitness functions makes the replicator equation into the delay differential equation (DDE)

$$
\begin{equation*}
\dot{x}_{i}=x_{i}\left(f_{i}-\phi\right) \tag{7}
\end{equation*}
$$

where

$$
\begin{equation*}
\phi=\sum_{i} x_{i} f_{i}=\sum_{i} x_{i}(A \cdot \overline{\mathbf{x}})_{i} . \tag{8}
\end{equation*}
$$

As a system of ODEs, the standard replicator equation is an $(n-1)$-dimensional problem, since $n-1$ of the $x_{i}$ are required to specify a point in phase space, in view of the fact that $\sum x_{i}=1$. The delayed replicator equation, by contrast, is an infinite-dimensional problem [1] whose solution is a flow on the space of functions on the interval $[-T, 0)$.

A concrete interpretation of this model is that it represents a social-type time delay [4]. There is a large, finite pool of players, each of whom uses a particular strategy at any given time. The population is well mixed, and one-on-one contests between players happen continuously. Each player continually decides whether to switch teams, based on the latest information they have about the expected payoff of each strategy. This information is delayed by an interval $T$.

Previous works on replicator systems with delay $[4,8]$ have examined two-strategy systems which have a stable interior equilibrium point (i.e., both strategies coexist) when there is no delay. It has been shown that for such systems, there is a critical delay $T_{\mathrm{c}}$ at which the interior equilibrium $x^{*}$ changes stability; for delay greater than $T_{\mathrm{c}}$ solutions oscillate about $x^{*}$.

In this work, we prove a similar result for RPS systems. Moreover, we use nonlinear methods to analyze the resulting limit cycles' amplitude and frequency.

## 2 Three-Strategy Games: Rock-Paper-Scissors

### 2.1 Derivation

Recall the form of the replicator equation, Eq. (7) with delayed fitness functions (8),

$$
\begin{equation*}
\dot{x}_{i}=x_{i}\left(f_{i}-\phi\right) \tag{9}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $f_{i}=(A \cdot \overline{\mathbf{x}})_{i}$ and

$$
\begin{equation*}
\phi=\sum_{i} x_{i} f_{i}=\sum_{i} x_{i}(A \cdot \overline{\mathbf{x}})_{i} . \tag{10}
\end{equation*}
$$

where the bar indicates delay.
We analyze a subset of the space of three-strategy delayed evolutionary games: those known as rock-paper-scissors (RPS) games. RPS games have three strategies, each of which is neutral versus itself and has a positive expected payoff versus one of the other strategies and a negative expected payoff versus the remaining strategy. The payoff matrix $A$ thus has the form

$$
A=\left(\begin{array}{ccc}
0 & -b_{2} & a_{1}  \tag{11}\\
a_{2} & 0 & -b_{3} \\
-b_{1} & a_{3} & 0
\end{array}\right)
$$

where the $a_{i}$ and $b_{i}$ are all positive. For ease of notation, write $\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3}\right)=(x, y, z)$. Then

$$
\begin{align*}
\dot{x} & =x\left(a_{1} \bar{z}-b_{2} \bar{y}-\phi\right)  \tag{12}\\
\dot{y} & =y\left(a_{2} \bar{x}-b_{3} \bar{z}-\phi\right)  \tag{13}\\
\dot{z} & =z\left(a_{3} \bar{y}-b_{1} \bar{x}-\phi\right) \tag{14}
\end{align*}
$$

where

$$
\begin{equation*}
\phi=x\left(a_{1} \bar{z}-b_{2} \bar{y}\right)+y\left(a_{2} \bar{x}-b_{3} \bar{z}\right)+z\left(a_{3} \bar{y}-b_{1} \bar{x}\right) . \tag{15}
\end{equation*}
$$

Now, since $x, y, z$ are the relative abundances of the three strategies, the region of interest is the three-dimensional simplex in $\mathbb{R}^{3}$

$$
\begin{equation*}
\Sigma \equiv\left\{(x, y, z) \in \mathbb{R}^{3}: x+y+z=1 \text { and } x, y, z \geq 0\right\} \tag{16}
\end{equation*}
$$

Therefore, we can eliminate $z$ using $z=1-x-y$. The region of interest is then $S$, the projection of $\Sigma$ into the $x-y$ plane:

$$
\begin{equation*}
S \equiv\left\{(x, y) \in \mathbb{R}^{2}:(x, y, 1-x-y) \in \Sigma\right\} \tag{17}
\end{equation*}
$$

See Fig. 1. Equations (12) and (13) become

$$
\begin{align*}
\dot{x} & =x\left(a_{1}(1-\bar{x}-\bar{y})-b_{2} \bar{y}-\phi\right)  \tag{18}\\
\dot{y} & =y\left(a_{2} \bar{x}-b_{3}(1-\bar{x}-\bar{y})-\phi\right) \tag{19}
\end{align*}
$$

where

$$
\begin{align*}
\phi= & x\left(a_{1}(1-\bar{x}-\bar{y})-b_{2} \bar{y}\right)+y\left(a_{2} \bar{x}-b_{3}(1-\bar{x}-\bar{y})\right) \\
& +(1-x-y)\left(a_{3} \bar{y}-b_{1} \bar{x}\right) . \tag{20}
\end{align*}
$$



Fig. 1 A curve in $\Sigma$ and its projection in $S$

### 2.2 Stability of Equilibria

The system (18)-(19) has seven equilibria: the corners of the triangle $S$,

$$
\begin{equation*}
(x, y)=(0,0), \quad(x, y)=(0,1), \quad(x, y)=(1,0) \tag{21}
\end{equation*}
$$

one point in the interior of $S$,

$$
(x, y)=\left(\frac{b_{3}\left(a_{3}+b_{2}\right)+a_{1} a_{3}}{a_{1}\left(a_{2}+a_{3}+b_{1}\right)+a_{2}\left(a_{3}+b_{2}\right)+b_{3}\left(a_{3}+b_{1}+b_{2}\right)+b_{1} b_{2}},\right.
$$

and three other points:

$$
\begin{align*}
(x, y) & =\left(0, \frac{b_{3}}{b_{3}-a_{3}}\right)  \tag{23}\\
(x, y) & =\left(\frac{a_{1}}{a_{1}-b_{1}}, 0\right),  \tag{24}\\
(x, y) & =\left(\frac{b_{2}}{b_{2}-a_{2}}, \frac{a_{2}}{a_{2}-b_{2}}\right) . \tag{25}
\end{align*}
$$

Note that since the payoff coefficients $a_{1}, \ldots, b_{3}$ are positive, the nonzero coordinate(s) of the last three equilibria are either negative or greater than 1 . In either case, these points lie outside of $S$ and we will not consider them further.

We linearize about the three corner equilibrium points to determine their stability. In all three cases, the linearization is independent of the delayed variables $\bar{x}$ and $\bar{y}$; that is, the linearized system about each corner point is an ordinary differential equation. Therefore, the stability of each corner point is determined by the eigenvalues of the Jacobian.

At the point $(x, y)=(0,0)$, the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the Jacobian are

$$
\begin{align*}
\lambda_{1}=a_{1}, & \mathbf{v}_{1}=[1,0]  \tag{26}\\
\lambda_{2}=-b_{3}, & \mathbf{v}_{2}=[0,1] . \tag{27}
\end{align*}
$$

Similarly, at the point $(x, y)=(1,0)$, the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the Jacobian are

$$
\begin{align*}
\lambda_{1}=a_{2}, & \mathbf{v}_{1}=[-1,1]  \tag{28}\\
\lambda_{2}=-b_{1}, & \mathbf{v}_{2}=[1,0] . \tag{29}
\end{align*}
$$

Finally, at the point $(x, y)=(0,1)$, the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the Jacobian are

$$
\begin{align*}
\lambda_{1}=a_{3}, & \mathbf{v}_{1}=[0,1]  \tag{30}\\
\lambda_{2}=-b_{2}, & \mathbf{v}_{2}=[-1,1] . \tag{31}
\end{align*}
$$

Therefore, as in the non-delayed RPS system [1], each corner of $S$ is a saddle point, and its eigenvectors lie along the two edges of $S$ adjacent to it. (Since the lines containing the edges of $S$ are invariant, these lines are in fact the stable and unstable manifolds of the three corner equilibria.)

Next, consider the interior equilibrium (22). Let $\left(x^{*}, y^{*}\right)$ be the coordinates of the equilibrium point. It is known [5] that in the case of no delay $(T=0)$, this point is globally stable if

$$
\begin{equation*}
\operatorname{det} A=a_{1} a_{2} a_{3}-b_{1} b_{2} b_{3}>0 \tag{32}
\end{equation*}
$$

All trajectories starting from interior points of $S$ converge to $\left(x^{*}, y^{*}\right)$. Similarly, if $T=0$ and $\operatorname{det} A<0$, the equilibrium point is unstable and all trajectories starting from other points converge to the boundary of $S$. If $T=0$ and $\operatorname{det} A=0$, then $S$ is filled with periodic orbits.

If $T>0$, however, then in contrast to the corner equilibria, the linearization about $\left(x^{*}, y^{*}\right)$ depends only on the delayed variables, and it is reasonable to expect that its stability will depend on the delay $T$. So, we analyze the system for a Hopf bifurcation, taking $T$ as the bifurcation parameter.

Define the translated variables $u$ and $v$ via

$$
\begin{equation*}
u=x-x^{*}, \quad v=y-y^{*} . \tag{33}
\end{equation*}
$$

Then, the linearization about $(u, v)=(0,0)$ is

$$
\binom{\dot{u}}{\dot{v}}=\left(\begin{array}{ll}
\alpha & \beta  \tag{34}\\
\gamma & \delta
\end{array}\right)\binom{\bar{u}}{\bar{v}} \equiv J\binom{\bar{u}}{\bar{v}}
$$

where the entries $(\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta)$ of the matrix $J$ are rational functions of the payoff coefficients $a_{1}, \ldots, b_{3}$. See Eqs. (124)-(127) in "Appendix 2".

Set $u=r \mathrm{e}^{\lambda t}$ and $v=s \mathrm{e}^{\lambda t}$ to obtain the characteristic equations

$$
\begin{align*}
& \lambda r=\mathrm{e}^{-\lambda T}(\alpha r+\beta s)  \tag{35}\\
& \lambda s=\mathrm{e}^{-\lambda T}(\gamma r+\delta s) . \tag{36}
\end{align*}
$$

Rearranging, we obtain

$$
\left(\begin{array}{cc}
\lambda-\alpha \mathrm{e}^{-\lambda T} & -\beta \mathrm{e}^{-\lambda T}  \tag{37}\\
-\gamma \mathrm{e}^{-\lambda T} & \lambda-\delta \mathrm{e}^{\lambda T}
\end{array}\right)\binom{r}{s}=\binom{0}{0} .
$$

For brevity, write

$$
M \equiv\left(\begin{array}{cc}
\lambda-\alpha \mathrm{e}^{-\lambda T} & -\beta \mathrm{e}^{-\lambda T}  \tag{38}\\
-\gamma \mathrm{e}^{-\lambda T} & \lambda-\delta \mathrm{e}^{\lambda T}
\end{array}\right) .
$$

Then, for a non-trivial solution to Eq. (37), we require

$$
\begin{equation*}
\operatorname{det} M=0 \tag{39}
\end{equation*}
$$

This occurs when

$$
\begin{equation*}
\beta \gamma=\left(\alpha-\lambda \mathrm{e}^{\lambda T}\right)\left(\delta-\lambda \mathrm{e}^{\lambda T}\right) \tag{40}
\end{equation*}
$$

At the critical value of delay for a Hopf bifurcation, the eigenvalues are pure imaginary. So, we set $T=T_{0}$ and $\lambda=i \omega_{0}$. Substituting this into Eq. (40) and separating the real and imaginary parts, we obtain

$$
\begin{align*}
\beta \gamma & =-\alpha \delta-\omega_{0}^{2} \cos \left(2 \omega_{0} T_{0}\right)+(\alpha+\delta) \sin \left(\omega_{0} T_{0}\right)  \tag{41}\\
0 & =\omega_{0} \cos \left(\omega_{0} T_{0}\right)\left(\alpha+\delta+2 \omega_{0} \sin \left(\omega_{0} T_{0}\right)\right) \tag{42}
\end{align*}
$$

In terms of the matrix $J$, these equations are

$$
\begin{align*}
\operatorname{det} J & =\omega_{0}^{2} \cos \left(2 \omega_{0} T_{0}\right)-(\operatorname{tr} J) \sin \left(\omega_{0} T_{0}\right)  \tag{43}\\
0 & =\omega_{0} \cos \left(\omega_{0} T_{0}\right)\left(\operatorname{tr} J+2 \omega_{0} \sin \left(\omega_{0} T_{0}\right)\right) \tag{44}
\end{align*}
$$

Solving these equations for det $J$ and $\operatorname{tr} J$, we get

$$
\begin{equation*}
\operatorname{det} J=\omega_{0}^{2}, \quad \operatorname{tr} J=-2 \omega_{0} \sin \left(\omega_{0} T_{0}\right) \tag{45}
\end{equation*}
$$

Thus, $\omega_{0}$ and $T_{0}$ are given by

$$
\begin{equation*}
\omega_{0}=\sqrt{\operatorname{det} J}, \quad T_{0}=\frac{-1}{\sqrt{\operatorname{det} J}} \sin ^{-1}\left(\frac{\operatorname{tr} J}{2 \sqrt{\operatorname{det} J}}\right) . \tag{46}
\end{equation*}
$$

We have found the critical delay and frequency associated with a Hopf bifurcation. In the next subsection, we use Lindstedt's method to approximate the form of the limit cycle that is born in this bifurcation.

### 2.3 Approximation of Limit Cycle

Recall that we have the system

$$
\begin{align*}
\dot{x} & =x\left(a_{1}(1-\bar{x}-\bar{y})-b_{2} \bar{y}-\phi\right)  \tag{47}\\
\dot{y} & =y\left(a_{2} \bar{x}-b_{3}(1-\bar{x}-\bar{y})-\phi\right) \tag{48}
\end{align*}
$$

where

$$
\begin{align*}
\phi= & x\left(a_{1}(1-\bar{x}-\bar{y})-b_{2} \bar{y}\right)+y\left(a_{2} \bar{x}-b_{3}(1-\bar{x}-\bar{y})\right) \\
& +(1-x-y)\left(a_{3} \bar{y}-b_{1} \bar{x}\right) \tag{49}
\end{align*}
$$

with the interior equilibrium point

$$
\begin{align*}
\left(x^{*}, y^{*}\right)= & \left(\frac{b_{3}\left(a_{3}+b_{2}\right)+a_{1} a_{3}}{a_{1}\left(a_{2}+a_{3}+b_{1}\right)+a_{2}\left(a_{3}+b_{2}\right)+b_{3}\left(a_{3}+b_{1}+b_{2}\right)+b_{1} b_{2}}\right. \\
& \left.\frac{a_{1}\left(a_{2}+b_{1}\right)+b_{1} b_{3}}{a_{1}\left(a_{2}+a_{3}+b_{1}\right)+a_{2}\left(a_{3}+b_{2}\right)+b_{3}\left(a_{3}+b_{1}+b_{2}\right)+b_{1} b_{2}}\right) \tag{50}
\end{align*}
$$

We have introduced the translated coordinates $u$ and $v$, defined by

$$
\begin{equation*}
u=x-x^{*}, \quad v=y-y^{*} \tag{51}
\end{equation*}
$$

and we have determined in Eq. (46) the critical delay $T_{0}$ and frequency $\omega_{0}$ associated with a Hopf bifurcation of the point $(u, v)=(0,0)$.

Substituting in $u$ and $v$, the system (47)-(48) can be written as

$$
\begin{align*}
\dot{u}= & \alpha \bar{u}+\beta \bar{v}+c_{1} u \bar{u}+c_{2} u \bar{v}+c_{3} v \bar{u}+c_{4} v \bar{v} \\
& +d_{1} u^{2} \bar{u}+d_{2} u^{2} \bar{v}+d_{3} u v \bar{u}+d_{4} u v \bar{v}  \tag{52}\\
\dot{v}= & \gamma \bar{u}+\delta \bar{v}+h_{1} u \bar{u}+h_{2} u \bar{v}+h_{3} v \bar{u}+h_{4} v \bar{v} \\
& +j_{1} v^{2} \bar{u}+j_{2} v^{2} \bar{v}+j_{3} u v \bar{u}+j_{4} u v \bar{v} \tag{53}
\end{align*}
$$

where $\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta$ are as in the linearization Eq. (34). The other coefficients $c_{1}, \ldots, j_{4}$ are also rational functions of the payoff coefficients $a_{1}, \ldots, b_{3}$; see Eqs. (129)-(144) in "Appendix 2 ".

Now we use Lindstedt's method to approximate the form of the limit cycle generated by this bifurcation.

We are looking for periodic solutions with delay close to $T_{0}$ and frequency close to $\omega_{0}$. First, we rescale time via $\tau=\omega t$, so

$$
\begin{align*}
& \dot{u}=\frac{\mathrm{d} u}{\mathrm{~d} t}=\frac{\mathrm{d} u}{\mathrm{~d} \tau} \frac{\mathrm{~d} \tau}{\mathrm{~d} t}=\omega \frac{\mathrm{d} u}{\mathrm{~d} \tau} \equiv \omega u^{\prime}  \tag{54}\\
& \dot{v}=\frac{\mathrm{d} v}{\mathrm{~d} t}=\frac{\mathrm{d} v}{\mathrm{~d} \tau} \frac{\mathrm{~d} \tau}{\mathrm{~d} t}=\omega \frac{\mathrm{d} v}{\mathrm{~d} \tau} \equiv \omega v^{\prime} \tag{55}
\end{align*}
$$

and, considering $u$ and $v$ to be functions of $\tau$,

$$
\begin{equation*}
\bar{u}=u(\tau-\omega T), \quad \bar{v}=v(\tau-\omega T) \tag{56}
\end{equation*}
$$

Next, expand the delay and frequency in $\epsilon$ :

$$
\begin{align*}
& T=T_{0}+\epsilon^{2} \mu_{1}+\epsilon^{3} \mu_{2}  \tag{57}\\
& \omega=\omega_{0}+\epsilon^{2} k_{1}+\epsilon^{3} k_{2} \tag{58}
\end{align*}
$$

Note that there is no $O\left(\epsilon^{1}\right)$ term in $T$ or $\omega$ because of the presence of quadratic terms in Eqs. (52) and (53). Removal of secular terms at the appropriate order of $\epsilon$ will require any $O\left(\epsilon^{1}\right)$ terms in Eqs. (57) and (58) to vanish.

We expand the functions $u$ and $v$ similarly:

$$
\begin{align*}
u & =\epsilon u_{0}+\epsilon^{2} u_{1}+\epsilon^{3} u_{2}  \tag{59}\\
v & =\epsilon v_{0}+\epsilon^{2} v_{1}+\epsilon^{3} v_{2} . \tag{60}
\end{align*}
$$

Then, we substitute the expanded functions and parameters into Eqs. (52) and (53) and collect like orders of $\epsilon$. This includes expanding $\bar{u}$ and $\bar{v}$ in Taylor series:

$$
\begin{align*}
\bar{u}= & u(\tau-\omega T) \\
= & \epsilon u_{0}\left(\tau-\omega_{0} T_{0}\right)+\epsilon^{2} u_{1}\left(\tau-\omega_{0} T_{0}\right) \\
& +\epsilon^{3}\left(u_{2}\left(\tau-\omega_{0} T_{0}\right)-\left(T_{0} k_{1}+\omega_{0} \mu_{1}\right) u_{0}^{\prime}\left(\tau-\omega_{0} T_{0}\right)\right)+\ldots \tag{61}
\end{align*}
$$

$$
\begin{align*}
\bar{v}= & v(\tau-\omega T) \\
= & \epsilon v_{0}\left(\tau-\omega_{0} T_{0}\right)+\epsilon^{2} v_{1}\left(\tau-\omega_{0} T_{0}\right) \\
& +\epsilon^{3}\left(v_{2}\left(\tau-\omega_{0} T_{0}\right)-\left(T_{0} k_{1}+\omega_{0} \mu_{1}\right) v_{0}^{\prime}\left(\tau-\omega_{0} T_{0}\right)\right)+\ldots \tag{62}
\end{align*}
$$

Since the only remaining delayed terms are of the form $u\left(\tau-\omega_{0} T_{0}\right)$ or $v\left(\tau-\omega_{0} T_{0}\right)$, we introduce the notation

$$
\begin{equation*}
\tilde{u} \equiv u\left(\tau-\omega_{0} T_{0}\right), \quad \tilde{v} \equiv v\left(\tau-\omega_{0} T_{0}\right) \tag{63}
\end{equation*}
$$

The resulting equations are

$$
\begin{align*}
& O\left(\epsilon^{1}\right): \quad \omega_{0} u_{0}^{\prime}=\alpha \tilde{u}_{0}+\beta \tilde{v}_{0}  \tag{64}\\
& \omega_{0} v_{0}^{\prime}=\gamma \tilde{u}_{0}+\delta \tilde{v}_{0}  \tag{65}\\
& O\left(\epsilon^{2}\right): \quad \omega_{0} u_{1}^{\prime}=\alpha \tilde{u}_{1}+\beta \tilde{v}_{1}+\tilde{u}_{0}\left(c_{1} u_{0}+c_{3} v_{0}\right)+\tilde{v}_{0}\left(c_{2} u_{0}+c_{4} v_{0}\right)  \tag{66}\\
& O\left(\epsilon^{3}\right): \quad \omega_{0} v_{1}^{\prime}=\gamma \tilde{u}_{1}+\delta \tilde{v}_{1}+\tilde{u}_{0}\left(h_{1} u_{0}=h_{3} v_{0}\right)+\tilde{v}_{0}\left(h_{2} u_{0}+h_{4} v_{0}\right)  \tag{67}\\
&+\beta \tilde{v}_{2}+\tilde{u}_{1}\left(c_{1} u_{0}+c_{3} v_{0}\right)+\tilde{v}_{1}\left(c_{2} u_{1}+c_{3} v_{1}+c_{4} v_{0}\right) \\
&+\tilde{v}_{0}\left(c_{0}^{2}+d_{3} u_{0} v_{0}\right) \\
&\left.-k_{1} u_{0}^{\prime}-\alpha\left(T_{0} v_{1}+d_{2} u_{0}^{2}+\omega_{0} \mu_{1}\right) \tilde{u}_{0}^{\prime} u_{0} v_{0}\right) \\
&  \tag{68}\\
& \omega_{0} v_{2}^{\prime}=\left.\gamma \tilde{u}_{2}+\delta \tilde{v}_{2}+\tilde{u}_{1}\left(h_{1} u_{0}+h_{3} v_{0}\right)+\tilde{v}_{1}\right) \tilde{v}_{0}^{\prime}\left(h_{2} u_{0}+h_{4} v_{0}\right) \\
&+\tilde{u}_{0}\left(h_{1} u_{1}+h_{3} v_{1}+j_{1} v_{0}^{2}+j_{3} u_{0} v_{0}\right) \\
&+\tilde{v}_{0}\left(h_{2} u_{1}+h_{4} v_{1}+j_{2} v_{0}^{2}+j_{4} u_{0} v_{0}\right) \\
&-k_{1} v_{0}^{\prime}-\gamma\left(T_{0} k_{1}+\omega_{0} \mu_{1}\right) \tilde{u}_{0}^{\prime}-\delta\left(T_{0} k_{1}+\omega_{0} \mu_{1}\right) \tilde{v}_{0}^{\prime} . \tag{69}
\end{align*}
$$

We must solve the equations for each order of $\epsilon$ successively, substituting in the results from the lower-order equations as we proceed.

### 2.3.1 Solve for $u_{0}$ and $v_{0}$

As seen above, the $\epsilon^{1}$ equations are linear:

$$
\begin{align*}
& \omega_{0} u_{0}^{\prime}=\alpha \tilde{u}_{0}+\beta \tilde{v}_{0}  \tag{64}\\
& \omega_{0} v_{0}^{\prime}=\gamma \tilde{u}_{0}+\delta \tilde{v}_{0} . \tag{65}
\end{align*}
$$

Up to a phase shift, the solution has the form

$$
\begin{align*}
u_{0} & =A_{0} \sin \tau  \tag{70}\\
v_{0} & =A_{0}(r \sin \tau+s \cos \tau) \tag{71}
\end{align*}
$$

for some constants $r$ and $s$. We substitute these solutions into Eqs. (64) and (65) and use the angle-sum identities to obtain

$$
\begin{align*}
\omega_{0} \cos \tau= & \left(s \beta \cos \left(\omega_{0} T_{0}\right)-(\alpha+r \beta) \sin \left(\omega_{0} T_{0}\right)\right) \cos \tau \\
& +\left(s \beta \sin \left(\omega_{0} T_{0}\right)+(\alpha+r \beta) \cos \left(\omega_{0} T_{0}\right)\right) \sin \tau  \tag{72}\\
\omega_{0}(r \cos \tau-s \sin \tau)= & \left(s \delta \cos \left(\omega_{0} T_{0}\right)-(\gamma+r \delta) \sin \left(\omega_{0} T_{0}\right)\right) \cos \tau \\
& +\left(s \delta \sin \left(\omega_{0} T_{0}\right)+(\gamma+r \delta) \cos \left(\omega_{0} T_{0}\right)\right) \sin \tau . \tag{73}
\end{align*}
$$

Setting the coefficients of $\cos \tau$ and $\sin \tau$ equal to 0 in both equations gives us

$$
\begin{equation*}
r=\frac{\delta-\alpha}{2 \beta}, \quad s=\frac{\sqrt{-4 \beta \gamma-(\alpha-\delta)^{2}}}{2 \beta} \tag{74}
\end{equation*}
$$

Thus,

$$
\begin{align*}
& u_{0}=A_{0} \sin \tau  \tag{75}\\
& v_{0}=A_{0} \frac{1}{2 \beta}\left((\delta-\alpha) \sin \tau+\sqrt{-4 \beta \gamma-(\alpha-\delta)^{2}} \cos \tau\right) . \tag{76}
\end{align*}
$$

(Note that the coefficient of $\cos \tau$ above is real for the values of $\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta$ given in "Appendix 2".)

### 2.3.2 Solve for $u_{1}$ and $v_{1}$

Next we solve for $u_{1}$ and $v_{1}$ using the solutions for $u_{0}$ and $v_{0}$ above. Recall that they satisfy the equations

$$
\begin{align*}
& \omega_{0} u_{1}^{\prime}=\alpha \tilde{u}_{1}+\beta \tilde{v}_{1}+\tilde{u}_{0}\left(c_{1} u_{0}+c_{3} v_{0}\right)+\tilde{v}_{0}\left(c_{2} u_{0}+c_{4} v_{0}\right)  \tag{66}\\
& \omega_{0} v_{1}^{\prime}=\gamma \tilde{u}_{1}+\delta \tilde{v}_{1}+\tilde{u}_{0}\left(h_{1} u_{0}+h_{3} v_{0}\right)+\tilde{v}_{0}\left(h_{2} u_{0}+h_{4} v_{0}\right) \tag{67}
\end{align*}
$$

Using Eqs. (75) and (76), and the values of the various coefficients given in "Appendix 2", these become

$$
\begin{align*}
& \omega_{0} u_{1}^{\prime}=\alpha \tilde{u}_{1}+\beta \tilde{v}_{1}+A_{0}^{2}\left(B_{1} \sin 2 \tau+B_{2} \cos 2 \tau\right)  \tag{77}\\
& \omega_{0} v_{1}^{\prime}=\gamma \tilde{u}_{1}+\delta \tilde{v}_{1}+A_{0}^{2}\left(B_{3} \sin 2 \tau+B_{4} \cos 2 \tau\right) . \tag{78}
\end{align*}
$$

The constant coefficients $B_{1}, \ldots, B_{4}$ are given in Eqs. (145)-(148) in "Appendix 2". Note that there are no resonant terms to eliminate, and the homogeneous solutions are unnecessary because they will have the same form as $u_{0}$ and $v_{0}$. Thus, we expect solutions of the form

$$
\begin{align*}
u_{1} & =A_{0}^{2}\left(r_{1} \sin 2 \tau+s_{1} \cos 2 \tau\right)  \tag{79}\\
v_{1} & =A_{0}^{2}\left(r_{2} \sin 2 \tau+s_{2} \cos 2 \tau\right) \tag{80}
\end{align*}
$$

Substituting into Eqs. (77)-(78) gives

$$
\begin{align*}
& {\left[B_{2}-\sin \left(2 T_{0} \omega_{0}\right)\left(\alpha r_{1}+\beta r_{2}\right)-2 r_{1} \omega_{0}+\cos \left(2 T_{0} \omega_{0}\right)\left(\alpha s_{1}+\beta s_{2}\right)\right] \cos 2 \tau} \\
& \quad+\left[B_{1}+\cos \left(2 T_{0} \omega_{0}\right)\left(\alpha r_{1}+\beta r_{2}\right)+\sin \left(2 T_{0} \omega_{0}\right)\left(\alpha s_{1}+\beta s_{2}\right)+2 s_{1} \omega_{0}\right] \sin 2 \tau=0  \tag{81}\\
& {\left[B_{4}-\sin \left(2 T_{0} \omega_{0}\right)\left(\gamma r_{1}+\delta r_{2}\right)-2 r_{2} \omega_{0}+\cos \left(2 T_{0} \omega_{0}\right)\left(\gamma s_{1}+\delta s_{2}\right)\right] \cos 2 \tau} \\
& \quad+\left[B_{3}+\cos \left(2 T_{0} \omega_{0}\right)\left(\gamma r_{1}+\delta r_{2}\right)+\sin \left(2 T_{0} \omega_{0}\right)\left(\gamma s_{1}+\delta s_{2}\right)+2 s_{2} \omega_{0}\right] \sin 2 \tau=0 . \tag{82}
\end{align*}
$$

We set the coefficients of $\sin 2 \tau$ and $\cos 2 \tau$ equal to 0 . This gives four linear equations in $r_{1}, r_{2}, s_{1}$, and $s_{2}$, which can be solved easily:

$$
\left(\begin{array}{l}
r_{1}  \tag{83}\\
r_{2} \\
s_{1} \\
s_{2}
\end{array}\right)=C^{-1}\left(\begin{array}{l}
B_{1} \\
B_{2} \\
B_{3} \\
B_{4}
\end{array}\right)
$$

where

$$
C=\left(\begin{array}{cccc}
\alpha \cos & \beta \cos & 2 \omega_{0}+\alpha \sin & \beta \sin  \tag{84}\\
-2 \omega_{0}-\alpha \sin & -\beta \sin & \alpha \cos & \beta \cos \\
\gamma \cos & \delta \cos & \gamma \sin & 2 \omega_{0}+\delta \sin \\
-\gamma \sin & -2 \omega_{0}-\delta \sin & \gamma \cos & \delta \cos
\end{array}\right)
$$

where the argument of each $\sin$ and $\cos$ is $2 \omega_{0} T_{0}$. However, the expressions for $r_{1}, \ldots, s_{2}$ are cumbersome and are omitted here for brevity.

### 2.3.3 Use the $u_{2}$ and $v_{2}$ Equations to Find $A_{0}$ and $k_{1}$ in Terms of $\mu_{1}$

As in the previous steps, we substitute the solutions found above for $u_{0}, v_{0}, u_{1}$ and $v_{1}$ into the equations satisfied by $u_{2}$ and $v_{2}$. Recall that

$$
\begin{align*}
\omega_{0} u_{2}^{\prime}= & \alpha \tilde{u}_{2}+\beta \tilde{v}_{2}+\tilde{u}_{1}\left(c_{1} u_{0}+c_{3} v_{0}\right)+\tilde{v}_{1}\left(c_{2} u_{0}+c_{4} v_{0}\right)  \tag{68}\\
& +\tilde{u}_{0}\left(c_{1} u_{1}+c_{3} v_{1}+d_{1} u_{0}^{2}+d_{3} u_{0} v_{0}\right) \\
& +\tilde{v}_{0}\left(c_{2} u_{1}+c_{4} v_{1}+d_{2} u_{0}^{2}+d_{4} u_{0} v_{0}\right) \\
& -k_{1} u_{0}^{\prime}-\alpha\left(T_{0} k_{1}+\omega_{0} \mu_{1}\right) \tilde{u}_{0}^{\prime}-\beta\left(T_{0} k_{1}+\omega_{0} \mu_{1}\right) \tilde{v}_{0}^{\prime} \\
\omega_{0} v_{2}^{\prime}= & \gamma \tilde{u}_{2}+\delta \tilde{v}_{2}+\tilde{u}_{1}\left(h_{1} u_{0}+h_{3} v_{0}\right)+\tilde{v}_{1}\left(h_{2} u_{0}+h_{4} v_{0}\right)  \tag{69}\\
& +\tilde{u}_{0}\left(h_{1} u_{1}+h_{3} v_{1}+j_{1} v_{0}^{2}+j_{3} u_{0} v_{0}\right) \\
& +\tilde{v}_{0}\left(h_{2} u_{1}+h_{4} v_{1}+j_{2} v_{0}^{2}+j_{4} u_{0} v_{0}\right) \\
& -k_{1} v_{0}^{\prime}-\gamma\left(T_{0} k_{1}+\omega_{0} \mu_{1}\right) \tilde{u}_{0}^{\prime}-\delta\left(T_{0} k_{1}+\omega_{0} \mu_{1}\right) \tilde{v}_{0}^{\prime} .
\end{align*}
$$

Using Eqs. (75), (76), (79) and (80), these become

$$
\begin{align*}
\omega_{0} u_{2}^{\prime} & =\alpha \tilde{u}_{2}+\beta \tilde{v}_{2}+K_{1} \cos \tau+K_{2} \sin \tau+L_{1} \cos 3 \tau+L_{2} \sin 3 \tau  \tag{85}\\
\omega_{0} v_{2}^{\prime} & =\gamma \tilde{u}_{2}+\delta \tilde{v}_{2}+K_{3} \cos \tau+K_{4} \sin \tau+L_{3} \cos 3 \tau+L_{4} \sin 3 \tau . \tag{86}
\end{align*}
$$

The coefficients $K_{1}, \ldots, L_{4}$ are omitted for brevity.
The $\sin 3 \tau$ and $\cos 3 \tau$ terms are non-resonant, so the $L_{i}$ will not give any information about $A_{0}$ or $k_{1}$. The $\sin \tau$ and $\cos \tau$ terms are resonant, so we use the method detailed in "Appendix 3" to eliminate secular terms. The existence of a periodic solution to Eqs. (85) and (86) requires

$$
\begin{align*}
& K_{3}=\frac{K_{1}(\delta-\alpha)-K_{2} \sqrt{-(\alpha-\delta)^{2}-4 \beta \gamma}}{2 \beta}  \tag{87}\\
& K_{4}=\frac{K_{1} \sqrt{-(\alpha-\delta)^{2}-4 \beta \gamma}+K_{2}(\delta-\alpha)}{2 \beta} . \tag{88}
\end{align*}
$$

We find that the $K_{i}$ have the form

$$
\begin{equation*}
K_{i}=A_{0}\left(q_{i 1} A_{0}^{2}+q_{i 2} k_{1}+q_{i 3} \mu_{1}\right) \tag{89}
\end{equation*}
$$

Substituting (89) into Eqs. (87) and (88) gives two simultaneous equations on $A_{0}, k_{1}$ and $\mu_{1}$. We solve these for $A_{0}$ and $k_{1}$ in terms of $\mu_{1}$.

As expected, $A_{0}$ is proportional to $\sqrt{\mu_{1}}$. If the proportionality constant is real, the limit cycle exists for $\mu_{1}>0$, and its stability is the same as that of the interior equilibrium $\left(x^{*}, y^{*}\right)$ when $T=0$.

### 2.4 Example

Consider the RPS system

$$
\begin{equation*}
\dot{x}_{i}=x_{i}\left(f_{i}-\phi\right) \tag{90}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $f_{i}=(A \cdot \overline{\mathbf{x}})_{i}$ and

$$
\begin{equation*}
\phi=\sum_{i} x_{i} f_{i}=\sum_{i} x_{i}(A \cdot \overline{\mathbf{x}})_{i} \tag{91}
\end{equation*}
$$

with

$$
A=\left(\begin{array}{rrr}
0 & -1 & 2  \tag{92}\\
1 & 0 & -1 \\
-1 & 1 & 0
\end{array}\right)
$$

Following Sect. 2.2, we see that in this case, $\operatorname{det} A=1$, so the interior equilibrium point $\left(x^{*}, y^{*}\right)=\left(\frac{1}{3}, \frac{5}{12}\right)$ is stable when $T=0$. The critical delay and frequency are

$$
\begin{equation*}
\omega_{0}=\frac{1}{2} \sqrt{\frac{5}{3}} \approx 0.64550, \quad T_{0}=2 \sqrt{\frac{3}{5}} \sin ^{-1}\left(\frac{1}{4 \sqrt{15}}\right) \approx 0.10007 \tag{93}
\end{equation*}
$$

Using the method of Sects. 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, we find that

$$
\begin{align*}
u_{0} & =A_{0} \sin \tau  \tag{94}\\
v_{0} & =A_{0}(-0.671875 \sin \tau-0.72467 \cos \tau) \tag{95}
\end{align*}
$$

and

$$
\begin{align*}
u_{1} & =A_{0}^{2}(0.235279 \sin 2 \tau-0.430682 \cos 2 \tau)  \tag{96}\\
v_{1} & =A_{0}^{2}(0.203199 \sin 2 \tau-0.0397297 \cos 2 \tau) . \tag{97}
\end{align*}
$$

Then, as in Sect. 2.3.3,

$$
\begin{align*}
& \omega_{0} u_{2}^{\prime}=\alpha \tilde{u}_{2}+\beta \tilde{v}_{2}+K_{1} \cos \tau+K_{2} \sin \tau+L_{1} \cos 3 \tau+L_{2} \sin 3 \tau  \tag{98}\\
& \omega_{0} v_{2}^{\prime}=\gamma \tilde{u}_{2}+\delta \tilde{v}_{2}+K_{3} \cos \tau+K_{4} \sin \tau+L_{3} \cos 3 \tau+L_{4} \sin 3 \tau . \tag{99}
\end{align*}
$$

where

$$
\begin{equation*}
\alpha=-\frac{23}{36}, \quad \beta=-\frac{8}{9}, \quad \gamma=\frac{125}{144}, \quad \delta=\frac{5}{9} \tag{100}
\end{equation*}
$$

and

$$
\begin{align*}
& K_{1}=A_{0}^{2}\left(-0.957018 A_{0}^{2}-k_{1}\right)  \tag{101}\\
& K_{2}=A_{0}^{2}\left(-0.146492 A_{0}^{2}+0.0645946 k_{1}+0.416667 \mu_{1}\right)  \tag{102}\\
& K_{3}=A_{0}^{2}\left(0.573076 A_{0}^{2}+0.625065 k_{1}-0.301946 \mu_{1}\right)  \tag{103}\\
& K_{4}=A_{0}^{2}\left(-0.472711 A_{0}^{2}-0.768069 k_{1}-0.279948 \mu_{1}\right) . \tag{104}
\end{align*}
$$

Therefore, using Eqs. (87) and (88), the condition to eliminate secular terms is

$$
\begin{equation*}
A_{0}=2.26293 \sqrt{\mu_{1}}, \quad k_{1}=-4.46834 \mu_{1} . \tag{105}
\end{equation*}
$$

This means that the limit cycle exists when $\mu_{1}>0$, so the bifurcation is supercritical and the limit cycle is stable (Fig. 2).


Fig. 2 Limit cycle given by Lindstedt (dotted) and numerical integration (solid) for $\epsilon=0.1$ and varying values of $\mu_{1}$. Recall that $T=T_{0}+\epsilon^{2} \mu_{1}$

To evaluate the results of Lindstedt's method qualitatively, we compute the average radius of the limit cycle (i.e., the radius of the circle with the same enclosed area). For the limit cycle predicted by Lindstedt's method, this is simply

$$
\begin{equation*}
r_{\text {Lind }}=\left[\frac{\omega}{2 \pi} \int_{0}^{2 \pi / \omega}\left(u(t)^{2}+v(t)^{2}\right) \mathrm{d} t\right]^{1 / 2} \tag{106}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $u$ and $v$ are as in Eqs. (94)-(97). Recall that $\tau=\omega t$ where $\omega=\omega_{0}+\epsilon^{2} k_{1}$, where $\omega_{0}$ is given by Eq. (93) and $k_{1}$ by Eq. (105).

We compare this to the average radius of the approximate limit cycle given by numerical integration. To find this, we integrate the original system given in Eqs. (90)-(92), using NDSOLVE in Mathematica. This is a versatile method that can handle ordinary, partial or delay


Fig. 3 Average radius of the limit cycle given by Lindstedt (solid) and numerical integration (dotted) for $\epsilon=0.1$ as a function of $\mu_{1}$
differential equations, and which adaptively chooses from among several solving routines. For 40 values of $\mu_{1}$ between -0.5 and 1.5 , we integrated the system up to $t=3,000$, with the assumption that the solutions were constant for $t<0$. We found that for $t>2,900$, the numerical solutions were nearly periodic: in all cases tested, the peak-to-peak times of the first cycle after $t=2,900$ and the last cycle before $t=3,000$ differed by less than one part in $10^{-7}$. This gave the desired approximation to the limit cycle.

Thus, the average radius for the numerical limit cycle is

$$
\begin{equation*}
r_{\text {numer }}=\left[\frac{1}{p\left(\mu_{1}\right)} \int_{t_{0}}^{t_{0}+p\left(\mu_{1}\right)}\left(\left(x(t)-x^{*}\right)^{2}+\left(y(t)-y^{*}\right)^{2}\right) \mathrm{d} t\right]^{1 / 2} \tag{107}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $p\left(\mu_{1}\right)$ is the period of the limit cycle, obtained using FindRoot in Mathematica, and $t_{0}$ is chosen large enough that the numerical solutions are close to the limit cycle.

We compare the average radius given by Lindstedt's method to that found by numerical integration and observe from Fig. 3 that the two methods are in relatively good agreement for small $\mu_{1}$.

## 3 Conclusion

We have investigated the dynamics of rock-paper-scissors systems of the form

$$
\begin{equation*}
\dot{x}_{i}=x_{i}\left(f_{i}-\phi\right), \tag{108}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $f_{i}=(A \cdot \overline{\mathbf{x}})_{i}$ is the (delayed) fitness of strategy $i$.
It is known that limit cycles cannot occur in non-delayed rock-paper-scissors systems; the phase space is filled with either decreasing, increasing or neutral oscillations, depending on the determinant of the payoff matrix $A$.

In this work, we have shown using nonlinear methods that, by introducing a social-type delay in the fitnesses of the strategies, it is possible to find rock-paper-scissors systems which exhibit non-degenerate Hopf bifurcations and limit cycles. We have analyzed the resulting limit cycles using Lindstedt's method, finding an approximation of their frequency and amplitude. We have demonstrated a choice of parameters for which a rock-paper-scissors
system undergoes a supercritical Hopf bifurcation and exhibits a stable limit cycle. For this choice of parameters, the prediction of Lindstedt's method is found to agree with numerical integration for $T$ close to $T_{0}$.

This generalization of the replicator model may be useful in modeling natural or social systems in which each player has a delayed estimate of the expected payoff of each strategy.

## Appendix 1: Derivation of replicator equation

Consider an exponential model of population growth,

$$
\begin{equation*}
\dot{\xi}_{i}=\xi_{i} g_{i} \quad(i=1, \ldots, n) \tag{109}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $\xi_{i}$ is a real-valued function that approximates the population of strategy $i$ and $g_{i}\left(\xi_{1}, \ldots, \xi_{n}\right)$ is the fitness of that strategy. The replicator Eq. [7] results from Eq. (109) by changing variables from the populations $\xi_{i}$ to the relative abundances, defined as $x_{i} \equiv \xi_{i} / p$ where $p$ is the total population:

$$
\begin{equation*}
p(t)=\sum_{i} \xi_{i}(t) \tag{110}
\end{equation*}
$$

We see that

$$
\begin{align*}
\dot{p} & =\sum_{i} \dot{\xi}_{i}=\sum_{i} \xi_{i} g_{i}  \tag{111}\\
& =p \sum_{i} \frac{\xi_{i}}{p} g_{i}=p \sum_{i} x_{i} g_{i}  \tag{112}\\
& =p \phi \tag{113}
\end{align*}
$$

where $\phi \equiv \sum_{i} x_{i} g_{i}$ is the average fitness of the whole population.
By the product rule,

$$
\begin{align*}
\dot{x}_{i} & =\frac{\dot{\xi}_{i}}{p}-\frac{\xi_{i} \dot{p}}{p^{2}}  \tag{114}\\
& =\frac{\xi_{i}}{p} g_{i}-\frac{\xi_{i}}{p} \frac{\dot{p}}{p}  \tag{115}\\
& =x_{i}\left(g_{i}-\phi\right) . \tag{116}
\end{align*}
$$

Therefore,

$$
\begin{align*}
\sum_{i} \dot{x}_{i} & =\sum_{i} x_{i} g_{i}-\phi \sum_{i} x_{i}  \tag{117}\\
& =\sum_{i} x_{i} g_{i}-\sum_{j} x_{j} g_{j} \sum_{i} x_{i} \tag{118}
\end{align*}
$$

So, using the fact that

$$
\begin{equation*}
\sum_{i} x_{i}=\frac{\sum_{i} \xi_{i}}{p}=\frac{p}{p} \equiv 1 \tag{119}
\end{equation*}
$$

Equation (118) reduces to the identity

$$
\begin{equation*}
\sum_{i} \dot{x}_{i}=0 . \tag{120}
\end{equation*}
$$

The fitness of a strategy is assumed to depend only on the relative abundance of each strategy in the overall population, since the model only seeks to capture the effect of competition between strategies, not any environmental or other factors. Therefore, we assume that $g_{i}$ has the form

$$
\begin{equation*}
g_{i}\left(\xi_{1}, \ldots, \xi_{n}\right)=f_{i}\left(\frac{\xi_{1}}{p}, \ldots, \frac{\xi_{n}}{p}\right)=f_{i}\left(x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}\right) \tag{121}
\end{equation*}
$$

Under this assumption, Eq. (116) is the replicator equation,

$$
\begin{equation*}
\dot{x}_{i}=x_{i}\left(f_{i}-\phi\right), \tag{122}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $\phi$ is now expressed entirely in terms of the $x_{i}$, as

$$
\begin{equation*}
\phi=\sum_{i} x_{i} f_{i} . \tag{123}
\end{equation*}
$$

Mathematically, $\phi$ is a coupling term that introduces dependence on the abundance and fitness of other strategies.

## Appendix 2: Coefficients generated in the RPS problem

The entries of the matrix $J$ from Eq. (34) are

$$
\begin{align*}
\alpha & =x^{*}\left(\left(a_{1}-b_{1}\right)\left(x^{*}-1\right)-\left(a_{2}+b_{1}+b_{3}\right) y^{*}\right)  \tag{124}\\
\beta & =x^{*}\left(\left(a_{1}+a_{3}+b_{2}\right)\left(x^{*}-1\right)+\left(a_{3}-b_{3}\right) y^{*}\right)  \tag{125}\\
\gamma & =y^{*}\left(\left(a_{1}-b_{1}\right) x^{*}-\left(a_{2}+b_{1}+b_{3}\right)\left(y^{*}-1\right)\right)  \tag{126}\\
\delta & =y^{*}\left(\left(a_{1}+a_{3}+b_{2}\right) x^{*}+\left(a_{3}-b_{3}\right)\left(y^{*}-1\right)\right) \tag{127}
\end{align*}
$$

where $x^{*}$ and $y^{*}$ are the coordinates of the interior equilibrium point,

$$
\begin{align*}
\left(x^{*}, y^{*}\right)= & \left(\frac{b_{3}\left(a_{3}+b_{2}\right)+a_{1} a_{3}}{a_{1}\left(a_{2}+a_{3}+b_{1}\right)+a_{2}\left(a_{3}+b_{2}\right)+b_{3}\left(a_{3}+b_{1}+b_{2}\right)+b_{1} b_{2}},\right. \\
& \left.\frac{a_{1}\left(a_{2}+b_{1}\right)+b_{1} b_{3}}{a_{1}\left(a_{2}+a_{3}+b_{1}\right)+a_{2}\left(a_{3}+b_{2}\right)+b_{3}\left(a_{3}+b_{1}+b_{2}\right)+b_{1} b_{2}}\right) . \tag{128}
\end{align*}
$$

The coefficients in Eqs. (52) and (53) are

$$
\begin{align*}
& c_{1}=\left(a_{1}-b_{1}\right)\left(2 x^{*}-1\right)-\left(a_{2}+b_{1}+b_{3}\right) y^{*}  \tag{129}\\
& c_{2}=\left(a_{1}+a_{3}+b_{2}\right)\left(2 x^{*}-1\right)+\left(a_{3}-b_{3}\right) y^{*}  \tag{130}\\
& c_{3}=-\left(a_{2}+b_{1}+b_{3}\right) x^{*}  \tag{131}\\
& c_{4}=\left(a_{3}-b_{3}\right) x^{*}  \tag{132}\\
& d_{1}=a_{1}-b_{1}  \tag{133}\\
& d_{2}=a_{1}+a_{3}+b_{2}  \tag{134}\\
& d_{3}=-\left(a_{2}+b_{1}+b_{3}\right)  \tag{135}\\
& d_{4}=a_{3}-b_{3}  \tag{136}\\
& h_{1}=\left(a_{1}-b_{1}\right) y^{*}  \tag{137}\\
& h_{2}=\left(a_{1}+a_{3}+b_{2}\right) y^{*}  \tag{138}\\
& h_{3}=\left(a_{1}-b_{1}\right) x^{*}-\left(a_{2}+b_{1}+b_{3}\right)\left(2 y^{*}-1\right) \tag{139}
\end{align*}
$$

$$
\begin{align*}
h_{4} & =\left(a_{1}+a_{3}+b_{2}\right) x^{*}-\left(a_{3}-b_{3}\right)\left(2 y^{*}-1\right)  \tag{140}\\
j_{1} & =-\left(a_{2}+b_{1}+b_{3}\right)  \tag{141}\\
j_{2} & =a_{3}-b_{3}  \tag{142}\\
j_{3} & =a_{1}-b_{1}  \tag{143}\\
j_{4} & =a_{1}+a_{3}+b_{2} . \tag{144}
\end{align*}
$$

The coefficients $B_{1}, \ldots, B_{4}$ in Eqs. (77) and (78) are

$$
\begin{align*}
B_{1}= & \frac{1}{2}\left[s\left(2 c_{4} r+c_{2}+c_{3}\right) \cos \left(\omega_{0} T_{0}\right)\right. \\
& \left.-\left(c_{4}(r-s)(r+s)+\left(c_{2}+c_{3}\right) r+c_{1}\right) \sin \left(\omega_{0} T_{0}\right)\right]  \tag{145}\\
B_{2}= & \frac{1}{2}\left[-s\left(2 c_{4} r+c_{2}+c_{3}\right) \sin \left(\omega_{0} T_{0}\right)\right. \\
& \left.-\left(c_{4}(r-s)(r+s)+\left(c_{2}+c_{3}\right) r+c_{1}\right) \cos \left(\omega_{0} T_{0}\right)\right]  \tag{146}\\
B_{3}= & \frac{1}{2}\left[s\left(2 h_{4} r+h_{2}+h_{3}\right) \cos \left(\omega_{0} T_{0}\right)\right. \\
& \left.-\left(h_{4}(r-s)(r+s)+\left(h_{2}+h_{3}\right) r+h_{1}\right) \sin \left(\omega_{0} T_{0}\right)\right]  \tag{147}\\
B_{4}= & \frac{1}{2}\left[-s\left(2 h_{4} r+h_{2}+h_{3}\right) \sin \left(\omega_{0} T_{0}\right)\right. \\
& \left.-\left(h_{4}(r-s)(r+s)+\left(h_{2}+h_{3}\right) r+h_{1}\right) \cos \left(\omega_{0} T_{0}\right)\right] \tag{148}
\end{align*}
$$

where $r$ and $s$ are as in Eq. (74).

## Appendix 3: Removal of secular terms in Lindstedt's method with delay

Consider a system of differential delay equations of the form

$$
\begin{align*}
& \omega \frac{\mathrm{d} u}{\mathrm{~d} t}=\alpha \bar{u}+\beta \bar{v}+K_{1} \sin t+K_{2} \cos t  \tag{149}\\
& \omega \frac{\mathrm{~d} v}{\mathrm{~d} t}=\gamma \bar{u}+\delta \bar{v}+K_{3} \sin t+K_{4} \cos t . \tag{150}
\end{align*}
$$

where $\bar{u}=u(t-\omega T)$ and $\bar{v}=v(t-\omega T)$, and where $\omega$ and $T$ are such that the associated homogeneous problem,

$$
\begin{align*}
& \omega \frac{\mathrm{d} u}{\mathrm{~d} t}=\alpha \bar{u}+\beta \bar{v}  \tag{151}\\
& \omega \frac{\mathrm{~d} v}{\mathrm{~d} t}=\gamma \bar{u}+\delta \bar{v} \tag{152}
\end{align*}
$$

admits solutions of the form $\sin t$ and $\cos t$, or equivalently $\mathrm{e}^{i t}$.
Substituting $u=r \mathrm{e}^{i t}$ and $v=s \mathrm{e}^{i t}$ into Eqs. (151) and (152), we obtain the characteristic equations

$$
\begin{align*}
& i r \omega=\mathrm{e}^{-i \omega T}(\alpha r+\beta s)  \tag{153}\\
& i s \omega=\mathrm{e}^{-i \omega T}(\gamma r+\delta s) . \tag{154}
\end{align*}
$$

Rearranging, these become

$$
\left(\begin{array}{cc}
\alpha \mathrm{e}^{-i \omega T}-i \omega & \beta \mathrm{e}^{-i \omega T}  \tag{155}\\
\gamma \mathrm{e}^{-i \omega T} & \delta \mathrm{e}^{-i \omega T}-i \omega
\end{array}\right)\binom{r}{s}=\binom{0}{0} .
$$

Define

$$
R \equiv\left(\begin{array}{cc}
\alpha \mathrm{e}^{-i \omega T}-i \omega & \beta \mathrm{e}^{-i \omega T}  \tag{156}\\
\gamma \mathrm{e}^{-i \omega T} & \delta \mathrm{e}^{-i \omega T}-i \omega
\end{array}\right) .
$$

A non-trivial solution for $r$ and $s$ requires that det $R=0$. Separating the real and imaginary parts, this means that

$$
\begin{align*}
& \operatorname{Re}(\operatorname{det} R)=\cos (2 \omega T)(\alpha \delta-\beta \gamma)-\omega((\alpha+\delta) \sin (\omega T)+\omega)=0  \tag{157}\\
& \operatorname{Im}(\operatorname{det} R)=-\cos (\omega T)(\sin (\omega T)(2 \alpha \delta-2 \beta \gamma)+\omega(\alpha+\delta))=0 . \tag{158}
\end{align*}
$$

Equation (158) tells us that

$$
\begin{equation*}
\sin (\omega T)=\frac{\omega(\alpha+\delta)}{2(\beta \gamma-\alpha \delta)} \tag{159}
\end{equation*}
$$

(We neglect the alternate possibility that $\cos (\omega T)=0$.) Then, we substitute this back into Eq. (157) to obtain

$$
\begin{equation*}
\omega^{2}=\alpha \delta-\beta \gamma \tag{160}
\end{equation*}
$$

Under the conditions (159) and (160), the solutions to Eqs. (149) and (150) will in general have secular terms:

$$
\begin{align*}
& u=m_{1} \cos t+m_{2} \sin t+n_{1} t \cos t+n_{2} t \sin t  \tag{161}\\
& v=m_{3} \cos t+m_{4} \sin t+n_{3} t \cos t+n_{4} t \sin t . \tag{162}
\end{align*}
$$

We wish to derive conditions on the $K_{i}$ in Eqs. (149) and (150) such that the $n_{i}$ are all equal to 0 .

We substitute the solutions (161) and (162) into Eqs. (149) and (150), and set the coefficients of $\sin t, \cos t, t \sin t$ and $t \cos t$ separately equal to 0 in both equations.

The coefficients of $\sin t$ and $\cos t$ give us a system of linear equations on the $m_{i}$ and $n_{i}$, of the form

$$
\begin{equation*}
M \cdot \mathbf{m}+N \cdot \mathbf{n}=-\mathbf{k} \tag{163}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $\mathbf{m}=\left(m_{1}, \ldots, m_{4}\right)^{\mathrm{T}}, \mathbf{n}=\left(n_{1}, \ldots, n_{4}\right)^{\mathrm{T}}$ and $\mathbf{k}=\left(K_{1}, \ldots, K_{4}\right)^{\mathrm{T}}$.
Similarly, the coefficients of $t \sin t$ and $t \cos t$ give us a system of linear equations on the $n_{i}$, of the form

$$
\begin{equation*}
S \cdot \mathbf{n}=\mathbf{0} \tag{164}
\end{equation*}
$$

By row reducing in Mathematica, we find that both $M$ and $S$ have rank 2. To eliminate the $n_{i}$, we proceed as follows:

- Without loss of generality, set $m_{3}=m_{4}=0$.
- Solve any two independent rows of Eq. (164) for $n_{3}$ and $n_{4}$ in terms of $n_{1}$ and $n_{2}$. The result is

$$
\begin{align*}
& n_{3}=\frac{n_{2} \omega \cos (\omega T)-n_{1}(\alpha+\omega \sin (\omega T))}{\beta}  \tag{165}\\
& n_{4}=-\frac{n_{1} \omega \cos (\omega T)+n_{2}(\alpha+\omega \sin (\omega T))}{\beta} \tag{166}
\end{align*}
$$

- Substitute these expressions for $n_{3}$ and $n_{4}$ into Eq. (163). This is now a full-rank linear system of equations on $m_{1}, m_{2}, n_{1}$ and $n_{2}$. Solve this system to obtain expressions for $m_{1}, m_{2}, n_{1}$ and $n_{2}$ in terms of the $K_{i}$.
- Substitute the expressions for $n_{1}$ and $n_{2}$ from the previous step into Eqs. (165) and (166). Now we have all the $n_{i}$ in terms of the $K_{i}$.
- Set the $n_{i}$ expressions equal to 0 . This gives a rank- 2 system of equations on the $K_{i}$, so it is possible to solve for $K_{3}$ and $K_{4}$ in terms of $K_{1}$ and $K_{2}$. The result is

$$
\begin{align*}
& K_{3}=\frac{\gamma\left(K_{1}(\alpha+\omega \sin (\omega T))+K_{2} \omega \cos (\omega T)\right)}{\alpha^{2}+2 \alpha \omega \sin (\omega T)+\omega^{2}}  \tag{167}\\
& K_{4}=\frac{\gamma\left(K_{2}(\alpha+\omega \sin (\omega T))-K_{1} \omega \cos (\omega T)\right)}{\alpha^{2}+2 \alpha \omega \sin (\omega T)+\omega^{2}} . \tag{168}
\end{align*}
$$

Using Eqs. (159) and (160), these reduce to

$$
\begin{align*}
& K_{3}=\frac{K_{1}(\delta-\alpha)-K_{2} \sqrt{-(\alpha-\delta)^{2}-4 \beta \gamma}}{2 \beta}  \tag{169}\\
& K_{4}=\frac{K_{1} \sqrt{-(\alpha-\delta)^{2}-4 \beta \gamma}+K_{2}(\delta-\alpha)}{2 \beta} . \tag{170}
\end{align*}
$$

If Eqs. (169) and (170) hold, then there are solutions of Eqs. (149) and (150) with no secular terms.

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