



# **Open to Negotiation: Phenomenological Assumptions and Knowledge Dissemination**

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Open to Negotiation: Phenomenological Assumptions and Knowledge Dissemination

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Abstract

Phenomenological assumptions—assumptions about the fundamental qualities of the phenomenon being studied and how it relates to the environment in which it occurs—affect the dissemination of knowledge from subfields to the broader field of study. Micro-process research in organizational studies rests on implicit phenomenological assumptions that vary in the extent to which micro-processes are viewed as parts of larger systems. We suggest that phenomenological assumptions linking micro-processes to organizational contexts highlight the relevance of micro-process research findings to broader organizational questions, and therefore increase the likelihood that the findings will disseminate to the larger field of organizational research. We test this assertion by analyzing studies of negotiation published in top peer-reviewed management, psychology, sociology, and industrial relations journals from 1990 to 2005. Our findings reveal a continuum of open systems to closed systems phenomenological assumptions in negotiation research. Analysis of the citation rates of the articles in our data set by non-negotiation organizational research indicates that more open systems assumptions increase the likelihood that a negotiation article will be cited in organizational studies, after controlling for other, previously identified effects on citation rates. Our findings suggest that subfields can increase the impact they have on the broader intellectual discourse by situating their phenomena in rich contexts that illuminate the connections between their findings and questions of interest to the broader field.

Research in the field of organizational studies reflects the multi-level and multi-faceted nature of organizations. Scholars draw from the disciplines of psychology, sociology, economics, political science, anthropology and industrial relations and apply different methodologies to explain particular organizational problems. Although integrating knowledge across disciplines and methodologies facilitates a deeper understanding of phenomena within and across organizations (Chatman and Flynn 2005), scholarly discourse tends to be contained within subfields of research with little cross-fertilization (Augier et al. 2005; Biehl et al. 2006; Gallagher and Appenzeller 1999; Pieters and Baumgartner 2002). In spite of the co-location of multiple disciplines within business schools, pluralistic approaches to studying organizations remain rare (Augier et al. 2005; Heath and Sitkin 2001) and knowledge dissemination between academics and practitioners is often limited and inaccurate (Kieser and Leiner 2009; Rynes et al. 2007; Shapiro et al. 2007).

These barriers to knowledge dissemination may arise from incompatibilities across researchers' assumptions. Studies of knowledge sharing within organizations reveal that mutually held understandings and assumptions play an essential role in coordinating across boundaries (Bechky 2003b; Carlile 2004; Donnellon et al. 1986; Kellogg et al. 2006). In academia, subfields of researchers have their own "thought

worlds” with particular “funds of knowledge” – what is known – and “systems of meaning” – how they know (Fleck 1979). These distinct thought worlds give rise to “epistemic cultures” (Gittelman 2007; Knorr-Cetina 1999), with their own “rules by which scientists define their careers, identities, methods of empiricism, and collaboration with others” (Gittelman and Kogut 2003: 368). Such intense scientific specialization results in epistemological assumptions related to specified norms of knowledge development and presentation. These epistemological assumptions create barriers that reduce the likelihood that scholars will be exposed to each other’s research.

Academics may also hold different meta-theoretical assumptions about the nature of truth (Burrell and Morgan 1979; Kuhn 1970; Morgan 1980). Burrell and Morgan (1979), in their seminal work on sociological paradigms, categorized organizational studies along two dimensions of meta-theoretical assumptions: objective v. subjective, and regulation/stasis v. radical change. These dichotomies result in four incommensurate research paradigms: functionalist, interpretivist, radical-humanist and radical-structuralist. Meta-theoretical assumptions can generate barriers to knowledge sharing because they lead to diverging sets of research questions across paradigms, but differences in meta-theoretical assumptions cannot explain limited within-paradigm knowledge integration. Since the field of organizational studies is dominated by research in the functionalist paradigm (Burrell and Morgan 1979; Gioia and Pitre 1990; Morgan and Smircich 1980), the degree of parochialism that has been observed likely involves substantial intra-paradigm knowledge barriers as well.

Davis and Marquis (2005) argue that modern organizational research is focused not on meta-theorizing, but on identifying theoretical mechanisms to help understand the nature of problems. Their work suggests that barriers to knowledge sharing between subfields and the broader field may arise from different assumptions about the problems under investigation, which could occur even within a single research paradigm. Research conducted in production settings also suggests that assumptions about the nature of the problem being solved are sources of interpretive barriers (Bechky 2003b; Carlile 2002; Dougherty 1992). We, therefore, propose that different assumptions about the problem being studied —

“phenomenological assumptions”<sup>1</sup>— may act as barriers limiting the integration of knowledge generated within a subfield to the broader intellectual discourse in organizational studies.

We define phenomenological assumptions as revealed beliefs about the fundamental qualities of the phenomenon, or problem, under investigation and its relationship to the environment in which it occurs. Whereas epistemological assumptions reduce exposure to other scholar’s work and meta-theoretical assumptions direct research in different directions, incompatible phenomenological assumptions make it hard for scholars to interpret others’ research or recognize its relevance to their own work, even when asking related questions and exposed to others’ findings. Like tangible boundary-spanning objects in manufacturing processes (Bechky 2003a; Carlile 2002), shared phenomenological assumptions in academic research may help translate a subfield’s research findings to questions of interest in the broader field.

To illustrate what we mean by phenomenological assumptions, contrast “reductionist” and “holistic” beliefs about a phenomenon and its relationship with the environment. Studies taking a reductionist approach investigate objects and events through the elementary subsystems comprising a larger system, without considering the relationships between these elements (Gallagher and Appenzeller 1999). In contrast, holistic research studies the interactions and integration among multiple subsystems in order to understand the system as a whole (Verschuren 2001). Parallel sets of phenomenological assumptions can be seen in Thompson’s (1967) view of organizations as open systems, characterized by exchange with the environment, or closed systems, characterized as independent from the environment. Reductionism and treating phenomena as closed systems have in common that they assume the objects under investigation can be studied in isolation from the surrounding environment. In contrast, holism and treating phenomena as embedded in open systems have in common that they assume the object under investigation is both a product of and constitutive of the broader environment. As these examples

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<sup>1</sup> Our term, “phenomenological assumptions” does not refer to the assumptions of phenomenological research, which denote knowledge as the subjective interpretation of lived experiences by actors (Suddaby, 2006). There is also mention of “phenomenological assumptions” in research literatures as diverse as those of theoretical mathematics and geophysics. Similar to our use, the term in these contexts refers to the assumptions researchers make about the phenomenon they are modeling or measuring.

illustrate, scholars' phenomenological assumptions define the problem being studied and how it relates to its environment.

We shed light on the effects of phenomenological assumptions on knowledge dissemination by studying how research from one subfield, negotiations, is incorporated into the broader field of organizational studies. We explore whether revealed beliefs about the fundamental qualities of the phenomenon of negotiation and its relationship to the environment in which it occurs affect knowledge dissemination to the larger field. To do so, we analyze the content and citations of the empirical negotiation articles published over fifteen years in peer-reviewed journals. Though studies are not labeled, for example, "reductionist" or "open systems," our qualitative analysis identifies three questions that reveal the underlying phenomenological assumptions within negotiation research: Who is presented as central to the phenomenon? What variables are identified as the critical features of the phenomenon? When does the phenomenon take place and have its effects? Qualitative examination of "who," "what" and "when" in each study allows us to infer underlying phenomenological assumptions. We offer formal hypotheses linking these phenomenological assumptions to citation rates. Our quantitative analyses show that the revealed assumptions reliably predict citation rates in non-negotiation organizational research, after controlling for variables that past social science citation research has found to be critical. We conclude by discussing the effects of phenomenological assumptions on knowledge dissemination from subfields to broader fields of knowledge.

#### PHENOMENOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS IN NEGOTIATION RESEARCH

Organizational scholars have attributed to negotiations an essential role in the maintenance, adaptation and management of organizations (Barley and Tolbert 1997; Follett 1918; Pondy 1967; Ranson et al. 1980; Scott 1992). In turn, negotiation research has generated a host of illuminating findings regarding individuals' behaviors and limitations as independent and interdependent decision makers (Bazerman et al. 2000). In spite of its theoretical centrality and empirical contributions, the negotiations subfield has been criticized for being isolated from the broader field of organizational studies (Pfeffer 1997). Some scholars have explicitly asserted that the a-contextual nature of mainstream negotiation

research precludes the application of its findings within organizational studies (Barley 1991; Kolb and Bartunek 1992; Kramer 1991). Such sweeping critiques of negotiation research have ignored variance within the subfield. If there is variation in the phenomenological assumptions that undergird negotiation research, some studies may be more viewed as relevant to the field than others. Specifically, phenomenological assumptions situating negotiations in rich contexts may simplify the translation of a study's findings from a particular setting to a more generalized organizational context. Because of this, studies that treat negotiation as part of a larger system may disseminate outside the subfield more readily than studies conceptualizing negotiations as isolated sub-systems.

In the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Mary Parker Follett (1918) set the stage for both organizational theory and negotiation research (Fox 1968). She pointed to varied and conflicting motives among factions in organizations, highlighted the importance of coalitions and the social nature of authority, and identified the necessity of interdependent decision makers negotiating in the face of these organizational realities. Nearly fifty years later, Walton and McKersie led negotiation research into the mainstream of modern organizational studies with *A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations* (1965). Referring to their own case study in industrial relations, as well as work in the burgeoning fields of game theory, behavioral decision theory and social psychology, they exposed four interrelated sub-processes of negotiations: integrative bargaining, distributive bargaining, attitudinal structuring and intra-party bargaining (Walton and McKersie 1965). Their theory rests on the recognition that negotiators bargain in the shadow of a complex social system. Consistent with this social theory of bargaining, negotiated order theory (Strauss 1978) detailed how social systems are constructed through contextualized interactions. Negotiated order theory suggests that, "[a]ctors create institutions through a history of negotiations that lead to ... generalized expectations and interpretations of behavior. The patterned relations and actions that emerge from this process ... shape future interactions and negotiations" (Barley and Tolbert 1997: 94). Bargaining research coming out of labor relations and sociology tended to follow in this vein, studying negotiations as contextualized, open systems with recursive influence between environments and

interactions (e.g., Friedman and Poldony 1992; Kochan and Rubinstein 2000; Kolb and Bartunek 1992; Morrill 1991).

Bargaining research in the disciplines of behavioral game theory and social psychology gained momentum with the publication of Howard Raiffa's (1982) seminal book, *The Art and Science of Negotiation*. With its emphasis on negotiator cognition and behavior and its carefully controlled laboratory studies, the work that followed Raiffa's tended to emphasize one-shot bargaining, measurable payoffs and at-the-table interaction. Although some organizational scholars lamented the bracketing of negotiations from the ongoing stream of daily life within organizations (e.g., Barley 1991), by studying bargaining in isolation from other interactions or social constructions within organizations, research in this vein was able to identify specific psychological and behavioral mechanisms underlying negotiation processes and outcomes. Findings from this research easily generalized to important questions concerning spot markets and one-shot, arms length transactions, though the extension to intra-organizational negotiations between embedded political players was more tenuous. Walton and McKersie's (1965) concepts of integration and distribution are at the forefront of this literature, while intra-party bargaining and attitudinal structuring — attending to indirect effects from and on audiences, alliances and constituencies away from the table — are less prevalent.

The history of the subfield of negotiation research suggests that there is a continuum of phenomenological assumptions regarding the relationship between negotiation episodes and the environments in which they occur. These assumptions, while not explicitly stated, set the foundation for the design, execution and interpretation of negotiation research. Organizational studies scholars seeking to understand other systems or processes in and across organizations may find negotiation studies based on contextualized phenomenological assumptions more relevant and generalizable to organizational questions than studies reflecting a-contextual assumptions about the nature of negotiations.

## METHODS

Citations, while not a perfect measure of knowledge dissemination, offer a visible “footprint” of the evolution of scientific knowledge and are typically conceptualized as indicating scientific impact

(Judge et al. 2007). Previous research examined the extent to which presentational and political characteristics of articles determined the citation rate of organizational studies articles. For example, past research has found that citations are positively associated with the number of pages in an article (Stremersch et al. 2007). Judge, et al. (2007) found that the single best predictor of an article's citation rate is the citation rate of the journal in which the research was published. Other studies have identified disciplinary "cliques" among journals, with articles more likely to cite other articles published within their clique of journals (Biehl et al. 2006; Blackburn and Michell 1981). In the study presented here, we empirically assess the influence of phenomenological assumptions on citation rates in organizational studies, controlling for presentational and political characteristics of the cited articles.

We investigate phenomenological assumptions and their role in citations based on a set of peer-reviewed empirical studies of negotiation published between 1990 and 2005 in top-tier organizational behavior (OB), psychology, industrial relations (IR) and sociology journals. Using this database, we conducted our analyses in three steps: 1) content coding the "who," "what" and "when" of negotiations implied by the design of each study; 2) qualitative analyses inductively deriving measures of phenomenological assumptions in negotiation studies; and 3) quantitative citation analyses assessing the relationship between phenomenological assumptions and each negotiation article's frequency of citation in non-negotiation organizational research.

### *Articles Reviewed*

We attempted to include all empirical studies of negotiation published in top tier, peer-reviewed journals that are directed to the scholarly organizational studies audience between 1990 and 2005.<sup>2</sup> We limited our search to "top tier" journals based on Starbuck's ranking of business-related journals.<sup>3</sup> This resulted in a review of negotiation research published in three OB journals (*Academy of Management Journal (AMJ)*; *Administrative Science Quarterly (ASQ)*; and *Organization Science (OS)*), five

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<sup>2</sup> At the time of data collection, articles published before 1990 were not consistently available on line. This is changing rapidly and all past research is likely to be available on line at some point. In addition, citation data is constantly being updated. Our citation counts were finalized on May 20, 2007. We counted citations in articles published prior to January, 2007.

<sup>3</sup> Rankings by average annualized citations per article, estimated in 2004. Available at <<http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~wstarbuc/cites.htm>>. Accessed January 29, 2007.

psychology journals (*Journal of Applied Psychology (JAP)*; *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology (JESP)*; *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (JPSP)*; *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (OBHDP)*; and *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin (PSPB)*),<sup>4</sup> one IR journal (*Industrial and Labor Relations Review (ILRR)*), and two sociology journals (*American Journal of Sociology (AJS)*; and *American Sociological Review (ASR)*).

Using Business Source Complete, Science Direct, and Springer Link database search engines, limiting our search to the journals noted above, we conducted a Boolean search for articles with any of the terms “negotiat”<sup>5</sup>, “bargain”, or “conflict” in search terms, titles, keywords, or abstracts. We then refined the data set to retain only those articles in which the empirical study of negotiation was central to the research. To accomplish this, we dropped all articles with the following characteristics: review or theory not accompanied by an empirical study; studies focused on the efficacy of a specific negotiation software package; and research exploring negotiations in a specific context outside of formal organizations, such as international treaties, sexual aggression, or family conflict. To refine the list further, we adopted Walton and McKersie’s broad definition of negotiation: “interaction of two or more complex social units which are attempting to define or redefine the terms of their interdependence” (1965: 3). Using this definition as a guide, the authors read through the abstract of each article to assess whether or not negotiation was a central construct in the research. Reflecting that negotiations take place between “social units,” we dropped studies employing only computer simulations of negotiations, but we retained studies in which at least one of the parties was a human negotiating with a computer-simulated counterpart. We also deleted research on identity negotiation if the work referred to an intrapersonal, psychological process only, without reference to interaction between two or more parties (e.g., McNulty and Swann 1994). Studies of team decision making were dropped if there was no mixed motive component, i.e., the terms of the interdependence focused all of the parties on making optimal decisions for the group (e.g., Choi and Kim 1999). We also excluded research on organizational or group conflict if

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<sup>4</sup> Following Biehl et al. (2006), we break this group into two segments for our quantitative analyses.

<sup>5</sup> Searching for the root, “negotiat” captured all forms, including negotiate, negotiation, negotiations, negotiator and negotiators.

negotiation was not an explicit facet of or variable in the studies. For example, Jehn's conflict typology studies (Jehn 1995, 1997) were excluded, since they investigate the performance effects of different types of group conflict but do not explore the processes involved in the management of those conflicts. The final set includes 225 empirical negotiation articles. Short citations of the articles included in the review, along with indicators of the most highly cited article from each journal in our sample are presented in Table 1.

Insert Table 1 Here

## QUALITATIVE ANALYSES

### *Coding*

We reviewed each article, focusing on design, measures and analyses, to inductively derive the underlying assumptions revealed in the empirical negotiation research. As a first step, the authors together read through a subset of articles and developed an initial set of codes capturing the nature of the phenomenon under investigation in each study. The codes that emerged from this initial reading related to three simple questions about the phenomenon under investigation (i.e., the negotiation): who is treated as critical to the negotiation; what are the outcome variables of interest; and what are the temporal features of the negotiation. After we identified these general questions as helpful guides to uncovering underlying assumptions, we looked for distinctions on "who," "what" and "when" across studies. Reading through a subset of articles, we developed and expanded the codes as we identified new dimensions of "who," "what" or "when," continuing to add codes until no more were needed to capture the nature of the negotiations described in the articles. When we reached this point of saturation, we agreed on an initial protocol defining each code.

Independently, each author coded all of the articles based on the abstracts. Each article could receive multiple codes as needed to reflect multiple dimensions of "who," "what" or "when" within a single study or across multiple studies in a single article. When an abstract did not contain enough information to discern one or more of the codes, we perused the body of the article. Throughout this step, we continued to refine our coding protocol in discussions between the authors as we became more

familiar with the negotiation research. When this process was complete, we compared each of the codes on every article. At this point, our agreement rate on all codes was 77%. We discussed each disagreement. To determine the final codes, the set of articles was divided evenly between the authors, based on alphabetical order of article authorship. We read the text of each article to confirm or disconfirm the codes assigned in the previous step. We discussed and agreed on all changes to the original coding. Table 2 presents the final coding protocol.

Insert Table 2 About Here

For “who,” we coded the nature of the actual relationship between the parties involved in the focal negotiation(s) described in each article. Each study could have multiple “who” codes. For example, Weingart, Hyder and Prietula (1996) studied the impact of knowledge about negotiation tactics on negotiator behaviors and joint outcomes. They hypothesized that access to written information about alternative tactics would provide negotiators with knowledge that could be used effectively in a negotiation, leading to different negotiation behaviors and higher joint outcomes for negotiators with this information than for those without it. Participants in the experiment were undergraduate students who either participated to fulfill a research requirement in an introductory organizational behavior or marketing course or responded to advertisements posted on campus. “Who” for this article, therefore, was coded as both classmates and strangers.

For “what,” we coded the nature of the empirical measures used in each study, based on the dependent variables. The majority of studies (86%) described effects on tangible outcomes, often in addition to other outcome measures. For example, Weingart, et al. (1996), described above, measured the Pareto efficiency of the agreements achieved by the negotiators as well as the integrative and distributive tactics negotiators used, based on coded transcripts of the videotaped interactions. “What” was coded as both tangible outcomes and negotiation processes. In a second “what” code, we coded whether or not the study considered outcomes outside the focal negotiation, such as effects on other organizational processes. The Weingart, et al. (1996) article was coded as zero on this variable because all of the outcomes examined were proximate to the focal negotiation.

For “when,” we coded the temporal aspect of the negotiation. Weingart, et al. (1996), for example, examined a single negotiation episode in their study. All interactions took place during the one-hour experiment. Although the authors carefully coded the specific tactics used by the negotiators during their exchanges, they did not break these tactics down into discrete phases of the negotiation. We, therefore, coded the “when” of this article as “one-shot.”

### *Qualitative Results*

Based on our coding of “who,” “what” and “when” in each study, we iterated back and forth between our data and definitions presented in the organizational literature to develop broad conceptualizations of phenomenological assumptions in negotiation research and to categorize our codes according to these assumptions. At one end of the spectrum we found assumptions consistent with a holistic, open systems, contextualized view of negotiations. We label this end of the continuum “open systems.” At the other end were assumptions consistent with a reductionist, closed system, a-contextual view of negotiations. We label this end of the continuum “closed systems.” Table 3 presents the codes categorized as open and closed systems, and the percentages of all articles receiving open and closed system codes. Table 4 summarizes the general features of open and closed systems assumptions about negotiations induced through our qualitative analyses.

Insert Tables 3 & 4 About Here

Closed systems assumptions. At one end of the continuum, design choices regarding “who” reveal an assumption that the actual relationships between subjects will not affect or distort their negotiation processes or outcomes. Pairing strangers or class members in fictional negotiation scenarios, for example, suggests an unstated assumption that negotiators are independent from the larger social and historical context in which negotiating occurs. Alliances at and away from the bargaining table are considered to be a circumscribed variation of negotiations, not a core feature central to negotiation processes and outcomes. “What” design choices point to an assumption that the most important outcomes from negotiations are tangible and proximate, not symbolic or involving factors or people outside the focal negotiation. Closed systems “when” design choices suggest that other processes, conflicts or

negotiations occurring before, during or after the focal negotiation are not viewed as central to the negotiation at hand. Negotiations are treated as discrete events, happening outside the routine of daily life. For example, many of the one-shot studies were conducted in classrooms. A few of the classroom-based studies noted the point in the course during which the data were collected (e.g., Kray et al. 2002; White and Neale 1994), but the majority neither mentioned other negotiations that had been or were to be experienced in the course nor discussed the effect of prior and/or future classroom negotiations on the focal negotiation.

An illustrative example of papers at this end of the continuum of phenomenological assumptions is Kray, Galinsky and Thompson's (2002) study of how gender stereotypes affect performance in mixed-gender negotiations. In a series of classroom-based experiments, the authors generate gender stereotype threat effects (Steele 1997) on negotiation outcomes by manipulating whether stereotypically feminine skills, gender-neutral skills or stereotypically masculine skills are associated with negotiation success (study 1) and failure (study 2). The strict experimental control allowed the authors to isolate and reverse the effects of gender stereotype threat on negotiation outcomes. The studies show the powerful result that performance expectations can both accentuate and reverse gender stereotype threat effects.

Open systems assumptions. Phenomenological assumptions at the other end of the continuum are revealed in a very different set of "who," "what" and "when" design choices. "Who" design choices at this end of the continuum imply a belief that negotiations are influenced by and affect not only those parties sitting at the table, but also others whose interests are only indirectly represented in the negotiation. Networks of interpersonal relationships, as well as status and power hierarchies, are anticipated to have meaningful effects on the negotiation, constraining behavior while opening up strategic opportunities within bargaining. "What" choices at this end of the continuum allow negotiations to affect structures, rules, beliefs, and practices away from the bargaining table, and measure symbolic resources such as legitimacy, reputation, identity, honor, esteem, respect and status. "When" choices imply an assumption that past (dis)agreements bear on the present negotiation and the present negotiation

bears on future interactions, taking temporal linkages into account by studying negotiations over time or across multiple, recursive events.

An illustrative example of articles with phenomenological assumptions at this end of the continuum is Glynn's (2000) study of negotiations over identity and legitimacy during a musician's strike at the Atlanta Symphony Orchestra. The approach taken in this research allowed the author to discern how the social structure of the organization was reconstructed through the negotiation process. Although the dispute was ostensibly over wages and working conditions, Glynn paints the musicians and administrators as competing parties vying for the legitimacy to define the core identity of the orchestra. Embedded within the multi-layered negotiations, reports Glynn, "were conflicts over status and power, and implicitly, control over the resources that would confer such status and power" (pp. 291). Through the protracted and often acrimonious negotiation, the disputants came to share a "new, integrated, negotiated identity" (pp. 292).

Hybrid assumptions. Although 52 of the articles were coded as revealing fully closed system assumptions and ten articles were coded as revealing fully open system assumptions, the majority of the papers in our sample lay somewhere in between. Some articles, for example, adopted an open systems "who" assumption that negotiations take place between socially embedded parties, while retaining closed systems assumptions on other dimensions. In one illustrative study, Tenbrunsel and her colleagues ran a classroom experiment exploring the effect of personal relationships on simulated market-based negotiations (Tenbrunsel et al. 1999). The study retained closed systems assumptions for "what" and "when," but the independent variable was a measure of the actual personal relationships between students acting as buyers and sellers.

## HYPOTHESES

With our qualitative analyses in mind, we turned to organizational studies to explore the possible implications of phenomenological assumptions on the dissemination of findings from negotiation research. We considered how phenomenological assumptions about the nature of negotiation and its relationship to the environment in which it takes place might make bargaining research seem more or less

relevant to the broader field of organizational studies. Evidence from organizational studies suggests that phenomenological assumptions situating negotiations in rich contexts may expose the relevance of negotiation research findings for broader organizational questions.

Organizational studies have shown that decision makers in organizations are inextricably embedded in networks of relationships (Martin 1990; Podolny and Baron 1997). Multiple features of relational ties, such as the quality of information conveyed, relative power, and trust, play themselves out in exchange interactions (Granovetter 2005). Hierarchical and status relationships, for example, have been shown to have measurable effects on interaction processes and outcomes (Ridgeway 1991). These studies suggest that conflict and interaction within organizations is influenced by and affects not only those parties directly involved in the process, but also others whose interests are only indirectly represented. The mere possibility of forming a coalition in the future may be enough to influence current behavior, even if the allies are never mobilized (Baumgartner et al. 1975; Morrill 1995; Schmidt and Kochan 1972). Because of the high degree of relational embeddedness among organizational actors assumed in much of organizational studies, and the documented effects of that embeddedness, we propose that the broader field will be more likely to incorporate findings from a study of negotiations to the extent that the study is designed to be attentive to relationships both among and beyond the parties directly involved in the negotiation. Formally:

*HYPOTHESIS 1(H1): The more that negotiation articles exhibit assumptions that negotiators' direct and indirect relationships influence negotiation processes and outcomes, the more frequently they will be cited in organizational research.*

Organizational studies posit interpersonal interaction within organizations to be both “constituted and constitutive” of organizational structure (Ranson et al. 1980). Current beliefs, rules, practices and structures shape individual and interpersonal action within organizations; simultaneously, individual and interpersonal action alters future beliefs, rules, practices and structures (Giddens 1984; Pratt and Rafaeli 2001). Interactions also reflect and affect the distribution of symbolic resources such as legitimacy, trust, reputation and status (Morrill 1995; Zhou 2005). Disputes over symbolic resources may generate

behaviors that appear inexplicable when considering material resources alone (Maines and Charlton 1985). Hambrick and Cannella (1993), for example, showed that strategic and economic models cannot explain why favorable retention packages do not keep executives from resigning after their companies are acquired. Their study suggests that these decisions, as costly as they are in economic terms, are motivated by the executives' losses in social status following acquisitions. This view of organizations suggests that the findings from a negotiation study will be more readily incorporated into the broader field if the outcomes considered in the study go beyond the circumscribed negotiation process and objective payoffs to the parties at the table. Formally,

*HYPOTHESIS 2 (H2): The more that negotiation articles exhibit assumptions regarding the symbolic and constitutive nature of negotiation outcomes, the more frequently they will be cited in organizational research.*

Research contextualizing interpersonal interaction within organizational environments assumes that behavior reflects a history of past interactions and an expectation of future interactions (Raven 1993). Realization of the long term, recursive effects of actions may feed into individuals' strategies and give rise to different behaviors at different points in time (Fligstein 1987). Westphal and Khanna (2003), for instance, demonstrate how directors who support changes instituting greater board control over management action and compensation are subjected to informal sanctioning by directors on other boards. Directors who experience such social control are deterred from subsequent participation in governance changes that threaten the interests of fellow top managers. Taking such linkages for granted assumes that conflict and conflict resolution is ongoing in organizations, and that episodes of intense negotiation are temporally tied events (Barley 1991; Fine 1984; Kolb and Bartunek 1992). We propose that negotiation research will be perceived as more relevant to broader organizational research when the negotiation studies reflect temporal interdependence across negotiation episodes. Formally,

*HYPOTHESIS 3 (H3): The more that negotiation articles exhibit assumptions regarding temporal interdependence across negotiation episodes, the more frequently they will be cited in organizational research.*

## QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES

*Analyses*

To test our hypotheses regarding the effect of phenomenological assumptions on knowledge dissemination within organizational studies, we collected data on the citation counts of the 225 negotiation articles in our data set. None of the articles published in 2005 had any record of citations in ISI-SSCI<sup>6</sup> when we finalized the citation count in 2007, so we dropped articles published in 2005 from the quantitative analyses. For the remaining 212 articles, we collected data through the ISI-SSCI on citations within articles published in the journals identified as management journals by ISI. Of the 86 management journals listed, we excluded four journals focused narrowly on decision-making and negotiations, since we are studying the dissemination of negotiation research into the broader field of organizational studies.<sup>7</sup> We also excluded 11 journals focusing on quantitative engineering or operations research.<sup>8</sup> We dropped all author self-citations and all citations from within our sample of negotiation articles. The final citation count in management articles is our primary dependent variable (“mgmt cites”).

Because our dependent variable is a count of citations over a maximum of 17 years (the earliest articles were published in 1990 and citation data were collected in 2007), we estimate our models with negative binomial maximum-likelihood regressions (Stremersch et al. 2007). A negative binomial regression assumes the dependent variable is an over-dispersed count variable (i.e., the variance is very high relative to the mean and the distribution is truncated at zero), and corrects for varying lengths of exposure time across observations. In our model, the exposure time is number of years since publication.

Model 1 shows the effects of a wide set of control variables. One set of controls accounts for the effects of methodology and discipline on citation rates. To control for methodology, we include dummy

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<sup>6</sup> Institute for Scientific Information Social Sciences Citation Index. Accessed through <http://scientific.thomson.com/webofknowledge>, Web of Science Database. The database includes: Science Citation Index Expanded; Social Science Citation Index; and Arts & Humanities Citation Index.

<sup>7</sup> We excluded *Decision Sciences*, *Group Decision & Negotiation*, the *Negotiation Journal* and *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*.

<sup>8</sup> We excluded *IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management*, *Information Systems Research*, *International Journal of Operations and Production*, *Industrial Marketing Management*, *International Journal of Technology Management*, *Journal of Information Technology*, *Journal of Management Information Systems*, *Journal of Operations Management*, *Journal of the Operational Research Society*, *MIS Quarterly* and *Technovation*.

variables for laboratory experiment, ethnography or field study<sup>9</sup> (omitted dummy). We control for the level of analysis at which the research was conducted with an ordinal variable that equals one for analyses at the interpersonal level, two for analyses at the group or intra-organizational level and three for inter-organizational analyses. To control for the higher likelihood of within-discipline access to information affecting knowledge dissemination (Hansen 1999; Hendriks 1999), we created categorical variables based on Biehl et al.'s (2006) sociometric analyses identifying citation cliques in business journals (see also Salancik 1986). Our analyses include dummy variables for citation cliques in industrial relations (ILRR), sociology (ASR, AJS), social psychology (JESP, PSPB, JPSP), organizational psychology (JAP, OBHDP) and management (AMJ, ASQ, OS) (omitted dummy).

Citations reflect presentational and political factors, as well as methodology and discipline (Blackburn and Michell 1981; Judge et al. 2007; Stremersch et al. 2007). To control for presentation, we include a count variable of the number of pages in each article ("no. pages") (Stremersch et al. 2007). We include a count of within-article citations ("no. citations") to control for the possibility that the number of citations within a paper relates positively to the rate at which that paper is cited by others, reflecting both presentational and political influence (Gilbert 1977; Judge et al. 2007). Political effects on citations can reflect the influence and status of the author, the publication outlet and the institutions with which the author is affiliated (Judge et al. 2007). Within academia, an individual's reputation and status are reflected in publication rates (Merton 1968). We control for author's reputation and status by including a count variable of how many times the author of an article appeared as author on other papers published in our sample ("author reputation w/in negotiation"). To account for the prestige of the journal in which an article was published (Judge et al. 2007), we control for average citation rate of each of the eleven journals based on Starbuck's 2004 analysis<sup>10</sup> ("journal prestige"). Finally, to control for the political effects of co-location enhancing interaction with and influence on organizational scholars, we include a

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<sup>9</sup> Articles with multiple studies could receive multiple methodology codes.

<sup>10</sup> Average annualized citations per article, estimated in 2004, available at <<http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~wstarbuc/cites.htm>>.

dummy variable set to one if any of the authors of a paper were in a business school or management department as of 2007 (“B-school affiliation”).<sup>11</sup>

We add our independent variables to the controls in Model 2. The variables of interest are the three sets of open and closed systems variables codifying phenomenological assumptions (“who\_open,” “what\_open” and “when\_open”). “Who\_open” equals zero if a study employed students or strangers as research subjects without consideration of their interpersonal relationships and did not measure coalitions; it equals one if a study either measured the actual relationship between the parties *or* considered coalition potential; and it equals two if it considered both the parties’ relationship *and* coalition potential. “What\_open” equals zero if the dependent variable(s) measured only the immediate outcomes of material resources and/or negotiator perceptions of outcome or process; it equals one if any other combination of dependent variables was considered *or* the study examined the effects of the negotiation on the larger organization or environment; and it equals two if the dependent variables included any other combination of measures *and* the analyses considered effects on factors external to the negotiation. “When\_open” equals zero for articles in which negotiations were one-shot; it equals one when the study considered phases, multiple rounds, or recursive effects of one negotiation on another. These details are summarized in Table 3.

### *Quantitative Results*

Means and correlations are shown in Table 5. Table 6 presents average aggregate citation counts and annualized citation counts (i.e., the citation counts divided by the number of years since the paper was published), by “who,” “what” and “when” codes. These counts suggest the predicted positive, linear effect for open systems assumptions, before controlling for other factors previously shown to affect citation rates.

Insert Tables 5 and 6 About Here

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<sup>11</sup> We base business school affiliation on information provided in the published article or found on the Internet in 2007. For practical reasons, we did not attempt to determine the affiliation of the authors at the time of the citation when that information was not available in the published article. Affiliations of 25 of the 322 authors could not be found from information in the published article, search of identified university websites, Google search or Facebook search. We counted these authors as missing, which effectively counted them as not in a business school for the purposes of this measure.

Table 7 presents the results of the negative binomial regressions, with the coefficients transformed to incidence-rate ratios (IRR), i.e.,  $\exp(\beta)$  rather than  $\beta$ . Incident rate ratios indicate the estimated change in the response ratio, in this case the citation rate (“mgmt cites”), for each one unit increase in the independent variable, holding all other variables constant and correcting for exposure time (years since publication). An IRR below 1.0 signifies a decrease in the response variable, e.g., IRR = .95 would signify a five percent decrease in the management citation rate for each unit increase in the independent variable. An IRR above 1.0 signifies a corresponding increase in the response variable, e.g., IRR = 1.05 would signify a five percent increase in the citation rate for each unit increase in the independent variable.

Insert Table 7 Here

Model 1 results show significant effects for methodological, disciplinary, presentational and political factors, supporting past research on citation rates. Relative to those based on field studies, negotiation studies featuring experimental methodology are significantly less likely to be cited in management journals. Similarly for disciplinary cliques, negotiation studies published in social psychology, organizational psychology, sociology or industrial relations journals are significantly less likely to be cited in management journals than negotiation studies published in management journals. Presentational factors had mixed effects. The IRR for the number of citations within the negotiation article indicates that each additional citation in the focal article increases the annual rate of citations in management journals by two percent, but number of pages had no additional effect. Of the political factors, only the prestige of the journal in which the negotiation article was published significantly affects citation rates, with articles in higher prestige journals being cited significantly more often.

This pattern of effects for the control variables remains in Model 2 when the independent variables are added to the equation, but the IRR for experimental methodology falls below standard significance levels. The IRRs for “what\_open” and “when\_open” are greater than 1.0 and significant, indicating positive effects on citation rates. The IRR of 1.41 for “what\_open” indicates that negotiation articles in which the dependent variable reflected one open system assumption, about *either* the nature of

the dependent variable *or* the potential for bargaining to affect variables outside the focal negotiation had a 41 percent higher annual citation rate in management research than articles with fully closed systems dependent variables (e.g., tangible payoffs only), holding all other variables constant. Similarly, the IRR for “when\_open” of 1.67 indicates that the articles in our sample that explored negotiations extending beyond one-shot interactions increased their annual citation rate in management research by 67 percent relative to negotiation articles studying only one-shot interactions, again holding all other variables constant.<sup>12</sup> The coefficient for “who\_open” is not significant. Though the number of citations rises with the extent of open systems assumptions about who is involved in the negotiation, as indicated in Table 7, and the pairwise correlation between “who\_open” and management citations was positive and significant, this relationship is negative and not significant when entered simultaneously with the other open systems variables and the control variables.

Because the independent variable, “who\_open,” was correlated at greater than .6 with a number of the control variables — methodology (experimental and field) as well as level of analysis — we conducted analyses assessing multicollinearity effects. Negative binomial regression analyses do not allow examination of variance inflation factors (VIF). As a proxy, we conducted OLS regression on annualized citation counts with all of our variables: the mean VIF was 2.24, with a maximum of 5.18 for our organizational psychology journal variable. The VIFs for all open systems variables were less than 3.5. We concluded that multicollinearity does not seem to be driving our results (Neter et al. 1996), though we remain cautious that phenomenological assumptions are, at least in part, closely reflected in, and therefore correlated with, methodology.

Our results provide strong evidence that phenomenological assumptions affect the likelihood that negotiation articles will be cited in the broader field of management research. Open system assumptions about what is negotiated and the temporal nature of bargaining have additional, positive effects on citations beyond those of methodological, disciplinary, presentational and reputational variables. What

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<sup>12</sup> Four articles had annualized citation rates greater than 2.5 standard deviations above the mean. The pattern of results remains when these four papers are removed from the analysis, though the IRR for “what\_open” falls to 1.25 and the significance level is reduced.

these analyses do not and cannot tell us *why* scholars are more likely to cite research based on open system assumptions. As a post-hoc test exploring this question, we collected information on the citations of a subset of 25 articles in our data set, 13 primarily open system ( $\text{open\_who} + \text{open\_what} + \text{open\_when} \geq 4$ ) and 12 primarily closed system ( $\text{open\_who} + \text{open\_what} + \text{open\_when} \leq 1$ ) articles (average number of citations = 9.5 open, 8.1 closed). We coded the 182 papers that cited these 25 articles for the following reasons why the article was cited: to develop the theory in the introduction of the paper; to support specific hypotheses; to back up methodological decisions; to explain results; or, to broaden the discussion and conclusion. We aggregated the codes into two dichotomous categories, theory (introduction or discussion) and empirics (hypotheses, methods or results). Overall, the negotiation articles in our subsample were more likely to be used for theory development than to support empirics, but open system articles were more likely than closed system ones to be cited for theory (82% open v. 70% closed) while closed system articles are more likely to be cited for empirics (26% open v. 32% closed). We then conducted a simple logistic regression predicting the likelihood that a paper cited one of our articles for theory. The predictor of interest was whether the cited article revealed primarily open or closed system assumptions, controlling for methodology. The coefficient for open system was positive and significant ( $\beta = .75, p < .05$ ). Thus, we conclude that open system articles are significantly more likely than closed system papers to be used for building general theoretical arguments rather than supporting specific hypotheses, methods or results. In other words, scholars publishing in management journals appear more likely to recognize the relevance of open system negotiation studies to their own research questions, and, as a result, they are better able to generalize beyond the specifics in open system than closed system negotiation research.

## DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Phenomenological assumptions, revealed beliefs about the fundamental qualities of the phenomenon under investigation and its relationship to the environment in which it occurs, influence the dissemination of knowledge from subfields to their broader academic fields. Open system phenomenological assumptions increase the perceived relevance of the subfield's research questions and

findings to scholars working in different domains of the same, broad field. Identifying the role played by assumptions related to the problem under investigation (Davis and Marquis 2005), while controlling for those related to the epistemology of knowledge creation, extends our understanding of how assumptions affect knowledge dissemination in organizational studies research. Our findings point to a potential limit to the ability of problem-driven scholarship to generate a cohesive catalogue of basic understandings about how organizations work (Davis and Marquis 2005). Without attention to underlying phenomenological assumptions within subfields and between them and the larger intellectual field, the “new age” of organizational research continues to risk fracturing into multiple, unrelated pieces, each focused on a small piece of the larger puzzle.

Our investigation of negotiation articles published between 1990 and 2005 revealed that phenomenological assumptions locating the interaction in a larger system, particularly contextualizing what is negotiated and when the negotiation takes place, facilitate the citation of negotiation research by non-negotiation research published in management journals. The empirical results support our contention that phenomenological assumptions are distinct from epistemological and meta-theoretical assumptions. Reflecting theoretical work on the distinctive practices within “epistemic cultures” (Gittelman 2007; Knorr-Cetina 1999) and the importance of sharing meta-theoretical assumptions (Burrell and Morgan 1979), we found that disciplinary similarity is a critical driver of knowledge dissemination. Negotiation articles published in management journals were more likely to be cited by non-negotiation management research than negotiation studies published in social psychology, organizational psychology, industrial relations or sociology journals. As seen in past research, presentation and political factors are also important drivers of citation rates (Biehl et al. 2006; Blackburn and Michell 1981; Judge et al. 2007; Stremersch et al. 2007). Reflecting presentational factors, and perhaps political factors as well, papers with more citations were more likely to be cited by others in turn. Journal prestige also drove citations, but other political factors, including authors’ publication records and business school affiliations did not have significant effects in our analyses. It may be that our measures of these political factors were insufficient. An author’s publication record in the subfield of negotiation, for example, may be a less

accurate status measure than the author's publication record overall. Even if our measures are sufficient, it may be that political factors are local and may have more effect on within-subfield citations than citations from a subfield to the larger field. We hope future research will investigate this question. Despite this limitation, our findings lead us to conclude that phenomenological assumptions affect knowledge dissemination above and beyond the methodological, disciplinary, presentational and political factors found to be significant predictors of citation rates in past research.

Our post-hoc analyses of citations suggest that scholars publishing in management journals more readily recognize and appreciate the relevance of open system negotiation studies to their own research questions. This is reflected in their greater propensity to use negotiation research based on open system assumptions when developing their theories and conclusions. Although closed system assumptions may allow clearer demonstration of cause and effect, they lie in stark contrast to the situated interpretation of negotiations as central mechanisms in complex organizational systems (Katz and Kahn 1966; Ranson et al. 1980; Strauss 1978).

We found that phenomenological assumptions in negotiation research were seldom made explicitly, and reasonable boundary conditions for the findings were rarely acknowledged. While the authors of the articles in our data set may not have articulated or even consciously acknowledged these assumptions when they designed their studies and wrote their papers (Morgan and Smircich 1980), the assumptions are evident in the choices made in design, analyses and presentation of the research. We believe that studies of micro-processes could potentially enhance the impact they have in organizational studies by confronting the assumptions incorporated into their research designs and the implications of these assumptions for generalizing into organizational contexts. Just as articulating assumptions about physical objects may facilitate knowledge transformation across occupational boundaries (Bechky 2003a), explicating assumptions underlying academic research may make new information more transparent and easily adopted.

The predominance of closed system assumptions in this negotiation research sample indicates that negotiation research may have less impact on organizational scholarship than it deserves, given the

centrality of the phenomenon to organizational processes. We also found, however, that not all open systems assumptions were equally important to increasing management research citations of negotiation studies. Assumptions about what constitutes critical outcome variables have notably large effects on citation rates. Open system assumptions about the temporal nature of negotiations result in even greater increases in citation rates. Contrary to our hypotheses, however, assumptions about who is involved in the negotiation did not significantly affect citation rates in our full model. These results imply that negotiation scholars may increase their influence outside their own subfield by adopting open systems assumptions about negotiated outcomes and the temporal nature of negotiations. Negotiation scholars who are interested in disseminating their research findings should consider adapting their designs to incorporate, for instance, the effects of the negotiation on processes and structures beyond the focal negotiation. In addition, utilizing longer-term designs, where the effects of negotiations can unfold over time, may enhance the relevance of the research's findings to broader organizational research.

Negotiation studies that maintain experimental control over study participants and their interpersonal relationships while featuring open system assumptions about what affects and is affected by negotiations and when negotiations take place may optimize both control and relevance. These design guidelines may point the way towards new, fruitful avenues of negotiation research and, hopefully, encourage more dialogue between negotiations and organizational studies research.

Disseminating knowledge from subfields of specialists to the broader academic field benefits scholarship by increasing the likelihood of producing integrative, rather than incremental, knowledge (Dauphinee and Martin 2000). Our presumption is that phenomenological assumptions that relate to different kinds of micro-process research have similar effects on the perceived relevance of that work to broader intellectual discourses both within and beyond organizational studies. We hope that exposing the role of phenomenological assumptions in the dissemination of negotiation research to the larger field of organizational studies encourages scholars in all subfields to explicitly consider and discuss the assumptions underlying their research.

**Table 1.** Summary of Articles in Data Set<sup>a</sup>

Type	Journal (Count)	Simple Citation
Industrial Relations	ILRR (18)	(Bell, 1995); (Belzer, 1995); (Budd, 1992); (Burgess & Marburger, 1993); ( <b>Cutcher-Gershenfeld, 1991</b> ); (Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al., 1996); (Cutcher-Gershenfeld & Kochan, 2004); (Deery & Iverson, 2005); (Erickson, 1992); (Erickson, 1996); (Hebdon & Hyatt, 1998); (Iankova, 2000); (Ichniowski & Delaney, 1990); (Morishima, 1991); (Nay, 1991); (Paul & Kleingartner, 1994); (Ready, 1990); (Thomas & Kleiner, 1992)
Management	AMJ (14)	(Balogun & Johnson, 2004); (Brett et al., 1998); (Brett & Okumura, 1998); (Conlon & Fasolo, 1990); (Conlon & Sullivan, 1999); (Floyd et al., 1994); (Martin & Berthiaume, 1995); (Parks & Conlon, 1995); (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1995); (Pinkley & Northcraft, 1994); (Polzer et al., 1998); (Simons, 1993); (Tenbrunsel, 1998); ( <b>Yan &amp; Gray, 1994</b> )
	ASQ (10)	(Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1991); (Brockner et al., 2000); (Cooper et al., 1992); (Dyck & Starke, 1999); (Friedman & Poldony, 1992); (McGinn & Keros, 2002); (Pisano, 1990); ( <b>Robinson, 1996</b> ); (Rosenkopf et al., 2001); (Seidel et al., 2000)
	OS (10)	(Adair & Brett, 2005); (Coff, 1999); (Glynn, 2000); (Golden-Biddle & Rao, 1997); (Greenwood et al., 1994); (Griffith & Northcraft, 1994); (Hardy & Phillips, 1998); (Kochan & Rubinstein, 2000); (Rosenblatt et al., 1993); ( <b>Zaheer et al., 1998</b> )
Organizational Psychology	OBHDP (83)	(Allred et al., 1997); (Anderson & Thompson, 2004); (Arunachalam & Dilla, 1995); (Ball et al., 1991); (Bazerman et al., 1992); (Beersma & De Dreu, 2002); (Bereby-Meyer et al., 2004); (Blount et al., 1996); (Blount & Larrick, 2000); (Boles et al., 2000); (Bottom & Studt, 1993); (Bottom, 1998); (Brockner et al., 2005); (Brodt, 1994); (Brodt & Tuchinsky, 2000); (Chen & Komorita, 1994); (Chen et al., 1996); (Chen, 1996); (De Dreu et al., 1994); (De Dreu & Boles, 1998); (De Dreu, 2003); (Diekmann et al., 1996); (Fobian & Christensen-Szalanski, 1993); (Fobian & Christensen-Szalanski, 1994); (Gelfand & Christakopoulou, 1999); (Ghosh, 1996); (Gist & Stevens, 1998); (Handgraaf et al., 2004); (Harinck et al., 2000); (Harris & Carnevale, 1990); (Hilty & Carnevale, 1993); (Keysar et al. et al., 1995); (Kim, 1997); (Kim et al., 2003); (Kramer et al., 1993); (Kray et al., 2002); (Kristensen & Garling, 1997); (Larrick & Boles, 1995); ( <b>Lim &amp; Murnighan, 1994</b> ); (Loewenstein et al., 2005); (Mannix & Loewenstein, 1993); (Mannix et al., 1995a); (Mannix et al., 1995b); (Messick et al., 1997); (Moore et al., 1999); (Moore, 2004); (Morgan & Tindale, 2002); (Naquin, 2003); (Northcraft et al., 1998); (Novemsky & Schweitzer, 2004); (O'Connor, 1997); (O'Connor & Arnold, 2001); (Okhuysen et al., 2003); (Olekals et al., 1996); (Oliver et al., 1994); (Peterson & Thompson, 1997); (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996); (Pinkley et al., 1994); (Pinkley et al., 1995); (Rapoport et al., 1997); (Ravenscroft et al., 1993); (Ritov, 1996); (Robert & Carnevale, 1997); (Shapiro & Bies, 1994); (Singh, 1997); (Solnick & Schweitzer, 1999); (Sondak & Bazerman, 1991); (Sondak et al., 1995); (Srivastava, 2001); (Stuhlmacher & Stevenson, 1994); (Tenbrunsel et al., 1999); (Thompson & Hastie, 1990); (Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992); (Thompson & DeHarpport, 1994); (Thompson et al., 2000); (Tinsley et al., 2002); (Valenzuela et al., 2005); (Valley et al., 1992); (Walters et al., 1998); (White et al., 1994); (White & Neale, 1994); (White et al., 2004); (Whyte & Sebenius, 1997)
	JAP (19)	(Adair et al., 2001); (Arnold & O'Connor, 1999); ( <b>Ashford &amp; Black, 1996</b> ); (Conlon & Ross, 1993); (De Dreu et al., 1998); (Gelfand & Realo, 1999); (Gelfand et al., 2002); (Gerhart & Rynes, 1991); (Humphrey et al., 2004); (Kim & Fragale, 2005); (Kwon & Weingart, 2004); (Leung et al., 2004); (Naquin & Paulson, 2003); (O'Connor et al., 2005); (Pinkley, 1995); (Ross & Wieland, 1996); (Stevens et al., 1993); (Tinsley, 2001); (Weingart et al., 1993)
Social Psychology	JESP (18)	(Bornstein et al., 2004); (Chen et al., 2003); (Curhan et al., 2004); (De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004); (De Grada et al., 1999); (Drolet & Morris, 2000); (Matheson et al., 1991); (Moore, 2004); (Morris & Sim, 1998); (Ohtsubo & Kameda, 1998); ( <b>Olekals &amp; Smith, 2003</b> ); (Thompson, 1990); ( <b>Thompson, 1991</b> ); (Thompson, 1993); (Thompson et al., 1995); (Van Beest et al., 2005); (Van Dijk et al., 2004); (Weingart et al., 1999)
	JPSP (21)	(Barry & Friedman, 1998); (Bornstein, 1992); (Bowles et al., 2005); (Cotterell et al., 1992); ( <b>De Dreu et al., 2000a</b> ); (De Dreu et al., 2000b); (Diekmann et al., 1997); (Diekmann et al., 2003); (Enzle et al., 1992); (Forgas, 1998); (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001); (Galinsky et al., 2002); (Kray et al., 2001); (Larrick & Blount, 1997); (Morris et al., 1999); (Thompson, 1990); (Thompson, 1995); (Thompson et al., 1996); (Van Kleef et al., 2004); (Weingart et al., 1996); (Wit & Kerr, 2002)
	PSPB (18)	(De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995); (De Dreu et al., 1999); (Eggin et al., 2002); (Galinsky et al., 2002); (Galinsky et al., 2005); (Garcia et al., 2001); (Kray et al., 2004); (Kray et al., 2005); ( <b>Liberman et al., 2004</b> ); (Moore, 2005); (O'Connor & Carnevale, 1997); (Ohbuchi et al., 1996); (Olekals & Smith, 1999); (Olekals & Smith, 2005); (Paese & Gilin, 2000); (Parks & Rumble, 2001); (Van Beest et al., 2003); (Vorauer & Claude, 1998)
Sociology	AJS (5)	(Bittman et al., 2003); (Chaves, 1993); ( <b>Molm et al., 2000</b> ); (Morrill, 1991); (Phillips, 2001)
	ASR (9)	(Bonacich, 1990); (Bridges & Villemez, 1991); (Lawler & Yoon, 1993); (Markovsky et al., 1993); ( <b>Molm et al., 1999</b> ); (Molm et al., 2003); (Shrum, 1990); (Stepan-Norris & Zeitlin, 1995); (Thye, 2000)

<sup>a</sup> Bold cites have highest annualized citation rates among those in the journal.

**Table 2.** Coding Categories and Protocol

<b>WHO = Relationships among negotiators and Coalition potential</b>
Relationships among negotiators*
S = Strangers recruited as experimental subjects C = Classroom exercise; participants recruited in class; no consideration of prior or future relationship R = Existing direct tie relationship, other than reporting relationship (coded H) H = Hierarchical power or status relationship E = Embedded, tied via the collective; includes market-based negotiations in which parties are embedded in market; excludes classmates
Coalition potential
Coal = 0: no coalitions possible Coal = 1: coalitions available to at least one party
<b>WHAT = Nature of dependent variable and External effects</b>
Nature of Dependent Variable*
\$ = Tangible, material resources; includes impasse/agreement rates and votes on ratification P = Negotiation process; e.g., perceptions of process; number of offers; perceptions of fair treatment; evaluations of competitiveness/cooperativeness O = Negotiator attitude; perceptions, attitudes, moods or emotions regarding the negotiation; e.g., perceptions of outcome fairness, participant satisfaction, perceptions of others' motivations; does not include process perceptions (coded "P") and perceptions of other party (coded "R") R = Relationship; e.g., future partner selection based on relationships; attitudes about other party; perceptions of other party, except trust/reputation (coded "T") or status or power ("S" and "Pw") S = Status; social esteem and/or position in the informal hierarchy Pw = Power; resources that can be brought to bear on a negotiation, e.g., BATNA T = Trust/reputation
External effects
E = 0: All measured effects internal to focal negotiation/parties at the table E = 1: Negotiation's effects on larger organizational issues outside negotiation itself
<b>WHEN = Temporal nature</b>
1 = one-shot; includes experiments in which subjects played multiple separate negotiations with no repeat partners or consideration of carry over effects across rounds. 1p = one-shot with distinct phases R = Recursive or ongoing, reserved for those studies in which effects of one negotiation on another were actually measured M = Multiple rounds, ongoing negotiation.

\*Articles were coded with multiple codes in this category when appropriate.

**Table 3.** Categorization and Percentages in Closed/Open Assumptions

<b>WHO = 0, 1 or 2 (additive)</b>	<b>Relationships among negotiators*</b>					<b>Coalition Potential</b>			
	Closed Systems (+ 0)		Open Systems (+ 1)			Closed (+ 0)	Open (+ 1)		
	Classmates (C)	Strangers (S)	Embed'd (E)	Hierarch'l (H)	Friends (R)	None (0)	Possible (1)		
Percent	65%	16%	20%	1%	8%	90%	10%		
<b>WHAT = 0, 1 or 2 (additive)</b>	<b>Nature of Dependent Variables*</b> (70% of articles received > 1 code)							<b>External Effects</b>	
	Closed Systems (+ 0)			Open Systems (+ 1)				Closed (+ 0)	Open (+ 1)
	Tang'ble (S)	Attitude (O)	Process (P)	Power (P)	Status (S)	Trust (T)	Relat'p (R)	Effects outside neg (E=0)	Effects wi/ neg (E=1)
Percent	86%	30%	42%	9%	27%	5%	9%	10%	90%
<b>WHEN = 0 or 1</b>	Closed (+ 0)	Open (+ 1)							
	1-shot (1)	1-shot w/ phases (1p)	Multi- round (M)	Recursive (R)					
Percent	51%	18%	6%	25%					

\*Articles could receive multiple codes.

**Table 4.** Summary of Qualitative Results Regarding Open and Closed Systems Assumptions about Negotiations

	<b>Closed systems assumptions</b>	<b>Open systems assumptions</b>
Who	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Negotiations take place between parties with independent preferences and interests.</li> <li>• Coalitions or constituencies are not critical to the negotiation.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Negotiations take place between parties connected through personal and organizational relationships and social networks.</li> <li>• Alliances at and away from the table are critical to negotiations.</li> </ul>
What	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Negotiations primarily involve material resource exchanges.</li> <li>• Local negotiation outcomes are separable from their effect on the broader organization.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Negotiations involve symbolic resources as well as material resources.</li> <li>• Negotiations affect and are affected by larger organizational structures and systems.</li> </ul>
When	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Negotiations are discrete events.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Negotiations are overlapping, recurrent and recursive events.</li> </ul>

**Table 5.** Correlations (excludes papers published in 2005: N = 212)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
Mean/ N = 1	.46	9	165	38	1.44	51	97	14	17	33	2.03	8.53	160	47.9	18.16	.39	.56	105	9.88
(S.D.)	(1.19)	--	--	--	(.65)	--	--	--	--	--	(.76)	(8.09)	--	(19.04)	(6.68)	(.62)	(.64)	--	(4.14)
1. Ann. Mgmt. cites	--																		
2. Ethnography	.26**	--																	
3. Experiment	-.32**	-.39*	--																
4. Field	.21**	-.10	-.88*	--															
5. Level of Analysis	.29**	.18**	-.57**	.53**	--														
6. Soc. Psych. Journal	-.12	-.06	.25*	-.23*	-.15*	--													
7. Org. Psych. Journal	-.18**	-.19*	.44*	-.38*	-.35**	-.52*	--												
8. Soc. Journal	-.04	.13	-.18*	.12	.14*	-.15**	-.24*	--											
9. I.R. Journal	-.08	-.06	-.55*	.63*	.36**	-.17**	-.27*	-.08	--										
10. Mgmt. Journal	.48**	.30*	-.37*	.24*	.30**	-.24*	-.39*	-.11	-.13	--									
11. Journal Prestige	.24**	.08	-.01	-.03	.11	.39*	-.55*	.20*	-.32*	.39*	--								
12. Author Reputation w/ Negotiation	-.03	-.17*	.42**	-.36**	-.30**	.19**	.20**	-.17*	-.24**	-.21**	-.02	--							
13. Bus. School Affiliation	.05	.01	-.01	.01	-.01	-.16*	.17*	-.33**	.01	.18**	-.06	.22**	--						
14. Wi/ article citation count	.25**	.23*	-.07	-.05	.07	.08	-.05	.11	-.25*	.10	.26*	.01	-.09	--					
15. No. pages	.17**	.21*	-.22*	.13	.08	-.24*	.00	.28*	.00	.10	-.10	-.01	-.06	.11	--				
16. Who_open	.29**	.32*	-.78*	.68*	.57**	-.26*	-.39*	.23*	.43*	.36*	.02	-.34**	-.02	.11	.25*	--			
17. What_open	.32**	.33*	-.37*	.23*	.25**	-.08	-.21*	.12	.04	.28*	.14**	-.15*	-.05	.27*	.14**	.42*	--		
18. When_open	.18**	.12	-.31*	.28*	.32**	-.20*	-.15**	.12	.23*	.20*	-.01	-.26**	-.01	-.14**	.16**	.34*	.16**	--	
19. Yrs. since publication	.04	-.03	-.16**	.20*	.19**	-.22*	-.02	.08	.21*	.08	-.04*	-.11	.04	-.31	.12	.16**	-.06	.27*	--

\*\* (p < .01); \* (p < .05)

**Table 6.** Management Citation Counts by “Who,” “What” and “When”

Open systems (OS) codes	Number of observations	Mgmt. citations Mean (S.D.)	Annualized Mgmt. citations Mean (S.D.)
Who = 0 OS codes	146	2.38 (3.84)	.28 (.43)
Who = 1 OS code	50	6.52 (19.68)	.64 (1.55)
Who = 2 OS codes	16	15.00 (28.79)	1.63 (2.90)
What = 0 OS codes	110	2.26 (3.50)	.28 (.41)
What = 1 OS code	85	3.81 (12.96)	.35 (.88)
What = 2 OS codes	17	20.00 (31.68)	2.26 (3.12)
When = 0 OS codes	107	1.93 (2.95)	.25 (.40)
When = 1 OS code	105	6.72 (18.09)	.69 (1.62)

**Table 7.** Negative Binomial Regression Testing Effects of Assumptions on Rate of Management Journal Citations, 1990-2007. N = 212.

Mgmt cites	Model 1 IRR	Model 2 IRR
Ethnography	.799 (.367)	.772 (.362)
Experiment	.425* (.171)	.475+ (.202)
Level of Analysis	.805 (.156)	.822 (.157)
JESP_JPSP_PSPB	.145** (.054)	.147** (.054)
OBHDP_JAP	.287** (.111)	.266** (.105)
Soc. Journal	.176** (.077)	.162** (.073)
I.R. Journal	.175** (.089)	.191** (.101)
Journal Prestige	1.54* (.291)	1.47* (.279)
Author Reput'n w/in Negotiation	1.02 (.015)	1.02 (.015)
B-School Affiliation	.990 (.247)	1.07 (.267)
No. cites	1.02** (.006)	1.02** (.006)
No. pages	1.02 (.016)	1.02 (.015)
Who_open		.654 (.176)
What_open		1.41* (.233)
When_open		1.67* (.350)
Yrs. since pub	(exposure)	(exposure)
/lnalpha	.165    .156	.073    .160
Alpha	1.18    .184	1.08    .172
Log likelihood	-419.301	-414.028
LR chi2 (8)/(11)	112.75	123.30
Prob > chi2	.000	.000
Pseudo R2	.119	.130
Test for change in LR		LR chi2(3) = 10.55 Prob > chi2 = .014

Standard errors are shown below each coefficient. Significance as follows:

\*\* (p < .01); \* (p < .05); + (p < .10)

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