


本研究报告由王雪莲教育基金赞助



建立“中美俄东盟安全合作组织”

Toward a China-US-Russia-ASEAN
Security Cooperation Organization



清华国际安全论坛研究报告 No.4

清华大学当代国际关系研究院

2011年3月26日

内容提要 ...

- ◆ 自冷战结束以来，东亚建立多边安全合作机制的努力要么濒于失效，要么无果而终，要么沦为“清谈馆”。
- ◆ 东亚多边安全机制建设的失败原因，主要是区域内军事大国未能合作承担起领导责任，致使每个机制都缺乏权威性。当一个地区安全机制缺乏权威时，它就没有行动能力。
- ◆ 一个成功的多边安全合作机制需要同时具备三个条件：一是以军事实力为领导力的基础；二是初始成员不多但具有广泛代表性；三是规模界限明确，严格限定议题，不轻易扩大合作内容。
- ◆ 本报告建议：建立由中、美、俄和东盟四方组成的“中美俄东盟安全合作组织”。美中俄三个军事大国的合作可提供足够的军事保障能力，创立组织的四方基本可代表东亚多种安全利益，较少的创始者可提高组织的合作效率。四方合作的程度越高，提供的领导力越大，组织的权威性越强。
- ◆ “中美俄东盟安全合作组织”的地理界限定在东亚和大洋洲；议题应限制于安全问题之内，以传统安全问题为主，非传统安全问题为辅；新成员须接受该组织已有的合作规则。

建立“中美俄东盟安全合作组织”

2010年以来，东亚安全形势趋于动荡，新老安全问题不断涌现。然而，东亚现有的地区安全合作机制面对这些安全问题时却无所作为。事实上，自冷战结束以来，东亚国家在建立多边安全合作机制方面进行了多次尝试，然而到目前为止，这些尝试要么濒于失效，要么无果而终，要么沦为“清谈馆”。我们认为，这些努力失败的根本原因在于区域内大国未能充分合作，共同发挥有效的领导作用。有鉴于此，我们主张东亚区域内的大国联合起来，建立一个更具权威和效力的地区安全合作机制：“中美俄东盟安全合作组织”。这一新组织既能适应东亚当前以及未来的权力分配格局，也能更有效地应对东亚的安全问题。

一、东亚进入安全问题集中爆发期

2010年对于东亚地区来说是一个“多事之年”，从东北亚到东南亚，各类国际安全冲突不断。2011年第一季度，东亚仍然继续着上一年度安全问题频发的势头。诸多迹象表明，东亚正在进入一个安全问题日益突显的时期。

诸多迹象表明，
东亚正在进入一个安全
问题日益突显的时期。

（一）美对台军售破坏中美军事互信

2010年伊始，美国对台军售严重破坏了中美军事互信关系，致使两国关系有所倒退。1月30日，美国政府不顾中方的多次交涉，宣布对台出售“黑鹰”直升机、“爱国者-3”反导系统、扫雷艇等总额近64亿美元的武器装备。中国外交部对此做出强烈反应，除向美方提出严正抗议外，还决定推迟中美两军部分交流项目，推迟双方拟于2010年上半年举行的副部长级战略安全、军控与防扩散等磋商，并对参与售台武器的美国公司实施相关制裁。中美在有关重要国际与地区问题上的合作也不可避免地受到了影响。美国此次对台军售导致中美军事交流中断，使本就脆弱的中美两军互信关系再次遭到严重破坏。

（二）韩朝冲突使半岛局势剑拔弩张

在东北亚，朝鲜半岛局势持续恶化，朝韩双方剑拔弩张，形势一度非常紧张。2010年3月26日，韩国“天安”号警戒舰在朝韩争议海域发生爆炸沉没。5月20日，韩国经调查后指认该舰

系由朝鲜潜艇发射的鱼雷击沉。朝鲜当即拒绝接受这一调查结果，并要求派团赴韩调查。5月25日，朝鲜宣布针对韩国的八项制裁措施，实际上断绝了双方的一切对话与往来。6月4日，韩国正式将此事提交联合国安理会讨论，并与美国通过显示战争决心的方式回击朝鲜。7月21日，美韩举行2+2（双方的外交部长和国防部长）会谈，决定在未来数月举行十余次联合海上演习。美国国务卿希拉里会后声称，美方近期无意恢复六方会谈。

11月23日，正在举行“护国军演”的韩国军队在延坪岛向有争议的“北方界线”海域发射了数十枚炮弹。朝鲜人民军发炮还击，造成韩国军民多人伤亡。美国迅即表态支持韩国，谴责朝鲜的冒险行为。美、韩、日三国还拒绝中国关于迅速举行六方会谈代表团长紧急磋商的提议，并于12月6日在华盛顿召开三国外长会议。会后发表的联合声明重申，重启六方会谈需朝鲜认真努力改善与韩国关系，采取具体行动以显示其无核化承诺。12月16-20日，美国新墨西哥州州长理查森以“私人身份”访问朝鲜，说服朝鲜不要对美韩的军事演习做出实质性反应，此后本轮朝鲜半岛紧张局势才逐渐缓和下来。

（三）南海问题引发新的主权争议

在东南亚，南海问题自2009年以来有所升温，并因美国的高调介入而越发复杂起来。随着中国综合国力的迅速提升，以及中国维护海洋领土权益力度的增强，东盟有关国家担心南海地区的权力格局向有利中国的方向发展。因此，自2009年以来，一些国家（尤其是越南）试图通过“主动出击”的做法不断图谋蚕食南海争议岛屿和相关资源，强化自己在南海问题上的主动权，以迫使中国接受既成事实。2009年4月25日，越南任命某官员出任“黄沙岛县”主席，7月24日，又任命越海军第146旅副旅长为“长沙县”（中国称南沙）副主席，以分别宣示对中国西沙和南沙群岛“拥有”主权。同年5月6日，越南联合马来西亚向联合国划界委员会提交了两国在南海南部200海里以外大陆架的划界方案，次日又单独提交了一份在南海中部部分地区的外大陆架划界方案。

2010年7月23日，美国国务卿希拉里在越南参加东盟地区论坛外长会议时声称，南海的自由通行权攸关美国和东盟各国国家利益，希望南海争议各方切勿威胁或实际使用武力。这一貌似公允的讲话实际上是在攻击中国，并暗中支持越南在南海问题上的立场。杨洁篪外长当场通过提问方式对希拉里的讲话予以回击，并阐述了中方的立场和主张。

（四）钓鱼岛事件使中日关系严重下滑

在东海，“扣船扣人”事件使中日钓鱼岛争端再次爆发，两国关系严重下滑。2010年9月7日，一艘中国渔船在钓鱼岛海域与日本海上保安厅巡逻船相撞后被日方扣留。次日，日方以涉嫌“妨碍执行公务”为由，逮捕了中国船长詹其雄。10日，日本冲绳县地方法院批准拘留詹其雄10天。13日和15日，日方分别放回非法扣留的14名渔民和渔船，但坚持扣留中方船长并启动所

谓“司法程序”。19日，日方宣布对詹其雄延长扣押10日。中国对日本企图以国内法审理此案的做法提出强烈抗议，并宣布了一系列反制措施。24日，迫于各方强大压力，日方释放了詹其雄。2011年2月10日，日本海上保安厅向詹其雄索赔1429万日元，以作为两艘巡逻船的修理费用。12日，中国外交部发言人表示，日方无权向中方船长提出所谓的赔偿要求。“撞船”事件表明，日本企图以国内法起诉中方船长的方式来否认钓鱼岛是两国争议领土，其在中日领土争端问题上的立场趋于强硬。

（五）岛屿之争使俄日关系陷入僵局

俄日在南千岛群岛（日本称北方四岛）归属问题上又起龃龉，双方关系严重恶化。2010年11月1日，俄罗斯总统梅德韦杰夫登上南千岛群岛的国后岛视察，这是俄罗斯国家元首首次视察俄日之间存在争议的岛屿。2011年2月7日，日本右翼分子聚集在俄罗斯驻日使馆门外示威，并侮辱了俄罗斯国旗。2月10日，俄“青年近卫军”组织以在日本驻俄使馆门前示威的方式迎接日本外相原诚司的来访。俄日两国外长的会谈几乎是不欢而散。俄罗斯外长拉夫罗夫在新闻发布会上强硬地指出：“当激进的做法在日本占上风时，就此问题进行对话变得毫无意义。”另外，俄罗斯决定加强在南千岛群岛的军事力量，给驻岛部队配备新型武器，以推进军事现代化。

（六）柏威夏寺问题引发泰柬武装冲突

东盟内部也不平静。2011年2月初，柬埔寨和泰国就柏威夏寺归属问题发生激烈的武装冲突，双方互有伤亡。柬埔寨总理洪森声称，由于两国发生了真正的战争，因此柬方不再与泰方举行双边会谈，而是要求联合国安理会召开紧急会议讨论此事。柬方还希望联合国在这一地区设立缓冲区，并派驻维和部队。泰国则反对联合国的介入，声称解决这一冲突不需要第三方。有意思的是，一方面，两国都没有把东盟的介入与斡旋作为解决双边冲突的第一选择。另一方面，东盟轮值主席国印尼外长马蒂·纳塔莱加瓦在2月8日表示，泰柬边界纠纷问题复杂，东盟难以发挥影响，只能通过双边会晤和谈判解决这一问题，东盟可帮助双方创造有利于解决问题的形势。

上述安全问题的凸现甚至是激化与近年来东亚地区大国实力对比迅速改变密切相联，如果没有一个以传统安全为核心议题的地区安全机制进行管理，未来3-5年内地区安全冲突仍可能不断增加。这不禁使我们要问，现有的东亚的地区安全合作机制为什么在上述问题上难以有所作为？

二、东亚多边安全合作缺乏效力

自1991年柬埔寨战争结束以来，东亚国家就开始尝试建立多边安全合作机制。自上世纪90年代中期以来，东亚国家提出并尝试了多种安全合作机制，但无一获得稳定而持久的成功。按照组织者领导力、成员数量/代表性和议题针对性三

自上世纪90年代中期以来，东亚国家提出并尝试了多种安全合作机制，但无一获得稳定而持久的成功。

个指标，这些机制可划分为：领导无力型、议题不专型和代表性不强型三大类。

（一）领导无力型

领导无力是指该机制由小国主导，大国作为参与者但不提供领导作用。这一类型又可分为两个亚型：一是“无力落实”型的东盟地区论坛和东盟防长扩大会议（由东盟十国和中国、美国、俄罗斯、日本、印度、韩国、澳大利亚等八国的国防部长参加，简称东盟10+8防长会）；二是“无力持续”型的六方会谈。

领导无力是指该机制由小国主导，大国作为参与者但不提供领导作用。这一类型又可分为两个亚型：一是“无力落实”型，二是“无力持续”型。

1. 无力落实型。“无力落实”是指该机制在讨论安全问题时能达成多项共识，但是领导者无力去落实这些共识。东盟地区论坛是冷战后由东盟发起、组织和主导的亚太地区规模最大的多边安全合作机制，其组织形式和活动机制完全按照“东盟方式”来运作，美、中、俄等大国是论坛的参与者而非领导者。“东盟方式”强调成员国通过对话协商、耐心渐进、实用主义和协商一致的方式开展合作，坚持不使用武力处理成员国之间的冲突和地区争端、不干涉成员国内政、协商一致地处理内部和地区问题等原则。1995年的东盟地区论坛会议确定了“三步走”的发展战略，即第一阶段建立信任措施，第二阶段开展预防性外交，第三阶段实施冲突管理。十六年来，东盟地区论坛在建立信任措施方面取得了较大的成绩，共开发并实施了51个建立信任措施项目。

然而，东盟地区论坛长期停留在建立信任措施阶段，无法过渡到预防性外交阶段，原因在于论坛坚持要求所有成员国一致同意才能实现阶段过渡，而论坛成员国始终无法就预防性外交问题达到一致意见。1996年以后，新加坡、泰国、菲律宾等东盟国家极力推动论坛向预防性外交方向发展。美国、日本、澳大利亚、加拿大等西方国家呼吁论坛绕过关于预防性外交定义、范围、对象等理论性问题的探讨，立即着手建立地区冲突预防机制。但中国、缅甸、越南、印度等国家反对这一做法，认为论坛的重点应继续放在深化建立信任措施上，同时积极对涉及预防性外交的理论问题进行探讨，使论坛循序渐进地向前发展。因此，论坛在向预防性外交过渡方面陷入了两难境地。如果继续采取无约束力的“东盟方式”运作，的确能使一些国家感到“舒适”，但势必会影响论坛的进程，引起一些国家的不满；如果加快推进预防性外交，将一些具体政治安全问题引入论坛，则必然会引起其他一些国家的反对，甚至以退出论坛相要挟，进而影响论坛的正常运行。

更为重要的是，论坛也无力应对成员国之间的安全问题。东盟地区论坛对任何地区安全问题都只是进行讨论，而不采取解决问题的具体措施。在不干涉成员国内政和共识决策的组织原则下，论坛甚至不能对某些国家有损地区或国际安全的做法进行谴责。比如，1998年印度和巴基斯坦进行核试验后，美国、澳大利亚和加拿大等国都希望论坛强烈谴责印巴两国，但印度提出指责

成员国不符合论坛的组织原则。结果，论坛的主席声明只是对南亚的核试验表示严重关切和遗憾。又如，2001年中美发生撞机事件后，中国在当年的论坛会议上对美国的安全政策和行为提出了强烈批评，得到了其他成员国的支持和认同，但论坛并未就此事件采取任何外交行动。此外，尽管朝鲜和韩国都是论坛的成员国，但论坛从未对朝鲜核问题以及半岛安全形势进行过充分讨论并表明立场，所有的信任建立措施似乎都与朝鲜半岛无关。

2010年10月12日，首届东盟防长扩大会议在越南首都河内召开。实际上，东盟防长扩大会议不过是东盟地区论坛的翻版，成为有关国家国防部长交流意见、增信释疑的论坛，而且仅限于此。可以预见，东盟防长扩大会议将是东亚地区的又一个关于多边安全合作的“清谈馆”。

2. 无力持续型。“无力持续”是指由于没有大国承担领导责任，决议因而无法落实以致合作机制破裂。这类机制比“无力落实”型机制的作用还小，连形式上的存在都无法维持。2003年8月以来，旨在解决朝鲜核问题的六方会谈一共进行了六轮谈判，但会谈既未能促使朝鲜弃核，也未能实现朝美关系正常化。朝鲜反而在2006年和2009年两次进行核试验，正式跨过了核门槛，并于2009年4月退出六方会谈。

朝鲜退出六方会谈是因为其未能实现当初参加会谈的目标。2002年朝鲜宣布要发展核武器，希望与美国进行双边会谈。美国对此坚决拒绝，并提出会谈应包含所有相关国家。两国最后同意采取六方会谈的方式，同时决定在六方会谈机制内举行朝美直接会谈。所以，朝鲜参加六方会谈是为了以“弃核”为诱饵，实现朝美关系正常化。因此，在2003年8月第一轮六方会谈达成的四点共识中，“以和平方式实现半岛无核化与有必要解决朝鲜对安全的忧虑”是其中的两点。朝鲜认为，平衡推进这两点是朝鲜继续参加六方会谈的前提。

在2005年9月19日第四轮会谈第二阶段会谈达成的《第四轮六方会谈共同声明》（亦称《9.19共同声明》）中，朝鲜承诺放弃一切核武器及现有核计划，早日重返《不扩散核武器条约》，并接受国际原子能机构的保障监督。美国确认，美国在朝鲜半岛没有核武器，无意以核武器或常规武器攻击或入侵朝鲜。朝鲜和美国承诺将采取步骤实现关系正常化。国际社会尊重朝鲜和平利用核能的权利，同意在适当时候讨论为朝鲜提供轻水反应堆的问题。9月20日，朝鲜外务省发言人发表声明称，朝鲜将在美国提供轻水反应堆之后才能重返《不扩散核武器条约》并接受国际原子能机构的安全保障监督。对此，美国国务院表示，在朝鲜放弃核武器、重返《不扩散核武器条约》并履行安全保障措施协定前，任何国家都不能与其开展民用核合作。美方的这一表态实际上使朝鲜认为美国是想先让朝鲜弃核，然后视情况（但并不保证）与朝鲜进行合作。

尽管在2006年2月13日通过的《第五轮六方会谈第三阶段会议共同文件》（亦称《2.13共同文件》）中，朝鲜争取到了“行动对行动”原则，即朝鲜分阶段弃核与朝美、朝日关系分阶段正常化同时进行。然而，美国不但在美朝关系正常化进程上止步不前，而且总想以经济援助或制裁来引诱或强迫朝鲜“弃核”，从而把原本的安全保障问题转化为经济援助问题，而这一点朝鲜是决不答应的。因此，为了获得稳固的核能力，朝鲜于2006年10月9日进行了第一次核试验，从而有

了在六方会谈中进退自如的资本。

总之，朝鲜参加六方会谈就是为了获得安全保障，实现朝美关系正常化。核武器是其实现这一目标的工具，六方会谈则是其实现这一目标的渠道。当朝鲜发现六方会谈只谈“弃核”、不谈安全保障时，最终选择了跨越核门槛并退出了会谈机制。

（二）议题不专型

“议题不专”是指在一个机制内讨论政治、经济、安全（包括非传统安全）等多种议题，而且安全议题也不是主要议题。亚太经合组织和东亚峰会属于这一类型。这一类型的机制最容易达成原则性共识，原因在于议题领域不受限，于是总可以在一些无关紧要的问题上达到一些无需落实的原则共识。亚太经合组织是亚太地区重要的多边经济合作机制。从1989年到1999年的十年间，该组织的活动主要围绕促进地区经济增长、推进全球多边贸易体制发展、实现各成员的共同繁荣等经济领域的合作与交流展开，并没有触及地区安全问题。

1999年9月的奥克兰会议前夕，东帝汶局势引起亚太经合组织成员国的高度关注。在美、加、澳等国地强烈推动下，东道主新西兰提出以外长非正式会议的形式讨论东帝汶问题，但不将其纳入正式议题。也就是说，此次外长非正式会议是借用亚太经合组织会议的机会，在会外举行的一次有关地区安全问题的讨论。2001年10月上海会议前发生了9·11事件，打击恐怖主义成为国际关系中最为突出的问题。东道主中国提议以外长早餐会的形式讨论反恐问题，并在此基础上以领导人午餐会形式进行非正式讨论，这些提议得到了各方支持。此次会议之后还发表了《领导人反恐声明》。2002年10月洛斯卡沃斯会议期间，与会领导人就深化反恐合作进行了专门讨论。东道主墨西哥外长还主持召开了外长晚餐会，就朝核等问题展开讨论并在会下进行了磋商。领导人还就反恐和朝核问题分别发表了单独声明。

可以看出，安全问题不是亚太经合组织的固定议题。在讨论安全问题时，亚太经合组织仍采取“一事一议”的办法，坚持自主自愿、协商一致的合作方式，而且会议最后文件也不具有法律约束力，各成员只是在政治和道义上有责任尽力予以实施。所以，亚太经合组织对地区安全问题的讨论不过是蜻蜓点水或浅尝辄止，缺乏实质意义。

东亚峰会是东盟倡议召开、涵盖“10+3”国家和印度、澳大利亚和新西兰三国的首脑会议。从2005年至今，东亚峰会一共召开了五次，所讨论的议题十分广泛，包括应对禽流感、救灾、可持续发展、经济、能源、文化、教育合作、气候变化、朝核问题等。地区安全问题只是东亚峰会的诸多议题之一，而且不是每届峰会的固定议题。由于东亚峰会仍由东盟主导并采取“东盟方式”，所以其对地区安全问题的讨论只具有观点交流和政治表态的作用。

（三）代表性不强型

“代表性不强”是指该安全合作机制缺少关键一方、特别是关键大国的参与。“胎死腹中”的美日澳印四国同盟和“若隐若现”的美日韩三边安全合作都属于这一类型。这类安全机制具有

“自我娱乐”的性质。由没有重大安全利益冲突的国家组成安全合作机制，一起讨论与非成员国安全利益冲突问题，于是总能就无法落实的共识达成一致看法。

2006年，时任日本首相安倍晋三提出了日本新的地区战略对话机制构想：“美日澳印四国同盟”。2007年5月，日本政府邀请美国、澳大利亚和印度三国在马尼拉的东盟地区论坛会议上举行局级磋商，但是澳大利亚和印度对这一建议却并不热心，美国的态度也比较谨慎。在8月初举行的东盟地区论坛外长会上，日本外交官继续努力游说美、印、澳三国，但没有成功，这一设想最终“胎死腹中”。四国同盟机制未能建成的主要原因在于澳大利亚和印度担心中国对这一机制强烈不满，因而态度消极。这一设想在日本国内也遭遇了强烈的批评声音。日本前驻华大使阿南惟茂就表示，组建四国战略同盟“绝非是高明的外交政策”，这样的外交姿态只能引起中国的担忧。他认为日本政府应该从战略高度重视发展日中友好关系。日本共同社亦指出，在忽略中国意愿的情况下组建亚太地区的多边安全框架并不现实。

迄今为止，美日韩三边安全合作并非一个成型的安全合作机制。2010年12月7日，为了应对“延坪岛炮击”事件后的朝鲜半岛危机，美国、韩国和日本三国外长在华盛顿举行会谈，并发表了联合公报。现在还不清楚三国是否会将这一会谈定期化、机制化。即使三国日后确实建立起这样的安全合作机制，那也是一个代表性不强的机制，因为中国没有参加进来。没有中国的参与，这一机制不可能有效应对朝核问题及其他地区安全问题。

三、东亚多边安全合作机制无效的原因

一个成功的地区多边安全合作机制需要同时具备以下三个条件：一是初始成员较少，以减少利益不一致性，便于达成合作协议；二是议题严格限定在安全领域，防止议题“泛化”使机制失去发展方向；三是区域内军事大国联合提供军事保障实力。东亚现有的多边安全合作机制均不同时具备上述三个条件，因此失效甚至失败难以避免。

一个成功的地区多边安全合作机制需要同时具备以下三个条件：一是初始成员较少，以减少利益不一致性，便于达成合作协议；二是议题严格限定在安全领域，防止议题“泛化”使机制失去发展方向；三是区域内军事大国联合提供军事保障实力。

（一）成员过多且不分主次则无落实共识的领导力

“无力落实”型的东盟地区论坛是一个拥有27个成员的安全合作机制，主要讨论地区安全问题，包括非传统安全问题，因此议题的针对性较强，但不符合另外两个条件。东盟地区论坛初始成员过多，第一届论坛举办时就有16个国家参加，包括东盟6国、7个对话伙伴国和3个观察员国。此外，这一机制涉及地域范围过大，其成员来自整个亚太地区，甚至还包括欧盟这样的区域外组织。成员过多使论坛有关安全问题的讨论难以深入，决策十分困难。区域外成员的加入则使

论坛承担了过多的安全责任。比如，论坛曾经讨论过印巴核试验问题，这显然不是一个与东亚安全相关的事件。

区域内军事大国不愿承担领导责任，而由小国组成的东盟只能提供较弱的领导力，这是东盟地区论坛目前正在沦为“清谈馆”的最主要原因。冷战结束初期，东盟既担心美国减少在东亚地区的责任，又担心中国的崛起。为此，东盟倡导建立东盟地区论坛旨在拖住美国，同时约束和改造中国。东盟地区论坛在信任措施建立方面的成就，及其向预防性外交阶段过渡的失败都与美、中两国对论坛的有限支持密不可分。

美国对东盟地区论坛兴趣冷淡、消极支持。冷战结束以来，美国的东亚战略是以双边军事同盟为主，多边安全对话为辅。在1995年的《东亚安全战略报告》中，美国首次将建设性地参与并支持该地区的安全对话作为国家安全政策的一个新因素，主张建立美国主导的多边安全机制。美国一度努力推动论坛的机制化发展，力图使其成为美国持续介入东亚地区事务的新框架。但在“东盟方式”的制度框架下，美国的权力优势不能转化为主导和控制论坛议题的制度性权力。因此，美国后来对东盟地区论坛的兴趣日减。小布什总统上台后强调单边主义和先发制人，9•11事件后又将美国的战略重心转向反恐，而东盟地区论坛在反恐问题上缺乏实质性措施，这使得美国政府对这一机制的态度更加消极。时任国务卿赖斯甚至在2005年和2007年两次缺席东盟地区论坛外长会议。尽管2010年奥巴马政府高调“重返亚洲”，但美国更注重的是加强与东盟成员国的双边关系，而对东盟地区论坛则只字未提。总的来说，美国对论坛采取一种“消极支持、可有可无”的态度，既不主动推进也不蓄意阻挠论坛的发展。

中国坚决维护东盟的主导地位，既可以防止论坛变成其他大国掌握的工具，也意味着不必承担领导责任，以免为“中国威胁论”提供口实，这符合中国“韬光养晦、有所作为”的外交原则。中国对东盟地区论坛采取选择性支持的立场，即积极支持建立信任措施，但反对采取预防性外交行动。据统计，在论坛收到的51项建立信任措施提案中，中国和美国的提案次数均为9次，并列第一。自1997年以来，中国几乎每年都要主办一次以上的第一轨道外交活动，内容多与军事安全和国防事务有关。2002年，中国向论坛提交了新安全观立场文件。新安全观以“互信、互利、平等、协作”为核心，符合论坛倡导的“共同安全”理念。然而，一旦涉及预防性外交和领土主权问题，中国就变得谨慎和犹疑起来。中国不赞成论坛采取预防性外交行动，只同意论坛对预防性外交的概念、理论等问题进行探讨，并以“不干涉别国内政”为由反对论坛讨论台湾和南沙群岛主权问题。

（二）无大国承担落实协议的领导责任致使机制破裂

“无力持续”型的六方会谈包括了与朝核问题直接相关的六个国家，因此其成员数量合适。该机制旨在解决朝鲜核问题，而不讨论其他地区安全问题，所以议题的针对性很强。六方会谈失败的主要原因是中美俄三个军事大国都不愿承担落实协议的领导责任，特别是美国。

朝鲜核问题产生的主要原因是朝鲜担心美国对其进行军事打击，而核武器可以给予其“绝对

安全”感。朝鲜要求与美国举行旨在促进朝美关系正常化的双边会谈，希望六方会谈保证双边关系正常化进程和“弃核”进程同时推进。美国是朝核问题的两个主要当事人之一，却不愿承担解决这一问题的领导责任。特别是在达成初步协议后，美国不愿承担落实协议的领导责任，力图把这一责任推卸给中国，而自己却在承诺不侵犯朝鲜和朝美关系正常化方面拒绝采取实质性步骤。中国与俄罗斯均认为朝核问题是美国制造的安全问题，因此也无意承担领导责任。中国力图保持中立，声称自己充当六方会谈的东道主和桥梁，发挥居中斡旋的作用，但不愿意承担进一步的安全责任，比如公开承诺中朝同盟条约继续有效，或向违反六方会谈决议的某一方采取制裁行动。俄罗斯现在也不公开承诺俄朝同盟条约继续有效。这样一来，美中俄三大国均要求朝鲜弃核，却都回避了向其提供安全保障的问题。

在这种情况下，朝鲜认为再谈下去其安全也得不到保障，反而有被解除核武装的危险，于是朝鲜决定铤而走险，发展核武器，退出了六方会谈。由于没有军事大国承担落实协议的领导责任，六方会谈的结果是小国朝鲜投下自己的“否决票”，致使机制全面破裂。

（三）不同性质的议题纠缠在一起使安全问题更加难以解决

“议题分散”型的亚太经合组织和东亚峰会几乎不具备上述三个条件的任何一个。亚太经合组织和东亚峰会均成员众多（分别为21个和17个），且包括东亚区域外的成员。亚太经合组织是一个经济合作组织，东亚峰会则旨在推动东亚一体化进程，实现东亚共同体。因此，两个机制都不是专门针对地区安全问题而设立的。亚太经合组织间或讨论安全问题，东亚峰会虽然讨论安全问题，但只是作为议题之一，因此安全问题在两个机制中均不具备突出的重要性。

不同性质的议题混在一起，很可能发生纠缠、挂钩、相互影响，容易分散成员国在机制内解决问题的注意力。此外，经济合作问题在上述两个机制中都占据重要位置，各成员有可能为促进经济合作而牺牲安全合作。所以，两个机制在讨论安全问题时多是泛泛而谈。再加上两者都采取协商一致的原则，军事大国在其中并无突出的权威和领导作用，因此这两个机制均难以有效推动地区安全合作。

（四）主要军事大国的缺席使决议和共识没有意义

“代表性不强”型的美日澳印四国同盟和美日韩三边安全合作虽然其成员数量较少，易于决策，议题的针对性强，而且美国可以提供强大的领导力，但它们最大的问题是没有把东亚另外两个军事大国中国和俄罗斯吸纳进来。在东亚地区，任何多边安全合作机制都不能缺少美国、中国、俄罗斯三个大国。虽然美国可为四国同盟和美日韩三边安全合作提供领导力，但两个机制均未将中国和俄罗斯包括在内，当讨论涉及中国或俄罗斯安全利益的问题时，美国并不能替中国和俄罗斯做出决定。

自第二次世界大战结束以来，美国尝试在东亚建立多边军事同盟的努力从未成功过。冷战后，东亚地区大国之间安全冲突的严重程度明显弱于冷战时期，因此美国试图建立以自己为中心

的多边军事同盟缺乏现实动力。此外，美国连把自己军事盟友统合为一个多边安全同盟的能力都没有，试图建立一个以自己为中心并包括非军事盟友在内的安全合作机制就更不可能了。即使建立了这样的安全合作机制，也无法保障地区安全，原因在于被排除在外的军事大国不可能接受该机制的决议。

四、建立“中美俄东盟安全合作组织”的构想

在综合考虑成员数量/代表性、议题针对性和组织者领导力等三方面因素后，我们提出东亚应当建立由中、美、俄、东盟（十个东盟国家派出一位代表）四方组成的安全合作组织。

从以上分析可以看出，现有的东亚多边安全合作机制均没有同时具备三个成功条件，其中最根本的问题是军事大国不能提供领导力，使合作机制缺乏权威性。当一个地区安全机制没有权威时，它就丧失了行动能力。小国虽然可以提供领导，但缺乏持续能力。单独一个或少数大国虽然也能提供领导，但在其他大国不参与、不配合、甚至抵制的情况下，也无法达到目的。在综合考虑成员数量/代表性、议题针对性和组织者领导力等三方面因素后，我们提出东亚应当建立由中、美、俄、东盟（十个东盟国家派出一位代表）四方组成的安全合作组织。这一组织符合上述三个条件，有望比较有效地弥补现有安全合作机制的缺陷，因而未来成功的可能性更大（参见表1）。

导，但在其他大国不参与、不配合、甚至抵制的情况下，也无法达到目的。在综合考虑成员数量/代表性、议题针对性和组织者领导力等三方面因素后，我们提出东亚应当建立由中、美、俄、东盟（十个东盟国家派出一位代表）四方组成的安全合作组织。这一组织符合上述三个条件，有望比较有效地弥补现有安全合作机制的缺陷，因而未来成功的可能性更大（参见表1）。

表1 东亚多边安全合作机制比较

	初始成员数量	利益代表性	地理范围	议题针对性	机构领导力
东盟地区论坛 (东盟防长扩大会议)	过多	充分	过大	集中	弱
六方会谈	适中	充分	适度	集中	弱
亚太经合组织	过多	充分	过大	分散	弱
东亚峰会	过多	充分	过大	分散	弱
四国同盟	适中	缺乏	缺乏地理联系	集中	较强
美日韩三边安全合作	适中	缺乏	适度	集中	强
中美俄东盟安全合作组织	适中	适中	适度	集中	强

（一）“中美俄东盟安全合作组织”具备成功的三个条件

“中美俄东盟安全合作组织”的初始成员数量适中而且代表性强。虽然只有四个成员，但这一组织实际上可以覆盖整个东亚地区。东亚每个国家都可以在其中找到自己的利益代表。美国在东亚地区的盟国（日本、韩国、菲律宾、泰国）可以由美国代表，东南亚国家可以由东盟代表，朝鲜、蒙古等国家可以由中国或俄罗斯代表。这样既保证了组织的覆盖面，又大大减少了组织的成员数量，便于四方磋商和决策。东盟代表东南亚国家的集体利益，这样可减少因东盟国家内部意见不和对地区安全合作进程的影响。

“中美俄东盟安全合作组织”的议题集中于传统安全问题。这一组织专为应对东亚区域内的重大安全问题而设计，不讨论政治、经济和文化等其他事务。作为军事大国，中美俄可以提供足够强大的军事力量维护地区安全，这就为地区安全合作提供了必要的物质力量。就针对性而言，六方会谈只讨论朝核问题，缺少对东亚区域安全的战略稳定作用，而其他东亚安全机制讨论的问题又过于宽泛，不能集中于地区重大安全问题之上。“中美俄东盟安全合作组织”则将合作领域限于重大安全问题，防止因合作领域“泛化”而削弱合作的效率。

“中美俄东盟安全合作组织”的领导力以强大的军事力量为后盾。中国、美国、俄罗斯和东盟分别可以在合作中发挥领导作用。作为三个核大国，中美俄合作可防止核战争的发生。作为快速崛起的国家和世界唯一的超级大国，中美合作可防止因地区利益冲突而爆发大国战争。中美合作还可以管理美国与非美国盟友之间，以及中国与美国盟友之间的冲突。东盟则可以协调东盟国家的内部关系，并配合中美两国管理东盟区域内的安全问题。当然，“中美俄东盟安全合作组织”能够提供强大的领导力还有赖于中美俄三大国精诚合作。三国合作程度越高，其能提供的领导力越大。

（二）其他替代性设想的缺陷

我们之所以将其设计为“中美俄东盟安全合作组织”而不是其他形式的大国协调机制，比如“中美协调”、“中美俄协调”、“中美日俄+东盟”、“美日+东盟”，主要有如下几点考虑。

首先，“中美协调”是双边机制，可以应对与中、美两国均直接相关的安全问题，比如朝鲜核问题，却无法有效处理与中国或美国间接相关的安全问题，比如南海、北方四岛和日韩岛屿争端等问题。南海问题与中国直接相关，但与美国间接相关，而且东盟国家并不太愿意让美国直接插手此事。俄日之间的北方四岛归属问题和韩日之间的独（竹）岛争端显然也无法由中美协调来解决。另外，虽然俄罗斯的外交重点是欧洲而不是东亚，但其毕竟是跨欧亚大陆的大国，对东北亚局势仍具有一定的影响力，所以把俄罗斯排除在外并不合适。

其次，“中美俄协调”虽然把东亚地区的三大国均囊括在内，但忽视了东盟作为一个重要地区组织的存在。冷战结束二十年来，东盟一直作为地区一体化和多边安全合作的领头羊，具备一定的领导能力和协调能力，而且有些地区安全问题的解决必须要有东盟的参与，比如南海问题。

第三，“中美日俄+东盟”比我们设想的“中美俄东盟安全合作组织”多出一个日本。然而日本只是一个经济强国并不是军事强国，而且又是美国的亲密盟国，迄今在国防事务上日本没有完全的自主性，因此不能为任何东亚地区安全合作机制提供军事力量，而且其安全利益基本上可以由美国来代表。另外，在“中美日俄+东盟”机制中，美国和日本安全利益的高度同质性会导致机制利益代表性的失衡，使美日一方占据上风，从而不利于大国之间的合作和领导力的形成。

第四、“美日+东盟”。这一设想虽然考虑到了东盟

迄今在国防事务上日本没有完全的自主性，因此不能为任何东亚地区安全合作机制提供军事力量，而且其安全利益基本上可以由美国来代表。

的重要性，但由于未把中国和俄罗斯涵盖在内，所以无法实现地区军事大国之间的合作。实际上，这一设想与美日澳印四国同盟或美日韩三边合作一样缺乏代表性，具有相同的天然缺陷。

（三）建立“中美俄东盟安全合作组织”的具体设想

对于组织规模、方式、议题和进程，我们的考虑是：“中美俄东盟安全合作组织”的地理界限定在东亚和大洋洲，不能扩展到南亚、中亚和拉美。这一限制既有利于“中美俄东盟安全合作组织”集中于东亚的安全问题，也有利于四方发挥领导力。新成员加入的条件是接受组织已有的合作规则。“中美俄东盟安全合作组织”每年召开两次高官会，一次外长+防长会、一次首脑会议。

“中美俄东盟安全合作组织”的地理界限定在东亚和大洋洲，不能扩展到南亚、中亚和拉美。在议题设置上，“中美俄东盟安全合作组织”应以传统安全问题为主要议题，以非传统安全议题为辅助议题。

在议题设置上，“中美俄东盟安全合作组织”应以传统安全问题为主要议题，以非传统安全议题为辅助议题。东亚地区的传统安全问题较多，包括领土划界问题、岛屿归属问题、海洋权益问题、核扩散问题、对非主权政治实体出售武器问题、大规模杀伤性武器扩散问题、部署反导系统问题、海上航道安全问题、军事演习问题、军事互信问题、空中军事侦察问题、太空非武器化问题、清除地雷问题等。这些问题应成为“中美俄东盟安全合作组织”的主要议题。

在时间进程上，我们考虑按照如下三个阶段推进“中美俄东盟安全合作组织”的建设：

第一阶段：启动阶段（第1-2年）

第1年召开非正式磋商会议，由四方的高官协商合作原则、方式、内容等具体问题。与此同时，四方还可召开由学者参加的“二轨”会议。

第2年正式启动官方合作进程，四方继续协商有关合作事项。

第二阶段：机制化阶段（第3-5年）

第3年建立秘书处，实现初步机制化。秘书处可考虑设在东盟某国。

第4年由安全合作机制过渡到安全合作组织，实现进一步机制化。四方就该组织的规章制度进行磋商。

第5年制订组织规章制度，继续深化合作力度。

第三阶段：扩展阶段（从第6年起）

从第6年起考虑接收新成员。吸纳原则为：首批新成员应是地区内的中等军事强国；新成员的加入不能破坏机制内利益代表性的平衡；新成员的加入不能削弱机制的领导力。

现有的东亚多边安全合作机制失效甚至失败的核心原因在于大国不能合作承担领导责任，致使这些机制均缺乏权威性。我们构想的“中美俄东盟安全合作组织”可以有效解决现有东亚地区安全机制领导力不足和权威性缺乏的问题，推动中国、美国和俄罗斯真正携手起来，为东亚安全提供更加切实的保障。

Highlights ...

- ◆ Since the end of the Cold War, efforts to establish a multilateral security framework in East Asia have generally failed, most being reduced to mere theoretical conversations with no concrete progress.
- ◆ The reason that attempts to establish a multilateral East Asia security framework have failed is that the key military powers in the region have not been able to cooperate in taking a leadership role. As a result, frameworks lack legitimacy and remain unwieldy.
- ◆ A successful multilateral framework for security cooperation must meet the following three criteria: leadership based on military power; an initial group of members that is limited in size but broadly representative of the region; and a finite scope, limited issues and an agenda for cooperation that cannot be easily expanded.
- ◆ This report recommends that China, the US, Russia and ASEAN establish a four party “China-US-Russia-ASEAN Security Cooperation Organization.” Together, the US, China and Russia have adequate military capacity to provide a security guarantee, while ASEAN represents the pluralistic security interests of the rest of the East Asian region. By having a small number of initial members, the effectiveness of the framework can be enhanced. The more extensive the cooperation, the stronger the leadership provided and the greater the legitimacy of the framework.
- ◆ Geographically, the “China-US-Russia-ASEAN Security Cooperation Organization” should be limited to East Asia and Oceania. Cooperation should be limited to security issues, with a primary emphasis on traditional security issues, and a secondary focus on non-traditional security issues. As a prerequisite requirement for accession, any new member should accept the Organization’s pre-existing cooperative institutions.

Toward a China-US-Russia-ASEAN Security Cooperation Organization

Since 2010, the security situation in East Asia has been chaotic, as existing security challenges as well as new challenges keep emerging. In the face of these challenges, regional security arrangements have been ineffective. While the states of East Asia have made numerous attempts to establish multilateral security structures since the end of the Cold War, these efforts have generally failed, most being reduced to only theoretical conversations with no concrete progress. We argue that this failure is rooted in the fact that the major regional powers have not been able to achieve full cooperation, and have not provided effective collective leadership. To resolve this issue, we urge that major powers in the region unite and establish a legitimate mechanism for regional coordination, the China-US-Russia-ASEAN Security Cooperation Organization. Such a mechanism can adapt to both the current and future distribution of power in East Asia, and can effectively respond to East Asia's security issues.

I. East Asia Enters a Period of Frequent Security Incidents

The year 2010 was a difficult year for East Asia. From Northeast Asia to Southeast Asia, there were continuous international security conflicts. During the first quarter of 2011, this general trend of a growing number of security issues has continued, and all incidents demonstrate that East Asia is developing into an increasingly volatile regional security situation.

All incidents demonstrate that East Asia is developing into an increasingly volatile regional security situation.

US Arms Sales to Taiwan Compromise US – China Military-to-Military Relations

At the beginning of 2010, US arms sales to Taiwan compromised US-China military relations, leading to a serious setback in relations between the two countries. On January 30, in defiance

of numerous diplomatic efforts by China, the US government announced the sales of Blackhawk helicopters, Patriot-3 anti-missile systems, minesweepers, and other military equipment valued at nearly 6.4 billion US dollars to Taiwan. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs made strong responses to the news of the sales by issuing a serious diplomatic protest, postponing a number of US-China joint military exchange programs, and delaying scheduled talks at the deputy Minister level on strategic security, arms control and non-proliferation. China also pledged to impose sanctions against the American companies selling weapons to Taiwan. Inevitably, US-China cooperation on important international and regional issues was rolled back following the weapons sales. The sales resulted in the severance of military dialogue between the two states, another serious blow to already fragile US-China military-to-military relations.

Conflicts between North and South Korea Fuel Tensions on the Korean Peninsula

In Northeast Asia, the situation on the Korean Peninsula continued to deteriorate, with both sides adopting a hard-line stance that led to serious tensions. On March 26, 2010, the South Korean naval patrol boat, the Cheonan sunk following an explosion which occurred in waters disputed by North and South Korea. On May 20th after an investigation, South Korea alleged that the patrol boat was sunk by a torpedo fired from a North Korean submarine. Upon release of this report, the DPRK rejected the results of the investigation and demanded to send a delegation to South Korea to conduct its own investigation. On May 25, North Korea announced a series of eight punitive measures against the South, effectively severing all ties and exchanges between the two sides. On June 4, South Korea officially presented the matter to the United Nations Security Council for discussion, and rebuked North Korea by illustrating along with the United States its resolve to go to war over the matter. On July 21, the US and South Korea conducted 2+2 discussions (between foreign ministers and between defense ministers), and decided to conduct a series of more than 10 joint naval exercises in the coming months. After the meeting, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that the United States had no intention of returning to six party talks any time in the near future.

On November 23, in the course of conducting military exercises, the South Korean army fired more than 10 shells from Yeonpyeong Island into disputed waters across the Northern Limit Line. The North Korean People's Army returned fire, injuring several ROK soldiers. The United States immediately expressed its support for South Korea, condemning North Korea's behavior as provocative. The United States, Korea and Japan went on to reject a proposal by China to immediately convene emergency talks by delegations from the Six Parties, and on December 6 held tripartite Foreign Ministers talks in Washington. The three parties issued a joint statement requiring that North Korea improve relations with South Korea as a pre-requisite to resuming the Six Party Talks, and that North Korea take concrete actions to honor its commitment of denuclearization.

From December 16-20, Bill Richardson, the governor of New Mexico, made an “unofficial visit” to North Korea to persuade the DPRK not to respond to the US-ROK military exercises, which finally brought about a gradual easing of the situation on the Korean Peninsula.

South China Sea Issue Provokes New Disputes over Sovereignty

Since 2009, tensions have increased over the South China Sea issue, which has become more complicated after the United States decided to take on a high profile role in the matter. As China’s total national power continues to increase at a rapid pace, and as its ability to protect its territorial interests at sea strengthens, ASEAN nations have become more concerned about the fact that the balance of power in the South China Sea is increasingly tilting in China’s favor. For this reason, since 2009, a number of countries, especially Vietnam, have attempted to “pre-empt” by continuously taking physical control of disputed islands and resources in the South China Sea. Such a strategy aims to strengthen Vietnam’s position in the South China Sea, and force China to accept their sovereignty fait accompli. On April 25, Vietnam designated an official as the Chairman of the “Huangsha Island County” and on July 24, it further designated the Deputy Brigade Commander of the 146th Brigade of the Vietnamese Navy as the Vice Chairman of “Spratly Islands” (known in Chinese as Nansha Islands) and announced that it “maintained” sovereignty over China’s Xisha and Nansha Islands. On May 6, Vietnam and Malaysia joined forces to submit to the United Nations Commission on Demarcation a plan for demarcation of the boundary between the two countries based on 200 nautical miles outside the outer limits of the continental shelf of the southern Nansha islands. The next day the countries individually submitted a demarcation plan for several regions in the central Nansha islands based on the outer limits of the continental shelf.

On July 23, 2010, the United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton claimed during a Minister’s meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Vietnam that the right to free passage through the South China Seas was a core interest of the nations of ASEAN and the United States, and that she hoped that the dispute would not be resolved with the use or the threat of use of force. This seemingly equitable comment actually represented a warning to China and tacit support of Vietnam’s position with respect to sovereignty over the Nansha Islands. Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi questioned Hillary Clinton’s statement on the spot and described China’s own position and its suggestions for the South China Sea.

Diaoyu Islands Incident Results in Serious Decline in China-Japan Relations

An incident involving the detention of a boat and its crew caused yet another dispute between China and Japan over the Diaoyu Islands, and relations between the two countries to suffer. On September 7, 2010, a Chinese fishing boat traveling in the sea adjacent to the Diaoyu Islands col-

lided with a Japanese patrol boat, and was detained by Japanese authorities. The next day, Japan arrested the boat's captain, Zhan Qixiong, charging him with "obstruction of official duties." On September 10, an Okinawa court approved the detention of Zhan for a period of 10 days. From the 13th through the 15th, Japan released a total of 14 fishermen that it had been holding in detention illegally, but continued to detain Captain Zhan while preparing for so-called judicial proceedings. On the 19th, Japan announced that it would extend the detention for a period of another 10 days. In response to Japan's attempt to try the case under Japanese law, China issued stern diplomatic protests, and announced a series of countermeasures against Japan. On the 24th, under tremendous pressure Japan finally released Zhan Qixiong. On February 10, 2011, the Japanese Coast Guard demanded that Zhan pay compensation in the amount of 14.29 million Japanese Yen for repairs to two patrol boats. On February 12, the Speaker for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied that Japan had no authority to request damages from the Chinese captain. Through the collision incident, Japan attempted to use its domestic law against the Chinese captain in order to reject the claim that the Diaoyu Islands are territory disputed by China and Japan. Japan continues to become more radical in its stance on the territorial dispute with China.

Dispute over Islands Lead to Setback in Russia-Japan Relations

Conflict between Russia and Japan over the sovereignty of the South Kurils (known in Japan as the Northern Islands) caused a serious deterioration of relations between the two countries. On November 1, 2010, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev became the first Russian head of state to visit the disputed South Kuril Islands by traveling to Kunashir Island. On February 7, 2011, a group of right wing Japanese protestors gathered in front of the Russian Embassy in Japan, defaming the Russian flag in protest. On February 10, the Russia Youth Guard Organization assembled in front of the Japanese Embassy in Russia, greeting the visiting Japanese Foreign Secretary Maehara with protest. The foreign ministers meeting between the two states later broke down in discord, the Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov taking a hard-line stance at a press conference noting that, "Territorial talks are meaningless as long as radical elements have the upper hand in Japan." In addition, Russia also planned to increase its military deployments on the South Kurils, arming its forces stationed on the islands with new weapons, and modernizing its forces in the region.

Preah Vihear Temple Issue Provokes Dispute between Cambodia and Thailand

Nor is there peace within ASEAN. In February of 2011, a violent conflict erupted between Cambodia and Thailand over the issue of sovereignty over the Preah Vihear Temple, with both sides suffering losses and casualties. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen announced that the two sides were at war and that Cambodia would no longer engage in bilateral talks with Thailand. He requested that the United Nations Security Council call upon an emergency session to discuss

resolution of the conflict. Cambodia further requested that the United Nations establish a buffer zone in the region and dispatch a peacekeeping force. Thailand opposed UN involvement in the conflict, claiming instead that it did not warrant the intervention of a third party. What is interesting is that neither country opted to invite ASEAN to intervene or mediate the bilateral conflict. Instead, on February 8, Marty Natalegawa, the Foreign Minister of Indonesia, the current Chair of ASEAN, noted that the conflict between Cambodia and Thailand is too complicated for ASEAN to play a role, and that the two parties might only resolve the issue through bilateral meetings and negotiations. In his view, ASEAN would only help create an atmosphere conducive to solution of the issue.

The prominence and intensity of the above security issues is closely related to change in the distribution of power among the major powers in East Asia which has occurred in recent years. Without the management of a regional security framework that places traditional security issues as its primary concern, it is extremely likely that regional security conflicts in the region will become more frequent in the coming 3 to 5 years. This makes us wonder why the existing regional security cooperation institutions have failed to play a role in resolving the above disputes.

II. Multilateral Security Cooperation in East Asia Lacks Effectiveness

Since the Cambodian War in 1991, East Asian countries have attempted to establish a multilateral mechanism for security cooperation. In the years since the mid-1990s, a number of multilateral security cooperation frameworks have been proposed and tested. However, none of them have experienced consistent and enduring success. When considered based on the three indicators: leadership, size/representativeness of membership and agenda, these frameworks can be classified as having weak leadership, as lacking a focused agenda for cooperation or as failing to represent the security interests of East Asia.

In the years since the mid-1990s, a number of multilateral security cooperation frameworks have been proposed and tested. However, none of them have experienced consistent and enduring success.

Weak Leadership

By weak leadership we mean that security frameworks have been guided by small states. While major powers have also participated, they have not taken a leadership role in regional security frameworks. This type of problem might be further classified as follows: first are frameworks lacking capacity for implementation such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the expanded ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (including the defense ministers of the 10 ASEAN states, China, the US, Russia, Japan, India, Korea and Australia, and referred to as the ASEAN 10+8 Defense

Ministers Meeting); second are non-sustainable frameworks, such as the Six Party Talks.

Frameworks Lacking Implementing Ca-

capacity Such types of frameworks are able to reach a consensus on security issues, but their leadership is not capable of implementing these agreements. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which was initiated, organized and guided by ASEAN following the Cold War, and became the largest multilateral security framework in the Asia Pacific Region is an example of such a frame-

By weak leadership we mean that security frameworks have been guided by small states. This type of problem might be further classified as follows: first are frameworks lacking capacity for implementation; second are non-sustainable frameworks.

work. One of the organization's biggest problems is that it completely follows the nonbinding "ASEAN Way". The "ASEAN Way", emphasizes that member states engage in cooperation on the basis of consensus through dialogue, by gradually developing understanding and through pragmatism. ASEAN strictly emphasizes that force should not be used to resolve regional disputes or conflicts between members, that member states should not interfere in the domestic affairs of other members, and that internal and regional issues should be dealt with on the principles of negotiations and mutual consensus. The 1995 ARF meeting laid out a "three stage" development process of (1) promoting confidence building measures among states; (2) developing preventive diplomacy; and (3) elaborating approaches to conflict management. Over the past 16 years, the ARF has been most successful in building confidence, having developed over 51 projects to promote confidence building between members.

Despite this progress, the ARF remains trapped in the confidence building stage, as difficulties remain in passing over into the preventive diplomacy stage. The ARF's principle of consensus decision making requires that all members must be in agreement before the ARF begins to transition between stages. However, it has been impossible for member states to come to a consensus over issues related to preventive diplomacy. After 1996, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines and other ASEAN states made a concerted effort to push the ARF toward preventive diplomacy. At the same time, the US, Japan, Australia, Canada and other Western countries encouraged the ARF to skip over discussions of the definition, scope and objectives of preventive diplomacy and to move directly into building a framework for regional conflict prevention. China, Myanmar, Vietnam, India and other states opposed this move, arguing that the focus of the ARF should still be on deepening confidence building measures while also positively discussing conceptual issues related to preventive diplomacy so that the ARF might realize sequential and gradual progress. For this reason, the ARF faces a major dilemma in transitioning towards working on preventive diplomacy: if states continue to follow the nonbinding "ASEAN Way", a number of states may continue to feel very complacent with the arrangement, but the ARF will not be able to make any progress, and

other states will become dissatisfied; if on the other hand the ARF begins to increase the pace of transition toward preventive diplomacy by bringing specific political security questions into the ARF, a number of states will undoubtedly voice opposition, or even threaten to withdraw from the ARF, undermining the routine operations of the Forum.

More fundamentally, the ARF is powerless to respond to security issues between ASEAN members. The ARF is only able to discuss security issues, and does not actually take any specific measure to resolve them. Under the principles of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of member states and consensus decision making, the ARF is not even able to condemn actions of member states which damage regional or international security. For example, in 1998 when India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests, the United States, Australia and Canada hoped that the ARF would condemn the actions of the two countries, but this was not possible as India argued that making accusations against member states did not accord with the organizational principles of the Forum. Finally, the ARF Chair's Statement was only able to express concern and regret regarding the nuclear tests in South Asia. To offer another example, in 2001 following a collision between Chinese and American aircrafts, China made a stern critique of US security policy and behavior at that year's ARF. The Chinese statement was met with support of other member states, but the ARF could not take any diplomatic measures with respect to the incident. Yet another example is found with respect to the Korean Peninsula. Even though both North Korea and South Korea are members of the ARF, the ARF has never engaged in any in-depth discussions or issued any statements regarding nuclear concerns on the Korean Peninsula or with respect to regional security concerns. Further, it does not appear as if any of the confidence building measures addresses concerns on the Korean Peninsula.

A similar type of framework is the expanded ASEAN Defense Minister's meeting, which was first held in Hanoi, Vietnam in December of 2010. In reality, this framework is little more than a replication of ARF. While it may be useful for exchange between the defense ministers of the ARF member countries, and may also function to build confidence and understanding, it is limited to this. It is highly unlikely that the ASEAN expanded defense minister's meeting will be anything other than another multilateral security cooperation "talk-shop".

Frameworks Lacking Continuity This refers to cooperation mechanisms which break down because of a lack of responsible leadership on the part of great powers in terms of implementing resolutions. The effectiveness of such mechanisms is actually less than that of those lacking implementing capacity as discussed above, as these are not even sustainable as organizations. In August of 2003, the Six Party Talks convened a total of six rounds of negotiations aimed at resolving nuclear issues on the Korean peninsula. These talks failed both in terms of compelling North Korea to give up its nuclear program, and in normalizing relations between the US and North Ko-

rea. In 2006 and 2009, North Korea conducted nuclear tests, crossing the threshold into a de facto nuclear state, and in April of 2009, it withdrew from the Six Party Talks.

North Korea's exit from the Six Party Talks was a result of its failing to achieve the objective for participation in the talks. In 2002, North Korea announced that it would develop nuclear weapons, hoping that the United States might engage it in bilateral talks. The US rejected a bilateral approach, instead proposing that talks should include all relevant states. The two states finally agreed upon the Six Party Talks framework, and at the same time also agreed that the US and North Korea might engage in direct discussions within the framework of the Six Party Talks. North Korea's objective in participating in the Talks was to use the "bait" of quitting its nuclear program to achieve normalization of ties with the United States. As such, two of the Four Points of Consensus that were agreed upon during the first round of talks in August of 2003, stated that "a nuclear free Korean Peninsula should be achieved through peaceful means and that it is necessary to resolve North Korea's security concerns." North Korea argued that balancing these two issues was the condition for its continued participation in the Six Party Talks.

On September 19, 2005, at the second meeting of the fourth round of talks, the six parties came to an agreement known as the Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six Party Talks (also referred to as the Joint Statement of September 19), in which North Korea undertook to abandon its current stock of nuclear weapons and its nuclear program, to return to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as soon as possible and to accept the monitoring of the International Atomic Energy Agency. At the same time, the United States also confirmed that it did not have nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula, and that it had no intention of attacking or invading North Korea with either nuclear weapons or conventional forces. North Korea and the US also committed to taking specific steps toward normalization of relations, while the international community would respect North Korea's right to peacefully utilize nuclear energy, and agreed to discuss the issue of providing light water reactors to North Korea at an appropriate time. On September 20, the Speaker of the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that North Korea would only return to the NPT and accept monitoring from the International Atomic Energy Agency once the United States provides light water reactors. In response, the American Secretary of State responded that until North Korea abandons its nuclear missiles and returns to the NPT and executes its other responsibilities with respect to security measures, no country shall engage in civilian nuclear cooperation with North Korea. This expression on the part of the United States made North Korea believe that the United States required North Korea to first abandon its nuclear plans and that it would then see about (but not guarantee) cooperation with North Korea.

Despite this, on February 13, 2006 a Joint Statement of the Third Session of the Fifth Round of the Six Party Talks was passed (referred to also as the February 13th Statement) which indicated

that North Korea would respect the principle of “actions for actions”, whereby North Korea would incrementally abandon its nuclear weapons and normalize relations with the US, South Korea and Japan also on an incremental basis. However, the US proceeded to halt progress on the normalization of relations with North Korea, and instead tried to use economic assistance or sanctions to entice North Korea into abandoning its nuclear weapons. North Korea was not responsive to this attempt by the United States to turn a security problem into one of economic assistance, and on October 9, 2006 it conducted its first nuclear experiment toward obtaining a strong nuclear capacity.

North Korea hoped to obtain a security guarantee from the Six Party Talks by realizing the normalization of relations with the United States. Nuclear weapons were the key tool that it leveraged in order to realize this objective, and the Six Party Talks the platform through which it might be achieved. Once North Korea discovered that the purpose of the talks was only the abandonment of nuclear weapons and not the issue of a security guarantee, it felt that further negotiations were meaningless.

Lack of Specific Focus

By lack of specific focus, we mean that security frameworks discuss domestic politics, economics, security (including non-traditional security), but do not focus on any particular agenda. The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Organization (APEC) and the East Asia Summit might both be characterized in this way. These frameworks have a tendency toward achieving consensus around broad principles. Because there is no limit to the issues that they are concerned with, they regularly generate consensus around issues that are not of immediate importance, and for which there is no pressing need for implementation.

By lack of specific focus we mean that security frameworks discuss domestic politics, economics, security (including non-traditional security), but do not focus on any particular agenda.

APEC is the Asia Pacific Region’s most important framework for multilateral economic cooperation. During the 10 years from 1989 to 1999, the organization’s activities centered around promoting regional economic growth and advancing multilateral trade institutions, realizing the common economic prosperity of its members and engaging in economic cooperation and exchanges. During this period, it was not concerned with regional security issues.

In September of 1999 on the eve of an APEC meeting in Auckland, the situation in East Timor raised the concern of APEC members. Under pressure from the US, Canada, Australia and other countries, the host country, New Zealand, proposed that an informal foreign ministers meeting be held to discuss the situation in East Timor, but that the discussion not be brought into the of-

ficial agenda. As such, this informal foreign ministers meeting made use of the APEC meeting to conduct non-APEC business that was related to regional security issues. In October of 2001, just before the APEC meeting in Shanghai, the September 11 terrorist attacks occurred in the United States, and combating terrorism became the most prominent issue in international relations. The host country, China, suggested that anti-terrorism issues be discussed at a foreign ministers' breakfast meeting, and that on the basis of this discussion, an unofficial leader's lunch meeting might engage in further discussion. This proposal received widespread support from the members, who later issued an APEC Leaders Statement on Combating Terrorism. During the Los Cabos meeting which took place in October 2002, APEC leaders held an official discussion on cooperation on combating terrorism. The Foreign Minister of the host country, Mexico facilitated a foreign ministers' dinner meeting at which North Korean nuclear issues were discussed, and around which negotiations were held. The leaders issued individual statements regarding combating terrorism and North Korea.

As should be apparent, security issues are not a regular part of the APEC agenda. Nonetheless, APEC engaged in discussions of security issues and made related proposals on such issues, all of which were done on a voluntary basis and by consensus-based decision making. The meeting documents that were produced by these discussions were not legally binding, and member states bore only moral and political responsibility for implementing the contents of the statements. In the end, APEC's discussions on regional security issues were superficial and lacked substance.

The East Asia Summit was an initiative of ASEAN, and consists of a meeting of the heads of state of 10 ASEAN nations and six other states (China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India and New Zealand). From 2005 until present, the Forum has been held a total of five times, and the issues discussed have been extremely broad, including avian flu, humanitarian response, sustainable development, economics, energy, culture, educational cooperation, climate change, and North Korean nuclear issues. Regional security is just one of many issues covered by the East Asia Summit, and it is not necessarily even a fixed component of the Summit. Further, as ASEAN guides the summit, it follows the "ASEAN Way" and as such its discussions on regional security issues are no more than exchanges of ideas and pronouncements of political positions.

Lack of Representativeness

Security frameworks of this type lack the participation of a critical party, and often of a critical major power. The aborted US-Japan-Australia-India alliance and the occasional security co-

By lack of representativeness we mean that security frameworks lack the participation of a critical party, and often of a critical major power.

operation between the US-Japan and South Korea share this shortcoming. These types of security mechanisms are somewhat whimsical in nature. When security cooperation mechanisms include states which have no particular security interests at stake in a particular conflict, they are often able to reach a consensus, but one which can never possibly be realized.

The idea of an alliance between the US, Japan, Australia and India was first proposed in the then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's book titled *Towards a Beautiful Nation*. In May of 2007, the Japanese government invited the US, Australia, and India to a ministerial level meeting on the sidelines of the ARF in Manila. Neither Australia nor India was excited about this proposal, while the United States maintained a cautious attitude. In early August at the ARF Ministers meeting, the Japanese Foreign Minister continued efforts to bring the United States, India and Australia on board, but without success. In reality this framework was aborted in the conceptual phase. As a strategic dialogue between the four states excluding China, Australia and India worried that such an arrangement might be perceived by China as a means of "containment". The proposal was heavily criticized even back in Japan, where the Former Japanese Ambassador to China, Korechika Anami commented that a strategic alliance between the four countries was "not necessarily a wise foreign policy", as such diplomatic positions would only raise concerns on the part of China. He argued that the Japanese government should instead take a more strategic view and develop friendly relations with China. Kyodo news also pointed out that building a multilateral framework for security cooperation in Asia Pacific while ignoring China's voice was just not practical.

To take the other example, security cooperation between the US, South Korea and Japan has yet to take the form of a mature framework. On December 7, 2010, in response to the crisis on the Korean Peninsula following the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, the Foreign Ministers of the US, Korea and Japan met in Washington for negotiations and issued a joint statement. It is not yet certain whether the three states will regularize or institutionalize this framework. Should they actually establish such a framework for security cooperation, it will be weak in terms of representation, as China is not a participant. Without China's participation, such a mechanism will not be able to respond to the North Korean issue or other regional security issues.

III. Reasons for Ineffectiveness of East Asian Security Cooperation Frameworks

A successful regional multilateral security cooperation framework must meet the following criteria: it must have a small initial membership so that it can avoid great disparities in the interests of the members, and so that it can come to an agreement with respect to cooperation; it should focus exclusively on security issues in order to prevent the agenda from spilling over into other issues that may stall its development; it must have a guarantee of military support from the major

military powers in the region. None of East Asia's existing frameworks for multilateral security cooperation meet these three criteria, and as such their failure is inevitable.

A successful regional multilateral security cooperation framework must meet the following criteria: it must have a small initial membership so that it can avoid great disparities in the interests of the members, and so that it can come to an agreement with respect to cooperation; it should focus exclusively on security issues in order to prevent the agenda from spilling over into other issues that may stall its development; it must have a guarantee of military support from the major military powers in the region.

Overly Broad Membership and Unclear Leadership

The ARF is a security cooperation mechanism with a total of 27 members, which primarily discusses regional security issues, including non-traditional security issues. Although its agenda is focused, it does not meet the other two criteria discussed above. The initial member states of the ARF are far too many, the first round of the Forum including six ASEAN member states, seven dialogue partners and three observers. The geographic scope of the framework is also far too large. Its members include states from the entire Asia region, and even organizations from outside the region such as the European Union. This large membership has made deep discussions on security issues difficult at best, and decisions nearly impossible. The inclusion of members from outside the region has resulted in the Forum taking on too much responsibility. For example, it has discussed issues related to nuclear testing in India and Pakistan, which are obviously not East Asian security issues.

Further, the major military powers in the region do not play a leadership role in the ARF, which is instead guided by the small states of ASEAN. ASEAN can provide only weak leadership, and this is the primary reason why the ARF has been turned into a "talk shop". Following the Cold War, ASEAN grew increasingly concerned about the United States reducing its responsibility in the region, and at the same time also feared China's rise. In establishing the ARF, ASEAN's objectives included pulling the United States deeper into the region and constraining and changing China. The success of the ARF in confidence building measures and its failure with respect to advancing a transition toward preventive diplomacy were intimately connected to limited support from the United States and China.

The United States has long lacked interest in the ARF, and has provided only passive support. Since the end of the Cold War, the US strategy toward East Asia has centered on bilateral military alliances, and multilateral security efforts have been only secondary in importance. In its 1995

Strategic Security Report for East Asia, the United States included constructive support for the region's security dialogues as an element of its national security policy for the first time, advocating that a US guided multilateral security framework be established. The United States began working to institutionalize the Forum and attempted to mold it into a new framework for the US to become involved in East Asian affairs. However, as long as the framework remains guided by the "ASEAN Way", it is not possible for the United States to translate its advantage with respect to power into institutionalized leadership and influence over the Forum's agenda. For this reason, the interest of the US in the ARF gradually declined. After George W. Bush became President, the US began to emphasize unilateral action and preemption with its strategic concerns changing into combating terrorism following September 11. As the ARF lacked any substantive measures with respect to combating terrorism, the US government became even less interested in the platform. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice did not even manage to attend the ARF Foreign Ministers meetings in 2005 and 2007. In 2010 the Obama Administration made a high profile "return to Asia", but America still preferred to strengthen its bilateral ties with individual ASEAN states, and made no mention of the ARF. On the whole, the US has maintained a passive and indifferent attitude toward the ARF, neither advancing or promoting the framework nor obstructing its initiatives.

For its part, China has continuously promoted ASEAN's leadership role in the ARF so that it might prevent ARF from becoming a tool manipulated by great powers, and to avoid having to take on a leadership role itself and face accusations that it presents a threat to the region. Such a stance fits the Chinese foreign policy principle of "keeping a low profile while playing a role to the extent possible". China has been selectively in support of the development of confidence building measures, but has stopped short of advancing preventive diplomacy, which China has opposed. According to available data, of the 51 proposals for confidence building measures made to the ARF, China and the US have proposed nine, more than any other ARF member. Since 1997, China has hosted one or more track one diplomatic activities every year, with most focusing on military security and national defense. In 2002, China presented a position paper on a new security concept to the ARF. This concept placed "mutual confidence, mutual interests, equality and coordination" at its core, and fit very closely into the concept of "collective security" being advanced by the Forum. China's attitude shifted from positive support to caution and concern whenever the agenda of ARF was pushed toward preventive diplomacy and issues of territorial sovereignty. China does not support using ARF as a Forum for preventive diplomacy, and only agrees to discuss the concept and theory behind preventive diplomacy at ARF. It has stated the principle of "non-intervention in domestic affairs" in opposition to discussions of sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and Taiwan.

Frameworks Break Down When Major Powers Do Not Take a Leading Role

The Six Party Talks include all six states with a direct interest in the North Korean Nuclear issue, and as such the framework is suitable with respect to number of members. In terms of the objective of the framework, it is focused exclusively on the resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, and not on any other security issues. Where the Six Party Talks fail is that the three major military powers, the US, China and Russia are not willing to take leadership responsibility in terms of enforcing agreements. This is particularly the case with respect to the United States.

The root cause of the nuclear issue is North Korea's fear that the United States will launch a military attack against it. From North Korea's vantage point, nuclear weapons offer "absolute security". North Korea's objective is to promote bilateral talks on normalization with the United States, and it hopes that the Six Party Talks will guarantee simultaneous progress on normalization and the nuclear issue. The US is one of the two central actors with respect to the nuclear issue, yet it is not willing to take on a leadership role with respect to resolving the problem. Especially after an initial agreement was reached, the US was not willing to take leadership responsibility for enforcing the agreement, and instead attempted to pass responsibility on to China, not taking any substantive steps toward committing not to invade North Korea or with respect to normalizing relations. Both China and Russia argue that the Korean nuclear issue is a result of a security issue that the United States has generated and are not willing to take leadership responsibility. China has attempted to maintain a neutral position, and has positioned itself as both a bridge making the Six Party Talks possible and as a host for the Talks. China plays the role of mediator, but is not willing to take on further security responsibilities beyond that - for example assuring that the treaty between China and North Korea remains effective, or sanctioning any parties which violate the resolutions of the Six Party Talks. At the same time, neither will Russia publicly acknowledge that the treaty between it and North Korea remains effective. To put it simply, the US, China and Russia all demand that North Korea abandon its nuclear weapons, but all dodge the issue of providing a security guarantee.

Under such circumstances, North Korea cannot see how further talks will resolve its security concerns, and only sees talks leading to the dissolution of its nuclear program. As such, North Korea has taken a dangerous path by developing nuclear weapons and exiting the Six Party Talks. As none of the major military powers are willing to take responsibility for enforcing the agreement, the outcome of the Talks is that North Korea has decided to pull away from the framework, resulting in its complete breakdown.

Interlinking of Issues Increases Difficulty in Resolving Security Problems

Both APEC and the East Asia Forum fail to meet the three criteria identified above. Both frameworks have too many members (21 and 17 respectively), and include members outside of the Asia region. APEC is a framework for economic cooperation, while the East Asia Summit is a mechanism for increasing integration in East Asia and realizing an Asian Community. Neither framework is established specifically to address regional security issues. While both frameworks do discuss security issues, they do so as only one of many agenda items, and such issues are not of particular importance to either framework.

When different types of issues are mixed together, it becomes easy for them to become linked, made conditional or impact one another, and easy for member states to become distracted from resolving the key issues. Additionally, as economic cooperation features so prominently in these two frameworks, members might even sacrifice security issues to promote economic cooperation. It is best that the two frameworks maintain their discussions of security issues at only the most general level. Finally these frameworks both operate on the basis of consensual decision making, and major military powers have no particular authority or leadership role within them, rendering it difficult for them to be effective with respect to security cooperation.

Lack of Participation of Major Powers Undermines Outputs

The US-Japan-Australia-India alliance and the US-Japan-South Korea Tripartite Security Cooperation both have a limited number of members, focused agendas, and advantages with respect to decision making. At the same time, the United States can provide strong leadership in both of the frameworks. The main problem with these mechanisms is that they do not include the other two primary military powers in the region, China and Russia. In East Asia, any multilateral security framework must include the United States, China and Russia. While the United State might provide leadership in the two above mentioned frameworks, should either framework focus on issues involving Chinese or Russia interests, it will be impossible for the US to make decisions on behalf of Russia and China.

Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has attempted unsuccessfully to establish a multilateral military alliance in East Asia. After the end of the Cold War, security conflicts between regional powers in East Asia have obviously become less salient, and as a result, the United States has less of an incentive to build such an alliance around itself in the region. Furthermore, America lacks the ability to even unite its own military allies into a multilateral security alliance, not to mention construct a multilateral security framework around itself that includes non-military allies. Even if it might establish such an alliance, it would not be able to guarantee regional security, as major military powers outside of the framework would never accept its resolutions.

IV. The Concept of a “China-US-Russia-ASEAN Security Cooperation Organization”

From the analysis above, it should be clear that the current East Asian multilateral security cooperation mechanisms do not meet the three necessary criteria for success, with the key problem being that they lack the leadership of major military powers and thereby lack legitimacy. When a regional security cooperation framework lacks legitimacy, it will have no authority to take action on specific security issues. While small states can provide leadership, they cannot do so sustainably. At the same time a single power or only a small group of powers can provide leadership, but without participation or cooperation from other major powers, it will be impossible for such mechanisms to achieve their objectives. After giving careful consideration to number of members, representativeness, the contents of possible agendas and organizational leadership, we propose that East Asia establish a security cooperation organization composed of China, the US, Russia and ASEAN (with ASEAN sending one representative). Such an organization would meet the three criteria described above, and would likely be effective in terms of compensating for the shortcomings of the current security cooperation frameworks, which are much less likely to succeed (see Table 1).

Table 1 A Comparison of East Asian Multilateral Security Cooperation Frameworks

	Number of Initial Members	Representativeness	Geographical Range	Focus of Agenda	Leadership
ARF (Expanded ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting)	Too many	High	Too broad	Focused	Weak
Six Party Talks	Adequate	High	Adequate	Focused	Weak
APEC	Too many	High	Too broad	Broad	Weak
East Asia Summit	Adequate	High	Too broad	Broad	Weak
US-Japan-Australia-India Alliance	Adequate	Low	Lacks geographical reference	Focused	Fairly Strong
US-Japan-South Korea Security Cooperation	Adequate	Low	Adequate	Focused	Strong
China-US-Russia-ASEAN Security Cooperation Organization	Adequate	Adequate	Adequate	Focused	Strong

A China-US-Russia-ASEAN Framework Meets the Three Criteria for Success

The initial size of the membership of the China-US-Russia-ASEAN Cooperation Organization is appropriate, and it is highly representative of regional interests. While it only has four members, the organization actually covers the entire East Asia region. Every state in East Asia can find its interests represented in such a framework. America's alliance in the region (Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand) can be represented by the US, while the nations of Southeast Asia can be represented by ASEAN. North Korea and Mongolia can be represented by China or Russia. This model maintains coverage of the region as a whole while vastly decreasing the number of members to four – a very good number for engaging in negotiations and decision making. As ASEAN represents the collective interests of Southeast Asian countries, this reduces the impact of internal differences in viewpoints of ASEAN member states on the regional security framework as a whole.

As for the agenda of a China-US-Russia-ASEAN Security Cooperation Organization, it will be focused on traditional security issues. The organization should be structured to respond to major security issues in the East Asia Region, and should not be used to discuss politics, economics, or cultural affairs. As major military powers, China, the US and Russia can provide adequate military strength to maintain regional security, providing the necessary physical power needed for regional security cooperation, and the leadership needed to keep the agenda focused strictly on major regional security issues. Unlike the Six Party Talks, which is focused too narrowly on the Korean Peninsula or other East Asia Security frameworks which are focused too broadly, this framework can strike a balance between a broad and narrow agenda, maximizing the effectiveness of cooperation.

The leadership of the framework is based on authority provided by the major military powers. China, the US, Russia and ASEAN can each play their own respective leadership role in the framework. As nuclear powers, China, the US and Russia can prevent nuclear war. China as a rapidly rising power and the US as the world's only superpower can cooperate to prevent conflicts of interests in the region from erupting into wars between major powers. Cooperation between China and the US can also help to better manage the relationship between US and states in the region that are not its allies, as well as conflicts between China and US allies. As for ASEAN, it will be able to coordinate relations between its members, and work with China and the US to manage security issues within ASEAN. It is important to point out though that the strength of the organization's leadership will be limited to the level of cooperation between China, the US and Russia. The greater the cooperation between the three powers, the stronger the leadership can become.

Pitfalls of Other Potential Frameworks

We have designed the framework as a China-US-Russia-ASEAN Security Cooperation Organization and not as another coordination mechanism between powers (such as a China-US Coordination Mechanism, a China-US-Russia Coordination Mechanism, China-US-Russia-Japan + ASEAN, and US-Japan + ASEAN) for the following several reasons.

First, China-US coordination would be only bilateral in nature, and while it might respond to direct security issues between China and the US such as the North Korean issue, it would not be able to effectively handle indirect issues involving the US or China, such as the South China Seas, the Northern Islands, or islands disputed by Japan and South Korea. While the South China Sea issue directly involves China, it only indirectly involves the United States, and ASEAN states are not so willing to let the US directly intervene in this matter. The sovereignty dispute over the Northern Islands between Japan and Russia and disputes between South Korea and Japan obviously cannot be settled by China and the US. Furthermore, while Russia's diplomatic focus is Europe and not Asia, Russia is a major power that extends far beyond the Eurasian continent and which has a significant amount of influence in Northeast Asia. Leaving Russia outside of the framework would therefore be inappropriate.

China-US-Russia coordination includes the major powers of East Asia, but ignores the importance of ASEAN as a regional organization. In the 20 years since the end of the Cold War, ASEAN has led the way in terms of encouraging regional integration and multilateral security cooperation, and has significant leadership and coordinating capacity. The resolution of some regional security issues will absolutely require the participation of ASEAN – take the South China Sea for one.

A 4+1 framework involving China, the US, Japan, Russia and ASEAN includes one addition to our proposed framework. Japan is an economic power, but not a military power. Since it is further a close ally of the United States, and not completely independent when it comes to issues of national de-

Japan is not completely independent when it comes to issues of national defense. It is not possible for Japan to provide military guarantees to an East Asian regional security cooperation framework.

fense, it is not possible for Japan to provide military guarantees to an East Asian regional security cooperation framework. Beyond this, Japan's interests can largely be represented by the United States. Lastly, in a 4+1 mechanism, the high level of proximity between American and Japanese interests would result in an unequal representation of member interests in the framework. Such an advantage on the part of the US and Japan would not be conducive to the development of cooperation between the great powers, nor would it assist in building leadership for the framework.

Finally is the idea of a US-Japan + ASEAN framework. While such a framework considers the importance of ASEAN, leaving China and Russia outside would render it incapable of realizing cooperation between the major military powers in the region. Such a framework suffers from the same problems identified in the US-Japan-Australia-India alliance and the Tripartite US-Japan-South Korea Security Cooperation Framework.

Geographically the Organization should be confined to East Asia and Oceania, and it should not be expanded to South Asia, Central Asia or Latin America. In terms of the Organization's agenda, traditional security issues should be the primary focus, with a secondary emphasis on non-traditional security issues.

Specific Considerations Regarding the Establishment of a China-US-Russia-ASEAN Security Cooperation Organization

As for the size, procedures, agenda, and developmental path of the China-US-Russia-ASEAN Security Cooperation Organization, we have the following considerations: geographically the Organization should be confined to East Asia and Oceania, and it should not be expanded to South Asia, Central Asia or Latin America. Such a restriction is useful for keeping the framework carefully focused on East Asian security issues, and in terms of ensuring strong leadership by the four parties. Any new members added to the framework must accept its existing terms of cooperation. The Organization will have two high level meetings each year, one joint foreign ministers and defense ministers meeting and one meeting of heads of state.

In terms of the Organization's agenda, traditional security issues should be the primary focus, with a secondary emphasis on non-traditional security issues. East Asia faces a large number of traditional security issues, including boundary demarcation issues, sovereignty over offshore islands, disputes over territorial waters, nuclear proliferation issues, sales of weapons to non-political entities, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the deployment of anti-missile systems, security of sea lanes, issues over military exercises, issues related to a lack of military confidence, aerial spying, the militarization of space, and the removal of landmines. These should be the main items on the Organization's agenda.

In terms of the Organization's development, we consider advancing it through the following three phases:

Phase One: Initial Phase (First 1-2 years)

The first year will consist of informal meetings at which negotiations can take place and dur-

ing which the leadership can discuss the principles, means and contents of cooperation and other specific issues. At the same time, the four parties can also assemble a group of scholars for “track two” discussions.

During the second year official cooperation will be initiated, and the four parties will continue to negotiate the details of cooperation.

Phase Two: Institutionalization (3rd – 5th years)

In the third year, a secretariat should be established, and a basic level of institutionalization achieved. The secretariat might be placed in an ASEAN country.

In the fourth year, the institutionalization process should continue so that the body transitions from being a framework to an organization. The four parties should also discuss the articles of association of the organization.

In the fifth year, the articles of association should be completed and the level of cooperation deepened.

Third Phase: Expansion (Beginning the 6th year)

In the sixth year, the Organization can consider accepting new members. The principle for accepting new members is: the first group of new members must be middle level regional military powers; the addition of new members cannot disturb the balance of interests within the institution; the addition of new members cannot weaken the organization’s leadership.

The primary reason why the pre-existing East Asian multilateral security cooperation frameworks have become ineffective or even failed is that major powers are not able to cooperate in taking responsibility for leadership in such frameworks, causing them to lack legitimacy. The China-US-Russia-ASEAN Security Cooperation Organization proposed in this report can overcome problems of a lack of leadership and legitimacy. Only when China, the US and Russia sincerely join hands and cooperate can East Asia achieve real security.

March 26, 2011


Institute of Modern International Relations, Tsinghua University

Tsinghua International Security Forum Research Report No. 4



建立“中美俄东盟安全合作组织”

Toward a China-US-Russia-ASEAN Security Cooperation Organization



This research report is supported by Wang Xuelian Education Foundation