

Rejoinder

Robert E. Kass

In writing my essay I presumed I was voicing, with a few novel nuances, a nearly universal attitude among contemporary statistical practitioners—at least among those who had wrestled with the incompatibility of Bayesian and frequentist logic. Then David Madigan collected commentaries from several thoughtful and accomplished statisticians. Not only do I know Andrew Gelman, Steve Goodman, Hal Stern and Rob McCulloch, and respect them deeply, but I would have been inclined to imagine I had been speaking for them successfully. Their remarks shook me from my complacency. While they generally agreed with much of what I had to say, there were several points that would clearly benefit from additional clarification and discussion, including the role of subjectivity in Bayesian inference, the approximate alignment of our theoretical and real worlds, and the utility of p -values. Here I will ignore these specific disagreements and comment further only on the highest-level issues.

We care about our philosophy of statistics, first and foremost, because statistical inference sheds light on an important part of human existence, inductive reasoning, and we want to understand it. Philosophical perspectives are also supposed to guide behavior, in research and in teaching. My polemics focused on teaching, highlighting my discomfort with the use of Figure 3 as the “big picture” of statistical inference. My sense had been that as a principal description of statistical thinking, Figure 3 was widely considered bothersome, but no one had complained publicly. McCulloch agreed zealously. Gelman and Stern, however, dissented; both find much continuing use for the notion that statistics is largely about

reasoning from samples to populations. As a matter of classroom effectiveness, I am sure that many instructors can do a great job of conveying essential ideas of statistics using Figure 3. My main point, though, was that introductory courses benefit from emphasizing the abstraction of statistical models—their hypothetical, contingent nature—along with the great utility of this kind of abstraction. As we remarked in Brown and Kass (2009), when Box (1979) said, “All models are wrong, but some are useful,” he was expressing a quintessentially statistical attitude. Figure 1 seeks to make Box’s sentiment central to statistical pedagogy, and I tried to indicate the way the main idea may be illustrated repeatedly throughout an elementary course.

Recognizing Box’s apparent influence here, Goodman then asked whether I was simply restating Box’s philosophy, and he further prodded me to show how my own statement of statistical pragmatism could be consequential.

In his 1976 Fisher Lecture, cited by Goodman, Box railed against what he called “mathematicity,” meaning theory developed in isolation from practice, and he stressed the iterative nature of model building. The fundamental role of model criticism based on Fisherian logic was emphasized not only by Box but also, in several roughly contemporaneous discussions, by Dempster and by Rubin, and these presumably influenced Gelman and Stern, who, together with their colleague Xiao-Li Meng, developed and studied Bayesian model checking procedures. Importantly, model criticism plays a prominent role in Gelman et al. (2004). The aim of my discussion, however, was somewhat different than what I take Box to have intended. I understand Box to have said that estimation should be Bayesian but criticism frequentist, or inspired by frequentist logic. Statistical pragmatism asserts, more simply and more generally, that both forms of logic have merit, and either can be used for any aspect of scientific inference. In addition, I suggested the commonality of subjunctive statements to help us acknowledge that the big issues, in practice, are not Bayes versus frequentist but rather the effects of various modeling assumptions, and the likely behavior of procedures.

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Stern noted that the pragmatism I described “seems to be a fairly evolved state for a statistician; it seems to require a clear understanding of the various competing foundational arguments that have preceded it historically.” I agree. Along with Goodman, Stern wondered whether such an eclectic philosophy could influence statistical behavior, especially when tackling unsolved problems. I would claim that it does. I admit, however, that I have not done the substantial work it would take to provide a satisfactory argument, with compelling examples. Lacking this, I will try to make do with a brief illustration.

Many experiments in neuroscience apply a fixed stimulus repeatedly to some neural network and observe the consequences. A typical example, discussed by Vu, Yu and Kass (2009), involved the audio replay of a short snippet of a natural birdsong while a single auditory neuron was recorded from a zebra finch. In such contexts, mutual information is often used to quantify the strength of the relationship between stimulus and response. Mutual information requires the joint time series of stimulus and response to be stationary and ergodic, but bird songs contain many bursts of rapidly varying intensities with long pauses in between. Thus, a snippet of natural song appears highly nonstationary. In other experiments, the stimulus is deterministic. Vu et al. asked whether, in such contexts, estimates of mutual information become meaningless. If we demand that there be a well-defined chance mechanism behind every stochastic assumption, as the literal interpretation of Figure 3 suggests, then clearly mutual information becomes void for deterministic stimuli; but

so too would any kind of statistical inference involving the joint distribution. The broader notion emphasized by Figure 1 is that the mathematical formalism in the stochastic model is an abstraction whose primary purpose is to represent, in all relevant respects, the variability displayed by the data. Under this interpretation, stochastic models can be of use even with deterministic stimuli. Thus, dismissal of mutual information on the grounds of inadequate chance mechanism is too crude. Instead, the constraint on time series variability imposed by stationarity must be considered carefully. Vu et al. provided more pointed criticism, some new mathematical analysis, and a way to salvage the usual quantitative measures in such settings. Was the philosophy behind Figure 1 necessary to obtain the results of Vu et al.? No. But as I hope to have indicated, it was helpful in supporting a path we could follow, and that is all one should ask of foundations.

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