

**AN ANALYSIS OF TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS FROM 1945 TO 2004:
INITIATIVES AND REACTIONS IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY**

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Almost all American media, scholars, and politicians talk about the growing anti-Americanism all over the world today.¹ Interest on this matter grows up every day. In this paper we will try to examine that anti-American initiatives and reactions in Turkish foreign policy² essentially exhibit spasmodic and conjuncture characteristics. After 1945, Turkish-American relations are both strengthening and aggravating from time to time; however, general tendency of relations depicts a very positive image. Recently, because of the Iraqi crisis, Turkish reactions against American policies have significantly climbed up.

In the 19th century, the commercial (economical) facade of the Turkish-American relations has become dominant. The political relations came into considerations in a concrete way after the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. The American government has begun to perceive the Ottoman Empire as ‘the key of East’.³ The linkages between two states were mainly stationary between two world wars. The primary reason for that was the World Economic Crisis in 1929. The American government has returned to ‘isolation strategy’ during that period and suffered too much economically from that crisis. After World War II, for about 60 years, Turkey has accepted many different foreign policy patterns in its

relations with America. We especially observed the following three diverse reactionary conducts of Turkey against the United States of America during that period: within-bloc reactions (e.g. together with Western European countries); out-of-bloc reactions (e.g. together with the Soviet Union and/or the non-aligned bloc reactions); and unilateral reactions. Turkey has also posed two different behaviors vis-à-vis foreign threats: bilateral reactionary behaviors with the United States and multilateral reactionary behaviors involving also the United States. On the other hand, it might be said that Turkey has presented four different initiative models in relations with the United States of America: unilateral initiatives in spite of the United States; unilateral initiatives supported by the United States; bilateral initiatives together with the United States; and multilateral initiatives involving also the United States.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, Turkey has encountered with formidable security problems stemmed from the Cold War rather than economic ones. But it was not able to fight alone with all these threats. After Soviet occupation of all the Balkan states (with exception of Greece) in 1945, Turkey has given a great importance to the Middle East, so that it has augmented its relations with the countries in the region. This change in its approach was for benefits of both Turkey and the United States of America. Since then, a new 'balance of power' structure has been forged in that area. Thus, Turkey has begun to be involved in multilateral structures to save its interests. Within this framework, Turkey joined the Western bloc in scope of the Truman Doctrine in 1947. Its economic and military positions were significantly fortified by the 1948-Marshall Plan. Eventually, Turkey became a member state of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952. Hence, its reactions against the Soviet Union have been undertaken within a multilateral framework under the NATO.

TEETERING RELATIONS DURING THE 1950s

Significant recoveries of Turkish-European relations have taken place between 1945 and 1960. Besides, a cooperation process has also been established between Turkey and the United States. Those have developed concurrently. So that, Turkey was invited as a full member to the Council of Europe in 1949; at the same time the United States proclaimed its full support to Turkey vis-à-vis the Soviet threat, and decided to send its Sixth Fleet to the Mediterranean Sea. As a response to these developments, Turkey sent a brigade with 4.500 soldiers to the Far East in order to support American forces in Korean War in 1950. This Turkish decision was taken on even without any voting in National Assembly. In connection with this Turkish gesture, Turkey was taken into NATO by explicit American backing.⁴

But, during the 1950s, Turkey has also developed a bilateral reactionary foreign policy in Cyprus issue against America. In 1951, the United States put a green light in favor of Greece to bring the Cyprus problem to the United Nations (UN) platform. So, the Cyprus dispute has become internationalized from that time on. Turkey was in trouble to embark on a favorable activism on this vicious conflict. While Cyprus problem was evolving within the UN framework, the U.S. Senate has decreed to vote in favor of Greeks' requests and motives. Although, after 1954, the United States has shifted the emphasis on dealing with the Cyprus issue in the UN context; unfortunately it was not able to change Greece's mind.⁵ From that time on, Turkish official thesis has become 'division of the island between two communities'. Britain was very much effective on Turkey to accept this thesis. This new thesis has established one of the main components of Turkish policy with respect to Cyprus during the period of 1956-58. Briefly stating, in one side the United

States was reinforcing the Greek theses on Cyprus issue in 1951-54 period, in the other side Turkey was exposing its reaction by getting closer relations with London.

Beginning in the middle of 1950s, Turkey has recurrently given additional multilateral reactions in its relations with the United States. The primary factor behind this conduct was dissatisfactions with American aid programs. As a result of this reactionary manner of conduct, Turkey has tried to turn to its other allies (within-bloc-reactions) from the beginning of 1955. Yet it was not likely to see a clear emancipation from the U.S. course in Turkish foreign policy in this period. As an evidence of this, the United States of America has utilized the military bases in Turkey in Lebanon Operation out of the NATO purposes after Iraqi revolution in 1958.⁶ In 1959, Ankara admitted the American Jupiter Missiles to launch in its soil. And Turkey, as the first Muslim country has also recognized Israel and proved to be a very significant and viable partner for the American Middle East policy determined by the Eisenhower Doctrine. On July 28, 1958, by executive agreements with Britain, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, the United States linked herself to these states of the Baghdad Pact. The pact was renamed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), after the formal withdrawal of Iraq in 1959.⁷

THE 1960s: HAMSTRING OF TURKISH-AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP WITHIN THE BLOC

Within-bloc and out-of-bloc reactionary dispositions of Turkish foreign policy against the United States of America have strengthened during and after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.⁸ Rather with reactionary feelings, Turkey has run into the European Economic Community (EEC) as a 'within-bloc preference', mainly because of disruption of the American aids and project supports. Depending upon President Johnson's letter to Ankara in respect of Cyprus issue in 1964, the reactionary activities have significantly boosted and

Turkish foreign policy has begun to take an independent stand against the United States of America.⁹ Appropriately, in a short time, Turkey has made connections with a few alternative structures such as the Soviet Union and the non-aligned states' bloc. But this kind of factious preferences of Turkey was not too extreme; it was merely limited with declaring clearly some counter arguments against the regional and global benefits of the United States. For instance, Ankara has shown defiance to the U.S.' Vietnam policy.¹⁰ Turkey has tried to escape from a total dependency on America with respect to military aids by giving significance to domestic productions in military industry. Also, during the galvanized student protests in 1968 tremendous reactions vis-à-vis America have appeared in Turkish society.¹¹ Also, because of Turkish requests, bilateral secret agreements between the two countries have been revised and collected under the Bilateral Defense and Cooperation Agreement in 1969. As typical of some other NATO members, Turkey has also been apathetic in participating in the NATO-Multilateral Nuclear Force Project bolstered by the United States of America. The outcomes of this abstinence were quite harmful for some of its allies. For example, if this project could be realized, notably West Germany would obtain significant advantages about the nuclear weapons. But in contrary, the Soviet Union has become the prominent beneficiary of this negative result.

During the first quarter of 1960s, the United States has been sympathetic to Greek theses regarding to Cyprus problem. Turkey has concluded that this conflict could not be solved as it desired within the NATO framework. Therefore, it followed a strategy of getting closer to the Soviets and, by this way, isolating Makarios, the Cypriot leader. This strategy gave successful results. For a while, the Soviet Union has closed all the doors to Enosis. This was an out-of-bloc reactionary strategy from Turkish viewpoint, and it was quite satisfactory. After this breaking point, Turkish-American relations have much more

ameliorated. American Secretary of State Dean Acheson has suggested some plans about Cyprus in favor of Turkey. For instance, the plan dating 1965 insinuated the idea of dividing Cyprus between two communities. That was reflecting sizeable modifications in American attitudes (and strategies) with respect to Cyprus issue. Adequately, American Government gave vote in favor of Turkey in the UN-General Assembly in 1965. In that voting, only four states were supporting the Turkish approach. On this attitude of America, not only Turkey's reactionary strategies but also Makarios' policy of getting closer to the Soviet Union and to the non-aligned states was effective. By this way, Washington demonstrated her reactions against Makarios' policies.

In these matured conditions, Turkey seriously intended to interfere in Cyprus in 1967, because Colonel Grivas' EOKA's¹² savage aggressions against beleaguered Turkish community were climbing up everyday in the island. But again, the United States has not acceded to this 'intervention demand' by reminding the contents of the former (Johnson's) letter. As a reaction to this, Turkey has started to pronounce emphatically its anti-Americanistic sentiments during Arab-Israel War in 1967. Its official policy commenced to be formed in this axis. Nevertheless, American requests that Turkey must play manifold specific roles in the U.S.' Iraq policy have been repulsed by Ankara at that time.

TENUOUS TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS RESIST AGAINST DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIP DURING THE 1970s

Throughout the 1970s, despite all American reactions, the unilateral actions persisted in Turkish foreign policy. Particularly, in Cyprus issue the Prime Minister Ecevit has assiduously pursued a completely independent strategy from America. Although during the Demirel government American Sixth Fleet has been redundantly expelled from Turkish territorial waters and forced to be based in Pire harbor, Greece; in Turkish public opinion

the common idea was that the prime minister was acting in the route of American foreign policy.

By taking all the risks, Turkey intervened in Cyprus in 1974. That was not in coincidence with American regional strategies. The American reaction to this action has been to put an embargo for military items against Turkey for the period of 1975-78. Along this period, all military items selling and military credits have been suspended. President Gerald Ford has necessarily reached an understanding with the Congress on embargo legislation, even though he has given twice his veto. Then, the White House has spent efforts to soften the embargo by using all possible options.¹³ Turkey's first reaction against this embargo was to announce her unilateral decision of setting up of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus on February 13, 1975. At the same period, the Turkish Government, under the Prime Minister Ecevit, cancelled out the prohibition of agricultural opium production in western Turkey, that was banned earlier depending upon the American demands. In the Cold War conditions, America, as a reaction, has followed a 'low-profile' policy toward Turkey. Also, the Arab states of the Middle East have put an oil embargo on Turkey following the Yom Kippur War. Parallel to these tensions, the all-out reactions vis-à-vis the United States of America have significantly awakened in Turkey.¹⁴ First of all, Turkey has annulled the Bilateral Defense and Cooperation Agreement and halted all foreign military base activities excepting the ones in the framework of the NATO purposes, over all Turkey. At that time, Ankara has not given her support to Greece's return to NATO's military wing. But it welcomed the Imam Khomeini regime in Iran, and denied to base the Rapid Deployment Force in its soil. It did not permit for U-2 spy flights in its skies. Instead of former agreements, a new general agreement was prepared to be signed by Demirel government in 1976. But it was not entered into force by the Ecevit government.

During this period, the Turkish foreign policy tried to substitute West Germany instead of America. However, the Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher during the Carter administration has clearly given the message in one of his Ankara visits that ‘Turkey will use international credits only under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) from now on’.¹⁵ America was trying to transfer some of its international financial responsibilities over its allies, notably West Germany, because the United States of America was suffered from significant economic problems especially due to oil crisis. Secretary Christopher has underlined that Turkey must collaborate primarily with West Germany in Europe. Frankly speaking, the United States was looking at West Germany as a ‘complementary partner’ for guarding its regional interests. It might be construed that America was imagining West Germany as a ‘balancing factor’ in its policy on Turkey. For, the United States was apprehensive about Turkey that it could align with the Soviet Union as a reaction to American embargoes. As a matter of fact Turkish-Soviet relations were already depending upon the agreements of products exchange and out of date technology transfers. So, West Germany has been considered as a ‘balancing factor’ in these relations from the viewpoint of America. The Prime Minister Ecevit has affirmed his thinking in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* that if West Germany does not take the place of America in providing aids to Turkey, “Turkey can necessarily choose an option that satisfies nobody.”¹⁶ Undoubtedly, this implies a ‘camp alteration’ in fact.

After the 1979 elections, Demirel came in power again. He was in favor of multilateral policies in foreign relations.¹⁷ He has made known explicitly his decision to American Deputy Secretary of State Nimmetz that unless Turkish rights and privileges have been recognized in the Aegean Sea, Turkey would not give any commitment regarding to Greece’s entrance into NATO’s military branch. And, Demirel government has reluctantly

acknowledged American requests for military bases in Turkey, in response to some affirmative steps taken up by Greece in the Aegean Flight Area.

A TURNING POINT IN RELATIONS: THE 1980 MILITARY PUTSCH AND AFTER

The American approach has been amended to soothe Turkey's worries because Washington did not want to lose an outstanding ally. Under the deteriorated Cold War conditions at the beginning of 1980s, also Turkey has preferred to follow some stabilizing (balancing) policies and strategies toward the relations with the United States. It has almost become a discernible tradition in Turkish foreign policy during that time. One of these balancing strategies was the loosening of the relations with Europe which, so far, were significantly affected from general conjuncture of relations with the United States of America. In another word, it has been seemed that the relations between Turkey and Europe were a function or derivative of the relations with the United States. But in this relational pattern a remarkable change has been seen from the beginning of 1980s. With the military putsch on September 12, 1980, the USA has occupied a more important place than Europe in Turkish foreign policy.¹⁸ Some occidental values such as human rights, rule of law, social state, democracy etc. have been endangered in Turkey so that the relations with Europe have been considerably gone downhill during this time.

As the result of military putsch, the Turkish-American relations have swiftly ameliorated and regained normal poise in a short time. A draft of the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement was made ready and signed between two countries in 1980. But for comparison, before the putsch, Turkey had not given its consent to America to form a multilateral reactionary bloc against Iran during the Hostage Crisis. And Turkey

had not applied some malpractices suggested by America against Iran; on the contrary, it had preferred to act as a mediator between these two countries.¹⁹

After military putsch, also some analogous views with prior ones in respect of foreign relations between Ankara and Washington have been persistently observed. America tolerated the military administration and averred the decision that American aids would not be interrupted. After then, the two countries have often initiated and reacted together with respect to the various problems and issues of world politics. From that time on, America looked up Turkey as ‘a reliable ally in a problematic region’.

The Brzezinski-Wohlstetter Doctrine was suggesting that ‘the Green Belt Project’ and a ‘Rapid Deployment Force’ should come into agenda in order to solve the Persian Gulf Crisis and establish a peaceful situation in that region. This ‘Green Belt Project’ would cover a wide area stretching from Turkey to Pakistan. In this context, geopolitical importance of Turkey has significantly raised up under the conditions of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the Muslim Revolution in Tehran, and the Iran-Iraq War. Therefore, a Turkish-American friendship has developed. Turkey has adjusted its foreign policy by taking into consideration American sensitivities, and has become near to multilateral entrepreneurships and reactions with America. Nonetheless, Turkish government retracted its veto over Greece’s entrance into the military branch of NATO in line with American aspirations within the Rogers Plan’s framework. Turkey and America have begun to promote multilateral (and bilateral) reactionary conducts against the Soviet bloc, and Ankara, at last, has rendered green light on the Rapid Deployment Force Project. Besides, Turkey has brought up her reactions against Moscow by establishing official diplomatic channels with China and improving cooperation with Pakistan on the lines of American reactionary paradigm. Another reactionary approach against Eastern bloc

supported by America was to advance its relationships with Israel and Egypt. However, some unilaterally regulated relations of Turkey have also been monitored from time to time in contrast of America. For instance, Ankara unrepentantly recognized the new-born Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on November 15, 1983. But, despite such exceptions, America was successful to create a concrete 'reactionism' (reactionary policy) in Turkey against Soviets. Of course, some American competent authorities had momentous roles in this strategy during this time. For example, Paul Henze insisted that the Soviet Armenians would try to capture some territories in Eastern Anatolia (provoked by the Soviet central authorities); while Richard Perle and Albert Wohlstetter have carried on a negative propaganda about the weakness in Turkish defense system in the eastern part of Turkey. All these and similar activities were parts of the American grand strategy to establish a multilateral reactionary bloc against Soviets.²⁰ Within this framework, a high leveled Defense Council was founded between Turkey and the United States of America.

Ozal government was established as the result of general elections in 1983. One of Ozal's missions was to add a mutual trade dimension into relations with America. First of all, he avidly demanded to revise the Bilateral Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement in 1985. As it is publicly known, this agreement was paving the way for common initiatives (cooperation) depending upon two factors²¹: the United States of America would modernize the Turkish Army and assist Turkish economy; nevertheless, it would use certain military establishments in Turkey. For this revision aim, Turkish government sent a diplomatic note to American embassy in Ankara in 1984. And discussions have begun with regard to this theme between two governments. America put forward some rigid preconditions related to Cyprus and military aids ratio (7/10) between Turkey and Greece during negotiations. In addition, tension in bilateral relations has

escalated as the result of an Armenian ‘genocide proposal’ which was submitted to the Congress. On the other hand, America was trying to make serious reductions in aids to Turkey. Therefore, any changes have not been realized in the foregoing agreement.

Turkey has inclined to Europe in the middle of 1980s, because of all those above mentioned problems, significant reductions in American aids, and some unfavorable symptoms of the Middle Eastern markets. But again, Ankara searched for American support for its European Communities membership process in 1987. Therefore, this occasion has also turned to be a multilateral initiative activity between Turkey and America in a short time.

Generally speaking, the United States of America has tried to keep the relations with Turkey in high levels during 1980s. America has acted very carefully with respect to Kurdish problem and genocide thesis; because it was afraid of mounting upward an anti-American tone (reactions) in Turkey. For, Washington was still considering the Soviet bloc as a threatening nemesis.

ARRESTED DYNAMISM: CULMINATING BILATERAL REACTIONS AND INITIATIVES TO A MINI-POWER IRAQ AFTER THE SOVIET DEMISE

The Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991. The Cold War storms subsided but all was not quiet. The power vacuum resulting from this happening in the Caucasus and the Central Asia could have been filled by Turkey from American viewpoint, for a while.²² Under these circumstances, a new bilateral initiative possibility has become visible. A new slogan of ‘Turkic World from the Adriatic Sea to the China Wall’ was first proposed by the Economist Journal issued in October 1991.²³ In general, the cooperative interactions between two countries have enlarged and numerically multiplied during the 1990s because there was no more important threatening factor in the world. Turkish-American relations

have attained new partnership forms. The 'Enhanced Partnership' term has characterized the comprehensive relationships between Turkey and the United States of America from the beginning of 1991. This new term has aimed at building new varieties of relations between two countries and undertaking all the relations on the basis of reliable conditions. Indeed, Turkey has given its full support to America and coalition partners during the Second Gulf War (in Desert Storm Operation in Iraq).²⁴ It was involved in the multilateral reactions against Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Ankara opened its military bases for use of American and coalition forces. It has permitted the Rapid Reaction Force (so called 'the Hammer Force') to be launched in Turkey.²⁵ Turkey has also obeyed all the UN resolutions taken against Iraq. Ankara has acted as if within-the-bloc reaction that was established against the Saddam regime and has taken very important steps regarding the refugees concentrating in Iraqi border during 30 days of the Operation Provide Comfort. This new operation was extended twice by Turkish Assembly.²⁶ Thus, bilateral cooperative actions have proceeded at all. The second term of the Operation Provide Comfort (PC-II) began in July 1991. By this operation the allied forces have created 'safe havens' in northern Iraq that allowed the return of the hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Kurds to their homes²⁷ and the Iraqi forces were blocked to pass through the north of 36th latitude. Finally, this latter operation ended on December 31, 1996. But another cooperative action about Iraq took place between Turkey and America on December 25, 1996. The Operation Northern Watch has started. Britain has also been involved in all these operations. The aim of this last operation was to apply all the resolutions taken by the UN about Iraq. It has not aimed at any arbitrary attack to Iraq. It focused mainly on observatory and defense flights jointly campaigned by British-US air forces.²⁸ There was no precise deadline of this operation. It was possible to extend it in every 6 months. However, the Turkish Grand

National Assembly extended it until March 20, 2003, that was the beginning date of the Iraq War.

Meanwhile, for only a short period, Erbakan's moderated Islamist government -- in a coalition with liberal True Path Party (TPP) -- came into power in the midst of 1990s.²⁹ This new administration was not in favor of expanding relations neither with America nor with Western countries. While the new prime minister was paying a number of consecutive visits and trying to bind Turkey to Developing-8 (D-8) countries,³⁰ he has insistently rejected visiting to the United States of America during his administration. However, his government has collapsed in a short time.

In the period of next coalition government between Motherland Party (MP), Democratic Left Party (DLP), and Democratic Turkey Party (DTP), after the Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz's and the Foreign Minister Ismail Cem's successive visits to Washington in 1997, the list of renovations to be undertaken in Turkish-American relations was determined under five primary topics. It was called 'the Five Topics Agenda'. Those topics were energy; economy and trade; regional cooperation; Cyprus and defense issues; and security.³¹ At that time American Secretary of Commerce has named Turkey as an 'emerging market' among big 10s.³² So that Turkey would have an important role in American trade and investment strategies in the years of 2000s.

A new activity in the Middle East came on the scene in December 1998. The United States and Britain executed the Desert Fox Operation to Iraq to demolish the total destruction weapons. The military forces located in Incirlik base have been used in this operation. Naturally, the aircrafts used the Turkish air corridors to strike the targets. However, a small disagreement has erupted between Turkey and its allies at that time. Turkish authorities argued that America has not asked Turkey's approval before the

operation.³³ It immediately closed the Habur border gate to any probable refugee flows. The air attacks to Iraqi targets have significantly performed by the times. The USA and Britain made a full statement of their justification of this operation as the 'right of self defense'. In order to prevent any drastic results, the Turkish General Chief of Staff and its American counterpart came together on February 22, 1999. Some changes have been made in the 'Document of Engagement Rules', which had been signed among the military authorities of Turkey, the United States, and Britain before.

The prospect of Turkish-American relations has blurred with another problematic area. At the end of 1990s, Europeans have tried to outline their common security, defense, and foreign policy designs. About the European Security and Defense Policy initiative, America took some positive preliminary steps to St. Malo Declaration that was signed by Britain and France in December 1998. But the United States of America was supporting this initiative merely in the framework of NATO. According to the above mentioned declaration, the European Union (EU) would take its decisions about the subjects with respect to its own security and could automatically benefit from NATO's planning and operational facilities without asking for other non-EU members of NATO, like Turkey. However, Turkey has wielded its veto power to impede such kind of an automatic mechanism. To solve this problem, America and Britain have suggested giving a word of assurance to Turkey. And, a guarantee agreement was acted in 2001. But this accord was blocked by Greek veto. Eventually, this problem was settled by the 'Ankara Compromise' in 2001, and then in EU-Copenhagen Summit Meeting in 2002.

Turkish and American parts contacted vehemently with each other almost in every level particularly in the year of 1999. Turkish President Demirel went to Washington to attend the NATO Summit in April. After that, Prime Minister Ecevit's visit to the United

States took place in September. American President Clinton came to Turkey because of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)'s Summit conference and he also went to see Golcuk region where an earthquake disaster happened in 1999 in order to organize an international aid campaign. As a result of these manifold intensive contacts, Turkish-American relations have eventually progressed to the level of 'Strategic Partnership'. This new concept, indeed, symbolized the existence of tremendous common benefits of these two countries in the regions containing Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and the Central Asia.³⁴ It has become clearly a necessity for America to have a strategic partner in all these regions. The US side was contemplating to establish this partnership with Turkey by improving defense, security, and economic-commercial relations. Thoughts on this conception have clearly been shown in OSCE Summit Meeting held in Istanbul in November 1999. The improvement of oil reserves in the Caspian Sea and transporting oil by way of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline have been taken under decision in this summit meeting.³⁵ It was also concluded that it would be a consultation process in terms of crisis prevention and crisis management within the framework of strategic partnership between two states. The consultation process would intensively be on the subjects of containing the regional conflicts, heightening the enforcement of international rules, and fighting against international terrorism and against the proliferation of total destruction weapons all over the world. Appropriately, Turkey, with her other NATO allies, has joined to NATO-Kosovo Force (KFOR) in former Yugoslavia and the Operation Northern Watch in Iraq to serve the world peace.

AFTER TERRORIST ATTACKS: AMERICAN STRIVE FOR HEGEMONY STOKES FEARS IN TURKEY IN CASE OF IRAQ

Turkey has avowed its sorrow and cursed terror after the terrorist attacks to Pentagon and the World Trade Centre's Twin Towers on September 11, 2001. It has also notified its decision of battle against terrorism. Ankara was in favor of the cooperative actions in this field since it had suffered with very serious domestic security problems because of PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) for a long time. Therefore, it seemed that a common anti-terror initiative possibility and reactionary spirit have developed between Turkey and the United States of America. A concrete and gratifying example of this was the cooperative approach of Turkey during the Operation Infinite Justice - Operation Enduring Freedom³⁶ elicited against Taliban regime in Afghanistan. There was not a legality problem of this operation since it depended on the resolutions of the UN Security Council, numbered 1368 and 1373, and it was basically a NATO operation. Depending upon American requests, Turkey deliberately permitted for using her air corridors for coalition aircrafts with 'blanket permission' on September 21, 2001. Ankara has reinforced the coalition forces by sending military personnel to the United States Central Command (CENTCOM). Besides, Turkey has also taken the commandment task of ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan for six months from the beginning of June 20, 2002, as nowadays.

America demanded certain amounts of soldiers for operation from Turkey on October 2, 2001. The Turkish Council of Ministers decided to dispatch soldiers to Afghanistan on November 20, 2001, and a special force composed of ninety soldiers was transferred to Afghanistan. At the same date, the government has written a permission note to the assembly for being able to send more soldiers.

During the Washington visit of Prime Minister Ecevit on January 16, 2002, the agenda between the two countries focused dominantly over Iraq issue. The Cyprus issue, for example, was only on the seventh rank in the agenda. Turkey has tried to present a unilateral reactionary attitude during negotiations. Turkish part clearly set forth its red lines. It notified that Iraq's territorial unity must be protected in future. If the unity could not efficiently be provided, it would not give assent for any involvement of Mosul and Kirkuk within the Kurdish region. A consensus between Turkey and the United States could not be realized with respect to Iraq theme during this rendezvous.

After then, President George W. Bush adverted to Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as the 'Axis of Evil' in his speech, on January 29, 2002. America was insistent to fight against this axis even alone. The Turkish reaction to America raised by General Tuncer Kılınc, General Secretary of War Academies. He explained his thought in the meeting on March 6, as follows: "Turkey could make a new cooperation with Russia and Iran, if it would be necessary for her national interests."³⁷

Meanwhile, the United States hosted the leaders of all Kurdish groups living in northern Iraq, in Washington on August 9, 2002. The Turkish representatives have not been acquainted before this meeting and they were isolated from negotiations. During that time, Russian Assistant Foreign Minister Sultanov has visited Ankara and invited Turkey to take place in the camp taking shape against a probable operation. But, Turkey has acted very carefully not to generate a radical demarche in her foreign policy until the general elections on November 3. The White House implored manifold concrete actions from Turkey during September 2002.³⁸ Conveniently, the Turkish territories must have been opened to use of American forces in order to wage war from a northern front, and to influx a total of 80 thousand American soldiers and 250 fight aircrafts to Turkey. In addition,

some airports and harbors in Turkey must have been assigned to use of the United States and the coalition forces; all these establishments must have been modernized and inspected by America. The Turkish Government let the General Chief of Staff know all these American aspirations before general elections. For, the government hesitated from the unfavorable ramifications of these American requests just in the way of general elections. Although the UN has not taken a resolution to legalize any operation against Iraq, the American Congress gave the president the power to declare war against Iraq, without waiting for any UN Security Council resolution, on October 11, 2002.

The Justice and Development Party (JDP) as the leading political party in the elections formed the new government on November 28. When it came into power its primary concern has become the membership of Turkey in EU. The new cabinet in Turkey started to spend all its efforts and to focus its full attention toward the EU membership. It concentrated into the coming EU-Copenhagen Summit, at the end of 2002.³⁹ Therefore, American requests were delayed for a while. But eventually, Turkey decided to allocate bases to America depending upon cabinet's decision on December 18, 2002. As known, in Copenhagen Summit a favorable decision was not taken for Turkey's membership, and it was necessary to wait for that decision until December 2004 that was taken in Brussels Summit.

Naturally, the Iraq operation stigmatized the Turkish-American relations in 2003. A big fire was about to start in Iraq adjacent to Turkey. Before the operation, once again America has officially requested from Turkey to open the northern front. This request has been repeated a fortiori in March. According to a decision taken by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the modernization process of the allocated bases, airports, and harbors have begun for this purpose. On the other hand, a large amount of the U.S. military equipments

and personnel those were planned to be used in this operation have been kept out of the Turkish territorial waters during that time. Those were waiting for a Turkish decision to open a northern front to Iraq. At first, it seemed to be no problem, but later some NATO members have begun to present different views to the operation as the time passed. Moreover, France, Germany, and Belgium have hindered the NATO's supports to protect Turkey's security when in any war situation in Iraq.⁴⁰ America has very greatly disappointed from this decision of its NATO allies. A visible strain has been seen especially in U.S.-France relations.

Further, the foreign and national media have exaggerated the economic aid matter that was being conferred between Turkey and the United States. The problem of economic costs has been the primary factor for congestion of discussions. A good number of adverse articles and interpretations, accused Turkish side as gluttonous in economic aid talks, published in American media which were even judging the degree of Turkey's loyalty in alliance. From the beginning of February, the U.S. part has begun to ponder about the possible 'B-plans' seriously, because there was a very low probability for opening up of the Turkish front from north.

Finally, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey declined to give military permission on March 1, 2003. So that it was not allowed to locate the American military forces in Turkey. That decision brought into being a very important disappointment in America.⁴¹ The former American Ambassador Grossman pronounced that Turkey has lost the opportunity to determine the destiny of Iraq because of its decision. He has also notified Turkey not to make any action by itself in northern Iraq. By this action, Turkish government incurred American displeasure. According to the General Chief of Staff of America, General Myers, there were four more alternative war plans (B, C, D, and E) on

Iraq. The United States has implored to Turkey to open its air corridors, as assistance for the operation. Since almost all the allies in NATO had given permissions for American flights; finally, Turkey has also given its allowance in line with other NATO allies.⁴² It was a day after the beginning of the war on March 20. Nonetheless, the White House Spokesperson Ari Fleischer has counted Turkey's name within the list of the coalition countries. After Turkish objection, the United States has revoked the planned aids of aggregate \$ 6 billion to Turkey. But as a result of National Security Advisor Rice's intensive efforts only one billion dollars have been allocated as a grant to Turkey. This grant might be used as \$ 8.5 billion-credit with lower interest rate, if it is preferred. But it was constrained with two conditions: Turkey must continue to bolster the coalition powers and not to behave unilaterally in Northern Iraq during and after the operation. American Secretary of State Powell visited Turkey at the end of March and he demanded from Turkey that the Turkish Army must not go further inside Iraq. He also stated that Turkish rejection of American aspirations has apparently disappointed America but it was necessary to forget it all and look forward into the future with respect to Turkish-American relations.⁴³

President George W. Bush has once more avowed their disappointment from Turkish decision in his speech on NBC television channel. He pointed out that the main reason of unsuccessfulness of military intervention was the Turkish adversarial decision of not opening up the northern front to Iraq.⁴⁴ Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz has also used a very radical wording in one of his speeches that "the Turkish General Chief of Staff has not shown a good leadership to support America in Iraq War."⁴⁵ In a sense, Wolfowitz's speech could be interpreted as Turkey should excuse from America because of its unfavorable decision. The Turkish public opinion has enormously been impressed by

deputy secretary's claims. Another authority in Pentagon, Doug Feith (Defense Undersecretary for Policy) has also made some explanations in the manner of vouching for Wolfowitz's words.⁴⁶ All these negative messages have created immense indignations in Turkish public opinion.

This overall picture has made us cogitate whether the concept of strategic partnership between two countries died or not. Some other incidents and relations have also generally proved this anxiety. However, the new American Ambassador in Ankara Eric Edelman claimed in his first official speech that "the strategic partnership would be reshaped as soon as possible between Turkey and America".⁴⁷ But, in fact, any significant improvement has not been practiced in this context in the following dates. On the contrary, some incidents such as Orthodox Patriarch crisis, PKK problems in Northern Iraq, keeping Iraq's territorial unity intact, Turkmens' situations and their futures, the status of Kirkuk city and so on have created bomb effects in Turkish-American relations. President Bush has called up Turkish President Sezer for Bingol earthquake, and he promised to try to maintain Iraq's unity. This conduct of President Bush might be interpreted as an effort of creating a moderate improvement in the relations of two countries.

The last word with this respect might be that the American foreign policy or generally speaking the West's policy depends on 'forgive but never forget' principle. Therefore, Turkey must not forget this brief word and follow a coherent diplomacy to its interests. However, Graham E. Fuller in his article in Los Angeles Times stated that "Ankara is not following a policy against America, but plainly an independent policy."⁴⁸ He says that Turkey has undertaken very venerable democratic reforms in the way of its possible membership to EU in recent years. By this way, it extremely helps to American benefits in broader sense. For example, it has bravely taken very important steps for recovering

Turkish-Kurdish and Turkish-American relations. The most interesting thing is that some of its Arab neighbors begrudge and applaud its current foreign policies and strategies. In their eyes, Turkey is no more an ‘accomplice of the United States’.⁴⁹ For, Turkey quitted following America in its foreign policy after the end of Cold War.

WANING SPIRIT OF MUTUAL REACTIONS AND WEAKENING COMMON INITIATIVES IN TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS TODAY

A great extent of uneasiness in Turkish-American relations can simply be diagnosed in recent times. This adverse situation is serious enough to damage the spirit of mutual initiatives between two countries by climbing uni- and multilateral tendencies of reactions in Turkey. According to Alan Makovsky who is an expert over Turkey in the U.S. House of Representatives, Turkey is about to lose its romantic view (especially in American media) in the United States of America.⁵⁰ Recently, some climatic changes in the United States against Turkey prove this picture. The number of dissident senators against Turkey is increasing in the United States of America day after day. For example, the Republican Senator Bruce Jackson accused the JDP government for growing hostility against America in Turkey, in his speech on March 8, 2005. He asserted that “Turkey is not any more a beneficial country for America.”⁵¹ Also Arnaud de Borchgrave, analyst in the Washington Times, is questioning the causes of anti-Americanist reactions arose in Turkish public opinion (82 percent).⁵² He concludes that the media in both countries exaggerates the tensions between Turkey and the United States of America;⁵³ therefore, one of the most important roles belongs to media. But, we must admit that, besides media, the mutual manner of conduct is also a very important factor in this result. For example, one of the most damaging events took place in northern Iraq (in Suleymaniye near Iran border) on July 4, 2003. American officers insulted 11 high-level officers of Turkish Special Forces in

Iraq.⁵⁴ Attrition of bilateral relations as a result of this kind of infamous events rose to the highest point at that time. But fortunately, the negative trend in bilateral relations has not been allowed to climb more, because the gravity of Turkey has been once again recognized by American authorities within the framework of the New Global Defense Strategy devised at the end of year 2003. So that, the year of 2004 started in a quite positive atmosphere with respect to Turkish-American relations. Bush administration considered Turkey as a core country in the Greater Middle East Project. Parallel to that, the NATO Summit held in Istanbul, on June 28-29, 2004, aiming at ameliorating the trans-Atlantic relationships under the NATO umbrella.

In fact, the primary reason of distress in Turkish-American relations was the voting for military permission of March 1 in Turkish Assembly.⁵⁵ After that voting, some authorities in American side have begun to question the degree of friendship of Turkey. This situation might exactly be compared with the atmosphere created by the famous 'Johnson's letter' to Ankara in 1964. In that letter the United States had announced its opposite intention and that in turn had created a great indignation and negative reaction in Turkish public opinion.

At present, the Turkish-American controversies are more comprehensive than former ones, since it also covers various fields, subjects, and countries apart from Iraq issue. Some authorities in America criticize Turkey because of its views about general elections in Iraq. Even, some of them put forward the idea that Turkey has lost her attributes of being a model state (a paragon) in that area. Also, some authorities feel disappointment from Turkish approach to non-democratic countries like Iran, Syria, and Belarus. As it is known, some countries from this group have been viewed as 'rogue' or 'axis of evil' states by America. On these conceptions some attitudes of Turkey, such as, trying to obstruct the probable American attack to Iran, beginning cooperation with Asad regime in Syria and in

this context President Sezer's visiting to Syria in April 2005, some delays in taking a decision with respect to withdrawal of Syrian soldiers from Lebanon, have all enlarged American upset against Turkey. As a matter of fact, Ambassador Edelman argued in one of his conversations that "it is expected that Turkey must accommodate with international society."⁵⁶

Some current explanations of American authorities on Turkey present indirectly an important fact that America feels great discontent to Turkey's behaviors during and after the Iraq operation. For instance, the Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has released a speech in Fox TV that there is a clear correlation between Turkey's negative decision on northern front to Iraq and the present chaotic situation in that country.⁵⁷ According to Rumsfeld, Turkey has made something wrong, and it must correct its mistake. Therefore, America has required military bases from Turkey. It especially insisted on Incirlik base. The United States is planning to use it as a logistic hub. Washington's concrete stipulations for Incirlik base are as the followings: free flights (without asking for any permission from Turkish authorities in each flight), blanket permission, logistic storing, letting the Turkish officers inform for loadings just at the flight date (not before flights), unlimited loadings and forces transportation, using the base as a logistic centre toward Iraq and Afghanistan, and so on. On the other hand, Turkey is contradicting that Incirlik base can not be used for transporting any kinds of weapons and ammunitions, and all inspections for loadings must be undertaken in Incirlik base. In addition, the United States of America craved that the permission about the usage of the base must be made by an instant 'governmental decision' instead of enacting a law by the Assembly. It seems that there is no problem with much of these requirements of America in Turkish side.

Another important, intricate, and unsettled question in Turkish-American relations seems to be the probable recognition of 'April 24' as the 'genocide-day' by the American Congress. Bush administration gives to Turkey the message that 'Turkey must strongly support American hands (policies) for being verified against Armenian theses'. The meaning of this sentence in diplomatic language is that, Turkey must open up her boundaries to Armenian trade and transports. It might also be construed that some Turkish political groupings and newspapers portray the persecutions of American forces in Iraq and Israeli soldiers in Palestine (especially in refugee camps) as genocide, nowadays. America demands from the Turkish government to obstruct these kinds of reactions.

CONCLUSION

At the present time, the unilateral reactionary dimension (against each other) in Turkish-American relations got firmed. But, this is a 'temporary fluctuation' as stated by Secretary of the Turkish National Security Council, Ambassador Yigit Alpogan.⁵⁸ However, there is not even a little modification in the documents and negotiable devices which are putting the relationships between Turkey and the United States in order. Therefore, Turkey has still kept the main lines in her relations with America. Perhaps, America's opinion about 'Turkey as a model country' within the framework of the Greater Middle East Project might become severely mutilated. Because, Bush administration tries to found new leverage points in the areas of the Central Asia, the Middle East, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus. Therefore, America might review the strategic importance of Turkey once again. On the other hand, Americans' favorable approach to non-secular Shiite model in Iraq might replace Turkey's model in the second rank. In fact, Turkey's geo-strategic location is still a dominant factor for America so that its relations with Turkey must always be kept in a certain level. Appropriately, Secretary of State

Condoleezza Rice at the beginning of the second Bush administration has added Turkey in her first official visit tour. Another indicator of this thought is that the United States of America spends considerable efforts to make Incirlik base as a logistic hub.

Nobody denies that there are growing dissensions in Turkish-American relations nowadays. As in 2002, ‘the Declaration for Human Rights and Supporting Democracy’⁵⁹ issued in 2005 (by the U.S. State Department) includes the following requirements from Turkey: the reopening of the Patriarch School in Heybeliada and the recognition of the ecumenical status of Patriarch.⁶⁰ And according to this declaration, non-Turkish citizens might also serve as religious personnel in Turkey.

Also, Robert L. Pollock has underlined this unfavorable situation in the relations between two countries in his article published in the Wall Street Journal. He defined Turkey as ‘the sick man of Europe’.⁶¹ Similarly, Mark Parris, the former Ambassador of the United States in Turkey has also defined the relationships between two states as “allergic partnership”.⁶² One of the Nixon Center’s experts, Zeyno Baran asserts that one of the most problematic themes in Turkish-American relations is the Turkish negative judgments about transitioning the Turkey’s anti-democratic neighborhood in democracy under American leadership in the sphere of Turkey’s near abroad.⁶³ Yet the main reason behind the breaking up of the relations between two countries is the status of Kurdish people in Northern Iraq as Roger Cohen, the foreign policy writer of the New York Times has also underscored. According to Cohen, Turkey’s apprehension on this matter raises to a high level since America does not clearly present her opinion about a possible independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq.⁶⁴ Also, Turkey implores American support to terminate isolation in Northern Cyprus. America officially has given a positive response to this Turkish expectation. Ankara is also waiting for an active and decisive American

challenge against the PKK terrorist organization based in Northern Iraq. But, America seems quite non-sensitive with this expectation of Turkey so far.

When all these unfavorable conditions come together, today we see that Turkey has no alternative to use the within-the-bloc or the out-of-bloc balancing and stabilizing methods. Those were strongly possible during the Cold War era. So Turkey must very carefully assay to what extent it must go into relationships with states which follow anti-American policies. By conceding a realistic paradigm, it must adopt neither a full independent nor a full dependent policy from America. It must be admitted that Turkey's full independent space of movement (lebensraum) is getting narrower with respect to the relations with a super or hyper power, the United States, in the Middle East as time goes on. So that, a rational and realistic policy from Turkey's viewpoint should depend on the following factors: to observe and practice dominantly its public's welfare and happiness; to be sensitive not to demonstrate an unstable appearance in its vicinity; to keep its EU vision stable; to put its relations with the IMF in order; to follow a foreign policy by taking into consideration the feasibility of requirements, by being limited within the framework of diplomatic rules, and by presenting initiatives and/or reactions as not following indecisive policies as at the present time.

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NOTES

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- ¹³ See, Faruk Sonmezoglu, *Turkiye-Yunanistan Iliskileri ve Buyuk Gucler: Kibris, Ege ve Diger Sorunlar*, (Istanbul: Der Yayinlari, 2000), pp. 215-22.
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