THE MANAGEMENT OF INTUITION

John D Haynes
Management Information Systems Department
College of Business Administration
University of Central Florida, Orlando, USA
Email: jhaynes@bus.ucf.edu

ABSTRACT

Human intuition and the creativity afforded by that intuition is an aspect of the essential human-ness of any Human Being. Heidegger refers to this essential humanness as Dasein. Collectively and individually therefore, Dasein - and from that, intuition - should be an organization's greatest asset. It is accordingly, at least initially, difficult to understand why the management of almost all organizations do not pay more attention to the development of this asset. This paper examines a phenomenological approach to managing intuition. In particular, the paper examines the nature of Heidegger's notion of Ding-an-sich (the thing-in-itself), a grasp of which, it is argued, is essential in coming to terms with the human capacity for intuition and creativity. The paper also offers a number of possibilities for managing intuition under the general heading of Thematic Management.

Keywords: Thing, Thing-in-itself (Ding-an-sich), intuition, Phenomenology, Dasein, reflexivity, subjectivity, objectivity, Thematic Management.

INTRODUCTION

This paper is an attempt to focus on the hidden aspects of intuition and creativity and not treat them, or worse their creators, as "information packets" to be managed, but rather as crucial human assets to be nurtured and cared for. In many respects the proper care of intuition and creativity is seeing their possibilities in the context of an organization and guiding that transition from implicit conception to explicit recognition as a perceivable product. But humans who are (considerably) creative cannot always make the organizational contextual connection themselves, and in that sense intuition and creativity in an organizational context cannot be successfully self-managed. It is from this perspective that this paper is seeded. There needs to be a type of management that "contextually sees the possibilities of creativity and intuition" without at the same time interfering with the process of intuition and creativity. To do that this type of management needs to comprehend both the process of intuition and creativity as a thing-in-itself and to come to terms with the fact that this process is implicit or hidden, and at the same time recognize that this process must thematically connect with the goals and aspirations of the organization.

Thematic Management

The type of Management we speak of above we refer to, in this paper, as Thematic Management precisely because that type of Management needs to take the journey into what constitutes a thing-in-itself and to relate that understanding thematically to the organization. In order to achieve that goal more precisely, we restrict ourselves, in this paper to Heideggerian Phenomenology and thereby lead the way toward a Thematic Management approach. In seeing this connection Management discovers new possibilities. More particularly that kind of Management shifts from perceiving (and manipulating) things to seeing the possibilities inherent in the conception of things-in-themselves. Lucas Introna [Introna, 2002, p 224] comments that "Heidegger refers to the work of the artisan [to make this point abundantly clear]. The artisan did not make or manufacture 'things' as such. The relationship between the skills of the artisan and the material being transformed was one in which the artisan drew on his tacit understanding of the world – the referential whole – of the 'thing' being made".

The referential whole is a thing-in-itself and its relation to the 'thing' being made is thematic. This is precisely why "theme" and thematic" is of importance in this paper, because we are linking together

factor (thing) and process (thing-in-itself). We cannot link them directly, that would be to commit a category mistake, so we do so, just as the artisan does, indirectly, by gleaning the theme inherent in the thing-in-itself and linking that to what is thematic in the thing in question. The artisan intuits the theme as pure design (thing-in-itself) and makes the recognition of that thematic as an art product (thing). But just as the artisan expresses him or herself in this way, so too could Management, provided, of course, that the Management in question comprehends the crucial relation between thing as factor and thing-in-itself as process.

In terms of thing as factor (fragment) we could say that this is organizational perceiving, and in terms of thing-in-itself as process (wholes) we could say that this is organizational conceiving. Management needs to clearly see the relation between perceiving and conceiving in order to apply a "thematic approach" to the organization. Why? Because a theme of some work or process arises out of the reconciliation of the composition of the work or process as part and whole. This reconciliation is necessary to form a synthesis – a general grasp. On the basis of comments by David Bohm [Bohm, 1980, p 3] thinking in terms of referential wholes is what mankind has moved away from, to, generally, a state of fragmentation. Consider specifically Bohm's point as follows: "Being guided by a fragmentary world-view, man then acts in such a way as to try to break himself and the world up, so that all seems to correspond to his way of thinking. Man thus obtains an apparent proof of the correctness of his fragmentary self-world view though, of course, he overlooks the fact that it is he himself, acting according to his mode of thought, who has brought about the fragmentation".

Consider this fragmentation from the perspective of the development of the machine (computer). It is so easy for Management to relinquish control to the computer, or worse "the instrumentality of the machine appears to transform the entire universe into a *means* to humankind's own ends. But in this moment of apparent triumph, the will to mastery turns on itself and becomes self-destructive" [Taylor, 2001, p 83]. If mankind continues to develop ways of management that lack a sense of intuition, then in the end our very capacity for intuition will begin to diminish.

THE NOTION OF THEME AND ITS CONNECTION TO INTUITION

In *History of the Concept of Time*, [Heidegger, 1992, p 99] Heidegger says, "Every phenomenological analysis of acts considers the act in such a way that the analysis does not really go along with the act, does not follow its thematic sense, but rather makes the act itself a theme". This notion of making the act itself a theme is precisely why opportunities are open for all who adopt this Phenomenological approach. They are open because in seeing the theme in the act itself we are availing ourselves of our intuition. On the one hand we have the 'thingness' of the act (that is the object component in the act; the measurable aspect of the act) and on the other hand, its referential connection to, or context with, the rest of the world, either limited in terms of the organization or in a wider viewing. But what allows for a thematic viewing, what discloses itself for that viewing, is the character or essence of the act, it is the thing-in-itself of that act. Seeing that thematic connection, by having a sense of the thing-in-itself, is invoking intuition.

HEIDEGGER'S DASEIN

Dasein, Heidegger's special term for a Human Being's essential human-ness or "spark of spirit" [Caputo, 1987, p 157], which belongs specifically to humans, is indicative or expressive of a human thing-in-itself. The human body or content is its thing-ness and Dasein is indicative of its thing-in-itself. Our human-ness is made expressible through our body and our thoughts. But our body and our thoughts are things, whereas our human-ness is the 'form' in which our essence as a human being expresses itself via the content of the human body and human thoughts. Things are often seen in terms of content in space and time and things-in-themselves are seen in terms of form or concept (neither of which have spatial or temporal characteristics, yet they both 'appear' in space and time). Following this view, some things have content as well as form, for example humans. Some things have content but have no form, for example tables. 'Form' is not viewed here (in this paper) in terms of space and time, but rather in a similar way in which Heidegger treats Dasein (a term he himself coined). While Dasein (form) applies specifically to the content of humans, we can certainly conceive of a form that is not Dasein.

The point that Phenomenology takes at issue with other philosophies is that Phenomenology tries to articulate the essence (the thing-in-itself) in things. If, of course, the 'thing' in question possesses one, see in particular Heidegger [Heidegger, 1967]. Insofar as Phenomenology does this it is interested in the phenomenon itself rather than the word, or label, that points to it. In much the same way as Heidegger is interested in Dasein (not the word, but the phenomenon that it points to, i.e., human-ness) rather than which type of human, man or woman, who possesses it. Therefore Heidegger is being considerably more interested in the phenomenon that its definition. Definitions for Heidegger obscure our openness to the phenomenon, a phenomenon that may be elusive, but nevertheless is able to be grasped conceptually.

Moreover, in all of Heidegger's (considerably prodigious) work he never mentions either of the words 'Man' or 'Woman'. This was no oversight. He replaced the word 'man' and 'woman' with Dasein. Heidegger coined the word 'Dasein' to describe a human's essential human-ness. One clear reason for the introduction of Dasein is the provision for the shift from the need to define things-in-themselves. Indeed, he wanted to get away from the need to define any thing or any ideal, rather he chose to reveal. More particularly the subjective side of humans, as reflected in their feelings and their thoughts is implicit and indicative of implicit knowledge which is not, as such, definable, and is often unintelligible, anticipating some future explicit action or destination in intelligible explicit knowledge. It might of course seem questionable whether revelation in the Heideggerian sense could actually be achieved when starting from a concept such as the thing-in-itself. He is, after all, introducing severe constraints on objectivity. Heidegger actually declares objective knowledge illusory. The confusion dissolves through recognition of Heidegger's primary target. He proposes to aid in revealing Dasein as a thing-in-itself. It is first and foremost Dasein which cannot be defined as a closure but should instead be appreciated as revealing opening.

THE NOTION OF INTUITION

The acceptance of the 'form' or the concept or the idea of Being (as distinct from the thing-ness or content of being or being-in-the-world) is an example of the implicit nature of intuition. Almost all of Heidegger's work is the attempt to reveal, and render in all its beauty, the form or idea of Being in its relation to being. He states again and again that our Being shines forth in the (good) actions of our being or being-in-the-world. It is evident, also from Heidegger's own actions, for that matter, that good-ness is not intrinsic. Introducing value, i.e. good-ness, turns his program of revelation into an ideology. The intensity of Heidegger only confirms that Dasein cannot escape ideological revelation. Existence always involves responsibility. Man's responsibility is grounded in his intuition.

Intuition is not a thing and is therefore not able to be perceived as such. The process of intuition is hidden from our sense perceptions. Generally at the level of perception things are open to perception (by which they may, or may not, be perceived), but, importantly, we are not able to perceive an idea or concept – simply because neither have any identifiable 'thingness' about them to enable them to be perceived. However, in the mode of conception, the invisibility of ideas, (or concepts, or form) provides the ground from which we can conceive such ideas, concepts, form. Another phenomenological (albeit generically) writer of note on this general area of tacit or implicit knowledge (but beyond the scope of this particular paper) is Michael Polanyi [Polanyi, 1967].

THE MODE OF CONCEPTION AND THE LEVEL OF PERCEPTION

The notion of conception itself is an idea hidden from Dasein's perception and can only be comprehended in terms of its own hidden process of coming-into-being. In this sense conception is its own becoming, insofar as the idea that is conceived is its being conceived. That is how we come to know the idea, by conceiving of it, including conception itself. What emerges from that hiddenness is the manifest idea, the resultant knowing that has transpired in that implicitness that (the level of) perception cannot comprehend. As indicated in an earlier section, organizational perceiving relates to things as factors (as fragments), and organizational conceiving relates to things-in-themselves as process (wholes). It follows then that Management needs to clearly see the crucial

relation between perceiving and conceiving in order to apply a "thematic approach" to the organization.

THE SHIFT TO CONCEPTION

The way in which we conceive any idea or concept is the same thematic way in which we conceive of the idea of conception itself. This is known as reflexivity: the way in which phenomenologically we articulate thought in general is the same way-in-process in which we articulate Phenomenology (the process) itself. And this conception of conception itself is at one with itself. It should be noted that interpretations, for example, are characteristic of the level of perception, but interpretations are absent from conception, there is no 'thing' to interpret. The shift to conception, before conception is reached, can be regarded as a perception-in-gestalt as Haynes [Haynes, 1999, p 17] indicates:

> That bird's eye view or perception-in-gestalt is a mode that diffuses, like conceiving taken as a mode, a multiplicity of so-called interpretations into a modal shift. If one or the many so-called interpretations do not conform to a conception, i.e., leaving behind the perceiving of the [words as] objects or things, then we have a so-called interpretation, which is still operating at the level of perceiving. But if we consider the case of an interpretation that is conceived, then we have made one modal shift to that of conception. .. this arises out of the experience of undergoing the perception-in-gestalt. So there are three distinct stages in the comprehension of a central idea .. (1) perception, moving to (2) perception-in-gestalt, shifting to (3) conception.

From the above quote we can see that reflexivity, like conception itself, is a three-step process. Initially we have an interpretation at the level of perception, then we have a reflection, of seeing the duality of things, the beginning of the gestalt of things, until we move to the 'hiddenness' of conception. Out of the darkness of conception comes a new light, a light to illuminate what has been conceived, a light that turns the implicit knowledge of conception into the explicit knowledge of the product of conception (an objectified thing or subjective knowledge of some type).

The case in point in this paper is that the intuition inherent in conception leads to an outcome that is contextually accurate, not measurably accurate. Heidegger's comment "Inquiry, as a kind of seeking, must be guided beforehand by what is sought, So the meaning of Being must already be available to us in some way" [Heidegger, 1987, p 24] is of importance here. It points to a resolution of Phenomenology with its lived intuitional experience in being-in-the-world, which is its so-called pragmatic consequence. Intuition's pragmatic, or behavioural, import comes into play through perspective. Thus the concept of essence shifts to become perspectival, implying a departure from the Heideggerian thing-in-itself to the notion of intuition that is able to satisfy Heidegger's requirement of having "the meaning of Being already available to us" (that is intuitionally). Hirschheim, Klein and Lyytinen's [Hirschheim, Klein and Lyttinen, 1995, p 62] also recognize the need for such a shift in their question applied to the reconciliation of subjectivity and objectivity. The question Hirschheim et al pose is "Is it possible to conceive of a third perspective on data modeling which combines both objectivist and subjectivist principles?" The solution they explain is in terms of the actor's imagination. At some point that imagination must be intuitional, that is, at some point it must be able to imagine itself, which entails that the object of imagination is itself the subject of imagination, and in that sense it is "already available" to itself.

THE MANAGEMENT OF IMPLICIT INTUITION: THEMATIC MANAGEMENT

The upshot of the forgoing is that in taking a phenomenological approach we look for evidence of things and things-in-themselves, rather than attempt to define such apparent 'structures'. In seeking evidence we need to experience and/or re-experience what is in view, until the 'evidence' co-incides with our own experiences. Then we experience what is <u>really</u> (in the deeper sense) in view for the 'first time' (of perhaps many times). We experience the mode of meaningful intuition that arises out of conception, and we experience the level of significant intuition (the end result or product of

implicit intuition) that arises out of perception. What is implicit in meaningful intuition may eventually be made explicit as a product in significant intuition.

At some stage in early history the invention of the wheel was implicit intuitionally in some human's mind, now it is generally rendered as a significant product of that intuition, but that is not to say that one cannot take the journey again to re-experience it as implicit intuition, and further, to conception itself. In order to do that we need (again, like the original conceiver) to see stones not as objects but as possibilities for being "wheels". There is a continual potential cycle from implicit intuition to its own counterpart as an explicit product of intuition and back again to implicit intuition. What is emerging from our discussion is a theme. It is the theme of the recognition of the journey, the process, the becoming, that takes place in the movement of the implicit to the explicit and back again to the implicit.

This is the same journey that takes place in the recognition of a work of art, of music, of mathematics, of philosophy, of management. At some point the "experiencer" sees (or many experiencers see) that work for the very first time. In that experience of seeing the 'artistry' of a work of art, in that becoming, is the seed of the process of conception, and hence, potentially, the movement toward the 'centre' of creativity itself. In that potential is the distinct possibility of the centre of intuitional creativity because what is being conceived is conception itself. We see the work in its being conceived. The fact that someone else conceived it in its original 'form' before us is, of course the greater conception, but it nevertheless provides us with a crucial experience that when explored allows us to see not only the thing in itself (that which is really viewed) but the process of conception itself, the becoming itself, that sees it.

With the discovery of the process that sees conception comes the realization of the need to care for and preserve opportunities for conception itself. The process of conceiving cannot, in the long run, be self-managed. What manages this implicit intuition is a type of management that recognizes the crucial difference between a thing and a thing-in-itself. The becoming of creativity in conception is a thing-in-itself. It is not a structure that can be defined. It is a reflexive process that can only be experienced. Heidegger's "the essence of technology is not itself technological .. Technology is a way of revealing" [Heidegger, 1977, p 4] is of importance here. The essence of reflexivity is not itself reflexive (there is no logical mechanism in 'there' doing it), but rather, it is a becoming (a non-logical way) of itself as reflexive. Its essence then is that (uniquely instantiated) becoming, and that (particular) becoming can be grasped in thought as a thematic movement, and with further reflection to discover that there is a one-ness about this becoming in general.

We see that theme in the case of reflexivity itself as we see it elsewhere. We take the next step to a general thematic movement, when 'Becoming' becomes its own sign. A sign that so many good thinkers come to know. The good thinker who is asked 'what is your identity?' does not turn to his occupation, or to his name badge or his social security number, but to the fruits of his reflexivity of himself. There may not be an answer that can be logically or rationally created in order to be communicated to others, but there is a response to the question itself, a deep response that allows the question to be (to let it be), and to come into being in all its myriad forms to be asked again and again. In that asking; in that exploration, creativity expresses itself. And that creativity requires genuine management.

Stanislav Grof [Grof, 1990, p 19] suggests, in another context, namely psychology, that states of consciousness such as reflexivity, which he incorporates as part of a third level of consciousness generally under the umbrella of the Holotropic mind, suggests that we need to "develop brand new research projects, exploratory tools, and methodologies for discovering the deepest nature of the human psyche" in relation to human capacities such as reflexivity. But in the absence of those new techniques and in the absence of thematic considerations Management will try to freeze that shift, to grasp it as a structure, to define it and to measure it. This is the whole problem with definitions. Definitions freeze such a shift, and in freezing that which is so defined, dissolves that which is defined in its essential idea-hood; in its articulation in thought as an idea; in its grasping.

So how could a management of implicit intuition proceed? Such a management needs to recognize the crucial difference between a thing and a thing-in-itself. Out of this recognition comes a need to break an organization into aspects that allow for these differences. The conceivers and the perceivers could constitute the major division, but such a division need not be categorical. By this I mean that the division itself could be thematic; it could be two thematic organizational aspects. All humans

both conceive and perceive. Some choose to stay at the level of perception. But they often stay there unwittingly. The management could attempt to emulate the process itself of conception by rotating the organizational members from in and out of organizational aspects of conceiving and perceiving. What could constitute such aspects between conceiving and perceiving in an organization? That would be apparent given the context of the organization in question. In this paper we have referred to this type of management as <u>Thematic Management</u>. As conception often brings together apparently contradictory elements, so too would Thematic Management. In any conception questions of alternatives are, if the conception succeeds, resolved. At the level of perception alternatives abound, hence, at that level, we have many interpretations, and, such interpretations also entail many viewpoints that apparently contradict each other. Thematic Management is in a position to resolve those differing interpretations.

Consider for example, the notion of 'creative' errors: errors that lead to a new discovery. If a strictly perception level approach to management were adopted the possibility of reflection upon an error of this kind would largely be ruled out, but if a sense of discovery inherent in the mode of conception approach to management flourished in an organization, then it is very likely that the 'error' in question would lead to an investigation and exploration that in turn may lead to a new discovery. And this, in turn, is a nurturing management approach to intuition.

Consider another example. Apparently, "nothing succeeds like success", but if the succeeding is in an area that the person has no real competence in, then the success will sooner or later sour into failure, and often, if the position "succeeded to" is a prominent one in the organization, then that eventual failure is often at the expense incurred from the departures of many good and valued employees. Thematic Management would largely preclude such a possibility, because the enthusiasm of discovery inherent in a culture of conception arises from a competence in what is being done, and so in this scenario incompetence is, or should be, difficult to disguise.

CONCLUSION

We have seen how the distinction between a thing (Ding) and a thing-in-itself (Ding-an-sich) is essential to Phenomenology, and therefore, in part, to coming to terms with intuition. We have seen how a thing-in-itself is not a structure with spatial and temporal characteristics yet it makes its presence felt - it reveals itself - in time and space. We extend this very notion of thing-in-itself and in extending it experientially realize that it is implicit intuition. From an exploration of implicit intuition we come to realize that it is conception that allows us to conceive of itself as conception and conceive of the presence, hidden though it is, of intuition. To know conception we must experience conception: what is conceived is its being conceived. In the absence of that knowing we are bereft of a most crucial human quality of mind: intuition and the creativity that follows. Finally, we compared the mode of conception with the level of perception and arrived at a strategy for managing implicit intuition namely Thematic Management.

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