From Labor Process to Citizenship:

The Hegemonic Factory Regime and Working Subjects in Contemporary South China*

Thomas Peng**

Abstract

In Hengfa Handbag Company, a Taiwanese-invested factory in the labor-intensive Pearl River Delta area, workers worked assiduously though coercive means of labor control were not applied or were even abolished. Punishment was replaced by the organization of consent, and a hegemonic factory regime now runs the shop floor. To explain how this unique factory regime was generated and how it functioned, Michael Burawoy's concepts of the "game of making out" and "organization of consent" are important as major analytic concepts. The erosion of the despotic regime can be explained by social networks of kinship or locality that protected workers from physical and economical punishment and caused the degradation of despotic means of labor control. Situated in this plight of coercive labor control, a Burawoyian "game of making out" was generated to replace the punishment. Firstly, output quotas were assigned every day; only after fulfilling the quotas could a worker leave work. Secondly, the co-localization of the factory and dormitory as well as curfew and a desire for an urban lifestyle encouraged workers to work hard to increase their leisure time outside the factory. Furthermore, the process of pursuing this substantial reward organized social relationships among workers and promoted their participation in the voluntary labor process. Lastly, the *hukou* (household registration) system deeply rooted in modern Chinese society generated and legitimated the dormitory and curfew system, which in turn influenced the form of worker activities and initiated games on the shop floor. The lack of citizenship reduced worker safety and caused the dormitory and curfew system to be understood as protection rather than restraint by the workers. Thus, the Hengfa factory regime resulted from the convergence of the *hukou* system and differentiated citizenship inherited from the socialist party-state, as well as labor processes brought about by capitalist modes of production.

Keywords: factory regime, hegemonic regime, peasant worker, citizenship, China

---

* This factory ethnography is based on five months of fieldwork in 2006, in which I was employed by Hengfa as a worker and observed the labor process from the shop-floor as well as workers' everyday life in the dormitory. Sincerest gratitude should be expressed to Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica, Taiwan and Institute of Sociology, National Tsing Hua University, Taiwan, for the financial support during the fieldwork. And I am also grateful to Hengfa's generosity to enable this fieldwork.

** Master of Sociology, National Tsing Hua University, Taiwan. Contact: thomaspeng@msn.com

Introduction

Having read some prior studies about peasant workers in southern China by Ching Kwan Lee, Anita Chan and Ngai Pun, I expected a regime of labor control based on coercion when I stepped onto the shop floor of Hengfa. About 10 years ago, Ching Kwan Lee described her field site, Liton Company, as a factory with a "localistic despotic regime" (Lee 1998: 169-170); simultaneously, Chan (2001) unmasked the catastrophic labor environment in China. At the same time, the mass media in China and in the west reported on sweatshops in reformed China. Entering the field site with these impressions, I was shocked and confused by Hengfa's shop floor.

Located in the Pearl River Delta (PRD) of Guangdong Province, Hengfa Luggage & Handbag Company is an OEM producer of handbags and luggage cases funded by Taiwanese capital. This factory with its hourly wage system confused me with the anomalous labor scene on the shop floor: while I was working in my seat, Li Xiaodong, one of my roommates in my dormitory and the vice lineleader of the assembly line next to mine, was walking around the shop floor and singing a self-written song: "It is boiling hot today and the sun shines everywhere, everywhere!" After several months the weather became rainy, thus he switched to a new song: "For what reason does the rain fall? For what reason does the wind rise?" Besides Xiaodong, other people also took part in the labor process, although not as dramatically. The shop floor was not under strict surveillance: workers did not need to ask for permission to leave their seats and could drink water or go to the toilet as desired; chatting with a friend in other assembly line was usually not inhibited if it was not done not too flagrantly. Usually, the lineleaders did not keep a watchful eye on the working speed of every worker; in fact, they were unable to do so since there were over 20 workers in a line and lineleaders had many administrative matters and unexpected manufacturing problems to deal with; the manufacturing process of handbags and luggage cases was filled with uncertainty, thus the leaders had to frequently check production and adjust the sewing methods.

Even when supervisors did want to examine labor processes and punish workers whose working attitude or performance did not please them, punishment was not always successful. Physical punishment was prohibited, and admonishment was not always useful. I observed the forewoman of our department yelling at a lineleader abusively, yet the lineleader remained aloof and indifferent. When the vice foreman blamed a worker for poor working attitude, the worker just told him: "I was sitting here and working! You just neglected that!" Yelling at workers could even degrade the supervisor: supervisors yelling at workers were seen as incompetent for causing situations that forced the adoption of poor management strategies.

The scene on the Hengfa shop floor was in odds with the description in previous

literature, but some similarities still existed. Although coercive means of labor control such as physical punishment or admonishment or even the threat of reduced wages went weak in the shop floor, workers in Hengfa still worked hard. Although workers were not restrained from leaving their seats, they usually only did it once or twice in every four-hour long section of the workday; although there was no surveillance, workers were always working hard. Although Xiaodong had shown that people can do more than just work in the shop floor, the workers did not try to challenge the interests of the company. As I will point out later, the interests of the company and the workers was coherent. Michael Burawoy (1985) described this phenomenon as a hegemonic regime where the institutional arrangement organized workers interests. But how could this be? How could Hengfa, a labor-intensive export processing factory in South China, generate a factory regime so anomalous to the field work of Lee?

Social and Theoretical Context

After Mao's death and Deng Xiaoping's recovery of power, reform-and-open (*gai ge kai fang*) policy have changed socialist China into a world factory. Today, China is a major producer of almost everything. The spatial shift of production chains has made China an important area for the export of processing and a major supplier of inexpensive labor. To understand the mechanism of capital accumulation and the situation of the rising working class in the reformed era, previous works explored the labor control and factory regime in southern China (Lee 1998; Pun 2005). Various empirical studies have assessed working conditions in China, especially in the Pearl River Delta (Chan 2001).

Located in Guangdong, which is one of the most important coastal provinces for exporting processing, PRD was industrialized hand in hand with the development of FDI manufacturing capitals. FDI invested in PRD and brought technology of production and labor relations to post-socialist China (Hsing 1998). The "miracle of south China," which mainly referred to the industrialization and the connection to global production in PRD, had great impact on social science research in terms of the models of development it presented. What kind of change was brought to workers who had been peasants before the reform and are still defined by the state as peasants even now? What kinds of labor control are used in their workplace? How are they dominated and how do they resist? What kind of capitalism is involved when we talk about "capitalism in China"?

Peasant workers (*nong min gong*) played a major role in the story of development. Defined by the legacy of the socialist era and the *hukou* (household registration) system, they are "peasants" from the administrative viewpoint even when they are actually working in industrial departments. As a result of being defined as peasants,

they enjoy no welfare that state socialism has promised to workers (Pun 2005: 12-13; Wu 2006). As a result of an inability to be seen as local residents in urban areas, they cannot claim citizenship or social rights in urban areas or anywhere besides their hometown (Solinger 2001). Although "socialist China is the workers' nation" (*she hui zhu yi zhong guo shi gong ren de zu guo*), the peasant workers do not belong to the administrative category of "workers." Because of such discrimination and the consequent catastrophic labor condition, peasant workers became the major provider of residual value in the post-Maoist era of industrialization. Most workers in the private sector are peasant workers. In the private sector, the most critical contributor to development during the reform era in south China, low wages and lack of rights to associate was legitimated by the construction of the labor category (Wu 2006), and the cost of labor force reproduction was assigned to the rural department (Pun 2006).

To understand the core of capitalism, namely the obscuring of residual surplus value, Marxist labor process studies have been used to characterize the labor process in south China. Lee described the factory regime in her field site as "localistic despotism," where she claimed that companies in South China engaged in patriarchy in the workplace. As workers had been identified as "*dagongmei*" (maiden workers), coercive labor control was applied via the female workers' male family members, who took managing roles in the workplace (Lee 1998: 119-136). Besides patriarchal power, Pun argued that disciplinary arrangements such as electric eyes, timetables and slogans posted in workshops or dormitories, as well as hegemonic discourse based on discrimination between urban and rural people, shaped the workers' industrial body (Pun 2005: 14, 77-108, 115-119).

The highlight on the politics of identity (Lee 1998: 28-31; 164) and emphasis on the shaping of the industrial body (Pun 2005: 77-108) brought studies on China's labor process to the discussion of worker subjectivity. This may have had two reasons: first academic attention had been paid to analyses of subjectivity after Burawoy (1985) built a whole new framework to understand production organization for only commodities but also social relations and worker's experience of the labor process (Lee 1998: 18; Willmott 1990). The subjectivity of workers was brought to the limelight to explain resistance or its lack thereof, as well as to provide a solution to the dilemma between structure and agency in social science discourse.

In a society that has just started the process of industrialization, prospective workers do not develop through their adolescent experiences in school as Paul Willis (1977) observed in England. In these newly industrialized societies encountering the entrance of global capitalism, the alliance of state, capital and even society were always required to build a capitalist working subject that was somehow absent in the past.

But what kind of working subject exists in South China? Lee (1998) and Pun (1999; 2005) claimed that the working subjects were gendered, and that gendered subjectivity has penetrated the labor process in the form of patriarchal domination or in the combination of urban womanhood and labor processes, where control of female workers was attempted by identifying their gender characteristics and asserting a technology of power upon the gendered subject (Lee 1998: 166; Pun 2005: 142-145).

There are some empirical and theoretical issues raised by the case of Hengfa that are anomalous with respect to the labor situation in the PRD in the 1990s. Empirically, the question is raised: what a kind of factory regime exists in Hengfa? Why did it go beyond the despotic regime described by Lee (1998)? How did it function? The scene I saw on the shop floor of Hengfa implied the existence of a hegemonic regime, but why has Hengfa generated this particular means of labor control when other factories still looked like what Lee observed? And how can a factory with an hourly wage system be run in a hegemonic regime where the interests of workers was organized? Although Hengfa's workers were mainly female, there were some male workers on the assembly line. The relatively de-gendered composition of workers brings more conceptual problems: was gender as critical here as in the studies of Lee or Pun? If not, then what types of interpretation of the working subject would help to understand the factory regime in Hengfa and even "capitalism in China"?

In the midst of despotic factories in PRD, Hengfa was anomalous not only with Lee's account of the labor process in 1990s but also with the representation of labor conditions provided by Chan (2001) and the present Chinese mass media. With the expanded case of Hengfa, we can refine our comprehension of the labor process in contemporary China: due to reasons that will be discussed later, Hengfa's coercive means of labor control has faded even when other companies in PRD still retain it; this decreased control provides an opportunity to grasp the latent possibility of a hegemonic regime that might be widespread in China but is always covered by the patent despotic regime. For further understanding of the hegemonic regime in Hengfa, this study describes worker subjectivity in state, capital and social contexts; through this description we can probe the fundamental ways in which "capitalism" and "China" are joined together.

Social Networks: Do They Strengthen or Weaken Labor Control?

What happened on Hengfa's shop floor when Li Xiaodong was passing by my seat, singing? What enabled him and other workers to walk around the workshop, chat in the restroom, and smoke? What enabled them to work with their own rhythm? This question may have to be posed inversely: what caused the absence of coercive punishment that allowed workers to make their own decision as to whether to work

hard or not? Why were despotic means of labor control absent from Hengfa's factory regime?

The intervention by the state in labor relations and the labor process, as Burawoy (1985: 12; 137-148) determined, certainly contributed to changes in the shop-floor; a worker said, "in the past, if you were defiant in the shop-floor, you would have to get out immediately. The guards would come and pack your belongings and then let you go. They can't do that anymore. Anyone can report them to the Labor Bureau." The Taiwanese boss also said "You know, PRD has changed in these years; things that you could do several years ago may not be allowed now." The impact of the state's attitude toward labor relations may have changed; this has caused internal changes in the labor process and pushed the whole PRD toward a friendlier environment for workers. However, the overall changes in the PRD cannot explain the anomalous situation in Hengfa. Thus we have to ask: what other factors differentiate Hengfa from other factories in terms of shop floor management?

Why can Li Xiaodong walk around the workshop singing? The answer is simple: he is a nephew of the workshop leader. Hengfa hires workers through the *nei zhao* (inner recruit; recruit workers through the current workers' social network) system. All workers are recruited through social networks of current employees; as a consequence, there are strong and complex social ties among all workers. These social ties, always linked with kinship or *laoxiang* (people from the same county or village), function more or less as analyzed by Lee (1998: 127-128): social ties between workers are ancillary to labor control. In Hengfa, everyone has an "introducer," and whenever a worker makes trouble, his or her supervisor may use his or her introducer to press him or her; whenever a worker neglects his or her work, his or her supervisor can seek the introducer's help. However, in Hengfa, kinship or *laoxiang* networks are more often obstacles rather than means of labor control. This is exemplified by the story of Li Xiaodong.

Li Xiaodong's aunt, Li Ailin, is the director of our workshop. Li Ailin has worked in Hengfa for almost twenty years. Since adolescence, she worked in Hengfa and unceasingly introduced relatives into the company even when the situation of Hengfa was difficult. Now, she has at least 13 relatives in Hengfa. If we also take *laoxiang*s and friends into account, we realize that Li Ailin has a strong social network.

Figure 1, which depicts Li Ailin's family tree, shows the 13 relatives working in Hengfa. Those working in the office instead of the shop floor and those working in the new factory, Hengtai, were not included in the tree. Six of the 13 workers were working in my workshop: a sister of Ailin's sister in-law works who is a *shougong* (handcrafting) worker in line 3 (C7 in the figure); the daughter in-law of Ailin's eldest brother, called "Devil," is the leader of line 3 (D1) ; Devil's husband is the vice

lineleader of line 1 and usually works in line 3 (D2) ; the daughter in-law of Ailin's fourth brother is the vice leader of line 1 (D5) ; her fifth brother's son, Li Xiaodong, is the vice leader of diannaoban (a line with a computer sewing machine) (D6); and Li Xiaodong's younger sister is the vice leader of line 2 (D7). Besides the above-mentioned workers, Ailin also has several distant relatives in the workshop, such as the leader of line 1, who is Ailin's neighbor in her hometown, and the vice leader of line 2, who is Ailin's *laoxiang*. There is also a sewing worker of line 3 who is her distant cousin. Furthermore, it has been said that the leader of line 4 has a close patron – client relationship with Ailin, so close that workers rumor that the lineleader got her position by bribery.

If managers can dominate workers through networks of kinships, the workshop should be well-regulated. For Li Xiaodong, however, this not the case. Li Xiaodong was already a vice lineleader when I met him in August, but it was October before I finally realized his position and assignment since I rarely saw him working; every day, he was walking around the workshop singing, and, once in a while, engaging in some handcrafts. His loading was quite light, but this did not imply that he had ever performed his duties well. One day, his supervisor, Zhang Yun, told another lineleader that she needed one more vice lineleader. When being asked the reason, Zhang Yun answered, "Li Xiaodong can do nothing at all. He doesn't even understand how to qing-wei-shu!" Qing-wei-shu, which means to calculate the material loss in the manufacturing process and to estimate the residual quantity of materials to be processed, is a basic duty and primary to being a vice lineleader.

It is also the duty of the vice lineleader to get materials from storage depending on the situation on the shop floor. Based on my observations, Li Xiaodong does not do much of this. A worker also told me that when Li Xiaodong was only a sewing worker, he received fewer assignments than others. People told me that he slept in the restroom while others were working, "he just sat on the floor, stretching his feet to block the door so that no one could enter the restroom, and slept there."

In Hengfa, kinships and local network can result in supervisors who ignore workers' working attitudes. Even if this does not mean deliberate screening of worker behavior, it could imply that supervisors cannot effectively exercise labor control. As one worker said: "someday you will go back to your hometown, and they are your relatives after all; if you don't treat them well, what if they become your enemy?" According to this kind of logic, there was a managerial principle followed by almost all factories in PRD: never put workers from the same village or town in the same unit or dormitory room. This rule is in place to prevent workers' collective movements and supervisor favoritism. During a discussion after several months when I mentioned Hengfa's situation to a researcher familiar with factories in PRD, she directly

suggested that the firm would face some trouble with shop-floor control based on her experiences: factory owners always have to separate workers from the same kinship or hometown to prevent the workers from uniting.

Surely, supervisors sometimes find fault with their relatives and yell at them. However, the relatives as workers can ignore their yelling or even yell back. If Ailin yelled at "Devil," "Devil" might well ignore it as if she never heard a thing; when Ailin blamed Li Xiaodong for his working attitude, he just blamed it back on the way she talked to him. Ailin can never take further action to punish them due to the logic mentioned above: "you shouldn't make enemies among your relatives." In my workshop, lineleaders other than the leader of line 6 always maintained a nice relationship with Ailin and had their own social network, too. Situated in overlapping social networks, labor control had become vague and ambiguous.

Then, the puzzle became very clear and definite: given the stricter practice of labor laws and the obstruction of labor control by social networks, why did workers continue to work assiduously? Readers familiar with Burawoy tradition may consider this as "a making-out game." But how could a game of making-out be constructed based on an hourly wage system? In other words, how is the wage system in Hengfa connected to the labor process? To answer these questions, we have to probe Hengfa's hourly wage system to analyze its ambiguity and complexity. In the next section, I will show that, based on the interactions of the wage system, institutional arrangement in the shop floor and the calculation of expected production, the hourly wage system becomes a disguised piece rate wage. Furthermore, voluntary hard work was produced by the Trinitarian institutional matrix.

The Piece Rate Effect of Hourly Wage

Burawoy's making-out story was described in a factory that paid a per-piece wage, and workers participated in the game of making-out not only for higher income, but also for fun and a sense of self-fulfillment. But how could an hourly wage system provide workers with higher income as an incentive and encourage them to work hard? Hengfa's wage system, according to a manager's account, was based on the hours workers spent working. In Marxist terms, he implied that what the company bought was labor power rather than labor. According to Marx's prototype of the shop floor, what capitalists bought was labor power, surveillance and labor control close to every worker, which could be as indispensable used as a whip. If wages were given according to the hours worked at a fixed level, why would workers work assiduously and voluntarily?

Before analysis using the making-out game, determination of the piece-rate effect of Hengfa's hourly wage is crucial for explaining what happened on the shop floor.

Ostensibly, workers were paid for the hours worked in Hengfa; according to the minimum wage proclaimed by local government, the company divided the monthly minimum wage by 20.9 days, the average working days per month after deducting public holidays and weekends, and the result was a worker's daily pay. Based on the daily pay, a worker's actual pay per day was calculated by deducting the total time of his absence. Because the hour was the fundamental unit in the calculation formula, workers were actually paid by the hour. Besides the regular working hours, overtime was rewarded by a wage increase of 50%; this doubled when working on holidays. According Hengfa's CFO, Wang, the formula of calculating wages was:

w = W-[(W / 20.9) x (D-d)]

w = actual pay for a worker

W= legal minimum wage per month

D = number of days worked

d = number of days where the worker was absent from work, calculated on the basis of hours. For example, one hour is 1/8 of a day

This type of wage calculating system implies that company could adopt coercive means of labor control, since the payment system itself does not provide any means to ensure surplus labor effort. However, there were other institutional payment arrangements existing in Hengfa. The relationship between working hours and income was defined not only with the formula above but also with other regulations run on the shop floor.

In the middle of August, after we cleaned our dormitory room and leaned against the window for a short break, my roommate Chen Chun-jiang started a chat with me. He pointed his finger to a workshop near our dormitory that we could see from the window and told me: "look, that is my workshop, the one in which people check out the latest and earned the least. Its light is still on now." It was eleven o'clock pm. Chen's workshop, as a paradox, plays a critical role in understanding the payment system of Hengfa: what kind of payment system enables the coexistence of long working hours and low earning? How could this appear in a factory that pays an hourly wage as its CFO defined? Chen's answer was simple: *xiao lv* (efficiency).

The paradox described by Chen regarding the coexistence of long working time and low wages in a factory with "hourly wages" can be understood only when taking into account the calculation of *xiao lv*, for the negative correlation between working hours and wages should be understood as the result of the combination of the positive correlation between wages and efficiency and the negative correlation between working hours and efficiency.

The referent standard for calculation of *xiao lv* was the Gong Shi Xian Liang, namely the expected production measured by time. The Technical Department would

establish the time consumed by each working procedure to define expected productivity on the shop-floor and to simultaneously estimate the due date and the quoted price. However, the expected production was actually a theoretical maximum in a given interval of time; when explaining the measurement of the time consumption of a working procedure, the lady in the Technical Department told me, "if the procedure was to sew a leather strip onto a piece of textile with two lines and if each line takes twenty seconds of sewing, this procedure would take forty seconds." The calculation took only the time for sewing into account, but not the time spent on any other activities in the work such as taking materials from the basket nearby the sewing machine, putting it in the machine or any other activities in the labor process. Of course, this calculation also did not take into consideration the time spent taking a break, going to the washroom or having a cup of water in the intense heat of summer.

Since the expected production was the theoretical maximum productivity, Hengfa did not really ask the production units to accomplish 100% of that amount every day. In fact, if an assembling line could finish more than 65% of the quota assigned in that day, the workers would get bonus for efficiency. This is why Chen told me that their low wages were caused by low efficiency; this was the foundation of the positive correlation between income and efficiency.

But how was the negative correlation between working hours and efficiency built? To explain this correlation, we have to consider the infra-regulation of the calculation of expected production per day, namely the "quota assigned to workers by lineleaders." Since 100% accomplishment is almost impossible, the quota was always assigned by the lineleader to be about 60%-70% of the expected production per day. Workers would know their assignment every morning, and if they could not finish it before the regular checking-out time at 8:30 pm, they had to keep working until they accomplished this quota, and they would not be paid for the additional overtime. This rule was claimed to be legitimate by the managers of Hengfa, since the expected production per day was calculated by production in a ten hour day that included eight hours of regular working hours and two hours of overtime. As the target production was assigned for ten hours from 7:30 am to 8:30 pm, workers who could not satisfy their assignment because they took three hours for lunch and dinner should work additional overtime after 8:30 pm without any overtime pay. These "unpaid working hours" after 8:30 pm caused the negative correlation between working hours and efficiency.

The coexistence of low wages and long working time based on the calculation of expected production per day, *xiao lv* calculation and the unpaid additional overtime made the wage system in Hengfa more than an hourly wage system. In fact, with rewarded productivity and an assigned minimum production per day, the hourly wage

system was in effect a piece rate wage system. Although the payment formula paid workers wages measured based on their working hours, the rule of unpaid additional overtime assured that the company could secure a fixed amount of surplus labor.

We can say that the hourly wage in Hengfa is piece rate payment system in disguise. However, the piece rate wage itself would not ensure voluntary making-out. In the case of Hengfa, the institutional arrangement did constrain the choice faced by workers: a worker could make a choice between "high-tension work and getting off earlier" or "working easily and getting off late." Because of the high tension and assiduity required to get off on time at 8:30 pm, at the beginning of my field work I preferred to work leisurely and get off later than getting nervous and being exhausted in order to get off one or two hours earlier. But after several days, I realized that I was working harder and harder on the shop floor as the procedures became more and more difficult to accomplish. As the next section will show, in addition to the piece rate effect of hourly wages, the total control of workers' everyday life outside shop floor organized their interest in the labor process.

Making-out: Economical, Social and Ideological Effect of Labor Process

Previous works have indicated that higher income was not the only, though still important, reason for peasant workers to enter urban and industrial departments. Peasant workers came to the coastal provinces and entered factories for better, more modern and urban lives, or to seek a whole new life different from that of their rural lifestyle or from a reluctant marriage decided by their parents (Lee 1998: 71-84). After a *dagongmei* (maiden worker) came to a city, she was constructed as a consuming subject in seeking her modern, gendered and sexualized self (Pun 2005: 140, 157-159), although the capital disciplinary power was trying to shape her into an industrial body (Pun 2005: 14, 77-108). These previous works urged us to not consider workers with a class-first perspective and to understand them as industrial proletarians only. Besides the labor process, they had their own interests, goals and even dreams in everyday life, and it is ironic that these are exactly what I want to bring into the analysis of making-out; in fact, these people were voluntarily working hard to achieve their interests, goals and dreams.

It is not that they worked assiduously to get higher wages; workers' incomes were almost fixed at a given level determined by their working hours except for the unpaid additional overtime. Although there were some bonuses for excellent efficiency, the bonus was too uncertain to be a motive for a single person. It is not that the workers worked hard to get promoted either; the turnover rate was high in PRD and most of the workers did not think they would stay in the same factory for a long time. Because of the *hukou* system, dwelling in the city forever was almost impossible. Most of

workers, especially girls, expected themselves to go back to their hometown and get married. Also, because they were not well-educated (only a few workers had junior high school degrees), the opportunity for promotion was limited.

What I mean is their own interests, goals and dreams comprise other things; as Lee (1998: 71-84) and Pun (2005: 157-159) noted, workers came here to experience the urban and modern life they never experienced in their hometowns. The urban lifestyle was something that actually mattered to them and was never less important than their work and wages in the workplace. After their day's work on the shop floor, dressing up, strolling around the street and shopping were the essential meaning of "going away from the village and having a job in the city" for them. In the dormitory, workers discussed fashion and the kinds of dressing or hairstyles that could make them more attractive in appearance. They discussed each other's dates or prospective romances. They would display their new mobile phones to roommates or friends although mobile phones worthy of showing off always cost one or more months income.

Based on this kind of understanding, we can return to the topic of making-out. At the beginning of working on the assembly line, because the working procedure had been previously assigned, I didn't have explicit assignment and my task was assigned by my supervisor depending on the overall situation of the line. One day when I was sewing one tag after another onto textiles, the vice lineleader of our line came to ask me why I did not sew faster and get off earlier. "Haven't you finished your assigned quota?" She said, "why don't you get off?" I replied that I had some unfinished tasks, and I said, "after all it's not so different to get off at 9:30 or 10:30" She gave me a very surprised stare and asked, "Not so different? Why not? If you got off at 9:30 you could go out and stroll around the street and have some snacks; what can you do if you get off at 10:30?"

Similar to most other factories in PRD, it is compulsory that workers of Hengfa live in a dormitory near the shop floor. The wall of Hengfa Factory Park encloses both the workplace and *sheng huo qu* (living area) and has guards at the entrance. The entrance guard enforces a curfew after 10:30 pm; thus workers strolling on the street have to come back before that time. The vice lineleader's opinion was based wholly on the existence of curfew: if I got off at 10:30, I would have no chance to go out.

Based on my experience, the workers' common and fundamental motive for making-out was only to get off earlier to go out of the park and to enjoy their time before the curfew. Compared to the dull environment inside the factory compound, the outside world, although more dangerous as I will mention later, was really what the workers came to the coastal area for.

It was not easy to finish assignments by 8:30 pm; the finishing time depended on

the skill of the workers. The most important skill was not controlling the sewing machine but rather the *shou shi* (gesture, or action of hand). Running the sewing machine was simple; sewing faster or slower would not make a huge difference for someone who wanted to work faster. Other actions, such as grasping the materials, adjusting their position or putting them under the needle accurately, made greater differences in the time taken to complete assignments. In Hengfa, these types of hand actions were generally called *shou shi*, which is derived from *shou* (hand) and *shi* (gesture); some people also call it *shou fa* (this literally means hand method, and also means technique in Chinese). At the beginning of my worker life, some people suggested that my shou shi was not good and that I had to train myself. A co-worker even told me dramatically, "Your *shou shi* is too slow, and if you don't train yourself well, you will never get off!"

The outcome of the game, "getting off on the time" or "unpaid working overtime," was affected by various factors: the quantity and degree of difficulty of the assignment, the worker's skill and some unanticipated events such as the breakdown of the sewing machine or other workers' slowness in providing semi-manufactured materials. Except for the unanticipated events, making-out was a game in which workers tried to address the quantity and difficulty of assignments by themselves with their own skill. Thus, the game was always understood as a personal challenge and the result, namely the working hours, were a personalized end almost entirely influenced by the worker's own skill or assiduity. This is the reason long working hours and low incomes in Chen's workshop were attributed to bad *xiao lv,* which was likely caused by low skill or poor working attitude.

The game of making-out was initially understood to involve the skills of the worker and the difficulties of the assignment, whereas the quantity assigned was a standard for defining "wins" or "losses" in the game. The reward of winning was initially the substantial reward of more leisure time outside the factory park. However, although the desire to go out constituted the fundamental incentive to making-out, it was not the entire motive for workers. As Burawoy (1985: 39) noted, the labor process is constantly producing not only commodities, but also social relations and experiences of those relations. Although the interests of the workers were organized by the labor process, these interests were not only embedded in the substantial rules of reward, but also in the social relationships and culture of making-out.

As in Burawoy's experience, workers could estimate the outcome of the game when they were assigned work. Even I, after having worked for one or two months, could anticipate whether I would get out on time when I knew the assignment every morning. If it was possible to finish my work before 8:30 pm, I would surely work assiduously and try to get off on time. However, if I realized it was impossible to do

so, would I give up and work as slowly as I could, waiting for everyone to leave the workshop and asking for the lineleader to let me go. The answer was always "no." Even if it was hopeless for me to get off on time, it might be still be possible for my colleagues in the same producing line. Thus, I determined that I should not encumber them with my slow work. They might require my sewing to process their materials; thus if I worked slowly, it would burden their making-out. Logic of this sort could constitute potential conflicts between workers in the same producing line; there were actually some fights that happened on the shop floor due to this kind of conflict.

There were two basic mistakes that would cause conflict between workers: *fan gong* and *dang liao*. *Fan gong*, literally translated as "reworking" or "do it again," meant that due to bad quality of semi-manufactured materials from other workers, assignments had to be sewn again. On the other hand, *dang liao*, literally "obstructing the materials," was when co-workers worked too slowly to provide other workers with sufficient materials with which to work. Even when I was sure that I could not get off on time, I would work hard to avoid these two mistakes for fear of displeasing my colleagues in my producing line; these colleagues were my roommates in the dormitory and the closest people to me in Hengfa. Being unwilling to encumber colleagues sometimes made me even more nervous and assiduous than the desire to get off on time. While I was dealing with *fan gong* and facing the impatience expressed in others' eyes, the pressure was more serious than that of getting off late. Using this mechanism, the assurance of the abstraction of surplus labor was embedded in the social relationships shaped by the game of making-out.

As a result of this game, a culture of making-out was formed on the shop floor. In Hengfa's shop floor, even in the dormitories, people asked "when will you get off?" or "when did you get off?" when they ran into each other, as if they were saying hello. Every day after 8:30 pm, when someone met another person in the toilet, they were often asked "what o'clock will you get off?" (*ji dian xia ban*?) or "what time will you get off?" (*shen me shi jian xia ban*?), to which they would always answer "no o'clock!" (*mei dian*!) or "not time!" (*mei shi jian*!), which meant "God knows when."

"What time will you get off" and "no time" were common phrases in the shop floor and indicate the penetration of making-out into workers' experiences of the labor process. Thus, the experience of working was the experience of making-out, and workers understood the labor process through "winning" or "losing" the game. As a result of this making-out culture, the game brought a third type of reward besides free time and avoidance of conflict with colleagues and roommates: in Hengfa's shop floor, defeating the difficulty of the work, winning in the game of making-out and getting off on time were achievements worthy of pride. As long as making-out was understood as a game based on difficulties of working procedure and personal skills,

success in this game would bring symbolical capital to workers. The elation of workers getting off earlier than one another was expressed when they said “I am getting off” showed personal success based on excellent skill that gave them the self-earned privilege to stroll on the street.

One day while one of my colleagues, Liu, was struggling with his sewing machine, his friend Guo came to him and said “I am going to get off!” with a bantering attitude of showing off. Liu, as a reply to Guo’s display, joked that he would kill Guo. The fun of this conversation was based on Guo’s deliberate arrogance towards Liu as a joke and Liu’s feigned anger; this joke was feasible because of the consensus that getting off on time was something worthy of being shown off. Because of the symbolic capital embedded in the culture of making-out, dramatic showing off could become a tease.

In conclusion, the game of making-out was based on unpaid overtime generated by the wage system and the curfew run by the entrance guard. Avoidance of unpaid overtime provided a substantial reward for making-out, and the workers’ understanding of making-out, namely the struggle between the difficulty of assignments and the skill of workers, set up making-out as a personalized game. Simultaneously, the social relationships among workers offered a social incentive for making-out as no one wanted to encumber his or her friends or roommates. Finally, the game shaped the culture at the workplace and provided workers with a sort of symbolic reward for hard-working.

Outsiders and Insiders: the Spatial Category and the Experience of Entrance Guard

Consent was “manufactured” in the labor process as a game. Considering the labor process, workers comprehended the game of making-out as innocent, individualized and legitimate. When they got back to the dormitory late, lost free time or earning less wages than others would reflect their own lack efficiency, not a problem with their boss or with labor relations. At the same time, the workers wanted to get better efficiency for more leisure time, symbolic capital or at least not to impede their co-workers.

But what about the consent outside of the labor process? As mentioned in the last section, the curfew of Hengfa, as an institutional arrangement deployed around the game of making-out, played a momentous role in generating the game. How did workers experience the curfew and the entrance guard? Was this legitimate to workers? If not, why did they tolerate it and choose to fulfill their needs by working hard on the shop floor?

A clue to analyzing workers’ experiences of curfew and the entrance guard comes

from a case of extortion. In the second night of my field work, some men came into my room, woke the boy in the bed opposite to mine and asked him to "lend" them 50RMB. They wanted to gamble with this money, they said, and they would give him the money back after they win more. Nobody believed their words, but we could only try to convince them that we didn't have that much money. After a long negotiation, they got some money and went away.

The next afternoon, while my roommate were napping in the dormitory and I was typing my field notes in an empty office allotted to me by the company, a manager, Wang, came to me and told me about the extortion. "Here's some news, you know," he said, "last night, some OUTSIDERS (*wai mian de ren*) infiltrated (*hun*) into the dormitory and extorted some employees."

"I know……in fact, I was almost one of the victims." I told him, "by the way, they were OUTSIDERS?"

"Oh no, they are our employees. There might be some problem with our hiring process because we should have been able to filter the troublesome people out. But how could we?"

The first time I heard the term "outsiders," I thought Wang was referring to people who were not employees of Hengfa. "Outsiders" here, namely *wai mian de ren* in Chinese, can be used to indicate someone outside of a spatial boundary or an institution. Whatever the usage, it should indicate someone not in the factory park or someone who is not a member of the company. Furthermore, the term "infiltrate" or *hun* implied that these people should not be in the dormitory. Therefore, when Wang told me that the suspects were Hengfa employees, I was astonished. I thought that Wang might not have spoken correctly and ignored it for some time. After several days I recalled the conversation and felt more and more perplexed—what does "outsiders" mean? How could "outsiders" be "employees" at the same time? Was Wang talking about someone who was originally from outside of the company and then infiltrated the regular hiring process? The suspects were not born as employees of Hengfa, thus they must have been outsiders to the company as some point. Was this why Wang had used this term? It still did not make sense—every worker should be called an outsider according to this logic; why were some (suspects) called outsiders while others (victims) were called employees?

About three weeks later, an attack occurred in Hengfa. An employee was seriously injured by someone at night. On the next day, I heard people talking about the incident.

"Did you hear that someone was slashed in the street? They said he got a very deep wound" someone said.

"Who did that? An employee or an OUTSIDER?" her friend asked.

"Surely outsiders. It's impossible for an employee to be so cruel" the former replied to her friend.

The story above is another case of the distinction drawn between "outsiders" and "employees," or "insiders." In both criminal cases, "outsiders," who were actually employees in one case, played the roles of evildoers. In the attack, "outsiders" were even identified through their "cruelty." During my fieldwork in Hengfa, for the workers, the term "outsiders" always meant people who are uncontrollable, unpredictable and potentially dangerous. In contrast, employees, or insiders, were orderly, familiar to each other and less threatening. This categorization of people was based on the category of space. The line between "outside" and "inside" the factory park, materialized as the wall around the park, separated a safe place from a potentially dangerous place. In the aftermath of the extortion, as my roommates discussed the possibility of the suspects coming back and taking revenge on the witnesses, one of them said, "That's O.K. They can only stir up trouble OUTSIDE." When he said that, he was talking about the protection provided by the wall, the entrance guard and the company.

In the context of the daily discourse in Hengfa, "outsiders" mostly meant "hoodlums." In local language, they are called *lan zai*. Not all of them are organized as a gang, but they actually have groups. For companies, they are supposed be filtered out in the hiring process; for workers, they are potential threats outside of the factory park. They always swagger in the street and sometimes fight people from other groups. They are a problem for worker safety and impact workers by their danger, cruelty and threat. Furthermore, in Hengfa's context, "outside" means a dangerous yet attractive space where employees have to be careful and not to stay out too late at night.

The categorization of "outsiders" and "insiders" coincides with the spatial binary designation of "outside" and "inside." The latter was defined based on the spatial distinction built by the walls and the entrance guards of the factory park. On the one hand, in the factory, there were security guards and the order they maintained; on the other hand, outside the factory, the public security force and laws were useless, if not threatening, for workers.

Not so many years before my fieldwork and not far away from my field site, on 17 March 2003 in Guangzhou, a young man was arrested in the street because he had no ID card (*shen fen zheng*) or temporary residence permit (*zhan zhu zheng*) with him. Several days after, he was found dead in the "detention and deportation station" (*shou rong qian song zhan*), believed to have been tortured (Wu, 2006). As a "three withouts person" (*san wu ren shi*),[1] the victim Sun Zhigang was not the only person threatened

[1] Namely, people with no identity card, temporary residence certificate and temporary labor handbook (Pun 2005: 46).

by the public security force, which included police officers and "urban management officers" (*cheng shi guan li ran yuan*, or briefly *cheng guan*). After the "*Rules for Detention and Deportation of Vagrants and Beggars in the Urban Area*" were sanctioned in the early 1980s, inner-migrant workers coming from rural to urban areas were unceasingly threatened by public security organizations. In the 1990s, the personnel of companies would advise workers to not leave the factory because of the risk of being arrested by the police (Pun 2005: 45-46). Sometimes workers even said, "in the eyes of public security, we are not even dogs" (Chan 2001: 79). Even now, the situation has not softened for peasant workers, especially when taking Sun Zhigang's story into consideration; after that incident, although the central government tried to rescind the practice of issuing temporary residential permits, such permits are still used in the town where Hengfa is located.

Even if public security is not as threatening to peasant workers, it is still of no use in assuring their personal safety. When police officers might even arrest or even torture to death those without ID cards or temporary residential permits, there is no reason to believe that they will work hard to keep peasant workers from being victims of crime. When my roommates were discussing the extortion, what made them feel safe was not the juridical process, but rather the wall of the factory park and Hengfa's safety guard sitting in the entrance guardroom.

This is the foundation of the spatial category appearing in the worker's daily discourse as "inside" versus "outside." For peasant workers from rural villages far away from the coastal province, although the stores and restaurants outside the factory were attractive, "outside" was somehow dangerous especially at night, as the street would have *lan zai* fighting each other. For the few workers living in apartments outside the factory, Hengfa had a poster to persuade female workers not go out alone at night; they should be accompanied by their husbands.[2] The image of danger, both imagined and true, was based on the attitude of public security personnel toward peasant workers. According to the *hukou* system, peasant workers are not seen as residents by the local government, including public security. For public security, peasant workers are not only "not even dogs" (Chan 2001: 79), but also sometimes potential troublemakers. A review of the representation of peasant workers in Chinese mass-media concluded that peasant workers were represented as "stupid, backward, coarse, sloppy and with criminal inclination" (Li and Tan 2006). Based on this kind of stereotype, they are objects to guard against, not to be protected, in the eyes of public security. The only security force on which peasant workers can rely is the security guard of the company.

As a result of the situations peasant workers faced, manager Wang's account that

[2] Only married couples can apply to not live in the dormitories provided by company.

"the company is their home, their shelter" does not only apply to the company's perspective. In fact, the company was more or less a local government for peasant workers. The company applied for temporary residential permits for peasant workers, and these permits were indispensable for workers to legally stay in urban areas. In other words, the workers' legal residential status was defined through their labor relationship with the company, not their citizenship. Besides their de jure residential rights, their de facto personal safety was guarded by the wall and entrance guard separating "inside" and "outside" because they knew that the public security would not care about them. Furthermore, in Hengfa, if any event occurred in which a worker is involved with other institutions, such as medical disputes, it is the company's role to bargain with the hospital on the behalf of the peasant workers. Even in the case of extortion, my roommates did not report it to police; they instead went to the office nearby the shop floor, reported it and hoped that the company could help them to get the money back. After that, the company contacted the public security force to investigate the case and negotiate the investigation.

In Hengfa, the company is not only the buyer of the labor force, but also the supplier of legal residential status and personal safety to workers. The wall of the factory park was not only a restraint of worker movement, but also a safeguard. The entrance guard setting the boundary of the factory park was a shield rather than a barrier. As more episodes like the reported extortion or street violence occurred, the legitimacy of the entrance guard became more rooted in the workers' minds through the spatial category separating the two worlds: the chaotic and dangerous one, and the organized and safe one.

Sometimes people experienced the spatial distinction more immediately. One night after working all day, I took a rest in the living area (*sheng huo qu*). I went to read a newspaper near the guardroom and then sat on the ground to enjoy the cool fresh air. Suddenly, I heard some people exchanging angry words, and looked to see what was happening.

Some "outsiders" were arguing with our security guards. One of them, a young man with long dyed hair, was trying to force his way into the factory park. The security guard pushed him to stop the action, and the long-haired man got even angrier. As a response, he beat the guard and shouted out some obscenities. People of both groups, the security guards and the "outsiders," stopped their short fight and tried to negotiate. After several minutes, the leader of the security guards came to the scene and talked to the head of the "outsiders." The young man with long hair yelled at him. The young guard who had argued briefly with the long-haired man, got angry again.

When we noticed the argument taking place around the guardroom, some workers went back to their dormitory room to tell their roommates. Thus, when the second

round of battle seemed about to take place in the guardroom, the space near the guardroom was crowded with people. Workers said to each other, “they are going to fight!” If someone arrived late, his or her friends would report to him or her what had happened. We were all waiting for a fight, even a battle. When the young guard got angrier, we felt excited and stared at the guardroom. No one look in any other direction; no one wanted to miss the expected fight.

The young guard was removed by two of his coworkers. Without him, the people in the guardroom became calmer. However, the dispute (in fact, no one knew what the dispute was about) was still not resolved. Finally, public security force came and asked what was going on. The frustrated spectators became excited again; if we could not see a fight, at least we could witness an arrest. Some moved closer to the gate to squat and observe the public security force through the railing of the entrance gate. In the end, however, no one was arrested. People felt frustrated again and went back to their dormitory; “let’s go - there is no show to see anymore.”

We were actually spectators in this episode. People came to “see a show” as they knew they were surrounded by the wall and thus safe. The material wall was also a mental wall that separated us from the “battle.” Behind the wall, workers could see the show without feeling threatened, which is why they felt excited and interested in the conflict between security guards and outsiders. Their attitude toward this event, namely “watching a show,” was on one hand enabled by the abstract wall separating “inside” and “outside”; on the other hand, the experience of seeing the show could reinforce their spatial comprehension based on the abstract wall.

This kind of episode was representative of the workers’ spatial experience that constructed in their daily life through their experience of the entrance guard system and the curfew. Although workers might argue with the guards over some trivial matters such whether several minutes tardiness could be ignored or not, they would not complain about the existence of the entrance guard or the curfew. The consent in shop floor was generated by the game of making-out, and the game was constructed by the curfew. However, when we probe the consent to the curfew, we realize that the background of all of these stories involves the workers’ experience of the spatial distinction between the two sides of the wall of the factory park. Furthermore, the foundations for this experience were the workers’ personal safety, the threat and lack of assistance from urban public security forces and the protection provided by the company. Beginning with the labor process in the shop floor, these stories represent the fundamental and general situation that workers faced in their everyday life in coastal urban areas, as well as their status of “not even dogs” (Chan 2001: 79) or “as pariahs or at best, second-class citizens” (Wu 2006: 1) in the eyes of local government. The workers’ political identity as “peasants” should thus be considered in the analysis

of the labor process in Hengfa.

We began with production; we must end with politics (Burawoy 1985: 253).

Conclusion: Production, Politics and Subjectivity

The term "peasant workers" literally combines these people's political identity and their labor process. In this social group, or class, previous studies have provided much insight. Studies on "peasants" have analyzed the differential citizenship and social rights between peasant workers and urban residents, as well as how peasant workers have struggled to satisfy their needs in disadvantageous social conditions (Solinger 2001; Wu 2006). Studies on "workers" have demonstrated how the labor processes are organized and how labor control is enabled (Lee 1998; Pun 2005). Some of the previous studies emphasized the noncitizens as subjects (Solinger 2001: 27), and some of them emphasize gendered subjectivities (Lee 1998; Pun 2005) to describe the labor process.

Both of these approaches describe subjectivities. In my fieldwork, studies of citizenship and labor processes met each other through the formation of subjectivity. In Hengfa, the institutional organization of labor process took on the non-citizen subjects as its major means and object for "simultaneously obscuring and securing of surplus values" (Burawoy 1979: 30). In other words, in Hengfa, noncitizen-subjectivity played a role in not only the struggle for social welfare issues such as social security or education rights, but also in the labor process. With this case study of Hengfa, I wanted to determine how the noncitizen-subject penetrated the labor process and affected the means of labor control or, in more Burawoyian terms, how it obscured the conflicts between the workers and the company and removed the need for "control".

In this study, I started with a factory with an anomalous factory regime in PRD, described its labor process as a Burawoyian making-out game, analyzed the institutional arrangements generating the game, and finally ended by describing the workers' experience of one of the most important arrangements: the entrance guards and curfew, and the formation of their legitimacy. Through this analysis, I am arguing that the workers' everyday life experience, the way they understand their dormitory and the boundary separating them from "outside," and their political status on which these experiences was based must be considered as a part of the composition of the factory regime. The "peasant" identity first assigned to them by the *hukou* system and later reinforced by their daily experience with lack of social security and personal safety, forced workers to rely on the security guards of the company as the only reliable means of safety. This was the foundation of the workers' experience of the entrance guard and curfew, which stemmed from the legitimacy of the boundary

separating the "inside" and the "outside." This boundary joined the institutional arrangements to make the labor process a game in which workers worked hard to earn their leisure time outside of factory.

Burawoy (1985: 13) has suggested that the relation between state and production organization shape the factory regime. However, in Hengfa, things were more complicated. The intervention of the state has somewhat restricted the company's ability to control labor through coercive means, but the more important role played by the state is as an institutional force that defines the workers' political identity. This identity is used to construct the workers' experiential world, where workers realize that they are outcasts in the eyes of local government and that the only security promise they have is provided by the company. Finally, the noncitizen subjects consent to the entrance guards and curfew, which might be considered as merely a restriction at the first glance, was generated by the institutional legacy of the communist era, namely the *hukou* system. The state affected the factory regime not only by intervention, but also by the formation of working subjects through political means. In other words, in addition to direct intervention, the state penetrated the factory regime through the working subjects.

The population registration, the *hukou* system, was not something new to the post-Maoist era. By 1960, this system halted population flows between rural and urban area of China and restricted peasants in the agriculture production. Furthermore, this restriction became an institutional foundation of control over the relative price between agricultural and industrial products – by controlling the population flows, production and trade between agriculture and industrial sectors, the government obtained low-price grains to control the price level in the urban industrial sector thus assured a low wage level. Finally, this relative price system accelerated the original accumulation of Chinese early industrialization (Ka and Selden, 1986: 1303, 1306-1308). After the reform-and-open policy, the companies could control peasant workers' movement and job changing with the threat of being arrested by the police (Pun 2005: 45-46). Then in the early 2000s, in Hengfa, the same institutional arrangement became the foundation of hegemonic factory regime through the formation of subjectivity. Those things made the history of China's industrialization from Maoist era to nowadays a story of population control and differential citizenship.[3] This policy, which might be one of the strictest social institutions in modern China, was rediscovered again and again to exert the exploitation and the capital accumulation.

[3] The term "differential citizenship" was first used by Jieh-min Wu (2006).



A1: grandmother

B1: aunt

B2: mother

B3: father

B4: 5th brother's parents in law

C1: cousin

C3: 4th brother

C4: Ailin

C5: 5th brother (lineleader in another workshop)

C6: 5th brother's wife (worker in another workshop)

C7: younger sister of 5th brother's wife (worker in line 3)

C8: brother in law of 5th brother (worker in another workshop)

D1: 1st brother's daughter in law (lineleader of line)

D2: 1st brother's son (vice lineleader of 1st line)

D3: 4th brother's son (repairer)

D4: 4th brother's son (department of designing)

D5: 4th brother's daughter in law (vice lineleader of line 1)

D6: 5th brother's son (vice-line-leader of computer-based sewing machine line)

D7: 5th brother's daughter (vice lineleader of line 2)

Figure 1: Li Ailin's family tree

Reference

Burawoy, Michael (1979) *Manufacturing Consent: Changes in the: Labor Process under Monopoly Capitalism*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Burawoy, Michael (1985) *The Politics of Production: Factory Regimes under Capitalism and Socialism*, London: Verso Books

Chan, Anita (2001) *China's Workers under Assault: The Exploitation of Labor in a Globalizing Economy*, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe

Hsing, You-tien (1998) *Making Capitalism in China: The Taiwan Connection*, New York: Oxford University Press

Ka, Chih-min and Selden, Mark (1986) "Original Accumulation, Equity and Late Industrialization: The Cases of Socialist China and Capitalist Taiwan", in *World Development*, Vol.14, No10/11, pp. 1293-1310

Lee, Ching Kwan (1998) *Gender and the South China Miracle: Two Worlds of Factory Women*, Berkeley: University of California Press

Li, Yongjian and Tan, Enhua (2006) The Inharmonious Sounds in the Construction of a Harmonious Society: An Analysis on the Stereotypes of Peasant Workers on Mass Media, in *The Journalist*, 2006 April. [李永健、譚恩花 (2006)〈和諧社會建設中的不諧和音：大眾傳媒中的農民工刻板印象淺析〉,《新聞記者》, 2006 年 4 月]

Pun, Ngai (1999) "Becoming Dagongmei: the Politics of Identity and Difference in Reform China", in *The China Journal*, No. 42. pp.1-19

Pun, Ngai (2005) *Made in China: Women Factory Workers in a Global Workplace*, Durham: Duke University Press

Solinger, Dorothy J. (1999) *Contesting Citizenship in Urban China: Peasant Migrants, the State, and the Logic of the Market*, Berkeley: University of California Press

Willis, Paul (1977) *Learning to Labor: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Job*, New York: Columbia University Press

Willmott, Hugh (1990) "Subjectivity and Dialectics of Praxis: Opening up the Core of Labor Process Analysis", in *Labor Process Theory*, Knights David and Hugh Willmott eds., pp.336-378 London: MacMillan

Wu, Jieh-min (2006) "Chinese Migrant Workers under Differential Citizenship: a Comparative-Institutional Analysis", in *One Country, Two Societies? Rural-Urban Inequality in Contemporary China*, edited by Martin Whyte, under submission to Harvard University Press