

The Politics of Reproduction among Urban Migrant Workers in China

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ABSTRACT

This article explores the tug-of-war between the state and migrant workers on the domain of reproductive politics. Based on the field studies in seven Chinese cities and one village from October, 2005 to March, 2007, I identified four strategic tools used by peasant migrant workers to evade state control—institutional loopholes (created by peasants' cultural practice), relatively autonomous social space in the cities (such as migrant ghettos and factories), migration (which contains the ideas of economic self-empowerment and spatial mobility), and social networks (which provide logistical resources for resistance). Facing such challenges of migrant control, the state has sought to improve its skills of government, such as reforming the *hukou* system and providing limited reproductive welfares. Thus, migrant workers make use of their spatial mobility and the resulting economic empowerment to claim autonomy of their bodies, whereas the state offers a package of social rights (reproductive welfare, pension, medical care, single child's education benefits, etc.) to bring them back into the population control system. I argue that there has been a frontline shift in China's birth-planning struggle from rural to urban areas in an era of mass migration, generated by the economic reform. Due to the inefficacy of the state's migrant governance, migration has become the repertoire of resistance against the state's birth control policy.

INTRODUCTION

Control of population growth has been one of the crucial tasks of the Chinese state's modernization plan since 1970s. Over the course of thirty years the state has consistently devoted major resources to this project. During 1978 and 1979, the state altered its family planning approach and imposed a radical one-child-per-couple scheme. Nonetheless, the dissolution of the communes deprived rural cadres' of control over the peasants' living and hence, their reproductive behavior. In order to reclaim this political territory, the state launched a fierce nationwide mobilization movement in 1983. Within one year, 20.7 million women and men were sterilized and 17.8 million women underwent intra-uterine device insertion (Zhang 2006: 4). The policy generated serious open confrontations between the state and peasant society, which resulted in the state's reevaluation of the policy. While the communist state was recovering from its loss in legitimacy by loosening the requirements for the second birth and adjusting its way of law enforcement, a third force entered the picture—the market force. Autonomous labor migration became regular, which ultimately led to the state's lifting of the ban on population mobility in 1984 and 1985¹ and thus, created new opportunities for resistance.

Despite vigorous population mobility, the state has maintained the institutional dualism of population control—the *hukou* system, established during the period of the planned economy, under which it classifies the population into urban citizens and rural peasants. The “peasant migrants” are treated as “aliens” in the cities and are

¹ 1984 “Notification Concerning the Problem of Peasants' *Hukou* Registration in the Market Town,” issue by the State Council stipulates that peasants working in the market town for a long time can “arrange their own ration” and register locally as non-agricultural *hukou*. This can be viewed as the official confirmation of autonomous migration. 1985 “Provisional Regulations Concerning the Management of the Temporary Population in the City,” issued by the Department of Public Security is the legal origin of the temporary residence registration system. The regulation prescribes that all non-*hukou* residents whose residency exceeds three months must apply for the “temporary residence permit.”

excluded from the “urban public goods regime”,² as suggested by Dorothy Solinger (Solinger 1999). The unanticipated consequence is that they have no incentive to register with the city government and thus, more latitude to circumvent the state’s regulation. According to the public statement of the Minister of the State Population and Family Planning Commission, China’s floating population (mostly peasant migrant workers) accounts for 10% of the total population but is responsible for 60% of “unauthorized births” and even 80% in the Pearl River Delta.³ Violation of birth planning is but one example of the loss of control resulting from rural-urban migration, but it is one of the most important examples from the viewpoints of both the peasants and the state.

In the research of China’s reproductive politics, Susan Greenhalgh’s pioneer work on the “informal birth policy” in the rural settings disclosed the micro politics of birth control in rural areas (Greenhalgh 1990, 1993, 1994). However, based on the rural women’s contraceptive and reproductive histories instead of their own discourses, her research failed to separate the positions of the women and their patriarchal families, and it also posed limits on the real understanding of the peasants’ strategies and the process of resistance. Tyrene White defined three types of resistance (confrontation, evasion, and accommodation) and identified the strategy of evasion (including migration) as the most common practice (2003: 188-196). Yet, she did not elaborate on how the peasants operate their strategies once they enter their sojourning cities. To complete the picture of birth control politics in China, an ethnographic research of individual resistance is required, especially in urban areas.

² To understand how the dual *hukou* system in welfare provision affects migrants’ health, see the insightful observations of Xiang Biao (2003).

³ “Minister of the State Population and Family Planning Commission, Zhang Wei-qing’s talk about the population problem.” http://www.ymsrk.gov.cn/Article_show1.asp?ArticleID=245, 24 January, 2007, accessed 28 August, 2008. “Guangdong to Become the Most Populated Province.” <http://www.southcn.com/news/gdnews/nanyuedadi/200705120012.htm>, 12 May, 2007, accessed 28 August, 2008.

This paper intends to answer three questions: First, how has economic and social change created new opportunities for resistance? Second, how have women made use of these opportunities to avoid the state's control over their bodies? Third, how has the interaction between the state and peasants changed the face of birth control politics in China?

The first section will discuss China's flawed population control system. The second section takes the readers to China's coastal cities. Based on the field research in seven Chinese cities and one village, I shall reveal how peasant workers employ their tactics of resistance in the cities. In the final section, I will discuss how this tug-of-war between the state and peasant migrant workers has changed the birth control politics in China.

FLAWED MECHANISM OF MIGRANT BIRTH CONTROL

Ever since the agricultural reform in 1978, the peasant household has restored itself as a unit of reproduction. This has created incentives to reinvigorate the stagnated rural economy. Yet, the age-old phenomenon of labor surplus in the rural area has become distinct. Seasonal labor migrants started to enter the nearby towns and cities to conduct business or work in the factories. Most middle-age farmers I have talked to in one Northern Jiansu village have had some sort of "migrant working experience" (*dagong*). Since the late 1970s, the economic boom in the coastal areas has generated mass rural-urban migration. Table 1 shows the surge of migrant population in the past two decades, especially from 1995 to 2000. Migrant governance has become one of the main tasks of the city governments.

In order to control the reproductive behavior of the floating population (in addition to family-planning apparatuses at each administrative level) the state has gradually combined the relevant departments to establish a comprehensive government mechanism. This includes joint jurisdiction of local governments (both

permanent residence and current residence) and cooperation between all departments concerning migrant activities in the cities. Table 2 shows the institutional arrangement relevant to migrant birth control, including formal regulations and informal practices. Among them, the “law enforcement team” is locally instituted and is the legacy of mobilization politics. It is not recognized by the law, but not forbidden by the state either.⁴

The birth-control mechanism seems comprehensive at the first glance, but in practice it depends greatly on migrant women’s voluntary obedience. This reveals the limited efficacy of the birth-control system on the floating population.

Weak Incentives and Indecisive Punishment

The state has instituted a birth-control mechanism comprised of both incentives and punishment. In the 1970s, the fertility rate in the rural area had a drastic drop from 6 to 3 (White 2003: 186). Yet, the incentive mechanism collapsed following the dissolution of the communes. Mosher (1984) recorded in detail about how the rewards from the commune were becoming so little that the peasants finally lost the incentives to follow the birth control regulations.

The one-child-policy has not encountered too much resistance in the cities (Cooney and Li 2001; Nie and Wyman 2005). The incentive mechanism was actually an unnecessary perk since the state had total control over the citizens’ livelihood, and the price to break the one-child rule was simply too expensive for any ordinary couple to bear. The seventh document of 1984 “A Report about the Condition of Birth Planning Work,” issued by the Central Committee, pointed out the implementation problem faced with urban areas, “Now the problem [about birth planning work] is

⁴ Informal result might be created by the agents’ “informal practice” of the institution. Take contraception for example, the state should protect citizens’ “right to know,” according to “Population and Family Planning Law of the People’s Republic of China.” But a 2007 government report shows that, instead of other less-intrusive contraceptives, 87.2% of the couples have “chosen long-term measures,” such as IUD insertion and the sterilization of one half of the couple. For the data, please view http://www.cpirc.org.cn/tjsj/tjsj_cy_detail.asp?id=8124, accessed August 15, 2008.

[fiscally] unaffordable. The higher the one-child rate, the heavier the burden [of the one-child rewards] is. Some places offer too many rewards and too severe punishments.”

Nowadays, those incentives have become merely symbolic thanks to the market reform, during which the state has gradually retreated from the welfare sphere. Take Foshan⁵ for example, the single-child parents are provided with a monthly pension subsidy of 80 yuan (around 11 USD), just one-fourth of the minimum livelihood standard set up by the government. Besides, few have claimed the single-child benefits. According to “2001 Governmental Report on National Birth Planning and Reproductive Health”(2001nian quanguo jihuashengyu yu jiankangshengzhi diaochagongbao), among those certified single-child families, only 8.8% have received the benefits for education, 7% for medical care, 5.3% for pension, 4.9% for land distribution, and 0.4% for job recruitment.⁶

On the contrary, the extra-birth fine has been a deterrent to the citizens because the fines are parallel to the local economic development and usually hundreds of thousands of yuan. Nonetheless, the punishment mechanism has become somewhat of a symbol due to the fact that the socio-economic condition in the cities has already kept the birth rate low. For instance, the birth rate of the Shanghai *hukou* population has stayed negative for more than a decade.⁷

We can see in table 2 that the birth-control mechanism does not offer migrant women any decisive incentives to follow the regulations. Moreover, the severe economic punishment in the cities does not create any significant disincentive for rural migrants simply because the excess-birth cases are revealed mostly when they

⁵ Foshan City is the third biggest immigrant destination, second to Shenzhen and Dongguan.

⁶ “2001 Governmental Report on National Birth Planning and Reproductive Health.” http://www.chinapop.gov.cn/fzgh/tjgz/200804/t20080429_42962.htm, 4 March, 2002, accessed 13 August, 2008.

⁷ Please view Table 3.5 in 2007 Shanghai Statistical Yearbook. <http://www.stats-sh.gov.cn/2003shtj/tjnj/nj07.htm?d1=2007tjnj/C0305.htm>, accessed 13 August, 2008.

return home to register the children. And a 10,000 to 20,000 yuan fine (around 1,250 to 2,500 USD) in rural areas is not unbearable to migrant couples. In sum, the birth-control mechanism requires that migrant women place their bodies under the state's surveillance but gain no compatible welfare. Similarly, employers and landlords are granted supervising jobs in the mechanism. But spying on the employees or tenants does no good to the factory owners or landlords. On the contrary, the thankless task would only add administrative cost to the employers and drive away the potential tenants. According to a 2002 survey in 12 provinces,⁸ 51.9% of the migrant women have rented houses, and only 25.1% of them have signed a "birth planning lease" with their landlords. Also, the employers I have talked to in my field survey all expressed indifference toward their employees' reproductive behaviors. It is apparent that when the agents in the mechanism do not accept the assigned roles, the institution runs simply by the state's wishful thinking and is thus, a flawed design.

Administrative Jockeying

Birth control involves all sorts of economic and social aspects and therefore relies on cooperation among all related departments. However, the administrative ranking of the family planning commission is no higher than other departments. It can only depend on the other bureaucrats' courtesy, which is a grave organizational disadvantage (Scharping 2003). This is especially critical when "migration" is concerned.

The jurisdiction of those who leave their places of household registration (*hukou*) had been unclear. Not until 1999 "Measures on Administration of Family Planning for the Floating Population (*liudongrenkou jihuashenyugongzuo guanlibanfa*)" did the state stipulate the main responsibility of the migrant-receiving

⁸ "2002 No. 2 Governmental Statistics Report on Birth Planning."
http://www.gsjsw.gov.cn/html/dczltjsj/22_39_09_171.html, accessed 13 August, 2008.

localities. The birth planning stations appointed to other provinces by the migrant-sending governments were thus withdrawn.

Moreover, the information exchange among concerned governments and departments is still difficult. Merli (1998) and Solinger (1999) have observed the obstacles posed by bureaucratic jockeying on migrant birth control. In 2003, “Opinion Concerning Further Completion of Birth Planning Work on the Floating Population” (*guanyu jinyibuzuohao liudongrenkou jihuashenyugongzuo de yijian*) issued by nine central departments, required their subordinates to include birth planning in their reform plans and establish a joint department committee and a negotiation mechanism. The Opinion also announced that the departments of public security, health, industrial and commercial administration, and family planning should share their information. But it is no easy job to just set up a platform within one government. According to our field research on Taiwanese companies in China, the lack of information exchange among the custom, tax bureau, and labor bureau has been the main reason why they can negotiate separately with each department on issues such as migrant workers’ contracts, salaries, and social security. Therefore, we can assume the difficulties of the exchange among governments from different levels and provinces.

In order to solve this problem, since 2003 the state has started to build a national platform where each locality can exchange information on migrant birth planning. However, the prerequisite of this institution is that each local government is able to manage the migrant information within its own jurisdiction. If the migrants do not register with the local government promptly and accurately, the validity of the platform is in doubt. Let us take a look at the statistics in “2002 No. 2 Governmental Statistics Report on Birth Planning” (*2002nian dierhao jihuashenyu tongjigongbao*).⁹ The city governments examined 65.6% of the migrant women who hold the “marital

⁹ Ibid.

and child-bearing status certificate”, and the number drops to 48% when it comes to the short-term (within 3 months) or jobless migrants. As to those who do not hold the certificate, only 24% are asked to apply for the certificate locally. The number drops to 10.7% and 13.8% separately for the short-term and the jobless migrants. This clearly shows that the local governments are either incapable of managing the migrants or are unwilling to do so.

Informal Institution—Local State Violence

Even though the state has been trying to embed birth control in everyday bureaucratic work, the results are often unsatisfactory due to the above problems. Yet, birth control is a “veto” (*yipiaofoujue*) criterion of local party leaders’ promotion, which has often led the local officials to take extreme mobilizational measures. At the peak of a nationwide birth planning campaign in 1983, the state mobilized 760,000 medical staff to the rural area. Within one year, around 17,750,000 intra-uterus devices were inserted, and 4,350,000 vasectomies and 16,390,000 tubal sterilizations were performed (Zhang 2006: 4). Extreme mass mobilization like this no longer has a role in Chinese Politics. But small-scale warfare is still scattered around some localities. In recent years, there were two widely reported collective resistances due to the local state’s ruthless birth-control campaign—one in Linyi City, Shandong Province, which ended up with the alleged dismissal of some relevant local officials and the imprisonment of the blind activist, Chen Guangcheng; the other in Bobai County, Guangxi Province, which I will discuss in the following paragraph.

The Bobai incident resulted from the local state’s intense and brutal crackdown on excess-births. After two months’ oppression, the fury exploded and created a domino effect among nearby towns during the monthly local fairs. Tens of thousands of people revolted and more than ten township governments were set on fire. The riots were soon put down and the “instigators” were held and punished.

About half a month before the incident, an article, “Bobai Is Practically Staging a Rally Concerning the Population and Birth Planning War”¹⁰ was posted on the government website after the county was given the “yellow card” warning. This article revealed in detail the thinking and methods of the sporadic behavior by the local government.

... Yulin City has stationed eight leaders, including the vice party secretary Yu Xinxian and 36 relevant departments in the county to instruct the [birth planning] work. All members of the party and governmental staff are required to mobilize one remedial action [abortion] or sterilization, and collect at least 500 yuan’s social maintenance fees [excess-birth fines] ... The county has set up a leading team to enforce birth planning cases. One vice president of the county court is leading the team full-time to hunt down any violators ... [The government] have combined all forces to practice mass troop formation against the difficult “nail household” and “corner village” ... As to those targets who fled by water through the reservoir in Jiangning Town, [the government has] sent the assault boats to patrol day and night and intercepted 252 people, whose birth-planning measures were later enforced. To those who retaliated against the birth-planning staff in Yangchong Village, Yingqiao Town, and [the government] organized more than 300 police forces to hunt them down ... Those flowing out of Jiangning, Nalin, Yingqiao were greatly stunned and thus returned to practice the [birth-planning] measures... Since February, the county has stationed more than two-thirds of the governmental workers, led by the main leaders and equipped with cars and food, in each town to carry out birth-planning service month programs ... [The government] published an open letter to the people and business owners, which guides them to understand accurately the relation

¹⁰ The article was deleted from the government website right after the riots erupted. The embedded article can be reached at http://www.dongcha.com/Article_Show.asp?ArticleID=5451, accessed August 15, 2008.

between production and birth-planning ... In the towns being given “yellow card” warnings, all workers’ whole year’s awards shall be cancelled; for those towns that were “vetoed,” all workers’ two continuous years’ awards will be cancelled ... From the beginning of this year, the county has injected more than 12,000,000 yuan and 200 vehicles; produced 4,663 pieces of permanent banners and 182 large billboards; delivered 305,000 documents of propaganda. By April 24, the county has practiced 17,268 “four operations” [IUD insertion, sterilization, terminations of early-term and mid-term pregnancy] and collected 7,881,000 yuan’s social maintenance fees.

Unlike the above confrontation in which the targets of both sides are clear, the city government’s informal law enforcement presents the characteristics of guerrilla warfare. I, myself witnessed the forced registration of migrant workers. On March 21, 2007, dozens of migrants were locked in the trunk of a van and shipped to the floating population management station¹¹ across from where I lived. They were held in the station until they paid the required registration fees. Most of them either did not have the required documents to register or did not bring enough money with them. Those who were lucky enough to have cell phones could call for help. The whole process was carried out by around twenty public security staff, who were not listed in the bureaucracy. Four police officers did nothing but watch the procedure. Another incident happened one morning when I heard a loud, aggressive knock on the door. It was eight public security staff wanting to check all the legal documents I had as a migrant, which did not work since I was not a citizen. They then turned to our neighbors but luckily there was no one answering and I

¹¹ The Floating Population Management Station is the subordinate institution of the leading team comprised of members from the departments of public security, labor, family planning, finance, trade unions, industrial and commercial affairs, and tax. The institution is the creation of Guangdong Province in Pearl River Delta. Public security workers are recruited to assist the governance of floating population. But, this set-up runs stably only in rich areas like Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Dongguan, Zhongshan. Shirking, jockeying, lack of training and budget, and running each own way have put the institution under stagnation.

told the intruders that they already went to work. The public security staff was widely placed in the market neighborhood. But most of the time they were either chatting with each other or listening to the radio. The raids I witnessed were only sporadic and mostly happened around the three big national holidays: May 1st, October 1st and the Chinese New Year. Local migrant governance was not based on routine work, but on informal raids.

To sum up, the agents in table 2 are incapable or unwilling to play the role assigned by the state for the following reasons: First, the state has provided few incentives for migrant women to voluntarily obey the birth-planning regulations. Second, the Chinese state's infrastructural power is not sufficient enough to carry out micro control. The computerization of the 1.3 billion population's information was not finished until the end of 2006.¹² Third, the administrative principle of territorial jurisdiction based on one's *hukou* has made it difficult for the exchange of information among local governments. This is even when trans-provincial exchange is involved. Fourth, the population and family planning department does not have a dominant bureaucratic status over the other departments. Hence, the birth planning work depends greatly on other departments' courtesy. In the following section, I will pin down how migrant workers take advantage of the loopholes in China's birth-control system.

URBAN SPACE: A SANCTURAY FOR CONTINUED REPRODUCTION

A stage show "Excess-birth Guerrilla" (*chaosheng youji dui*) on China Central Television on the Eve of Chinese New Year 1990 made the two actors household names. It was about one peasant couple who moved around the whole country with three daughters still in infancy, just to give birth to a son. Although the show was

¹² "'Citizen Identity Information System' Established."
http://news.xinhuanet.com/society/2007-02/09/content_5720050.htm, 9 February, 2007, accessed 13 August, 2008.

written from the viewpoint of the state, the usage of the terminology of guerrilla warfare to describe peasant tactics vividly displayed the logic of the weak in resistance—“He proceeds. I fall back; He retreats. I pursue; He stations. I harass; His exhaustion is my strength.”¹³

The common image of the rural migrants’ reproductive behavior carries the stigma of so-called “excess-birth guerillas”, the study of which usually focuses on the demographic goal of solving the alleged problem of the high fertility rates of migrant women, which has been proved to be a fallacy by Goldstein, White and Goldstein (1997). In fact, after more than two decades in practice, this “tactic” is no longer the patent of poor peasants. We can simply type the term in the web search engine and locate numerous stories about rich people leaving the mainland to deliver the “excess-births”. Besides, those peasants leaving their hometown are not vagabonds as were displayed on the stage show. They are actually people with rich social networks, knowledge and skills to earn their own livings in the cities. They know clearly the institutional loopholes of birth control and their resources of resistance are deeply rooted in the soil of market economy. The state’s birth control has forced the peasants to “plan birth” and yet the market has nourished the opportunities for resistance.

In this section, I will identify four strategic tools, which are based on my field surveys from April, 2005 to March, 2007, during which I took four field trips (21st to 30th April and 2nd to 16th August, 2005; 16th to 29th March, 2006; 15th to 21st January, 2007) with a research team led by Professor Jieh-min Wu to Shenzhen, Dongguan, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Kunshan and Beijing. I participated in the in-depth interviews of 47 migrant workers (one or both members of 33 unique couples), nine corporate managers and owners, and fourteen Chinese officials and scholars. Taken together, these migrant workers’ permanent places of registration cover a total of eleven

¹³ “Excess-birth Guerilla.” 1990.

provinces, their professions in these six cities including production-line worker, office personnel, middle-level management positions in both foreign and domestic factories, taxi-driver and individual entrepreneur (*getihu*). In addition to the basic information such as permanent place of registration, age, education level, monthly salary, housing and working experience, each female informant's reproductive history was recorded in detail, including the year of marriage registration, the cost of the birth permit, time and location(s) of delivery, reproduction fee, excess-birth fine, contraceptive method, pregnancy check, etc.

During the 2005 national holidays, I accompanied one of our informants back to her home village in northern Jiangsu Province, which provided me with a great chance to get along with the villagers as a visiting friend, and hence acquire a better understanding of their views about birth planning. In March 2007, I stayed with one migrant family in Foshan, Guangdong Province for one month, which allowed me great access into migrants' lives in the city.

The first strategic tool is the *institutional loopholes*, created by peasants' cultural practice and norms on sex and marriage. The second one is a relatively *autonomous social space*, which has functioned as a sanctuary for resistance. The third is *migration*, which has been an indispensable segment of resistance and become a repertoire of the Chinese peasants' resistance to the state's birth control. The last one is a structure of accomplices propped up by the peasant couples' *social networks*.

We have to realize that one's action of resistance normally contains all sorts of strategic tools, the mobilization of which depends on the resources one can afford to manipulate. A pregnant woman might encounter local patrol, both routinely or irregularly, so she constantly considers the safety of her daily routes or residence, and adjusts her strategies of action accordingly. She might change her residence, try to obtain birth permission (either official or forgery) through her social network, or even

bribe the patrol officers. I will base each representative case on the actors' main choices of strategies.

Institutional Loopholes

“The birth planning officer would ask, but we always told them we didn't have any children.”

—field note 070123Q

Lee is a veteran of the armed police forces. In old times, joining the army was one of the only ways to leave the rural area. After retiring from the army, Lee was assigned a security job in his hometown, Yongzhou, Hunan Province. He described the payment as limited (300 yuan per month) and the job boring, so he joined the “migrant army” in 1993. His military background earned him a captain position in charge of the security of a foreign shoe maker in Dongguan. Lee took advantage of the chance to learn factory management and later became the manager of a domestic shoe factory. It did not surprise me when he revealed that he has three children, for he was an “opportunist”.

Lee's wife Fang is from Chongqing—one of China's four municipalities. The couple got to know each other while they were both working for the same factory in Dongguan. Their first daughter was born in Dongguan, out of wedlock, in 1997. Two years later, the second daughter was born in Yongzhou, Lee's hometown. Not until 2000, did the couple register their marriage and apply for the “birth permit”. They told me, “The birth planning office would ask, but we always told them we didn't have any children. [The children were] born outside. They can't check and won't check.” In 2001, their son was born “legally” in Foshan.

Fang had not received tubal sterilization. Her official reproductive history recorded only one child after her son was born. Fang did not move her *hukou* to Lee's, which meant that her jurisdiction was still in Chongqing. That is why she was able to deliver the second daughter in Yongzhou without any “disturbance” from the local

officials. She did not even need to take any pregnancy test, since she had long resided outside of her hometown.

Fang's "single" status had exempted her from being the state's target, and her reproductive history showed strong spatial mobility—eldest daughter born in Dongguan, second daughter in Yongzhou, and the youngest son in Foshan, which had made it even more difficult to control her reproductive behavior.

I recall a scene in the Northern Jiangsu village. One night the children and women were separating the corn kernels from the cobs in the bedroom, while men were drinking in the living room. One young couple came in, and the "wife" joined us. She was eight months pregnant. Later that night, my informant told me that the pregnant girl is an "outsider", and the couple met while they were both working in the city, "They are not married yet. The guy did not spend a dime [betrothal money] to bring the girl home! She's just 18 years old.¹⁴ The baby can't be registered until later."

In the rural area where a marital relationship is built on the consensus of both parents, a "married" woman can still be single on paper. This is often used by the peasant family as a strategy to gain more latitude to evade the state control, until the ideal sexes and number of children are born. Delaying marriage registration is not the only way to maintain legally single status. Being divorced is also a practice, but this strategy is often turned down by the wife and her natal family, for fear that the husband would deny responsibility if the "wrong" baby is born.

The cultural practice that ties sex with marriage has been a norm by which the state has to abide. However, the state's recognized form of marriage is different from that of peasants, which has been used as a tool against the state's claim on women's bodies and to bail the "unmarried women" out of the birth-control mechanism.

¹⁴ The legal age to marry is 20 years old.

Birth control must start from sex. However, it is morally unthinkable and culturally unacceptable to conduct pregnancy tests among unmarried women. This has placed many de facto marriages beyond the legal boundary of the state's birth control. The state can only rely on surveillance at the grass-roots level, which has been made difficult in the era of mass migration.

In the next few paragraphs, I will discuss the special urban landscapes created by mass rural-urban migration. These migrant dwellings have grown into full communities and provided the services that the state has been reluctant to deliver. Therefore, they have become the sanctuaries for numerous migrant women who try to bear their children. To discuss the possibilities of resistance, we should investigate the urban spaces where migrants' livelihood is placed and everyday resistance is practiced.

Autonomous Social Space

“Go to the workers' dwellings. You'll know how they have excess-births!”

—field note 070122A

It was August, 2005. On our way out of Shanghai Jiangwan Airfield, the taxi driver told us that two men were murdered in the airfield and the bodies were not discovered until a couple of days later. He continued, “No driver is willing to take customers into this area.” The driver's story reveals a typical local thinking that public security had deteriorated ever since the migrants moved in. I recalled my first time in the very same community four months earlier in the evening—people gathering in front of TVs, workers returning home or leaving for the night shift, kids playing on the muddy road, and women shopping in the outdoor market. I did notice that all the security points were vacant. Our informant confirmed that all the security guards left before dark. The vibrant community seemed to be beyond the reach of any sort of state authority at night.

Jiangwan Airfield used to be a military base. After its abandonment, rural migrants gathered and gradually formed a huge community. The airfield was later handed to Shanghai government for urban expansion. The government had seemed indifferent to the “migrant problem” there. Yet, when I returned again in March 2006, most of the settlement had been torn down and migrants dispersed. In the same locality, a huge, new residential community, New Jiangwan Town, had been opened up together by the army and the municipal government.

The torn-down settlement was established by migrant social force. It contained all the services and functions of a community, including a market, transportation, education, medical care, entertainment, and so on, albeit in a rudimentary form. Yet, this vitality could not guarantee the sustainability of the settlement, thanks to migrants’ outsider status, which put them in a vulnerable position when faced with the urban regime. Migrant interests are often sacrificed if their community stands in the way of the power holders’ plan, mostly urban expansion, and the government more often than not would ruthlessly tear down the whole settlement. In this sense, it seems to showcase the state’s absolute monopoly on violence, but this might has just revealed that the state’s efficacy of governance is in doubt.

The destroyed settlement might be rebuilt on the same locality, such as the well-known case of Zhejiang Village in Beijing, or dispersed for good, like the case of Jiangwan Airfield. It seems that “migrant power” has often made the large migrant settlements the targets of the state and therefore more vulnerable to state violence.

Another common form of migrant residency is to reside with the locals. The neighborhood where I stayed, the Pingzhou old market in Foshan, is an example. The old market used to be the township center. Following the economic development and urban planning, the modern commercial center has been moving westward. But the old market hosts a traditional food market, restaurants, hardware shops, a township

hospital, pharmacies, cheap hotels, schools (one township kindergarten; one migrant kindergarten; one district elementary school; one migrant elementary and high school), and all kinds of vendors. It still serves the local people's daily needs.

In 1982 the township government issued the first individual entrepreneur (*getihu*) license. In 1988 the first foreign owned factory was set up here. Both factories were shoe makers. Two decades passed, some of the first generation workers have also established their own businesses here. A local policeman told me, they now "serve" around 150,000 migrants, and the old market is one of the main migrant residences. Most of the old brick houses behind the food market have been rented to migrants. The locals' residences are easy to recognize, for they are mostly multi-storied buildings. The locals and migrants living right next door to each other are common in the old market. One of my informants, Ching spent most of her pregnancy around this area.

Unlike the case of Zhejiang Village, the migrants here have not built up specific enclaves and strong migrant networks according to their places of origins. So, the individual migrants' power seems to be insignificant compared with that of their counterparts in Zhejiang Village, but their symbiotic relations with the locals might actually grant them more safety. In sum, migrants' relative position against the state is fluid. It all depends not only on their resources, but the structural opportunities.

A third form is the factory. The foreign factories we have visited, especially large ones, run as independent communities, whose services include food, residence, entertainment, basic medical care, and even young children's education. The factories are also in charge of their own security, the personnel of which are normally provided by police-owned or police-linked businesses. The local officials do not intervene with the factory affairs if not necessary. As to the local factories, the owners mostly have strong connections with the local officials. One owner told me, "We locals all have

some sort of *guanxi*.” The officials will not interfere with his business.

Even if the birth-planning office can ask the factory to cooperate with its routine work, the job is difficult because the officers do not have the detailed information about the workers. One informant told us that during her pregnancy, she handed in a copy of her old record to the local birth-planning staff who had been sent to the factory and were supposed to check hundreds of female workers in a single afternoon. “It is easier to fake in the factory because they won’t examine everyone carefully. There are too many people waiting!”

The relative autonomy of the factory has made it a great sanctuary for migrant women to evade the state’s surveillance. One policeman I talked with quipped, “Go to the workers’ dwellings. You’ll know how they have excess-births!”

Migration

“Generally, the couple has to leave together.”

—field note 070122B

In a casual talk with a Chinese student in a Shanghai hostel, she expressed that even she could tell me the most common strategy to have excess-births—by leaving one’s place of *hukou*. This opinion or some variation of it has been constantly expressed during my field research. When asked if a couple would consider another child, one Chinese factory owner responded, “Generally, the couple has to leave together. The rich would migrate to Hong Kong or Macau. We have a factory to run. (We) can’t leave.” In this section, I will use case studies to describe how peasant workers manipulate or take advantage of spatial mobility to carry out their “birth plan”, which will at the same time explain the relations between migration and resistance.

Migration as initiative for resistance

It was April 2005 when I first met Mei. She and her husband had worked in a luggage factory in Dongguan for more than a decade and they had an eight-year-old

son. She made a deep impression on me because she was very well-groomed compared with other female assembly line workers. The second time I met her was in January of 2007 and there was a moment I could not associate this Mei with the Mei in my memory. Noticing my surprise, she smiled and explained, “I have put on weight this time because I have a daughter.” I wanted to find out if this birth had been planned, “Did you carry this birth because you wanted a daughter?” “Yes, so I got a daughter,” Mei answered happily, even though the couple was fined 5,000 yuan (around 700 USD).

According to the birth planning regulation in her hometown, if the first child is a healthy boy, the couple is not allowed to have a second child. Therefore, Mei had an intrauterine device (IUD) inserted “according to the rule” after her son’s birth. Then how did she remove her IUD since she was not permitted to bear the second birth?

Mei told us, seven to eight years after the IUD insertion, she could apply to her hometown birth planning office for free IUD replacement, which she did. After having the old IUD removed, Mei never returned to have the new IUD inserted as scheduled by the birth-planning office. She, of course, never intended to return to receive the new device. In April 2006, she delivered a baby girl in Dongguan.

Mei was a typical economic immigrant like tens of millions of other rural migrants. She came to Dongguan in 1990. It is marriage and giving birth that have interrupted her life as a migrant worker. Mei got to know her husband in 1995 and the couple returned to his home village the next year to get married. She gave birth to a son in 1997 and restarted her working life in the factory.

Although Mei migrated for economic reasons, the process of migration has created conditions, such as spatial mobility and economic power, so she could realize her wish to have a daughter. Migration has thus enabled many migrant women like Mei to have more autonomy for their reproductive decisions.

Migration for resistance

Other than economic migration, resistance has become a strong motive to migrate. Yet, in the process of migration, economic and resistance purposes often develop into an inextricable relation. Ching and Chang's case is representative.

Ching's father was sent to Yingde to teach the sent-down youths to farm. When Ching was four years old, the family moved to Yingde but kept their *hukou* in Chaozhou, which is around 300 kilometers away. Ching's husband, Chang is the son of the president of the local township power plant.

Ching and Chang's marriage was arranged by their parents. Chang's parents not only liked the fact that Ching was "good-looking and docile", but most importantly, the birth planning rule allowed township citizens marrying peasant women to have two children. Ching's parents agreed to the Chang family's proposal because of their local influence. The Chang family's relentless endeavor to continue the family line started with the choice of the daughter-in-law. Yet, the change of policy and the birth of Ching's daughter soon crushed their ingenious arrangement.

Moreover, old Chang's official position became the couple's main obstacle to the second birth. All township officials are mobilized first when there is a birth-planning campaign launched by the higher authority, and the campaign always begins with raids against their relatives. "Whoever wants the second birth has to leave because the officials in one's place of *hukou* will intervene," Ching told me.

Yet, the couple's decision to migrate did not come without family struggle. The Changs had tried to convince Ching to divorce as a measure of expediency and remarry after the second child was safely born, which was rejected by Ching, warned by many that she might end up with nothing.

Four years after the first child was born, the couple had an acquaintance remove Ching's IUD and joined the flow of rural-urban migration. Ching said, "People asked

my father-in-law if we were out to have the second birth. He always denied it. But they could all figure it out.” They could not return until Chang’s father retired from his position.

The couple and their daughter moved in to Chang’s younger sister’s apartment in Foshan, which was located in a closed residence community.¹⁵ Chang has since worked as a mechanic in a foreign shoe factory.

The residents in the community were mostly middle- or high-waged white-collar workers. The policemen or birth-planning officers normally will not raid communities such as that. The couple stayed there in the first few months of Ching’s pregnancy until the neighborhood birth-control office posted a notification of the seasonal pregnancy test. The couple then moved to Chang’s older sister’s place in Pingzhou old market and enrolled their daughter in the nearby migrant kindergarten.

Ching gave birth to her second child in the township hospital one street away. Pingzhou hospital does not require birth permits to deliver and also issues birth certificates.¹⁶ It took the couple simply 2,100 yuan to deliver in the hospital. Ching recalled, after suffering all the disgrace after her first birth and anxiety during the second pregnancy:

After delivery, I didn’t care to know if it was a boy or a girl. The doctor asked me, “Is your first child a boy or a girl?” I replied, “A girl.” The doctor then held up the baby and showed me, “This time [it] is a boy.”

Old Chang’s official status had made Ching the main target of the birth planning campaign. In order to continue the family line, the couple had no choice but to give up the job in the local power plant and migrate to the city. The couple was not allowed to go back even after their boy was born, for fear that local people would

¹⁵ Chang’s sister married a local resident and has moved her *hukou* to her husband’s.

¹⁶ To register a new-born child, one needs the parents’ registration book and the birth certificate issued by the hospital where she or he was born.

criticize old Chang, despite that the chief of the birth-planning office was a good friend of the family. Nevertheless, Foshan has been the temporary sanctuary for the family. Chang's salary was not much but could at least serve for the moment.

Migration and resistance

There are two lines in perceiving the relations between migration and resistance. First, migration has created the provisions for resistance. Migration might start by economic motives, but the process of migration has granted migrant women more latitude to circumvent the state's surveillance, thus more autonomy to their reproductive behaviors. The second is migration for reproductive purpose. In order to evade the surveillance from one's *hukou* authority, migration is the first step toward resistance. The city hosts not only a social space sustaining migrant livelihood but numerous economic opportunities, which provide both a living for the couple and the means to pay the excess-birth fine for the newborn child's registration. One migrant worker's remarks are representative:

[If we had been] at home, we wouldn't have been able to deliver the child; [But we were] outside, there was no forcible control ... generally speaking, the birth control staff don't look for those leaving the village. If you are at home, they will go to your house ... unless you hide ... normally you won't be able to deliver [the unauthorized baby] ... But it still depends on the situation, those having only one child are allowed to deliver the second one as long as they don't go out during the "movement" [clearing up the unauthorized births] in April and August ... In the rural area, only one [child] is absolutely unacceptable. The general ideal is two boys, one girl.

In the village I stayed, most couples had two children. The one-child families were rare, except among the young couples. My informant's brother-in-law took his daughter and wife to the wife's natal family in Shandong and stayed there for two years, during which he worked as a construction worker to earn the family's living.

They moved back only when they saved enough for the excess-birth fine.

The effect of the family's economic condition on child-bearing is obvious in the village. The spacing between two children is shorter in the better-off families, and longer in poor households. It is not uncommon to see teenage sisters with baby brothers. The economic condition of a family also reflects on the registration of unauthorized children. One woman told me that her youngest son had to stay outside the village until he was seven years old because she could not afford the fine. My informant concluded, "Here everyone knows that the price for the second birth is 15,000 yuan. With that money you can have one more, but leave the village during pregnancy."

In an era of vigorous population mobility, the state is doomed to face the predicament that more and more reproductive processes are skipping the boundaries of the fixed territorial jurisdiction of the *hukou* system, thus moving beyond the state's surveillance. Furthermore, economic migration has empowered peasant migrants and their families through economic advantage, so that they can redeem their reproductive rights in the cities.

Social Network

In this society, you can't go anywhere without guanxi!

—field note 070128R

Zhu, her younger brother and sister all have a pair of children—a son and a daughter, thanks to their father who is a hospital worker. Unlike other cases, the women in this family do not need to undergo any sort of operations because their father can obtain proof documents of IUD insertion and tubal sterilization. She claimed, "In this society, you can't go anywhere without *guanxi*!"

Even though the idea of "raising sons to provide against old age" prevails among peasants, Zhu's remarks still struck me. Zhu is proud to have a perfect family,

but she refuses to use permanent contraceptive. She told me in private, “[We] can’t guarantee nothing [bad] would happen to the children. We parents still need to provide against any contingency.”

Zhu’s case is by no means unique. The seemingly comprehensive birth-control system has left a lot of room for human manipulation, since it affects every single Chinese person’s life. The occurrence of an acquaintance’s help and support cannot be more common. Almost every case of resistance has “accomplices” involved—both families of the couple, the relatives, the friends, the landlords, and the factory owners. We can say that *guanxi* has been constructed and mobilized as a “safety net” standing between the woman and the state, so as to protect her body from the state’s surveillance and intrusion. The effect of *guanxi* is even more decisive in registering the newborn child. In the following paragraphs, I will discuss how *guanxi* can be used to lower down the economic cost of resistance when negotiating the new-born child’s *hukou*.

AFTER RESISTANCE: NEGOTIATING THE NEW-BORN *HUKOU*

Those intending to have excess births can make use of spatial mobility to evade the state’s surveillance, as discussed in the above case studies. Yet, under the state’s birth control, a child’s personhood is not granted by birth, but acquired through the state’s recognition. A child has to register to obtain his or her legal status, so he or she can enjoy the benefits or services provided by the state, such as education and land distribution. Even though the parents can purchase basic education in the migrant community, its function is only transitional and the quality is secondary. That is why all migrant children have to return home once they reach the threshold of higher education. Therefore, resistance does not end at the child’s birth. The personhood of the newborn is another struggle. The parents have to negotiate the price of the child’s legality with the local officials. The stronger their social network is, the cheaper the

price is, and the sooner they can solve the child's illegal status.

One informant told me, he holds a small township *hukou* whereas his wife holds a peasant *hukou*. When they got married in 1993, they were allowed to have two children under the provision of a spacing of four years. He did not wait that long because "you never know when the state will change its policy," he recalled. The couple was fined the minimum 500 yuan (around 62 USD) for their "rush-birth" (*qiangshen*). The price was of course "negotiated and acquired" through his social network. But his friend was not that lucky. The policy was indeed changed as expected. My informant had to help him obtain a peasant *hukou* before he could have another try.

Another case is Zhou whose cousin was the vice mayor of the county. Zhou has a peasant *hukou* and his wife a township *hukou*. He got the idea of legalizing his son's birth at the dinner table with the birth control staff. Zhou had his wife register the boy in her *hukou*, which exempted them from a fine of 17,000 yuan (around 2150 USD).

Ching and Chang's method was to register their son in Chaozhou. Ching took advantage of her father's *guanxi* and registered her son in her *hukou*, at the expense of a meal for the birth-planning staff and an extra bribe of 6,000 yuan. But when old Chang retires from his public position, their son's "returning to the family" will be another struggle of *guanxi*.

Other than *guanxi*, a woman's fertility can also be a bargaining chip, since the number of sterilization surgeries is one of the official missions. One couple told us that they spent less than one hundred yuan as a fee to register their second son without being fined, for the wife had undergone sterilization surgery. In some cases, the mother can exchange her fertility with the newborn child's *hukou*, thus the child's personhood. Since this quota is rare, some parents will save the valuable *hukou* for their son. For instance, Lee and Fang's two girls had been "black children" for several

years until the elder daughter reached the age to go to elementary school.

CONCLUSION: A NEVER ENDING STRUGGLE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

The resistance to the imposition of the one-child policy in the rural areas and the demographic consequences for the Chinese population and Chinese social structure are vivid demonstrations of how the resistance of the weak impedes the intended policy goals of the dominant (Scott 1985). Nevertheless, the struggle is never an all-or-nothing victory by either side, as demonstrated by previous research (Greenhalgh 2003a; Scharping 2003; White 2003), for low fertility and an aging population are already producing the predicament of a heavy pension burden on the state. Similarly, the distorted sex ratio is causing difficulties in finding brides due to the increasing ratio of males to females. Finally, the citizenship of the unplanned population is aggravating the problem of social justice.

In urban areas, the regular violations of the one-child policy by the “floating population” have seriously damaged the efficiency of the state’s birth-control mechanism. Thus, inspired by the international discourse promoted in the Cairo Programme of Action and political reform in the direction of the rule of law, the state has gradually changed its methods of governance to improve the implementation of the population policy, hence making it less coercive and more rights-oriented (Greenhalgh 2001; Winckler 2002). One example of this is the baby delivery centers designed by the Shanghai Municipality for migrant women, which charge only one-third of the average delivery fee, with vaccines for the babies included.¹⁷ The implication of this shift from birth control to health service is that the state is trying to regain its control over women’s bodies by providing limited reproductive welfare. Interestingly, in the battlefield over birth control and resistance, social rights and civil

¹⁷ “Shanghai established ten special arranged delivery spots for floating population.” http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/autopub/2004-07/27/content_1658319.htm, 27 July, 2004, accessed 29 August, 2008.

rights are employed separately as tactics by the two parties. We have seen on the one hand that peasants make use of their spatial mobility and the resulting economic empowerment to claim autonomy of their bodies. On the other hand, the state has tried to reinstall a package of social rights (reproductive welfare, pension, medical care, single child's education benefits, etc.) to bring them back into the population control system. Nonetheless, this welfare is only second-class compared to that provided to proper urban residents.

The resistance to birth control has forced the state to refine its methods of migrant governance, such as delivering limited welfares and instituting a principle of joint territorial jurisdiction between the governments of origin and destination. Yet, the local state has not been able to implement the reform due to the flawed design of the birth-control system and the jockeying bureaucrats. Moreover, the fundamental problems of the lack of support for peasants' old age and the conflict of gender ideology between the state and peasants have never been solved. That is why we have witnessed innumerable resistance, either collective or individual, against the state's claim on women's bodies.

Before the state lifted the ban on population mobility, peasants' strategies included bribing the local officials, assaulting the family-planning staff, sabotaging local officials' properties, hiding the women's pregnant bodies with baggy clothing, abandoning female infants, or even conducting female infanticide out of desperation (Wasserstrom 1984; Li 1995; Greenhalgh and Li 1995; Johnson 1996; Merli 1998; Merli and Raftery 2000; White 2003; Zhang 2006).

Market reform and the rapid economic growth in the coastal cities have made the state legalize spatial mobility and created a whole new opportunity structure. Yet, the strategic tool of migration into the cities did not come without trials, since the urban regime has never been friendly to the peasant outsiders. It is millions of rural

migrants taking up the jobs in the fast growing cities and building up their own urban spaces that has made the city a more benign place to stay. Ironically, the Chinese communist state’s strategic creation of categorized populations for the planned economy has become the “source of endless troubles” for later population governance.

Migrant birth control is such an example. Peasant migrants have been excluded from the “urban public goods regime” due to their “outsider” status, which has provided them no incentives to register with the city government. The principle of territorial jurisdiction according to one’s *hukou* has made it difficult to trace migrants’ whereabouts if they do not turn themselves in. The state’s regulations on the citizens’ *de jure* marriage and late legal marital ages have proven to be institutional loopholes that the peasants can take advantage of. Moreover, peasants’ social networks have been a safety net that provides necessary logistical support for resistance. Most importantly, spatial mobility and economic advantage of migration have enabled the migrant women to redeem their reproductive rights. The city has become a great sanctuary for continued reproduction and migration has become the repertoire for resistance against the state’s birth-control policy.

Table 1: Scale of migrant population (ten thousand)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Migrant</i>	<i>Total population</i>	<i>Migrant population ratio (%)</i>
1982	1139	100818	1.1

1990	2952	113368	2.6
1995	4758	120778	3.9
2000	14439	126583	11.4
2005	14735	130628	11.3

SOURCES: *Guanyu 1982 nian renkou pucha zhuyao shuzi de gongbao*; *Guanyu 1987 nian quanguo 1% renkou chouyang diaocha zhuyao shuzi de gongbao*; *Guanyu 1990 nian renkou pucha zhuyao diaocha shuju de gongbao*; *Guanyu 1995 nian quanguo 1% renkou chouyang diaocha zhuyao shuju de gongbao*; *Guanyu 2000 nian renkou pucha zhuyao shuju de gongbao*; *Guanyu 2005 nian quanguo 1% chouyang diaocha zhuyao shuju de gongbao*.

Table 2: Migrant birth-control mechanism

<i>Agents of the state and fields of control</i>		<i>Methods</i>			<i>Loopholes</i>
		<i>Control & punishment</i>	<i>Service & rewards</i>		
Birth planning	Gov. of permanent residence	Issue birth permit; issue marital and child-bearing status certificate; conduct propaganda; demand pregnancy check-up paper; extra-birth fine.	Provide contraceptives and health education.	Depend on migrants' autonomous cooperation; difficulties in tracking down migrants.	
	Gov. of current residence	Examine marital and child-bearing status certificate; conduct propaganda; patrol.	Provide contraceptives and health education.	Depend on migrants' autonomous cooperation; difficulties in tracking down migrants.	
Public Security (<i>hukou</i>)	Gov. of permanent residence	Birth permit required to register the new-born child.		Bribe, extra-birth fine, or one parent's sterilization in exchange for the new-born child's registration.	
	Gov. of current residence	Marital and child-bearing status information required in applying for residence permit and temporary residence permit; contraceptive methods required in obtaining local <i>hukou</i> .		Few incentives for registration.	

<i>Agents of the state and fields of control</i>		<i>Methods</i>		
		<i>Control & punishment</i>	<i>Service & rewards</i>	<i>Loopholes</i>
Industrial and Commercial administration		Marital and child-bearing status information required in applying for work permit and business license.		Vendors do not need license to conduct business.
Social Security department		Birth permit required in applying for child-bearing benefits.	Pension subsidy.	Few migrants have child-bearing insurance; pension subsidy is not enough to be incentives for compliance.
Education department			Single-child tuition cut; score benefits in high school entrance exam.	
Employing unit or individual		Require marital and child-bearing status certificate before employment; responsible for employees' birth planning; accept inspection from local birth planning administration.	Pay for employees' contraceptive expense.	Most enterprises do not care about employees' reproductive behavior.

<i>Agents of the state and fields of control</i>	<i>Methods</i>			<i>Loopholes</i>
	<i>Control & punishment</i>	<i>Service & rewards</i>		
Hospital	Birth permit required in undertaking delivery; practice forced abortion; contraceptive surgeries.	Issue birth certificate; provide pregnancy check-up service (with charge); practice contraceptive surgeries.		Many hospitals do not require birth permit to undertake delivery.
Mass organization (Labor Union; Communist Youth League; All-China Women's Federation)	Propagate; mobilization			
Landlord	Require marital and child-bearing status certificate before signing lease; informant assistance.			Most landlords care nothing but rents.
Court	Freeze violator's bank account; gather extra-birth fine.			

<i>Agents of the state and fields of control</i>	<i>Methods</i>		
	<i>Control & punishment</i>	<i>Service & rewards</i>	<i>Loopholes</i>
Local financial department	Provide budgets and logistics to “law enforcement team.”		
Local “law enforcement team”	Hunt down and detain possible violators; gather extra-birth fine.		Difficulty in tracking down migrants.

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