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Consciousness, cognition, and the hierarchy of context: Expanding the global neuronal workspace

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Abstract

Adapting Dretske's approach on the necessary conditions for mental process, we apply a communication theory analysis of interacting cognitive biological and social modules to the global neuronal workspace, the emerging standard model for consciousness. Using an obvious canonical homology with statistical physics, the method, when iterated, generates a fluctuating dynamic threshold recognizably similar to phase transition in a physical system, but constrained to a manifold/atlas structure analogous to a tunable retina. The resulting 'General Cognitive Model' can be extended in a straightforward manner to include the effects of psychosocial stress, culture, or other cognitive modules which constitute a structured, embedding, hierarchy of contextual constraints acting at a slower rate than neuronal function itself. This produces an empirically-testable 'biopsychosociocultural' treatment of individual consciousness that, while otherwise remarkably similar to the standard development, meets compelling philosophical and other objections to brain-only descriptions.

Key words: asymptotic limit theorems, atlas, cognition, consciousness, Dretske, groupoid, information theory, manifold, Onsager relations, orbit equivalence relation, phase transition, punctuated equilibrium, renormalization.

1 Introduction

A recent special issue of *Cognition* (**79**(1-2), 2001)) explores contemporary work on consciousness in humans, presenting various aspects of the new 'standard model' synthesized over the last decade or so (esp. Dehaene and Naccache, 2001). Sergeant and Dehaene (2004) describe that work, and some of the implicit controversy, as follows:

> "[A growing body of empirical study shows] large all-or-none changes in neural activity when a stimulus fails to be [consciously] reported as compared to when it is reported... [A] qualitative difference between unconscious and conscious processing is generally expected by theories that view recurrent interactions between distant brain areas as a nec-

essary condition for conscious perception... One of these theories has proposed that consciousness is associated with the interconnection of multiple areas processing a stimulus by a [dynamic] 'neuronal workspace' within which recurrent connections allow long-distance communication and auto-amplification of the activation. Neuronal network simulations... suggest the existence of a fluctuating dynamic threshold. If the primary activation evoked by a stimulus exceeds this threshold, reverberation takes place and stimulus information gains access, through the workspace, to a broad range of [other brain] areas allowing, among other processes, verbal report, voluntary manipulation, voluntary action and long-term memorization. Below this threshold, however, stimulus information remains unavailable to these processes. Thus the global neuronal workspace theory predicts an all-or-nothing transition between conscious and unconscious perception... More generally, many non-linear dynamical systems with self-amplification are characterized by the presence of discontinuous transitions in internal state..."

The review by Baars (2002) provides a somewhat different perspective on recent rapid progress in this direction, examining his own pioneering studies (Baars, 1983, 1988), along with the work of Edleman (1989), Damasio (1989), Freeman (1991), Llinas et al. (1998), Edelman and Tononi (2000), and so on.

Baars and Franklin (2003) describe the overall model as follows:

(1) The brain can be viewed as a collection of distributed specialized networks (processors).

(2) Consciousness is associated with a global workspace in the brain – a fleeting memory capacity whose focal contents are widely distributed ('broadcast') to many unconscious specialized networks.

(3) Conversely, a global workspace can also serve to integrate many competing and cooperating input networks.

(4) Some unconscious networks, called contexts, shape conscious contents, for example unconscious parietal maps modulate visual feature cells that underlie the perception of color in the ventral stream.

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(5) Such contexts work together jointly to constrain conscious events.

(6) Motives and emotions can be viewed as goal contexts.

(7) Executive functions work as hierarchies of goal contexts.

Our particular extension of this perspective will be to introduce the idea of a hierarchical structure for 'contexts-of-context'. We attempt to explicitly model the roles of culture, individual developmental and community history, and embedding sociocultural network in creating a further – and very powerful – hierarchy of constraints to conscious events. To do this we must bring together two other related strains of research on neural function, cognition, and consciousness, taken, respectively, from physics and philosophy.

The increasingly dominant global neuronal workspace paradigm has a corresponding track within the physics literature, involving adaptation of a highly mathematical statistical mechanics formalism to explore observed phase transition-like behavior in the brain. These efforts range from 'bottom up' treatments by Ingber (1982, 1992) based on interacting neural network models, to the recent 'top down' mean-field approach of Steyn-Ross et al. (2001, 2003) which seeks to explain empirically observed all-or-nothing effects in general anesthesia.

Parallel to both the neuroscience and physics lines of research, but absent invocation of either dynamic systems theory or statistical mechanics, is what Adams (2003) has characterized as 'the informational turn in philosophy', that is, the application of communication theory formalism and concepts to "purposive behavior, learning, pattern recognition, and... the naturalization of mind and meaning". One of the first comprehensive attempts was that of Dretske (1981, 1988, 1992, 1993, 1994), whose work Adams describes as follows:

> "It is not uncommon to think that information is a commodity generated by things with minds. Let's say that a naturalized account puts matters the other way around, viz. it says that minds are things that come into being by purely natural causal means of exploiting the information in their environments. This is the approach of Dretske as he tried consciously to unite the cognitive sciences around the well-understood mathematical theory of communication..."

Dretske himself (1994) writes:

> "Communication theory can be interpreted as telling one something important about the conditions that are needed for the transmission of information as ordinarily understood, about what it takes for the transmission of semantic information. This has tempted people... to exploit [information theory] in semantic and cognitive studies, and thus in the philosophy of mind.
>
> ...Unless there is a statistically reliable channel of communication between [a source and a receiver]... no signal can carry semantic information... [thus] the channel over which the [semantic] signal arrives [must satisfy] the appropriate statistical constraints of communication theory."

Here we redirect attention from the informational content or meaning of individual symbols, i.e. the province of semantics which so concerned Dretske, back to the statistical properties of long, internally-structured paths of symbols emitted by an information source which is 'dual' to a cognitive process in a particular sense. We will then adapt and modify a variety of tools from statistical physics to produce dynamically tunable punctuated or phase transition coupling between interacting cognitive modules in what we claim is a highly natural manner. As Dretske so clearly saw, this approach allows scientific inference on the necessary conditions for cognition, and, we will show, greatly illuminates the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness. It does so without raising the 18th Century ghosts of noisy, distorted mechanical clocks inherent to dynamic systems theory, and permits extension far beyond what is possible using statistical mechanics models of neural networks. In essence the method broadly recapitulates the General Linear Model for independent or simple serially correlated observations, but on the punctuated output of an information source, using the Shannon-McMillan Theorem rather than the Central Limit Theorem. Punctuation becomes the phenomenon of central interest, rather than linear (or time series) parameter estimation.

The technique opens the way for the global neuronal workspace to incorporate the effects of other cognitive modules, for example the immune system, and embedding, highly structured, social or cultural contexts that may, although acting at slower timescales, greatly affect individual consciousness. These contexts-of-context function in realms beyond the brain-limited concept defined by Baars and Franklin (2003). Such extension meets profound objections to brain-only models, for example the accusation of the 'mereological fallacy' by Bennett and Hacker (2003), which we will consider in more detail below.

Before entering the formal thicket, it is important to highlight several points.

First, information theory is notorious for providing existence theorems whose representation, to use physics jargon, is arduous. For example, although the Shannon Coding Theorem implied the possibility of highly efficient coding schemes as early as 1949, it took more than forty years for practical 'turbo codes' to actually be constructed. The research program we implicitly propose here is unlikely to be any less difficult.

Second, we are invoking information theory variants of the fundamental limit theorems of probability. These are independent of exact mechanisms, but constrain the behavior of those mechanisms. For example, although not all processes involve long sums of independent stochastic variables, those that do, regardless of the individual variable distribution, collectively follow a Normal distribution as a consequence of the Central Limit Theorem. This has fundamental importance for estimating functional models describing relations between independent or simple serially correlated data sets – the General Linear Model and its stationary time series variants. Similarly, the games of chance in a Las Vegas casino are all quite different, but nonetheless the possible success of strategies for playing them is strongly and systematically constrained by the Martingale Theorem, regardless of game details. We likewise propose that languages-on-networks and languages-

that-interact, as a consequence of the limit theorems of information theory, will inherently be subject to regularities of tunable punctuation and generalized Onsager relations, regardless of detailed mechanisms, as important as the latter may be.

Just as parametric statistics are imposed, at least as a first approximation, on sometimes questionable experimental situations, relying on the robustness of the Central Limit Theorem to carry us through, we will pursue a similar heuristic approach here.

Finally, we invoke an obvious homology between information source uncertainty and thermodynamic free energy density as justification for importing renormalization and generalized Onsager relation formalism to the study of cognitive process near and away from 'critical points' in the coupling of cognitive submodules. The purpose is to create a 'General Cognitive Model' (GCM) for the punctuated behavior of cognitive phenomena constrained by the Shannon-McMillan Theorem, a model which permits estimation of essential system parameters from observational data.

The question of whether we are demonstrating the necessity of global phase transitions for information-transmission networks or merely building a suggestive analogy with thermodynamics is, of course, ultimately an empirical one. For the microscopic case, however, Feynman (1996) has shown that the homology is an identity, which is no small matter and indeed suggests that behavior analogous to phase transitions in simple physical systems should be ubiquitous for a very broad class of information systems.

Our work appears similar, in a certain sense, to Bohr's treatment of the atom, which attempted a simple substitution of quantized angular momentum into a basically classical theory. Although incomplete, that analysis contributed materially to the more comprehensive approaches of quantum mechanics, relativistic quantum mechanics, and quantum electrodynamics. In that spirit we hope that increasingly satisfactory models will follow from the interplay of our work here and appropriate empirical studies.

We begin with a description of cognitive process in terms of an information source, a kind of language constrained by the Shannon-McMillan or Asymptotic Equipartition Theorem, and its Rate Distortion or Joint Asymptotic Equipartition and other variants for interacting sources.

2   Cognition as language

2.1   Theory

Atlan and Cohen (1998) and Cohen (2000), following a long tradition in the study of immune cognition (e.g., Grossman, 1989; Tauber, 1998), argue that the essence of cognitive function involves comparison of a perceived signal with an internal, learned picture of the world, and then, upon that comparison, the choice of a response from a much larger repertoire of possible responses. Following the approach of Wallace (2000, 2002a), we make a 'weak', and hence very general, model of that process which we illustrate with two neural network examples.

Cognitive pattern recognition-and-response, as we characterize it, proceeds by convoluting an incoming external sensory incoming signal with an internal ongoing activity – the learned picture of the world – and triggering an appropriate action based on a decision that the pattern of sensory activity requires a response. We will, fulfilling Atlan and Cohen's (1998) criterion of meaning-from-response, define a language's contextual meaning entirely in terms of system output, leaving out, for the moment, the question of how such a pattern recognition system is trained, a matter for Rate Distortion theory.

A pattern of sensory input is, then, mixed in an unspecified but systematic manner with an internal 'ongoing' activity to create a path of convoluted signals $x = (a_0, a_1, ..., a_n, ...)$. Each a_k thus represents some algorithmic or functional composition of 'internal' and 'external' signals.

This path is fed into a highly nonlinear, but otherwise similarly unspecified, decision oscillator which generates an output $h(x)$ that is an element of one of two (presumably) disjoint sets B_0 and B_1 of possible system responses. We take

$$B_0 \equiv b_0, ..., b_k,$$

$$B_1 \equiv b_{k+1}, ..., b_m.$$

Thus we permit a graded response, supposing that if

$$h(x) \in B_0$$

the pattern is not recognized, and if

$$h(x) \in B_1$$

the pattern is recognized and some action $b_j, k+1 \le j \le m$ takes place.

We are interested in paths x which trigger pattern recognition-and-response exactly once. That is, given a fixed initial state a_0, such that $h(a_0) \in B_0$, we examine all possible subsequent paths x beginning with a_0 and leading exactly once to the event $h(x) \in B_1$. Thus $h(a_0, ..., a_j) \in B_0$ for all $j < m$, but $h(a_0, ..., a_m) \in B_1$.

For each positive integer n let $N(n)$ be the number of high probability 'grammatical' and 'syntactical' paths of length n which begin with some particular a_0 having $h(a_0) \in B_0$ and lead to the condition $h(x) \in B_1$. We shall call such paths 'meaningful' and assume $N(n)$ to be considerably less than the number of all possible paths of length n leading from a_0 to the condition $h(x) \in B_1$ – actual pattern recognition-and-response is comparatively rare.

While convolution algorithm, the form of the nonlinear oscillator, and the details of grammar and syntax, may all be unspecified in this model, the critical assumption which permits inference on necessary conditions is that the finite limit

$$H \equiv \lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{\log[N(n)]}{n}$$

both exists and is independent of the path x.

We will – not surprisingly – call such a pattern recognition-and-response cognitive process *ergodic*. Not all such processes are likely to be ergodic, implying that H, if it indeed exists, is path dependent, although extension to 'nearly' ergodic processes is straightforward.

Invoking Shannon, we may thus define an ergodic information source $\mathbf{X}$ associated with stochastic variates X_j having joint and conditional probabilities $P(a_0, ..., a_n)$ and $P(a_n|a_0, ..., a_{n-1})$ such that appropriate joint and conditional Shannon uncertainties may be defined which satisfy the relations

$$H[\mathbf{X}] = \lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{\log[N(n)]}{n} =$$

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} H(X_n|X_0, ..., X_{n-1}) =$$

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{H(X_0, ..., X_n)}{n}.$$

(1)

The Shannon uncertainties $H(...)$ are defined in terms of cross-sectional sums of the form $-\sum_k P_k \log[P_k]$, where the P_k constitute a probability distribution. See Ash (1990) or Cover and Thomas (1991) for details.

We say this information source is *dual* to the ergodic cognitive process.

In essence we have created a statistical model of consciousness which, in a somewhat counterintuitive fashion, is similar in spirit to the General Linear Model (GLM) so familiar to researchers, but is based on the Shannon McMillan, rather than on the Central Limit, Theorem. As with the GLM, not all phenomena of interest are going to fit. We will return to these considerations below.

Again, for non-ergodic sources, a limit $\lim_{n \to \infty} H$ may be defined for each path, but it will not necessarily given by the simple cross-sectional law-of-large numbers analogs above. For 'nearly' ergodic systems one might perhaps use something of the form

$$H(x + \delta x) \approx H(x) + \delta x \, dH/dx.$$

Different language-analogs will, of course, be defined by different divisions of the total universe of possible responses into different pairs of sets B_0 and B_1, or by requiring more than one response in B_1 along a path. However, like the use of different distortion measures in the Rate Distortion Theorem (e.g. Cover and Thomas, 1991), it seems obvious that the underlying dynamics will all be qualitatively similar.

Similar but not identical, and herein lies the first of two essential matters: dividing the full set of possible responses into sets B_0 and B_1 may itself require higher order cognitive decisions by another module or modules, suggesting the necessity of 'choice' within a more or less broad set of possible languages-of-thought. This would, in one way, reflect the need of the organism to shift gears according to the different challenges it faces, leading to a model for autocognitive disease when a normally excited state is recurrently (and incorrectly) identified as a member of the 'resting' set B_0 (e.g. Wallace, 2003).

A second possible source of structure, however, lies at the input rather than the output end of the model: i.e. suppose we classify paths instead of outputs. That is, we define equivalence classes in convolutional 'path space' according to whether a state a_k can be connected by a path with some originating state a_M. We, in turn, set each possible state to an a_0, and define other states as formally equivalent to it if they can be reached from that (now variable) $a_0 = a_M$ by some real path. A state which can be reached by a legitimate grammatical and syntactical path from a_M is taken as equivalent to it.

We can thus divide path space into (ordinarily) disjoint sets of equivalence classes. Each equivalence class defines its own language-of-thought: disjoint cognitive modules, possibly associated with an embedding equivalence class algebra roughly analogous to the standard orbit equivalence construction for dynamical systems. Here, however, we are dealing with the extraordinarily rich dynamics possible to generalized languages rather than the constrained behavior of the usual distorted, noisy, clock-like contrivances of dynamical systems theory. The image which comes to mind is comparing the genome-environment interaction of evolutionary process to the Newtonian dynamics of a planetary system.

The natural algebraic structure arising from this kind of decomposition is the groupoid (Weinstein, 1996; Brown, 1987).

An open – and important – question is how path algebra structures might relate to B-set structures.

While meaningful paths – creating an inherent grammar and syntax – are defined entirely in terms of system response, as Atlan and Cohen (1998) propose, a critical task is to make these (relatively) disjoint cognitive modules interact, and to examine the effects of that interaction on global properties. One way this can be done is through measures of mutual information and their appropriate asymptotic limit theorems. Invoking an obvious homology with free energy density of a physical system then gives punctuated phase transition in the interaction between modules in what we claim to be a natural manner.

Glazebrook (2004) has remarked that our construction can be pieced together up to a global holonomy Lie groupoid using the Aof-Brown globalization theorem (Aof and Brown, 1992), a procedure which might shed further light on the problem of interacting cognitive modules.

We will eventually parametize the information source uncertainty of the dual information source with respect to one or more variates, writing, e.g. $H[\mathbf{K}]$, where $\mathbf{K} \equiv (K_1, ..., K_s)$ represents a vector in a parameter space. Let the vector $\mathbf{K}$ follow some path in time, i.e. trace out a generalized line or surface $\mathbf{K}(t)$. We will, following the argument of Wallace (2002b), assume that the probabilities defining H, for the most part, closely track changes in $\mathbf{K}(t)$, so that along a particular 'piece' of a path in parameter space the information source remains as close to memoryless and ergodic as is needed for the mathematics to work. Between pieces, below, we will impose phase transition characterized by a renormalization symmetry, in the sense of Wilson (1971).

We will call such an information source 'adiabatically piecewise memoryless ergodic' (APME).

To anticipate the argument, iterating the analysis on paths of 'tuned' sets of renormalization parameters gives a second

order punctuation in the rate at which primary interacting information sources representing cognitive submodules become linked to each other: the shifting workspace structure of consciousness.

2.2 Two examples

Before proceeding into the formal development we give two applications of the general theory to neural networks.

First the simple Hopfield/Hebb stochastic neuron: A series of inputs $y_i^j, i = 1...m$ from m nearby neurons at time j is convoluted with 'weights' $w_i^j, i = 1...m$, using an inner product

$$a_j = \mathbf{y}^j \cdot \mathbf{w}^j = \sum_{i=1}^{m} y_i^j w_i^j$$

in the context of a 'transfer function' $f(\mathbf{y}^j \cdot \mathbf{w}^j)$ such that the probability of the neuron firing and having a discrete output $z^j = 1$ is $P(z^j = 1) = f(\mathbf{y}^j \cdot \mathbf{w}^j)$. Thus the probability that the neuron does not fire at time j is $1 - f(\mathbf{y}^j \cdot \mathbf{w}^j)$.

In the terminology of this section the m values y_i^j constitute 'sensory activity' and the m weights w_i^j the 'ongoing activity' at time j, with $a_j = \mathbf{y}^j \cdot \mathbf{w}^j$ and $x = a_0, a_1, ...a_n, ...$.

A little more work leads to a fairly standard neural network model in which the network is trained by appropriately varying the $\mathbf{w}$ through least squares or other error minimization feedback. This can be shown to, essentially, replicate rate distortion arguments (Cover and Thomas, 1991), as we can use the error definition to define a distortion function $d(y, \hat{y})$ which measures the difference between the training pattern y and the network output $\hat{y}$ as a function of, for example, the inverse number of training cycles, K. As discussed in some detail elsewhere (Wallace, 2002), learning plateau behavior follows as a phase transition on the parameter K in the mutual information $I(Y, \hat{Y})$.

Park et al. (2000) treat the stochastic neural network in terms of a space of related probability density functions $[p(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}; \mathbf{w}) | \mathbf{w} \in \mathcal{R}^m]$, where $\mathbf{x}$ is the input, $\mathbf{y}$ the output and $\mathbf{w}$ the parameter vector. The goal of learning is to find an optimum $\mathbf{w}^*$ which maximizes the log likelihood function. They define a loss function of learning as

$$L(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}; \mathbf{w}) \equiv -\log p(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}; \mathbf{w}),$$

and one can take as a learning paradigm the gradient relation

$$\mathbf{w}_{t+1} = \mathbf{w}_t - \eta_t \partial L(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}; \mathbf{w})/\partial \mathbf{w},$$

where η_t is a learning rate.

Park et al. (2000) attack this optimization problem by recognizing that the space of $p(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}; \mathbf{w})$ is Riemannian with a metric given by the Fisher information matrix

$$G(\mathbf{w}) = \int \int \partial \log p / \partial \mathbf{w} [\partial \log p / \partial \mathbf{w}]^T p(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}; \mathbf{w}) d\mathbf{y} d\mathbf{x}$$

where T is the transpose operation. A Fisher-efficient online estimator is then obtained by using the 'natural' gradient algorithm

$$\mathbf{w}_{t+1} = \mathbf{w}_t - \eta_t G^{-1} \partial L(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}; \mathbf{w})/\partial \mathbf{w}.$$

Again, through the synergistic family of probability distributions $p(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}; \mathbf{w})$, this can be viewed as a special case – a 'representation', to use physics jargon – of the general 'convolution argument' given above.

It seems likely that a rate distortion analysis of the interaction between training language and network response language will nonetheless show the ubiquity of learning plateaus, even in this rather elegant special case.

Dimitrov and Miller (2001) provide a similar, and very elegant, information-theoretic approach to neural coding and decoding, albeit without address of punctuation.

3 Interacting cognitive modules

We suppose that two (relatively) distinct cognitive submodules can be represented by two distinct sequences of states, the paths $x \equiv x_0, x_1, ...$ and $y \equiv y_0, y_1, ...$. These paths are, however, both very highly structured and serially correlated and have dual information sources $\mathbf{X}$ and $\mathbf{Y}$. Since the modules, in reality, interact through some kind of endless back-and-forth mutual crosstalk, these sequences of states are not independent, but are jointly serially correlated. We can, then, define a path of sequential pairs as $z \equiv (x_0, y_0), (x_1, y_1), ...$. The essential content of the Joint Asymptotic Equipartition Theorem (JAEPT), a variant of the Shannon-McMillan Theorem, is that the set of joint paths z can be partitioned into a relatively small set of high probability termed *jointly typical*, and a much larger set of vanishingly small probability. Further, according to the JAEPT, the *splitting criterion* between high and low probability sets of pairs is the mutual information

$$I(X, Y) = H(X) - H(X|Y) = H(X) + H(Y) - H(X, Y)$$

where $H(X), H(Y), H(X|Y)$ and $H(X, Y)$ are, respectively, the (cross-sectional) Shannon uncertainties of X and Y, their conditional uncertainty, and their joint uncertainty. See Cover and Thomas (1991) for mathematical details. Again, similar approaches to neural process have been recently adopted by Dimitrov and Miller (2001).

Note that, using this asymptotic limit theorem approach, we need not model the exact form or dynamics of the crosstalk feedback, hence crushing algebraic complexities can be postponed until a later stage of the argument. They will, however, appear in due course with some vengeance.

The high probability pairs of paths are, in this formulation, all equiprobable, and if $N(n)$ is the number of jointly typical pairs of length n, then

$$I(X, Y) = \lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{\log[N(n)]}{n}.$$

Extending the earlier language-on-a-network models of Wallace and Wallace (1998, 1999), we suppose there is a coupling parameter P representing the degree of linkage between the modules, and set $K = 1/P$, following the development

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of those earlier studies. Note that in a brain model this parameter represents the intensity of coupling between distant neural structures.

Then we have

$$I[K] = \lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{\log[N(K,n)]}{n}.$$

The essential 'homology' between information theory and statistical mechanics lies in the similarity of this expression with the infinite volume limit of the free energy density. If $Z(K)$ is the statistical mechanics partition function derived from the system's Hamiltonian, then the free energy density is determined by the relation

$$F[K] = \lim_{V \to \infty} \frac{\log[Z(K)]}{V}.$$

F is the free energy density, V the system volume and $K = 1/T$, where T is the system temperature.

We and others argue at some length (Wallace and Wallace, 1998, 1999; Rojdestvensky and Cottam, 2000) that this is indeed a systematic mathematical homology which, we contend, permits importation of renormalization symmetry into information theory. Imposition of invariance under renormalization on the mutual information splitting criterion $I(X, Y)$ implies the existence of phase transitions analogous to learning plateaus or punctuated evolutionary equilibria. An extensive mathematical development will be presented in the next section.

The physiological details of mechanism, we speculate, will be particularly captured by the definitions of coupling parameter, renormalization symmetry, and, perhaps, the distribution of the renormalization across agency, a matter we treat below.

Here, however, these changes are perhaps better described as 'punctuated interpenetration' between interacting cognitive modules.

We reiterate that the details are highly dependent on the choice of renormalization symmetry and distribution, which are likely to reflect details of mechanism – the manner in which the dynamics of the forest are dependent on the detailed physiology of trees, albeit in a many-to-one manner. Renormalization properties are not likely to follow simple physical analogs, and may well be subject, in addition to complications of distribution, to the 'tuning' of universality class parameters that are characteristically fixed for simple physical systems. The algebra is straightforward if complicated, and given later.

4 Representations of the general argument

4.1 Language-on-a-network models

Earlier papers of this series addressed the problem of how a language, in a large sense, spoken on a network structure responds as properties of the network change. The language might be speech, pattern recognition, or cognition. The network might be social, chemical, or neural. The properties of interest were the magnitude of 'strong' or 'weak' ties which, respectively, either disjointly partitioned the network or linked it across such partitioning. These would be analogous to local and mean-field couplings in physical systems.

We fix the magnitude of strong ties – to reiterate, those which disjointly partition the underlying network (presumably into cognitive submodules) – but vary the index of weak ties between components, which we call P, taking $K = 1/P$. For interacting neural networks P might simply be taken as proportional to the degree of crosstalk.

We assume the piecewise, adiabatically memoryless ergodic information source (Wallace, 2002b) depends on three parameters, two explicit and one implicit. The explicit are K as above and an 'external field strength' analog J, which gives a 'direction' to the system. We will, in the limit, set $J = 0$.

The implicit parameter, which we call r, is an inherent generalized 'length' characteristic of the phenomenon, on which J and K are defined. That is, we can write J and K as functions of averages of the parameter r, which may be quite complex, having nothing at all to do with conventional ideas of space: For example r may be defined by the degree of niche partitioning in ecosystems or separation in social structures.

For a given generalized language of interest with a well defined (adiabatically, piecewise memoryless,) ergodic source uncertainty H we write

$$H[K, J, \mathbf{X}]$$

To summarize a long train of standard argument (e.g. Binney et al., 1986; Wilson, 1971), imposition of invariance of H under a renormalization transform in the implicit parameter r leads to expectation of both a critical point in K, which we call K_C, reflecting a phase transition to or from collective behavior across the entire array, and of power laws for system behavior near K_C. Addition of other parameters to the system, e.g. some V, results in a 'critical line' or surface $K_C(V)$.

Let $\kappa \equiv (K_C - K)/K_C$ and take χ as the 'correlation length' defining the average domain in r-space for which the information source is primarily dominated by 'strong' ties. We begin by averaging across r-space in terms of 'clumps' of length R. Then, taking Wilson's (1971) analysis as a starting point, we choose the renormalization relations as

$$H[K_R, J_R, \mathbf{X}] = f(R)H[K, J, \mathbf{X}]$$

$$\chi(K_R, J_R) = \frac{\chi(K, J)}{R},$$

(2)

with $f(1) = 1$ and $J_1 = J, K_1 = K$. The first of these equations significantly extends Wilson's treatment. It states that 'processing capacity,' as indexed by the source uncertainty of the system, representing the 'richness' of the generalized language, grows monotonically as $f(R)$, which must itself be a dimensionless function in R, since both $H[K_R, J_R]$ and $H[K, J]$ are themselves dimensionless. Most simply, this would require

that we replace R by R/R_0, where R_0 is the 'characteristic length' for the system over which renormalization procedures are reasonable, then set $R_0 \equiv 1$, i.e. measure length in units of R_0. Wilson's original analysis focused on free energy density. Under 'clumping', densities must remain the same, so that if $F[K_R, J_R]$ is the free energy of the clumped system, and $F[K, J]$ is the free energy density before clumping, then Wilson's equation (4) is $F[K, J] = R^{-3}F[K_R, J_R]$, i.e.

$$F[K_R, J_R] = R^3 F[K, J].$$

Remarkably, the renormalization equations are solvable for a broad class of functions $f(R)$, or more precisely, $f(R/R_0), R_0 \equiv 1$.

The second relation just states that the correlation length simply scales as R.

It is important to realize that there is no unique renormalization procedure for information sources: other, very subtle, symmetry relations – not necessarily based on the elementary physical analog we use here – may well be possible. For example McCauley, (1993, p.168) describes the highly counterintuitive renormalization relations needed to understand phase transition in simple 'chaotic' systems. This is important, since we suspect that biological or social systems may alter their renormalization properties – equivalent to tuning their phase transition dynamics – in response to external signals. We will make much of this possibility, termed 'universality class tuning', below.

To begin, following Wilson, we take $f(R) = R^d$ for some real number $d > 0$, and restrict K to near the 'critical value' K_C. If $J \to 0$, a simple series expansion and some clever algebra (Wilson, 1971; Binney et al., 1986) gives

$$H = H_0 \kappa^\alpha$$

$$\chi = \frac{\chi_0}{\kappa^s}$$

(3)

where α, s are positive constants. We provide more biologically relevant examples below.

Further from the critical point matters are more complicated, appearing to involve Generalized Onsager Relations and a kind of thermodynamics associated with a Legendre transform of H, i.e. $S \equiv H - KdH/dK$ (Wallace, 2002a). Although this extension is quite important to describing behaviors away from criticality, the full mathematical detail is cumbersome and the reader is referred to the references. A brief discussion will be given below.

An essential insight is that *regardless of the particular renormalization properties, sudden critical point transition is possible in the opposite direction for this model*. That is, we go from a number of independent, isolated and fragmented systems operating individually and more or less at random, into a single large, interlocked, coherent structure, once the parameter K, the inverse strength of weak ties, falls below

threshold, or, conversely, once the strength of weak ties parameter $P = 1/K$ becomes large enough.

Thus, increasing nondisjunctive weak ties between them can bind several different cognitive 'language' functions into a single, embedding hierarchical metalanguage which contains each as a linked subdialect, and do so in an inherently punctuated manner. This could be a dynamic process, creating a shifting, ever-changing, pattern of linked cognitive submodules, according to the challenges or opportunities faced by the organism.

To reiterate somewhat, this heuristic insight can be made more exact using a rate distortion argument (or, more generally, using the Joint Asymptotic Equipartition Theorem) as follows (Wallace, 2002a, b):

Suppose that two ergodic information sources $\mathbf{Y}$ and $\mathbf{B}$ begin to interact, to 'talk' to each other, i.e. to influence each other in some way so that it is possible, for example, to look at the output of $\mathbf{B}$ – strings b – and infer something about the behavior of $\mathbf{Y}$ from it – strings y. We suppose it possible to define a retranslation from the B-language into the Y-language through a deterministic code book, and call $\hat{\mathbf{Y}}$ the translated information source, as mirrored by $\mathbf{B}$.

Define some distortion measure comparing paths y to paths $\hat{y}$, $d(y, \hat{y})$ (Cover and Thomas, 1991). We invoke the Rate Distortion Theorem's mutual information $I(Y, \hat{Y})$, which is the splitting criterion between high and low probability pairs of paths. Impose, now, a parametization by an inverse coupling strength K, and a renormalization symmetry representing the global structure of the system coupling. This may be much different from the renormalization behavior of the individual components. If $K < K_C$, where K_C is a critical point (or surface), the two information sources will be closely coupled enough to be characterized as condensed.

In the absence of a distortion measure, we can invoke the Joint Asymptotic Equipartition Theorem to obtain a similar result.

We suggest in particular that detailed coupling mechanisms will be sharply constrained through regularities of grammar and syntax imposed by limit theorems associated with phase transition.

Wallace and Wallace (1998, 1999) and Wallace (2002) use this approach to address certain evolutionary processes in a relatively unified fashion. These papers, and those of Wallace and Fullilove (1999) and Wallace (2002a), further describe how biological or social systems might respond to gradients in information source uncertainty and related quantities when the system is away from phase transition. Language-on-network systems, as opposed to physical systems, appear to diffuse away from concentrations of an 'instability' construct which is related to a Legendre transform of information source uncertainty, in much the same way entropy is the Legendre transform of free energy density in a physical system.

Simple thermodynamics addresses physical systems held at or near equilibrium conditions. Treatment of nonequilibrium, for example highly dynamic, systems requires significant extension of thermodynamic theory. The most direct approach has been the first-order phenomenological theory of Onsager, which involves relating first order rate changes in system parameters K_j to gradients in physical entropy S, involving 'Onsager relation' equations of the form

$$\sum_k R_{k,j} dK_j/dt = \partial S/\partial K_j,$$

where the $R_{k,j}$ are characteristic constants of a particular system and S is defined to be the Legendre transform of free energy density F;

$$S \propto F - \sum_j K_j \partial F/\partial K_j.$$

The entropy-analog for an information system is, then, the dimensionless quantity

$$S \equiv H - \sum_j K_j \partial H/\partial K_j,$$

or a similar equation in the mutual information I.

Note that in this treatment I or H play the role of free energy, not entropy, and that their Legendre transform plays the role of physical entropy. This is a key matter.

For information systems, a parametized 'instability', $Q[K] \equiv S - H$, is defined from the principal splitting criterion by the relations

$$Q[K] = -KdH[K]/dK$$

$$Q[K] = -KdI[K]/dK$$

(4)

where $H[K]$ and $I[K]$ are, respectively, information source uncertainty or mutual information in the Asymptotic Equipartition, Rate Distortion, or Joint Asymptotic Equipartition Theorems.

Extension of thermodynamic theory to information systems involves a first order system phenomenological equations analogous to the Onsager relations, but possibly having very complicated behavior in the $R_{j,k}$, in particular not necessarily producing simple diffusion toward peaks in S. For example, as discussed, there is evidence that social network structures are affected by diffusion *away* from concentrations in the S-analog. Thus the phenomenological relations affecting the dynamics of information networks, which are inherently open systems, may not be governed simply by mechanistic diffusion toward 'peaks in entropy', but may, in first order, display more complicated behavior.

4.2 'Biological' phase transitions

Now the mathematical detail concealed by the invocation of the asymptotic limit theorems emerges with a vengeance. Equation (2) states that the information source and the correlation length, the degree of coherence on the underlying network, scale under renormalization clustering in chunks of size R as

$$H[K_R, J_R]/f(R) = H[J, K]$$

$$\chi[K_R, J_R]R = \chi(K, J),$$

with $f(1) = 1, K_1 = K, J_1 = J$, where we have slightly rearranged terms.

Differentiating these two equations with respect to R, so that the right hand sides are zero, and solving for dK_R/dR and dJ_R/dR gives, after some consolidation, expressions of the form

$$dK_R/dR = u_1 d\log(f)/dR + u_2/R$$

$$dJ_R/dR = v_1 J_R d\log(f)/dR + \frac{v_2}{R}J_R.$$

(5)

The $u_i, v_i, i = 1, 2$ are functions of K_R, J_R, but not explicitly of R itself.

We expand these equations about the critical value $K_R = K_C$ and about $J_R = 0$, obtaining

$$dK_R/dR = (K_R - K_C)yd\log(f)/dR + (K_R - K_C)z/R$$

$$dJ_R/dR = wJ_R d\log(f)/dR + xJ_R/R.$$

(6)

The terms $y = du_1/dK_R|_{K_R=K_C}, z = du_2/dK_R|_{K_R=K_C}, w = v_1(K_C, 0), x = v_2(K_C, 0)$ are constants.

Solving the first of these equations gives

$$K_R = K_C + (K - K_C)R^z f(R)^y,$$

(7)

again remembering that $K_1 = K, J_1 = J, f(1) = 1$.

Wilson's essential trick is to iterate on this relation, which is supposed to converge rapidly (Binney et al., 1986), assuming that for K_R near K_C, we have

$$K_C/2 \approx K_C + (K - K_C)R^z f(R)^y.$$

(8)

We iterate in two steps, first solving this for $f(R)$ in terms of known values, and then solving for R, finding a value R_C that we then substitute into the first of equations (2) to obtain an expression for $H[K, 0]$ in terms of known functions and parameter values.

The first step gives the general result

$$f(R_C) \approx \frac{[KC/(KC-K)]^{1/y}}{2^{1/y}R_C^{z/y}}.$$

(9)

Solving this for R_C and substituting into the first of equation (2) gives, as a first iteration of a far more general procedure (e.g. Shirkov and Kovalev, 2001)

$$H[K, 0] \approx \frac{H[K_C/2, 0]}{f(R_C)} = \frac{H_0}{f(R_C)}$$

$$\chi(K, 0) \approx \chi(K_C/2, 0)R_C = \chi_0 R_C$$

(10)

which are the essential relationships.

Note that a power law of the form $f(R) = R^m, m = 3$, which is the direct physical analog, may not be biologically reasonable, since it says that 'language richness' can grow very rapidly as a function of increased network size. Such rapid growth is simply not observed.

If we take the biologically realistic example of non-integral 'fractal' exponential growth,

$$f(R) = R^\delta,$$

(11)

where $\delta > 0$ is a real number which may be quite small, we can solve equation (8) for R_C, obtaining

$$R_C = \frac{[KC/(KC-K)]^{[1/(\delta y+z)]}}{2^{1/(\delta y+z)}}$$

(12)

for K near K_C. Note that, for a given value of y, we might want to characterize the relation $\alpha \equiv \delta y + z = $ constant as a "tunable universality class relation" in the sense of Albert and Barabasi (2002).

Substituting this value for R_C back into equation (9) gives a somewhat more complex expression for H than equation (2), having three parameters, i.e. δ, y, z.

A more biologically interesting choice for $f(R)$ is a logarithmic curve that 'tops out', for example

$$f(R) = m\log(R) + 1.$$

(13)

Again $f(1) = 1$.
Using Mathematica 4.2 to solve equation (8) for R_C gives

$$R_C = [\frac{Q}{LambertW[Q\exp(z/my)]}]^{y/z},$$

(14)

where

$$Q \equiv (z/my)2^{-1/y}[KCKC-K]^{1/y}.$$

The transcendental function LambertW(x) is defined by the relation

$$LambertW(x)\exp(LambertW(x)) = x.$$

It arises in the theory of random networks and in renormalization strategies for quantum field theories.

An asymptotic relation for $f(R)$ would be of particular biological interest, implying that 'language richness' increases to a limiting value with population growth. Such a pattern is broadly consistent with calculations of the degree of allelic heterozygosity as a function of population size under a balance between genetic drift and neutral mutation (Hartl and Clark, 1997; Ridley, 1996). Taking

$$f(R) = \exp[m(R-1)/R]$$

(15)

gives a system which begins at 1 when R=1, and approaches the asymptotic limit $\exp(m)$ as $R \rightarrow \infty$. Mathematica 4.2 finds

$$R_C = \frac{my/z}{LambertW[A]}$$

(16)

where

$$A \equiv (my/z)\exp(my/z)[2^{1/y}[KC/(KC - K)]^{-1/y}]^{y/z}.$$

These developments indicate the possibility of taking the theory significantly beyond arguments by abduction from simple physical models, although the notorious difficulty of implementing information theory existence arguments will undoubtedly persist.

4.3 Universality class distribution

Physical systems undergoing phase transition usually have relatively pure renormalization properties, with quite different systems clumped into the same 'universality class', having fixed exponents at transition (e.g. Binney et al., 1986). Biological and social phenomena may be far more complicated:

If we suppose the system of interest to be a mix of subgroups with different values of some significant renormalization parameter m in the expression for $f(R, m)$, according to a distribution $\rho(m)$, then we expect the first expression in equation (1) to generalize as

$$H[K_R, J_R] = < f(R, m) > H[K, J]$$

$$\equiv H[K, J] \int f(R, m)\rho(m)dm.$$

(17)

If $f(R) = 1 + m\log(R)$ then, given any distribution for m, we simply obtain

$$< f(R) > = 1+ < m > \log(R)$$

(18)

where $< m >$ is simply the mean of m over that distribution.

Other forms of $f(R)$ having more complicated dependencies on the distributed parameter or parameters, like the power law R^δ, do not produce such a simple result. Taking $\rho(\delta)$ as a normal distribution, for example, gives

$$< R^\delta > = R^{<\delta>}\exp[(1/2)(\log(R^\sigma))^2],$$

(19)

where σ^2 is the distribution variance. The renormalization properties of this function can be determined from equation (8), and the calculation is left to the reader as an exercise, best done in Mathematica 4.2 or above.

Thus the information dynamic phase transition properties of mixed systems will not in general be simply related to those of a single subcomponent, a matter of possible empirical importance: If sets of relevant parameters defining renormalization universality classes are indeed distributed, experiments observing pure phase changes may be very difficult. Tuning among different possible renormalization strategies in response to external pressures would result in even greater ambiguity in recognizing and classifying information dynamic phase transitions.

We believe that important aspects of mechanism may be reflected in the combination of renormalization properties and the details of their distribution across subsystems.

In sum, real biological, social, or interacting biopsychosocial systems are likely to have very rich patterns of phase transition which may not display the simplistic, indeed, literally elemental, purity familiar to physicists. Overall mechanisms will, we believe, still remain significantly constrained by our theory, in the general sense of probability limit theorems.

4.4 Universality class tuning: the fluctuating dynamic threshold

Next we iterate the general argument onto the process of phase transition itself, producing our model of consciousness as a tunable neural workspace subject to inherent punctuated detection of external events.

As described above, an essential character of physical systems subject to phase transition is that they belong to particular 'universality classes'. Again, this means that the exponents of power laws describing behavior at phase transition will be the same for large groups of markedly different systems, with 'natural' aggregations representing fundamental class properties (e.g. Binney et al., 1986).

It is our contention that biological or social systems undergoing phase transition analogs need not be constrained to such classes, and that 'universality class tuning', meaning the strategic alteration of parameters characterizing the renormalization properties of punctuation, might well be possible. Here we focus on the tuning of parameters within a single, given, renormalization relation. Clearly, however, wholesale shifts of renormalization properties must ultimately be considered as well, a matter we cannot pursue further here.

Universality class tuning has been observed in models of 'real world' networks. As Albert and Barabasi (2002) put it,

"The inseparability of the topology and dynamics of evolving networks is shown by the fact that

[the exponents defining universality class] are related by [a] scaling relation..., underlying the fact that a network's assembly uniquely determines its topology. However, in no case are these exponents unique. They can be tuned continuously..."

We suppose that a structured external environment, which we take itself to be an appropriately regular information source $\mathbf{Y}$ 'engages' a modifiable cognitive system. The environment begins to write an image of itself on the cognitive system in a distorted manner permitting definition of a mutual information $I[K]$ splitting criterion according to the Rate Distortion or Joint Asymptotic Equipartition Theorems. K is an inverse coupling parameter between system and environment (Wallace, 2002a, b). According to our development, at punctuation – near some critical point K_C – the systems begin to interact very strongly indeed, and we may write, near K_C, taking as the starting point the simple physical model of equation (3),

$$I[K] \approx I_0 [\frac{K_C - K}{K_C}]^\alpha.$$

For a physical system α is fixed, determined by the underlying 'universality class'. Here we will allow α to vary, and, in the section below, to itself respond explicitly to signals.

Normalizing K_C and I_0 to 1, we obtain,

$$I[K] \approx (1 - K)^\alpha.$$

(20)

The horizontal line $I[K] = 1$ corresponds to $\alpha = 0$, while $\alpha = 1$ gives a declining straight line with unit slope which passes through 0 at $K = 1$. Consideration shows there are progressively sharper transitions between the necessary zero value at $K = 1$ and the values defined by this relation for $0 < K, \alpha < 1$. The rapidly rising slope of transition with declining α is, we assert, of considerable significance.

The instability associated with the splitting criterion $I[K]$ is defined by

$$Q[K] \equiv -K dI[K]/dK = \alpha K (1 - K)^{\alpha - 1},$$

(21)

and is singular at $K = K_C = 1$ for $0 < \alpha < 1$. Following earlier work (Wallace and Wallace, 1998, 1999; Wallace and Fullilove, 1999; Wallace, 2002a), we interpret this to mean that values of $0 < \alpha \ll 1$ are highly unlikely for real systems, since $Q[K]$, in this model, represents a kind of barrier for 'social' information systems, in particular interacting neural network modules, a matter we will explore further below.

On the other hand, smaller values of α mean that the system is far more efficient at responding to the adaptive demands imposed by the embedding structured environment, since the mutual information which tracks the matching of internal response to external demands, $I[K]$, rises more and more quickly toward the maximum for smaller and smaller α as the inverse coupling parameter K declines below $K_C = 1$. That is, systems able to attain smaller α are more responsive to external signals than those characterized by larger values, in this model, but smaller values will be harder to reach, and can probably be done so only at some considerable physiological or opportunity cost: focused conscious action takes resources, of one form or another.

In a subsequent section we will make these considerations formal, modeling the role of contextual and energy constraints on the relations between Q, I, and other system properties.

The more biologically realistic renormalization strategies given above produce sets of several parameters defining the universality class, whose tuning gives behavior much like that of α in this simple example.

We can formally iterate the phase transition argument on this calculation to obtain our version of tunable consciousness, focusing on paths of universality class parameters.

Suppose the renormalization properties of a language-on-a network system at some 'time' k are characterized by a set of parameters $A_k \equiv \alpha_1^k, ..., \alpha_m^k$. Fixed parameter values define a particular universality class for the renormalization. We suppose that, over a sequence of 'times', the universality class properties can be characterized by a path $x_n = A_0, A_1, ..., A_{n-1}$ having significant serial correlations which, in fact, permit definition of an adiabatically piecewise memoryless ergodic information source associated with the paths x_n. We call that source $\mathbf{X}$.

We further suppose, in the now-usual manner, that the set of external (or internal, systemic) signals impinging on consciousness is also highly structured and forms another information source $\mathbf{Y}$ which interacts not only with the system of interest globally, but specifically with its universality class properties as characterized by $\mathbf{X}$. $\mathbf{Y}$ is necessarily associated with a set of paths y_n.

We pair the two sets of paths into a joint path, $z_n \equiv (x_n, y_y)$ and invoke an inverse coupling parameter, K, between the information sources and their paths. This leads, by the arguments above, to phase transition punctuation of $I[K]$, the mutual information between $\mathbf{X}$ and $\mathbf{Y}$, under either the Joint Asymptotic Equipartition Theorem or under limitation by a distortion measure, through the Rate Distortion Theorem (Cover and Thomas, 1991). Again, see Wallace (2002a, b) for more details of the argument. The essential point is that $I[K]$ is a splitting criterion under these theorems, and thus partakes of the homology with free energy density which we have invoked above.

Activation of universality class tuning, our version of attentional focusing, then becomes itself a punctuated event in response to increasing linkage between the organism and an external structured signal or some particular system of internal events.

We note, without further calculation, that another path to the fluctuating dynamic threshold might be through a second order iteration similar to that just above, but focused on

the parameters defining the universality class distributions of section 4.3.

Following the recent arguments of Gillooly et al. (2004) on how metabolic rate can calibrate the molecular clock of evolutionary process, and taking into account the crude analogy between punctuated equilibrium in evolutionary, and learning plateaus in cognitive, systems (e.g. Wallace, 2002b), it seems likely that the generalized Onsager relation arguments used above can be iterated as well. As we will show in section 6.2 below, such iteration must take place in the context of competing energy constraints defined at different levels of organization.

The question becomes, as in the study of the idiotypic networks of immune function, the rate of convergence of the iterative process. It seems likely that a small number of iterations will suffice to explain most current controlled experiments.

More generally, the development of Wallace (2003) suggests the possibility of one or more tunable internal 'retinas' for cognitive process which could be adjusted to accelerate convergence. This idea has certain interesting implications, which we now explore.

4.5   The simplest tunable retina

The development above, in terms of paths in renormalization-parameter space, can be significantly extended.

We expand our perspective, and now suppose that threshold behavior in conscious reaction involves some elaborate system of nonlinear relationships defining the set of renormalization parameters $A_k \equiv \alpha_1^k, ..., \alpha_m^k$ above. Our principal assumption is that there is a tunable 'zero order state', and that changes about that state are, in first order, relatively small, although their effects on punctuated process may not be at all small. Thus, given an initial m-dimensional vector A_k, the parameter vector at time $k + 1$, A_{k+1}, can, in first order, be written as

$$A_{k+1} \approx \mathbf{R}_{k+1} A_k$$

(22)

where $\mathbf{R}_{t+1}$ is an $m \times m$ matrix, having m^2 components.

If the initial parameter vector at time $k = 0$ is A_0, then at time k we will have

$$A_k = \mathbf{R}_k \mathbf{R}_{k-1} ... \mathbf{R}_1 A_0$$

(23)

The interesting correlates of consciousness are, in this development, *now represented by an information-theoretic path defined by the sequence of operators* $\mathbf{R}_k$, each member having

m^2 components. The grammar and syntax of the path defined by these operators is associated with a dual information source, in the usual manner.

The effect of an information source of external signals, $\mathbf{Y}$ in the section above, is now seen in terms of more complex joint paths in Y and R-space whose behavior is, again, governed by a mutual information splitting criterion according to the JAEPT.

The complex sequence in m^2-dimensional R-space has, by this construction, been projected down onto a parallel path, the smaller set of m-dimensional α-parameter vectors $A_0, ..., A_k$.

If the punctuated tuning of consciousness is now characterized by a 'higher' dual information source – an embedding generalized language – so that the paths of the operators $\mathbf{R}_k$ are autocorrelated, then the autocorrelated paths in A_k represent output of a parallel information source which is, given Rate Distortion limitations, apparently a grossly simplified, and hence highly distorted, picture of the 'higher' conscious process represented by the R-operators, having m as opposed to $m \times m$ components.

High levels of distortion may not necessarily be the case for such a structure.

Let us examine a single iteration in more detail, assuming now there is a (tunable) zero reference state, $\mathbf{R}_0$, for the sequence of operators $\mathbf{R}_k$, and that

$$A_{k+1} = (\mathbf{R}_0 + \delta \mathbf{R}_{k+1}) A_k,$$

(24)

where $\delta \mathbf{R}_k$ is 'small' in some sense compared to $\mathbf{R}_0$.

Note that in this analysis the operators $\mathbf{R}_k$ are, implicitly, determined by linear regression. We thus can invoke a quasi-diagonalization in terms of $\mathbf{R}_0$. Let $\mathbf{Q}$ be the matrix of eigenvectors which Jordan-block-diagonalizes $\mathbf{R}_0$. Then we write

$$\mathbf{Q} A_{k+1} = (\mathbf{Q} \mathbf{R}_0 \mathbf{Q}^{-1} + \mathbf{Q} \delta \mathbf{R}_{k+1} \mathbf{Q}^{-1}) \mathbf{Q} A_k$$

(25)

If we take $\mathbf{Q} A_k$ to be an eigenvector of $\mathbf{R}_0$, say Y_j with eigenvalue λ_j, we can rewrite this equation as a generalized spectral expansion

$$Y_{k+1} = (\mathbf{J} + \delta \mathbf{J}_{k+1}) Y_j \equiv \lambda_j Y_j + \delta Y_{k+1}$$

$$= \lambda_j Y_j + \sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i Y_i$$

12

(26)

where $\mathbf{J}$ is a block-diagonal matrix, $\delta\mathbf{J}_{k+1} \equiv \mathbf{Q}\mathbf{R}_{k+1}\mathbf{Q}^{-1}$, and δY_{k+1} *has been expanded in terms of a spectrum of the eigenvectors of* $\mathbf{R}_0$, with

$$|a_i| \ll |\lambda_j|, |a_{i+1}| \ll |a_i|.$$

(27)

The point is that, provided $\mathbf{R}_0$ has been 'tuned' so that this condition is true, the first few terms in the spectrum of this iteration of the eigenstate will contain most of the essential information about $\delta\mathbf{R}_{k+1}$. We envision this as similar to the detection of color in the retina, where three overlapping non-orthogonal 'eigenmodes' of response are sufficient to characterize a huge plethora of color sensation. Here, if such a spectral expansion is possible, a very small number of observed eigenmodes would suffice to permit identification of a vast range of changes, so that the rate-distortion constraints become quite modest. That is, there will not be much distortion in the reduction from paths in R-space to paths in A-space.

Some reflection shows this calculation suggests that, if consciousness indeed has something like a tunable retina – crudely, if 'the eye of the mind' has a fovea – then appropriately chosen observable correlates of consciousness may, at a particular time, and under particular circumstances, actually provide very good descriptions of conscious process, a matter having implication for the resolution of certain philosophically 'hard' problems, e.g. 'the redness of red' and the like.

In this regard, a recapitulation of the visual retina is of interest.

4.6   Tuning the visual retina

The tunable retina is, in fact, quite an old idea, as is the information-theoretic approach, which Schawbe and Obermayer (2002) describe as follows:

"Adaptation is a widespread phenomenon in nervous systems, and it happens on multiple timescales, i.e. the activity-dependent refinement cortical maps (weeks), perceptual learning (hours and days) or contrast adaptation (seconds) in the primary visual cortex. It is reasonable to hypothesize that the functional role of these adaptation mechanisms is to provide flexibility to function under varying external conditions. Using concepts from information theory [e.g. Cover and Thomas, 1991] the specific idea that neuronal codes constitute efficient representations of the sensory world has been formulated (Attneave, 1954; Barlow, 1959; Atick, 1992). Subsequently the adaptation processes were mainly viewed as a signature of an ongoing optimization of

sensory systems to changing environments as characterized by their statistical properties, i.e. as an optimization of the information transfer between the ensemble of stimuli and the neuronal responses."

Brenner et al. (2000) put it thus:

"One of the major problems in processing the complex dynamic signals that occur in the natural environment is providing an efficient representation of these data. More than 40 years ago, Attneave (1954) and Barlow (1961) suggested that steps in the neural processing of information could be understood as solutions to this problem of efficient representation. This idea was later developed by many groups, especially in the context of the visual system. Efficient representation requires a matching of the coding strategy to the statistical structure of incoming signals...

The mean light level, for example, changes by orders of magnitude as we leave a sunny region and enter a forest. Adaptation to mean light level ensures that our visual responses are matched to the average signal in real time, thus maintaining sensitivity to the fluctuations around this mean."

The mechanism of light level tuning for the visual retina involves a shift from a band pass Fourier spatial frequency filter at elevated levels of luminance, where noise is not a major concern, and high frequency spatial data can be processed, to a low frequency pass spatial frequency filter at low luminance, a regime where quantum noise dominates. Here, large shapes, without color, become the objects of attention. As Atick (1992) shows elegantly, quantum noise considerations can predict visual retina spatial filter performance from first principles, without much parameter fitting.

The model of section 4.5, which focused on altering operator spectral properties to determine Rate Distortion behavior, is roughly analogous. Rate Distortion arguments, unlike Atick's (1992) energy functional-analog minimization, are independent of the particular distortion measure chosen, but in a complicated ϵ - δ sense, which we briefly explore below.

In particular, we are led to suspect that, for internal retinas like the one we propose for consciousness (or, elsewhere, for immune cognition; Wallace, 2003), generalized noise does not have a simple quantum structure, and optimizations may not be at all straightforward.

The argument is as follows: We suppose that the version of the 'real world' to be perceived by the internal retina has a high dimensional, and extremely complicated, alphabet, which is projected by that retina onto a simpler, e.g. lower dimensional, alphabet, so that information will inevitably be lost. Suppose that the full (internal) world can be characterized by an information source $\mathbf{X}$ and its retinal projection by a simpler information source $\mathbf{Y}$ such that paths of signals generated by $\mathbf{X}$, of the form $x = x_0, x_2, ..., x_n, ...$, are mapped by some many-to-one operator R onto paths y. We permit definition of any distortion metric $d(x, y) = d(x, Rx)$ which measures the average deviation of x from y.

The Rate Distortion Theorem states that, for any chosen maximum average distortion such that $d(x, Rx) < \epsilon$ there is

a maximum possible transmission rate δ such that if $\mathbf{X}$ is mapped by R onto $\mathbf{Y}$ at a transmission rate (i.e. channel capacity) $C < \delta$, then the average distortion will be less than ϵ. The mutual information between $\mathbf{X}$ and $\mathbf{Y} = R\mathbf{X}$ provides the essential splitting criterion.

If the organism has much time, then the retina operator R can indeed remain fixed, and its rate of operation simply slowed down until the ϵ constraint on error is matched.

This is clearly not an option for animals who are hunted (or hunt) in the night. The rate of signal recognition becomes very important, hence the change from spatial band pass to low pass filtering, as a means of maintaining transmission rate at the expense of perceived detail: tunable coarse-graining. The Appendix gives an example of coarse graining.

If consciousness has, as we all believe, quintessential survival value, then spectral tuning of R to optimize both ϵ and δ under changing conditions becomes likewise a priority, but the constraints may not be simply defined by quantum noise, as in the visual retina, and the elegant calculation of Atick and Redlich (1990) is not sufficient. Indeed, like biological universality class tuning, there appear to be whole sets of monotonic relations between ϵ and δ which are subject to tuning.

There are further complications: tunable internal retina arguments can be inverted to produce global structures in much the same way local tangent spaces can be linked together by an atlas structure to create a larger-scale differential geometry (e.g. Sternberg, 1964). That is, following our development, the fovea of the mind's eye is, in fact, a local projection of a high order or complex alphabet information source onto a lower order, simpler alphabet, information source, done in a manner to locally optimize certain rate-distortion factors. An algebraic geometer at this point can invoke any number of globalization theorems to canonically construct a larger embedding manifold having interesting properties.

Such larger structures, however, are not unique, and not at all likely to be simple. We examine in more detail the argument-by-abduction from differential geometry.

4.7 The torus and the sphere

The tunable retina atlas we have proposed for dual information sources of cognitive processes is taken in concept from differential geometry, and an example can help show where this approach is leading.

We consider the two-dimensional torus and sphere within three dimensional space. The sphere is most simply defined as the set of points a fixed distance from some given point of origin. The torus is a little more complicated: take a 2-square in three dimensional space. Roll it so the top meets the bottom, then stretch the resulting cylinder until the ends meet. More directly, identify top and bottom edges of the square, and then identify the left and right edges.

These are fundamentally different constructions: Any closed one dimensional loop on the surface of a sphere may be continuously shrunk to a point. This is not true for the torus, since a closed loop which rings the torus cannot be shrunk down to a point, but is limited to size of the torus itself.

On the other hand, both structures are two dimensional surfaces in three-space: at any point on either a sphere or a torus, a 'small enough' patch containing that point can be mapped exactly onto a two dimensional tangent plane tuned to that point, without doing violence to the essential difference between the surfaces. This is analogous to our elementary tunable retina construction which locally maps a path of operators having m^2 components each onto a path of vectors having only m components, with minimal loss of information and maximal transmission rate.

It is important to realize that the analogy with differential geometry is limited at best. We are quite definitely not proposing a pseudoriemannian geometry based on the 'Fisher-information metric'. Rather, our manifold is an information source producing complex symbolic strings, and the R-projection onto a lower dimensional or coarse-grained information source is done by means of a local tuning which jointly minimizes distortion and maximizes transmission, subject to some embedding constraint structure defining the relation between them, which may itself be tunable. Distortion can be measured by any number of appropriate measures, according to the Rate Distortion Theorem. The result is far more like a stochastic version of a Finsler, rather than a Riemannian, system.

We are thus proposing what might be called a Rate Distortion manifold, instantiated through a locally-tuned coarse graining which has a larger scale Rate Distortion topology.

Thus, while the tunable retina is postulated to be a local coarse-grained construction for cognitive processes like the tangent space in differential geometry, so that the 'redness of red' may well be empirically indistinguishable between individuals having normal vision, the threshold at which the red signal becomes conscious, its meaning once it becomes conscious, and the possible and likely responses of the individual to it, are conditioned by larger global - i.e. topological - structures. These reflect the interaction of constraints of individual development and learning with the embedding culture which conditions that development and learning, matters which will determine larger global properties. These are the cognitive and conscious analogs of the difference between the torus and the sphere.

We now attempt to make these considerations more explicit.

5 Expanding the workspace

The Rate Distortion and Joint Asymptotic Equipartition Theorems are generalizations of the Shannon-McMillan Theorem which examine the interaction of two information sources, with and without the constraint of a fixed average distortion or some particular transmission rate target. We conduct one more iteration, and require a generalization of the SMT in terms of the splitting criterion for triplets as opposed to single or double stranded patterns. The tool for this is at the core of what is termed *network information theory* [Cover and Thomas, 1991, Theorem 14.2.3]. Suppose we have three (piecewise adiabatically memoryless) ergodic information sources, Y_1, Y_2 and Y_3. We assume Y_3 constitutes a critical embedding context for Y_1 and Y_2 so that, given three sequences of length n, the probability of a particular triplet of sequences is determined by *conditional probabilities with respect to Y_3*:

$$P(Y_1 = y_1, Y_2 = y_2, Y_3 = y_3) =$$

$$\Pi_{i=1}^n p(y_{1i}|y_{3i})p(y_{2i}|y_{3i})p(y_{3i}).$$

(28)

That is, Y_1 and Y_2 are, in some measure, driven by their interaction with Y_3

Then, in analogy with previous analyses, triplets of sequences can be divided by a splitting criterion into two sets, having high and low probabilities respectively. For large n the number of triplet sequences in the high probability set will be determined by the relation [Cover and Thomas, 1992, p. 387]

$$N(n) \propto \exp[nI(Y_1; Y_2|Y_3)],$$

(29)

where splitting criterion is given by

$$I(Y_1; Y_2|Y_3) \equiv$$

$$H(Y_3) + H(Y_1|Y_3) + H(Y_2|Y_3) - H(Y_1, Y_2, Y_3)$$

We can then examine mixed cognitive/adaptive phase transitions analogous to learning plateaus (Wallace, 2002b) in the splitting criterion $I(Y_1, Y_2|Y_3)$, which characterizes the synergistic interaction between Y_3, taken as an embedding context, and the cognitive processes characterized by Y_1 and Y_2. These transitions delineate the various stages of the chronic infection, which are embodied in the slowly varying 'piecewise adiabatically memoryless ergodic' phase between transitions. Again, our results are exactly analogous to the Eldredge/Gould model of evolutionary punctuated equilibrium.

We can, if necessary, extend this model to any number of interacting information sources, $Y_1, Y_2, ..., Y_s$ conditional on an external context Z in terms of a splitting criterion defined by

$$I(Y_1; ...; Y_s|Z) = H(Z) + \sum_{j=1}^{s} H(Y_j|Z) - H(Y_1, ..., Y_s, Z),$$

(30)

where the conditional Shannon uncertainties $H(Y_j|Z)$ are determined by the appropriate direct and conditional probabilities.

Note that this simple-seeming extension opens a Pandora's box in the study of 'mind-body interaction' and the impacts of culture and history on individual cognition. We now have a tool for examining the interpenetration of a broad range of cognitive physiological, psychological, and social submodules – not just neural substructures – with each other and with embedding contextual cultural language so characteristic of human hypersociality, all within the further context of structured psychosocial stress. Wallace (2003) analyzes the implications for understanding comorbid mind/body dysfunction, and provides a laundry list of physiological, psychological, and social cognitive modules associated with health and disease.

Bennett and Hacker (2003) define the 'mereological fallacy' in neuroscience as the assignment, to parts of an animal, of those characteristics which are properties of the whole. Humans, through both their embedding in cognitive social networks, and their secondary epigenetic inheritance system of culture, are even more than 'simply' individual animals. Equation (30) implies the possibility of extending the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness to include both internal cognitive physiological systems and embedding cognitive and other structures, providing a natural approach to evading that fallacy.

Equation (30) is itself subject to significant generalization. The single information source Z is seen here as invariant, not affected by, but affecting, cross talk with the information sources for which it serves as the driving context. Suppose there is an interacting system of contexts, acting more slowly than the global neuronal workspace, but communicating within itself. It should be possible, at first order, to divide the full system into two sections, one 'fast', containing the Y_j, and the other 'slow', containing the series of information sources Z_k. The fast system instantiates the conscious neuronal workspace, including crosstalk, while the slow system constitutes an embedding context for the fast, but one which engages in its own pattern of crosstalk. Then the extended splitting criterion, which we write as

$$I(Y_1, ..., Y_j|Z_1, ..., Z_k),$$

(31)

becomes something far more complicated than equation (30). This must be expressed in terms of sums of appropriate Shannon uncertainties, a complex task which will be individually contingent on the particular forms of context and their interrelations.

Our approach, while arguably more general than dynamic systems theory, can incorporate a subset of dynamic systems models through an appropriate coarse graining, a standard construction described at more length in the Appendix.

To reiterate somewhat, the essential trick is to show that a system has a 'high frequency limit' so that an appropriate coarse graining catches the dynamics of fundamental importance, while filtering out 'high frequency noise'.

Taking this analysis into consideration, the model of equation (31) can be seen, from a dynamic systems theory perspective, as constituting a 'double coarse-graining' in which the Z_k represent a 'slow' system which serves as a driving

conditional context for the 'fast' Y_j of the global neuronal workspace.

We can envision a 'multi' (or even distributed) coarse graining in which, for example, low, medium, and high, frequency phenomena can affect each other. The mathematics of such extension appears straightforward but is exponentially complicated. In essence we must give meaning to the notation

$$I(Y_1, ..., Y_j | X_1, ..., X_k | Z_1, ..., Z_q)$$

(32)

where the Y_j represent the fast-acting cognitive modules of the global neuronal workspace, the X_k are intermediate rate effects such as emotional structure, long-term goals, immune and local social network function, and the like, and the Z_q are even slower-changing factors such as cultural structure, embedding patterns of psychosocial stress, the legacy of personal developmental and community history, and so on.

Such analysis is consistent with, but clearly extends, the 'standard model' of global workspace theory.

We are suggesting, ultimately, that culture, developmental history, and structured stress serve as essential contexts-of-context, in the sense of Baars and Franklin (2003), defining a further hierarchy of externally-imposed constraints to the functioning of individual consciousness.

6 Energy efficiency and consciousness

6.1 Simple neural modules

A pioneering study by Levy and Baxter (1996) explores the energy costs of neural coding strategies, a matter which will prove to be of some interest here. To paraphrase Laughlin and Sejnowski (2003), detailed analysis comparing the representational capacity of signals distributed across a population of neurons with the costs involved suggests sparse coding schemes, in which a small proportion of cells signal at any one time, use little energy for signaling but have a high representational capacity because there are many different ways in which a small number of signals can be distributed among a large number of neurons. This is mitigated by the energetic cost of maintaining a large number of neurons, if they rarely signal. Thus there is an optimum proportion of active cells which depends on the ratio between the cost of maintaining a neuron at rest and the extra cost of sending a signal. When signals are relatively expensive, it is best to distribute a few of them among a large number of cells. When cells are expensive, it is more efficient to use few of them and to get all of them signaling.

A simplified version of the Levy and Baxter argument is as follows:

Suppose there are n binary neurons, taking an active value of 1 with probability p and an inactive value of 0 with probability $1 - p$, $0 \leq p \leq 1$. Classically, each binary neuron has a 'channel capacity' given by

$$h(p) = -p \log(p) - (1 - p) \log(1 - p).$$

(33)

See Ash (1990) or Cover and Thomas (1991) for details.

The maximum possible channel capacity of n such neurons would be the sum of n independent channels, so that

$$H(p) \leq nh(p).$$

(34)

If an active neuron has r times the energy requirements of an inactive one, then the average energy consumed by an active fraction p of n total neurons is just

$$E(p, r) = npr + n(1 - p) = n(1 + p(r - 1)),$$

(35)

where, again, we are measuring in energy units of an inactive neuron.

The ratio of maximum possible channel capacity to energy consumption is, then,

$$H(p)/E(p, r) \leq f(p, r) \equiv h(p)/(1 + p(r - 1)),$$

(36)

independent of n.

If we choose a typical value for r, say $r = 100$, so that a working binary neuron consumes 100 times the energy of a resting one (e.g. Lennie, 2003), then solving the extremum problem

$$df(p, 100)/dp = 0$$

for p numerically gives $p = p^* \approx 0.0334$, so that the most energy efficient neural system, in this model, will have only about three percent of its neurons active at any one time, a startling 'sparse code' result.

The peak of $f(p, r)$ as a function of p for even large fixed r is actually very broad, having a significant full width at half maximum (FWHM). In the example for $f(p, 100)$, half-maximum is met at $p = 0.0034, 0.3864$, so that FWHM= 0.3830, which is not inconsiderable.

Levy and Baxter (1996) examine a more complicated model which has, comparatively, narrower peaks than the simple binary neuron, but these too have rather large FWHM, suggesting that the maximization of efficiency is at best highly approximate: large fractions of neurons may, apparently, be mobilized for short times, dependent on the ability to meet the energy demand.

Balasubramanian et al. (2001) examine more general metrics of neural efficiency, and the role of noise, using both a Lagrange multiplier and a complicated iterative Arimoto-Blahut optimization strategy, making empirical application to the distribution of burst sizes in the visual retina.

6.2 Interacting modules: the global workspace

Alternative – and perhaps competing – metrics may apply at higher levels of organization, in particular to the global neuronal workspace itself.

Figures 1 and 2 show the results of a simple calculation at a level more complicated than that represented by equations (35) and (36). We assume that neural modules interact within themselves according to what might be characterized as 'strong ties', i.e. those which disjointly partition a structure according to some equivalence class relationship, indeed permitting the identification of modules which individually follow something like equations (35) and (36). To attain consciousness, however, these modules must interact with each other according to a 'weak' tie structure which does not disjointly partition into equivalence classes. Call the average probability of weak tie coupling across neural modules P and set $K = 1/P$.

We let the 'channel capacity' of the coupling across neural modules be a reverse S-shaped curve, as a function of $K = 1/P$, taken here as proportional to an Error Function. Since the source uncertainty of any information source - cognitive or otherwise - is constrained to be less than or equal to channel capacity, in figure 1 we express $H(K)$ as having the same functional dependence. We assume the energy consumed by consciousness is, as in the Levy and Baxter model, proportional to P, hence to $1/K$ in figure 1. Note that both curves have been adjusted to similar maxima.

Figure 2 shows, respectively, the ratios of H and $Q = -KdH/dK$ to energy, as a function of K, for this model. Here, again, $P = 1$ is assumed to consume 100 times the energy of $P = 0$. The plots have also been adjusted to similar maxima.

We, again, assume for complex 'social' constructs, as opposed to the individual elementary structures which compose them, that, while attempting to maximize H/E, the system attempts to minimize the experience of disorder, i.e. to minimize $Q/E = [-KdH/dK]/E$.

In terms of avoiding disorder, two regimes of figure 2 are 'stable': to the left and the right of the peak in Q/E. On the other hand, H/E is at a maximum for some $P < 1$ to the left of the peak in Q/E. Thus the peak in $Q/E = [-KdH/dK]/E$ serves to 'lock in' the system to either a state in which there is much cross-talk between interacting neural modules - consciousness - or a state in which there is little cross-talk – unconsciousness or sleep. The transition between the two states should be highly punctuated, according to this model, as the system overcomes the barrier defined by Q/E.

This interpretation is consistent with recent work by Lopez-Ruiz et al. (2004), who found a bistable waking/sleeping bifurcation in complex networks defined by mean-field multiplicative coupling among first-neighbor nodes.

It should, in addition, be clear that the second order universality class tuning of section 4.4, which we use to define the fluctuating dynamic threshold of consciousness, makes the most sense on the left hand side of figure 2, as a function of the waking state.

Clearly, questions of energy use vs. functional optimization for cognitive/conscious processes require further study, particularly as regards the impacts of multiple parallel or hierarchical organization levels. The difference between these two examples – the efficiency of neural modules vs. that of assemblies of interacting cognitive modules – might be seen as analogous to the contrast between the interest of individuals within an organization, who may wish to optimize their personal income per unit effort, vs. the interest of the organization itself, which is attempting to maximize its 'market share'. These are not at all the same goals, and the organizational priorities will likely be at considerable odds with the individual interests of the employees. Under a hierarchy, then, optimization may become a matter of conflict between competing levels. The FWHM of the different optimizations may represent the solution to mitigating that conflict.

6.3 Reconsidering fMRI

Recently Shulman et al. (2003) reexamined functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) from the perspective of global workspace theory. They find that the high energy consumption of the brain at rest and its quantitative usage for neurotransmission reflect a high level of neuronal activity for the non-stimulated brain. This high activity, in their view, supports a reinterpretation of functional imaging data, e.g., where the large baseline signal has commonly been discarded. Independent measurements of energy consumption obtained from calibrated fMRI equaled percentage changes in neuronal spiking rate measured by electrodes during sensory stimulation at two depths of anesthesia. These quantitative biophysical relationships between energy consumption and neuronal activity, they claim, provide novel insights into the nature of brain function. They propose the high resting brain activity includes the global interactions constituting the subjective aspects of consciousness. Anesthesia, by lowering the total firing rates correlates with the loss of consciousness. They conclude that these results, which measure localized neuronal response and distinguish inputs of peripheral neurons from inputs of neurons from other brain regions, fit comfortably into the global neuronal workspace model of Dehaene, Changeux, and others.

One is tempted to interpret the 'large baseline signal' in terms of the operator $\mathbf{R}_0$ of equation (24), and the fMRI-measured differences in terms of that equation's $\delta\mathbf{R}_{k+1}$, leading 'naturally' into the tunable retina arguments associated with the Rate Distortion manifold/atlas topologies discussed above.

A second temptation is to reformulate the parametization

of the consciousness phase transition itself in terms of baseline energy consumption, possibly producing a series of punctuated changes corresponding to different levels of consciousness, much as shown in figures 1 and 2.

These matters remain to be explored.

Next we attempt to place the general argument in a more comprehensive methodological context.

7 Toward a General Cognitive Model

The General Linear Model so familiar to empirical researchers is based on several critical assumptions. In the simplest case, following Snedecor and Cochran (1979, p. 141), there are three essential restrictions on the relation between independent and dependent variates X and Y:

1. For each selected X there is a Normal distribution of Y from which the sample value of Y is drawn at random. If desired, more than one Y may be drawn from each distribution.

2. The population of values of Y corresponding to a selected X has a mean μ that lies on the straight line

$$\mu = \alpha + \beta(X - \hat{X}) = \alpha + \beta x,$$

where α and β are parameters to be estimated. $\hat{X}$ is the mean of X.

3. In each population the standard deviation of Y about its mean $\alpha + \beta x$ has the same value, assumed constant as x varies.

The mathematical model is specified concisely by the equation

$$Y = \alpha + \beta x + \epsilon.$$

where ϵ is a random variable drawn from an appropriate Normal distribution.

The central problem then becomes the statistical estimation of the parameters α and β from observational data.

Variants of this model range from multiple regression, to canonical correlation, and, more recently, our own work on estimating system response to external perturbation (e.g. D. Wallace and R. Wallace, 2000). Similar methods can, of course, be used for more complicated 'linearizable' problems, for example fitting to polynomials or exponentials in x.

Indeed, as Anderson (1971) comments, many of the statistical techniques used in time series analysis are actually those of regression analysis – classical least squares theory – or adaptations or analogs of them, often translated from time-domain to frequency domain via Fourier or related transforms.

All such methods are, however, organized around the Central Limit Theorem.

Languages, i.e. information sources, are different, being much more highly structured, and cannot be addressed in the same manner. Here we, in effect, propose a General Cognitive Model for punctuation and other behavior in cognitive systems based, not on the Central Limit Theorem, but rather on the Shannon-McMillan Theorem, as modulated by the obvious homology with free energy density. The trick is to associate a cognitive process with a dual information source which is adiabatically piecewise memoryless ergodic,

using renormalization formalism at punctuation, and generalized Onsager relations away from punctuation. The model may, itself, be iterated to higher order in renormalization parameters.

The central problem of the GCM then becomes, in analogy with the GLM, the estimation, from observational data, of the renormalization relation and its 'universality class' parameters, which may be both tunable and distributed, and, away from punctuation, the generalized Onsager relations. This must be done in the context of possible complications resulting from second-order punctuation.

The different possible renormalization schemes or Onsager relations for the GCM are analogous to different possible polynomial or exponential fittings in the GLM.

Generalized parameter estimation for the model appears fiendishly difficult, except perhaps under very restricted experimental conditions.

In defense of the proposed empirical technique, cognitive and conscious processes are themselves fiendishly complicated, and what we have done may well be as simple as things can realistically be made – the cognitive equivalent of a straight line regression relation or simple time series analysis.

As is often true for the GLM, analysis of 'residuals' from fitting a GCM might well provide critical scientific insight. In sum, the GCM could serve as a compelling theoretical benchmark against which to compare real data.

8 Discussion and conclusions

We have constructed a punctuated, information-dynamic statistical model of the global neuronal workspace – the GCM – which incorporates a second-order and similarly punctuated universality class tuning linked to detection and interpretation of structured external signals. The model, which features a 'tunable retina' atlas/manifold topology, suggests that tuning the punctuated activation of attention to those signals permits more rapid and appropriate response, but at increased physiological or other opportunity cost: unconscious processing is clearly more efficient, if the organism can get away with it. On the other hand, if the environment is threatening, the organism can't always get away with it, suggesting a strong evolutionary imperative for a dynamic global neural workspace.

Linkage across individual dynamic workspaces – i.e. human hypersociality in the context of an embedding epigenetic system of cultural inheritance – would be even more adaptationally efficient. Indeed, equations (30-32) suggest the possibility of very strong linkage of individual consciousness and physiology to embedding sociocultural network phenomena, ultimately producing an extended model of consciousness which does not fall victim to the mereological fallacy.

In just this regard Nisbett et al. (2001) review an extensive literature on empirical studies of basic cognitive differences between individuals raised in what they call 'East Asian' and 'Western' cultural heritages, which they characterize, respectively, as 'holistic' and 'analytic'. They find:

1. Social organization directs attention to some aspects of the perceptual field at the expense of others.

2. What is attended to influences metaphysics.

3. Metaphysics guides tacit epistemology, that is, beliefs about the nature of the world and causality.

4. Epistemology dictates the development and application of some cognitive processes at the expense of others.

5. Social organization can directly affect the plausibility of metaphysical assumptions, such as whether causality should be regarded as residing in the field vs. in the object.

6. Social organization and social practice can directly influence the development and use of cognitive processes such as dialectical vs. logical ones.

Nisbett et al. (2001) conclude that tools of thought embody a culture's intellectual history, that tools have theories built into them, and that users accept these theories, albeit unknowingly, when they use these tools.

Individual consciousness – currently defined in terms of the dynamic global neuronal workspace – appears to be profoundly affected by cultural, and perhaps developmental, context, and, we aver, by patterns of embedding psychosocial stress, all matters subject to a direct empirical study which may lead to an extension of the concept particularly which will clearly be useful in understanding certain forms of psychopathology.

From even limited theoretical perspectives, current dynamic systems models of neural networks, or their computer simulations, simply do not reflect the imperatives of Adams' (2003) informational turn in philosophy. On the other hand, dynamic systems models based on differential equations, or their difference equation realizations on computers, have a history of intense and continuous intellectual development going back to Isaac Newton. Hence very little new mathematics needs to be done, and one can look up most required results in the textbooks, which are quite sophisticated by now. By contrast, rigorous probability theory is perhaps a hundred years old, its information theory subset has seen barely a half century, and the tunable retina atlas/manifold formalism is still under development. Consequently the mathematics can't always be looked up, and must often be created de novo, with considerable difficulty. One is reminded, not originally, of a drunk looking for his lost car keys under a street lamp 'because the light is better here'.

Nisbett's caution that tools of thought embody a cultural history whose built-in theories users implicitly adopt is no small matter: dynamical systems theory carries with it more than just a whiff of the 18th Century mechanical clock, while statistical mechanics models of neural networks cannot provide natural linkage with the sociocultural contexts which carry the all-important human epigenetic system of heritage.

Most current applications of information theory to the dynamic global neuronal workspace, however, appear to have strayed far indeed from the draconian structural discipline imposed by the asymptotic limit theorems of the subject. Information measures are of relatively little interest in and of themselves, serving primarily as grist for the mills of splitting criteria between high and low probability sets of dynamic paths. This is the central mechanism whose extension, using a homology with free energy density, permits exploration of tunably punctuated dynamics in a manner consistent with the program described by Adams (2003).

According to the mathematical ecologist E.C. Pielou (1976, p.106), the legitimate purpose of mathematical models is to raise questions for empirical study, not to answer them, or, as one wag put it, "all models are wrong, but some models are useful". The natural emergence of tunable punctuated dynamics in our treatment, albeit at the expense of elaborate renormalization calculations at transition, and generalized Onsager relations away from it, suggests the possible utility of the theory in future empirical studies of consciousness: the car keys really may have been lost in the dark parking lot down the street, but here is a new flashlight.

We have outlined an empirically-testable approach to modeling consciousness which returns with a resounding thump to the classic asymptotic limit theorems of communication theory, and suggests further the necessity of incorporating the effects of embedding structures of psychosocial stress and culture. The theory suffers from a painful grandiosity, claiming to incorporate matters of cognition, consciousness, social system, psychopathology, and culture into a single all-encompassing model. To quote from a recent review of Bennett and Hacker's new book, (Patterson, 2003), however, contemporary neuroscience itself may suffer a more pernicious and deadly form of that disorder for which our approach is, in fact, the antidote:

> "[Bennett and Hacker] argue that for some neuroscientists, the brain does all manner of things: it believes (Crick); interprets (Edelman); knows (Blakemore); poses questions to itself (Young); makes decisions (Damasio); contains symbols (Gregory) and represents information (Marr). Implicit in these assertions is a philosophical mistake, insofar as it unreasonably inflates the conception of the 'brain' by assigning to it powers and activities that are normally reserved for sentient beings... these claims are not false; rather they are devoid of sense."

This is but one example of a swelling critical chorus which will grow markedly in virulence and influence. Our development, or some related version, leads toward explicit incorporation of the full 'sentient being' into observational studies of consciousness. For humans, whose hypersociality is both glory and bane, this particularly involves understanding the effects of the embedding social and cultural system of epigenetic inheritance on immediate conscious experience – searching for the torus and the sphere.

The bottom line would seem to be the urgent necessity of extending the perspective of Nisbett et al. (2001) to brain imaging and other empirical studies of consciousness, and expanding the global neuronal workspace model accordingly, a matter which our development here suggests is indeed possible, if not straightforward.

9 Acknowledgements

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11 Appendix: an example of coarse-graining

We use a simplistic mathematical picture of an elementary predator/prey ecosystem for illustration. Let X represent the appropriately scaled number of predators, Y the scaled number of prey, t the time, and ω a parameter defining the interaction of predator and prey. The model assumes that the system's 'keystone' ecological process is direct interaction between predator and prey, so that

$$dX/dt = \omega Y$$

$$dY/dt = -\omega X$$

Thus the predator populations grows proportionately to the prey population, and the prey declines proportionately to the predator population.

After differentiating the first and using the second equation, we obtain the differential equation

$$d^2 X/dt^2 + \omega^2 X = 0$$

having the solution

$$X(t) = sin(\omega t); Y(t) = cos(\omega t).$$

with

$$X(t)^2 + Y(t)^2 = sin^2(\omega t) + cos^2(\omega t) \equiv 1.$$

Thus in the two dimensional 'phase space' defined by $X(t)$ and $Y(t)$, the system traces out an endless, circular trajectory in time, representing the out-of-phase sinusoidal oscillations of the predator and prey populations.

Divide the $X - Y$ 'phase space' into two components – the simplest 'coarse graining' – calling the halfplane to the left of the vertical Y-axis A and that to the right B. This system, over units of the period $1/(2\pi\omega)$, traces out a stream of A's and B's having a very precise 'grammar' and 'syntax', i.e.

$$ABABABAB...$$

Many other such 'statements' might be conceivable, e.g.

$$AAAAA..., BBBBB..., AAABAAAB..., ABAABAAAB...,$$

and so on, but, of the obviously infinite number of possibilities, only one is actually observed, is 'grammatical', i.e. $ABABABAB....$

More complex dynamical system models, incorporating diffusional drift around deterministic solutions, or even very elaborate systems of complicated stochastic differential equations, having various 'domains of attraction', i.e. different sets of grammars, can be described by analogous 'symbolic dynamics' (e.g. Beck and Schlogl, 1993, Ch. 3).

12 Figure Captions

Figure 1 Channel capacity-source uncertainty and energy consumption of a system of interacting neural modules as a function of the inverse probability of weak ties coupling the modules, $K = 1/P$. H is taken as proportional to an error function in K, and energy consumption as a linear function in P, i.e. Inverse in K.

Figure 2 Source uncertainty per unit energy and disorder $Q = [-KdH/dK]$ per unit energy, according to the model of Figure 1. We assume that, for 'social' systems, cognitive energy efficiency is to be maximized, while the experience of disorder is to be minimized, which are competing requirements. Clearly, two stable regimes are possible to this model: consciouss, or unconscious/sleeping, depending on the relative weighting of the optimization, which may, indeed, change according to resource availability: when tired, one falls asleep.

H(K)

En(K)

0

1

K=1/P