

供应链质量管理中抽样检验决策的非合作博弈分析

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Non-Cooperation Game Analysis of Sampling Inspection in Quality Management of Supply Chain

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摘要 保证产品质量是建立与维护供应链企业间长期稳定合作关系的重要基础. 本文提出一种供应链质量管理中抽样检验决策的非合作博弈模型, 以分析供应链的下游制造商应如何根据供应商产品的质量水平确定其抽检方案. 仿真结果表明, 供应链背景下抽检方案不同于单个企业各自优化的制造商抽检方案. 考虑供应链企业间互动关系的抽检方案与不考虑这种关系的独立抽检方案相比, 能有效降低抽样成本, 并使供应商和制造商获得更大的期望收益.

关键词: [供应链](#) [质量管理](#) [抽样检验](#) [博弈分析](#)

Abstract: Quality assurance is a basic requirement for establishment and maintenance of the long-term cooperation relationship of the supply chain. The paper proposes a non-cooperation game analysis model of sampling inspection in quality management of supply chain, and analyzes how the downstream manufacturers should determine their sampling plan based on the quality of supplier's product. Simulation results show that the sampling plan of a supply chain is different from the traditional sampling plan of an independent enterprise. In comparison with the traditional sampling plan, the sampling plan described in this paper can lower the costs, and increase the expected profits of supplier and manufacturer.

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