

## 基于顾客排队行为的专业服务等级的决策问题

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## Decision in Professional's Rank Based on Customers Queuing Behavior

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**摘要** 对专业服务企业而言, 提供服务专家的专业水平决定了服务的质量, 因此如何决策专家的等级 (体现专业水平的差异) 是企业所不能回避的重要问题。企业选择高等级的专家能够给顾客带来更高的服务质量使销售收入增加, 但同时会加大服务成本, 因此企业需要权衡这两方面来做决策。文章以专业服务为研究对象, 考虑专业服务企业面对以队列M/M/1到来的策略顾客, 如何按照最优定价原则来定价并决策专家的最优等级以使企业利润率最大化, 同时考虑专家不同的薪酬水平对企业最优决策的影响。证明结果显示对专家等级的决策主要受到两个主要因素的影响, 一个是专家间能力分化的程度, 一个是行业的专家的收入特征。

关键词: [专业服务](#) [专家等级](#) [策略顾客](#) [排队](#)

**Abstract:** For professional service firm, the quality or value by the service is affected by the professionals' rank which is decided by the skill levels of service provider. Professionals with higher rank (skill levels of service) can efficiently diagnose the customers' potential problem types and the services required treating these problems. Upon the better diagnosing by higher rank of professionals, the customers would acquire higher value of rewards from the service and the professional service firm would extract higher revenue from the service. Ignoring the service cost, it's optimal for the firm to hire highest rank of professional. However, professionals with higher rank call for higher cost of professional service, which mainly include paying higher salary to the professional. Tradeoffs such as this are most prevalent in professional service system. In this paper, the problem of balancing the incurred revenue against service cost is studied. To that end a professional services system is established where a firm as service provider hiring a professional provides service to homogenous, self-interested customers. The professional service firm's objective is to maximize the profit margin by selecting optimal rank of professional. Furthermore, the influence of income characteristics of the professional market is also considered. Results demonstrate that the optimal decision for the professional's rank is depend on the differentiation of the professional's ability and the income characteristics of the professional market.

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