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限制性定价策略中在位厂商的最优产量选择

叶泽, 袁玮志, 张新华, 王亚莉

长沙理工大学经济与管理学院, 湖南 长沙 410076

The Optimal Output of Incumbent Firm in Limit Pricing Strategy

YE Ze, YUAN Wei-zhi, ZHANG Xin-hua, WANG Ya-li

School of Economics and Management, Changsha University of Science and Technology Changsha 410004, China

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摘要 Milgrom-Roberts模型及相关研究证明了不完全信息条件下限制性定价策略均衡的存在,但对存在的具体形式却没有说明。本文通过对Milgrom-Roberts限制性定价模型的进一步研究,指出不完全信息条件下不同成本类型的在位厂商阻止潜在竞争厂商进入的策略均衡可以在一个产量区间内存在;并且由于利润最大化原则,实际上形成在位厂商生产最优产量即阻止进入的均衡产量区间内的利润最大化产量、潜在竞争厂商不进入的唯一策略均衡结果。由于潜在的进入威胁,在位厂商要想成功实施限制性定价策略,其最优产量只能大于或等于垄断产量,而利润只能小于或等于垄断利润。

关键词： 限制性定价　信息不对称　均衡产量区间　最优产量

Abstract： Milgrom-Roberts model and related researches prove that the existence of limit pricing strategy equilibrium under the condition of incomplete information, but they do not show the specific results.Through further research of Milgrom-Roberts limit pricing model, it is pointed out that the strategy equilibrium can exist in an output interval under the condition of incomplete information of different cost type of incumbent to prevent potential competitors. Because of the principle of profit maximization, actually the only strategy equilibrium that the incumbent product optimal output is formed, i.e. profit maximizing output between the equilibrium output interval that is prevented from entering,and the potential competitors do not enter. Due to the potential threat of entry, if the incumbent want to implement the limit pricing strategy successfully, the optimal output can only be equal to or greater than the monopoly output,while profits only less than or equal to the monopoly profit.

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