

考虑溢出效应的互补品企业间广告决策模型研究

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Research on Advertising Decision-making Model between Complementary Goods Enterprises Considering Spillover Effect

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摘要 具有需求信息优势的企业常常将广告投入作为市场需求信号,有选择地向其互补品生产企业传递需求信息,以刺激其增加广告投入,通过溢出效应获取更大收益。针对这一问题,本文建立了考虑溢出效应的互补品企业间广告决策的信号博弈模型,得到了分离均衡和混同均衡的存在条件,分析了均衡状态下企业的最优广告决策和收益,讨论了企业的广告策略选择。结果表明,分离均衡下,具有信息优势的制造商无法利用广告投入信号刺激其互补品制造商增加广告投入。混同均衡下,只有当市场需求为低时,具有信息优势的制造商能够利用广告投入信号,刺激其互补品制造商增加广告投入,通过溢出效应获得更大收益。最后,通过一个数值算例验证了有关结论的有效性。

关键词: 互补品 溢出效应 广告决策 不完全信息 信号博弈

Abstract: The manufacturer with demand information superiority will send demand information to complementary manufacturer by using advertising as signal of demand in order to stimulate its advertising investment and obtain more profits. To settle this problem, the signaling game theory model on advertising decision-making between complementary goods manufacturers considering spillover effect is established in this paper. Based on the model, the condition of separating and pooling equilibrium are solved, and the optimal advertising strategies and profits of complementary manufacturers under these two equilibriums are analyzed. Additionally, the advertising strategy choices of complementary manufacturers are discussed. The results show that under the separating equilibrium, the manufacturer with information superiority can't stimulate its complement manufacturer to increase advertising investment by using advertising as signal. Under pooling equilibrium, only when the market demand is low, the manufacturer with information superiority can stimulate its complement manufacturer to increase advertising investment by using advertising as signal and obtain more profits from advertising spillover effect. Finally, a numerical example is given to demonstrate the effectiveness of the relevant conclusions.

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