

一类供应链的Stackelberg主从对策问题研究

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The Study on Supply Chain Stackelberg Game Problem

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摘要 本文研究了供应链中的一般订货模式和协调模式,提出了一类供应链Stackelberg主从对策问题,卖方作为主方给出最小补充期策略,买方作为从方以最优库存策略响应。考虑一致价格折扣弥补买方的库存成本增加,以及买方的库存成本合理化,建立买方需求确定下的卖方成本优化模型。最后,应用遗传算法对石油分销系统Stackelberg主从对策问题离线仿真计算,得出Stackelberg主从对策均衡解。

关键词: 供应链 Stackelberg对策 最小补充期 价格折扣 库存 遗传算法 分销系统

Abstract: In this paper,the common order mode and coordination mode in supply chain are studied,providing a kind of Stackelberg Game in supply chain,in which the seller is the leader initializing the minimum replenishment periods policy,while the buyers are the follower responding with the optimal stock policy.Considering the identical price discount to offset the stock cost increase of the buyer,and the stock cost rationalization of buyer,the cost optimization model of the seller is established under deterministic demand of buyers.Then applying genetic algorithm,simulation works are carried out to off-line computing the Stackelberg equilibrium solution of this problem in Liaoyang Petroleum Company.

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