

不确定JIT交货条件下供应链协调及主从对策问题研究

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The Study on Stackelberg Game of Supply Chain Coordination with Uncertain Delivery

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摘要 供应链中在不确定JIT交货条件下如何进行供应商与生产商之间的协调是一个十分重要的问题。考虑到供应链成员间决策的交互形式,本文在文[1]的供应商与生产商独立最优和联合最优的基础上提出了一种更具实际意义的供应链协调机制—Stackelberg主从对策,推导了Stackelberg均衡解。文中以上海宝钢集团企业开发总公司的尾板卷深加工为实际背景,分别在独立最优、联合最优和主从对策三种条件下进行了仿真计算。仿真结果表明了主从对策的供应链协调机制的有效性。

关键词: Stackelberg对策 供应链 交货 不确定性 JIT

Abstract: Coordinating producer and supplier is one of main issues of supply chain with uncertain delivery. Considering alternation among the members in supply chain, a kind of Stackelberg game of supply chain is discussed in this paper. And the solution of Stackelberg game is deduced. A simulation on finely rolled steel products is done based on Shanhai Baoshan Steel Industry & Trade Co. And simulation solutions for the independent optimization, joint optimization and Stackelberg game are compared. It shows that Stackelberg game is effective.

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