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基于制销供应链产品安全责任的消费者投资决策

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Consumer's Investment Decision Based on Product Safety Responsibility of Manufacturer-Retailer Supply Chain Alliance

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摘要 本文运用博弈论的基本思想,从产品的安全性能(企业社会责任的一个方面)对消费者偏好的影响入手,对基于制销供应链联盟产品 安全责任的消费者投资决策进行了研究。结果表明:要使g类制销联盟对履行安全责任的要求作出必要的反应,消费者应向消费者组织做 出贡献,以确保g类制销联盟被选作为施压的目标;低产品安全责任满意度的消费者既不持有g类制销联盟的股票也不对消费者组织做贡 献,而是选择个人捐赠产品安全事业; 高产品安全责任满意度的消费者选择持有*g*类制销联盟的股票或者对消费者组织做贡献是对个人捐 赠产品安全事业较好的替代;消费者的产品安全责任满意度与消费者是否选择持有**b**类制销联盟的股票无关。本文的研究成果能够对基 于制销供应链联盟产品安全责任行为的消费者投资决策提供重要指导。

关键词: 制销供应链联盟 产品安全责任 消费者满意度 投资决策 博弈论

Abstract: Applying the basic idea of game theory, starting from the product safety (one perspective of the corporate social responsibilities) influence on the consumers, consumer's investment decision base on product safety responsibility of manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliance is studied in this paper. The results show that in order to make g manufacturer-retailer alliance respond essentailly to the consumers' requirement of fulfilling safety responsibilities, consumers should make contribution to the consumers' organization in order to ensureg manufacturer-retailer alliance is targeted by the consumers' organization. The low- σ consumer chooses to give personally to product safety causes, holds no shares in the g manufacturer-retailer alliance, and does not contribute to the the consumers' organization. The high- σ consumer which holds shares in the g manufacturerretailer alliance or contributes to the the consumers' organization is a better substitute for personal giving to product safety causes. Both the low- σ and the high- σ consumers may hold shares in the b manufacturer-retailer alliance. Valuable guidances to the consumer's investment decision base on product safety responsibility are provided in this study.

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