

煤电企业供应链合作冲突规制模型

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Regulation Model of Supply Chain Cooperative Conflict—The Case of Coal and Electric Power Enterprises

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摘要 供应链合作中由于企业目标的不完全一致性,合作企业间利益分配的激励性缺失,以及环境的不确定性等问题,会产生合作冲突。这一问题若不能得到有效解决,会影响到企业合作关系的稳定。本文在分析供应链合作冲突的表现及根源的基础上,重点研究了如何通过自我实施规制和政府规制解决合作冲突问题。认为自我实施规制应该通过可自执行协议模型和借鉴“关系性租金最大化”的思想建立的规制模型完成;而政府规制应重点从实现激励相容为目标的利益分配规制模型入手,实现从合作利益分配中的“囚徒困境”博弈向“猎鹿博弈”的转化。

关键词: [供应链合作](#) [合作冲突](#) [自我实施规制](#) [政府规制](#)

Abstract: Cooperative conflict will take place during the process of supply chain cooperation due to the different aim between cooperation enterprises, less inspiration of profit distribution, and the environmental uncertainty. It would affect the stability of cooperation relationship, if the problem of cooperative conflict can't be resolved effectively. The performances and reasons of cooperative conflict of supply chain are analyzed at first, then we pay more attention to studying how to resolve the cooperative conflict by self-regulation and government regulation. It is considered that the self-regulation should be finished by self-enforcing agreements and the model of maximization of relationship rent. While the government regulation should be finished by establishing proper benefit distribution proportion in order to turn prisoner's game to deerstalking game to realize benefit consistent inspiring.

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