

博士论坛

房地产开发商Cartel联盟合作博弈的稳定性分析

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摘要 从经济博弈的角度对房地产开发商Cartel联盟的稳定性进行了分析。首先利用古诺博弈模型分析了开发商的行为及收益均衡, 通过比较古诺均衡收益与Cartel联盟收益的大小, 分析了开发商形成Cartel联盟的动因。随后引入干预函数, 从博弈论的角度分析了开发商Cartel联盟的均衡点及不稳定性, 通过介入惩罚函数来强化Cartel联盟的稳定性, 实现了精炼子博弈Nash均衡。最后提出政策建议, 以限制Cartel联盟所形成的房地产市场垄断行为。

关键词 [Cartel联盟](#) [合作博弈](#) [稳定集](#)

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Stability analysis of Cartel alliance cooperative games of developer of real estate

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Abstract

The paper analyzes the stability of Cartel alliance of developer of real estate with relevant theory of economic games. At first, the behavior and profit equilibrium of developer with Cournot games model are analyzed, and researches the cause for the formation of Cartel alliance through the comparison of profit between Cournot equilibrium and Cartel alliance. And then, by adopting interference function, the equilibrium point and instability of Cartel alliance of developer is analyzed, the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium is realized by using punishment function to enhance the stability of Cartel alliance. Eventually, a proposal is proposed for the government to restrict the monopoly behavior of Cartel alliance in the real estate market.

Key words [Cartel alliance](#) [cooperative games](#) [stable set](#)

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