

校企实习联盟模式变迁的进化博弈模型与演化路径

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An evolutionary game model and evolution path on the change of the university-enterprise praxis allian pattern

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摘要 实习难是对“加强实习可改善大学生就业难”的尴尬回应,为此构建有效的校企实习联盟机制是当务之急.为了科学地探寻适合我国国情的校企实习联盟机制的构建,理性地剖析校企实习联盟变成目前这种尴尬局面的原因,探索其模式的演变过程可以起到知根溯源的作用,而这种定量分析的文献目前鲜为少见.该文尝试利用进化博弈的方法对校企实习联盟模式的变迁进行定量的探讨.首先建立了代表性高校与企业的非对称的实习联盟博弈模型,接着利用复制动态进化机制分析了高校和企业之间的群体博弈局势的变迁机理,最后基于演化路径分析为政府有效地构建校企联盟机制提出了两条建议和理论参考.

关键词: 校企实习联盟 进化博弈 复制动态 演化均衡

Abstract: The grim fact of difficult practice is an awkward response to the argument that strengthening the practice can improve the college students' difficult employment. And so it is an urgent matter to construct effective university-enterprise alliance mechanisms. In order to explore the alliance mechanisms suitable for China's national situation, it can play a role of finding root and source to rationally analyze the internship union's embarrassing situation and explore the evolution mode. However, it is scarcely seen to quantitatively discuss the problem. This paper attempts to utilize the evolutionary game theory to explore the change of alliance mode. First an asymmetric game model is given, and then the alliance model's change, the evolutionary equilibrium and the evolution path are analyzed successively based on the duplicate dynamics equations. Finally, two pieces of constructive advice are given for the government to positively construct the alliance mechanisms.

Key words: university-enterprise alliance evolutionary game theory duplicate dynamics evolutionary equilibrium

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