



A generalization of a classical model in contract theory: The agent behavior

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We present a first approximation of agent behaviour in a generalized model in contract theory. This model relaxes some of the the assumptions of one of the classical models allowing to include a broader range of agents. We introduce the motivation for the agent and reinterpret the classical definition of risk perception. Besides, we analyze different scenarios for the relation between the effort exerted by the agent and the probability that he gets an especific result.

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