

Login | Create Account

Search & Browse

Simple Search

Advanced Search

Browse by Subject

Browse by Year

Browse by Conferences/Volumes

Latest Additions

Information

About the Archive

Archive Policy

History

Help FAQ

Journal Eprint Policies

Register

Contact Us

News

Guide to new PhilSci-Archive features

Epistemic rationality and the definition of delusions

Bortolotti, Lisa (2009) Epistemic rationality and the definition of delusions. In: [2009] EPSA09: 2nd Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association (Amsterdam, 21-24 October, 2009) > EPSA 2009 Contributed Papers.



Microsoft Word (.doc) Download (84Kb)

Abstract

According to one argument for the anti-doxastic conception of delusions, delusions are not beliefs because they are not responsive to evidence and responsiveness to evidence is a constitutive feature of belief states. In this paper, I concede that delusions are not responsive to evidence, but I challenge the other premise of this anti-doxastic argument, namely, that responsiveness to evidence is a constitutive feature of belief states. In order to undermine the premise, I describe instances of nonpathological beliefs that strenuously resist counterevidence. I conclude that considerations about responsiveness to evidence do not necessarily lead us to deny that delusions are beliefs. On the contrary, they seem to support the view that there is continuity between delusions and nonpathological beliefs.

Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII (Chicago style) | HTML Citation | OpenURL

Social Networking: Share |

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED) Keywords: epistemic rationality, belief, delusions, evidence Subjects: Specific Sciences > Psychology/Psychiatry

Conferences and [2009] EPSA09: 2nd Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association

Volumes: (Amsterdam, 21-24 October, 2009) > EPSA 2009 Contributed Papers

Depositing User: <u>Lisa Bortolotti</u> Date Deposited: 02 Apr 2010 Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:19

Item ID: 5270

URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/5270

Actions (login required)



Document Downloads

ULS D-Scribe



This site is hosted by the <u>University</u> Library System of the University of Pittsburgh as part of its D-Scribe Digital Publishing Program

E-Prints



Philsci Archive is powered by **EPrints** 3 which is developed by the School of Electronics and Computer Science at the University of Southampton. More information and software credits.

Share

Feeds









	1 1 1