IZA News
About IZA
Organization Chart
People
Research

Labor Policy
Publications

Discussion Papers

Policy Papers

Standpunkte

Books

Research Reports

IZA Compact

IZA in the Press

Publication Record

Journals

Events

IZA Prize / YLE Award

Teaching

Links / Resources

Press

IZA

Home



Monopsony Power, Pay Structure and Training

IDSC

Site Map

Contact

Member Login

Search

by Samuel Mühlemann, Paul Ryan, Stefan C. Wolter (March 2011)

forthcoming in: Industrial and Labor Relations Review

Abstract:

Although interest in monopsonistic influences on labour market outcomes has revived in recent years, only a few empirical studies provide direct evidence on it. This paper analyses empirically the effect of monopsony power on pay structure, using a direct measure of labour market 'thinness'. We find that having fewer competitors for skilled labour is associated at the level of the establishment with lower pay for both skilled labour and trainees, but not for unskilled labour. These findings have potentially important implications for the economic theory of training, as most recent models assume that skilled pay is set monopsonistically but both unskilled and trainee pay are determined competitively. Our results support those assumptions for skilled pay and unskilled pay, but not for trainee pay.

Text: See Discussion Paper No. 5587



Back

© IZA Impressum Last updated: 2012-12-13 webmaster@iza.org | Bookmark this page | Print View