

论文

新现象学对海德格尔“在世存在”思想的扬弃

庞学铨 冯芳

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摘要:

在新现象学奠基人施密茨看来,海德格尔在《存在与时间》中的生存论分析是刻画严格主体性的杰作,然而这种主体性却是被异化的。海德格尔尽管突破了内心世界假说,超越了胡塞尔的主体性,但由于忽略了身体在严格主体性中的基础地位,使在他那里已萌芽的情景存在论终至“扭曲”,错失了凭切身的“在世存在”(in-der-Welt-sein) 莫立一种恰如其分的主体性学说的机遇。新现象学深入探究身体在“在世存在”中的意义,正式提出一种较为完备的情景存在论学说,并在(身体)情绪震颤的主观事实基础上提炼出新现象学视域下的“在世存在”即严格主体性。

关键词: 新现象学 严格主体性 身体 情景存在论

“Being-in-the-World”under the Horizon of the New Phenomenology

Pang Xuequan Feng Fang

Abstract:

Hermann Schmitz, founder of newphenomenology, regards Heidegger' sexistential analysis in Sein und Zeitas a masterpiece of strict subjectivity . However, this strict subjectivity there is alienated . Although Heidegger had broken through the“inner world”hypothesis and had thus transcended the subjectivity by Husserl, he overlooked the basis of the strict subjectivity-the“felt-body”(Leib) and eventually distorted the situation ontology in the embryonic stage . As a result, he missed the opportunity of establishing an appropriate subjectivity theory through literal“being-in-the-world”(in-der-Welt-sein) . The new phenomenology probes into the significance of the“felt-body”in“being-in-the-world”and proposes a more organized theory of situation ontology . On the basis of corporal-emotional fact (subjective fact), it also refines“being-in-the-world”under the horizon of the new phenomenology, namely the strict subjectivity.

Keywords: new phenomenology strict subjectivity felt-body situation ontology

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