



道德风险条件下的供应链质量控制策略研究

Supply Chain Quality Control Strategy Under Condition of Moral Hazard

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作者 单位

[尤建新](#) [同济大学 经济与管理学院, 上海 200092](#)

[朱立龙](#) [同济大学 经济与管理学院, 上海 200092; 伊利诺依大学香槟分校商学院, 伊利诺依 61820](#)

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中文摘要

基于委托代理理论,研究了道德风险条件下如何控制供应链质量的问题,建立了供应商和购买商期望收益函数,考虑了供应商单边道德风险(质量检验水平隐匿),以及存在双边道德风险(质量预防水平和质量检验水平均隐匿)三种情况下,如何设计质量合同设计值,并量化描述所支付的信息租金.仿真实验表明:当供应商存在单边道德风险时,购买商支付的信息租金和期望收益将减少,供应商支付的信息租金和期望收益将减少,购买商的期望收益将增加;当存在双边道德风险时,供应链支付的信息租金为供应商和购买商联合期望收益的损失最大.

英文摘要

Based on principal-agent theory, this paper presents a study of the problem of quality control strategy in supply chain under moral hazard. The expected revenue function of suppliers and buyers is set up to design the quality contract in the following three cases: the supplier (quality prevention probability concealed) and the single moral hazard on the part of the buyer (quality inspection probability concealed). According to the optimal moral hazard values were solved. A quantitative description of the information rents was presented and a simulation was conducted. The results show that when there is a single moral hazard on the part of the supplier, the buyer's information rents and expected revenues will increase; when there is a single moral hazard on the part of the buyer, the supplier's information rents and expected revenues will increase; when there is a double moral hazard, the information rents of supplier chain are the sum of the information rents of single moral hazard, the loss of the jointed expected revenues of the supply chain will be maximum.