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# **Agric. Econ. – Czech**

**H. Doll**

## **-Impacts of the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) on land markets in Germany**

Agric. Econ. – Czech, 51 (2005): 194-201

The political goal to reduce the transformation effects of political measures to the advantage of active farmers is only partially achieved with the Combi-model. The primary recipients are farmers who will give up their farms after

introducing the Combi-model. These farmers have mostly farmed leased land. They will return these lands (leased before the reform) to the former lessors and sell their premium rights to other farm owners or lease these in co-operation with the former lessors for a fee to a new lease. Farmers who want to farm over a long term cannot use the stronger negotiating position against the old lessors following the introduction of the Combi-model because they must maintain a good lessor-lessee relationship. But they do profit to a certain extent, at least at first, because the negotiating results of the farms closing with the old lessors will become public. In contrast, the negotiating position of farmers who first lease their land areas following the introduction of the Combi-model is hardly strengthened, particularly in the current lease market in Germany.

**Keywords:**

Common Agricultural Policy, land market, rental market, land prices

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