



Activate your online access!

Home | My Online Account | For Librarians | Help | Search:

Home >> [List of Issues](#) >> [Table of Contents](#) >> [Abstract](#)

[<< previous article](#) | [next article >>](#)



# Asian Development Review

March 2013, Vol. 30, No. 1, Pages 31-51

Posted Online April 1, 2013.

(doi:10.1162/ADEV\_a\_00002)

© 2013 Asian Development Bank and Asian Development Bank Institute

Modes of Collective Action in Village Economies: Evidence from Natural and Artefactual Field Experiments in a Developing Country  
Yasuyuki Sawada

Corresponding author: Yasuyuki Sawada, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033, Japan; *E-mail address:* sawada@e.u-tokyo.ac.jp, *Phone:* +81-3-5841-5530, *Fax:* +81-3-5841-5521.

Ryuji Kasahara □ Keitaro Aoyagi

Ryuji Kasahara and Keitaro Aoyagi, Japan International Cooperation Agency;

Masahiro Shoji

Masahiro Shoji, Faculty of Economics, Seijo University, Japan; and

Mika Ueyama

Mika Ueyama, Ryukoku University.

[Full Text](#) | [PDF \(498.102 KB\)](#) | [PDF Plus \(302.02 KB\)](#)

Biannual (March, September)  
192 pp. per issue  
6 3/4 x 10  
Founded: 1983  
ISSN 0116-1105  
E-ISSN 1996-7241

### Inside the Journal

- [Editorial Info](#)
- [Abstracting and Indexing](#)
- [Release Schedule](#)
- [Advertising Info](#)
- [Electronic Access](#)
- [Rights & Permissions](#)
- [Author Publication Agreement](#)
- [Author Rights & Permissions FAQ](#)
- [Submission Guidelines](#)

In a canonical model of collective action, individual contribution to collective action is negatively correlated with group size. Yet, empirical evidence on the group size effect has been mixed, partly due to heterogeneities in group activities. In this paper, we first construct a simple model of collective action with the free rider problem, altruism, public goods, and positive externalities of social networks. We then empirically test the theoretical implications of the group size effect on individual contribution to four different types of collective action, i.e., monetary or nonmonetary contribution to directly or indirectly productive activities. To achieve this, we collect and employ artefactual field experimental data such as public goods and dictator games conducted in southern Sri Lanka under a natural experimental situation where the majority of farmers were relocated to randomly selected communities based on the government lottery. This unique situation enables us to identify the causal effects of community size on collective action. We find that the levels of collective action can be explained by the social preferences of farmers. We also show evidence of free riding by self-interested households with no landholdings. The pattern of collective action, however, differs significantly by mode of activity—collective action that is directly rather than indirectly related to production is less likely to suffer from the free rider problem. Also, monetary contribution is less likely to cause free riding than nonmonetary labor contribution. Unlike labor contributions, monetary contributions involve collection of fees which can be easily tracked and verified, possibly leading to better enforcement of collective action.

Quick Tools

- [Email to a Colleague](#)
- [Add Article to Favorites](#)
- [Alert Me](#)  
When new articles cite this article
- [RSS \(TOC Alert\)](#)
- [RSS \(Citation Alert\)](#)
- Download to [Citation Manager](#)
- [Most Downloaded Articles](#)
- [Most Cited Articles](#)
- [View Related Articles](#)
- [Request Permissions](#)
- [Order/Subscribe](#)

Quick Search

In

MIT Press Journals [jn](#)

CrossRef [jn](#)

By keywords

- [collective action](#) €
- [social preference](#) €
- [natural and artefactual field experiment](#) €
- [irrigation](#) €
- [South Asia](#) €
- [C93](#) €
- [H41](#) €
- [H54](#) €
- [O13](#) €
- [Q15](#) €

[search](#)

