



非经营性政府投资项目特许经营期决策动态博弈模型

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The Dynamic Game Model of the Decisions of Non-Profitable Government Investment Project during its Concession Period

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摘要 在非经营性政府投资项目中引入特许经营可有效地实现项目投资主体多元化,从而解决项目资金短缺、投资主体缺位以及项目激励和约束机制失效等问题。通过构建无现金收益的非经营性政府投资项目实施过程中政府与项目公司之间的动态博弈模型,深入剖析了特许权期与项目公司建设成本、补偿费用等因素之间的相互影响,从而得出项目特许权期的决策方案,确定项目建设成本与补偿费用。算例分析结果表明非经营性政府投资项目的补偿费用对项目公司具有一定的激励效用。

关键词: 非经营性政府项目 特许经营 动态博弈 特许权期

Abstract: The non-profitable government investment projects can effectively invite diversified investors by introducing franchise and solve many questions such as the shortage of funds,the vacancy of the main investors,and the invalidation of the incentive mechanism.Through constructing a dynamic game model between government and the project company during the construction and operation of a non-profitable government investment project,the paper will analyze the mutual influence among concession period,construction cost,compensation and other factors,thus determining the concession period scheme and the construction cost and compensation.Numerical analysis results show that the compensation of non-profitable government investment project has certain incentives to the project company.

Key words: non-profitable government investment Project;franchise ; dynamic game;concession period

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