

Objective probability-like things with and without objective indeterminism

E. Szabó, László (2007) Objective probability-like things with and without objective indeterminism.

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Abstract

I shall argue that there is no such property of an event as its "probability." This is why standard interpretations cannot give a sound definition in empirical terms of what "probability" is, and this is why empirical sciences like physics can manage without such a definition. "Probability" is a collective term, the meaning of which varies from context to context: it means different — dimensionless [0,1]-valued — physical quantities characterising the different particular situations. In other words, probability is a reducible concept, supervening on physical quantities characterising the state of affairs corresponding to the event in question. On the other hand, however, these " probability-like" physical quantities correspond to objective features of the physical world, and are objectively related to measurable quantities like relative frequencies of physical events based on finite samples — no matter whether the world is objectively deterministic or indeterministic.

Keywords:	probability, interpretation of probability, branching space-time, quantum probability
Subjects:	Specific Sciences: Probability/Statistics Specific Sciences: Mathematics Specific Sciences: Physics General Issues: Determinism/Indeterminism General Issues: Operationalism/Instrumentalism Specific Sciences: Physics: Quantum Mechanics General Issues: Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
ID Code:	3956
Deposited By:	E. Szabo, Laszlo
Deposited On:	24 March 2008
Additional Information:	Journal reference: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (2007) 626

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