

Carnap' s Logical Empiricism, Values, and American Pragmatism

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Abstract

Abstract. Value judgments are meaningless. This thesis was one of the notorious tenets of Carnap' s mature logical empiricism. Less well known is the fact that in the Aufbau values were con-sidered as philosophically respectable entities that could be constituted from value experiences. About 1930, however, values were banished to the realm of meaning-less me-taphysics, and Carnap came to endorse a strict emotivism. The aim of this paper is to shed new light on the question why Carnap abandoned his originally positive attitude concerning values. It is argued that Carnap' s non-cognitivist attitude was the symptom of a deep-rooted and never properly dissolved tension be-tween his conflicting inclinations towards Neokantianism and Lebensphilosophie. In America Carnap' s non-cognitivism became a major obstacle for a closer collaboration between lo-gical empiricists and American pragmatists. Carnap' s persisting ad---herence to the dualism of practical life and theoretical science was the ultimate reason why he could not accept Morris' s and Kaplan' s pragmatist the-ses that cognitivism might well are compatible with a logical and empiricist scientific philosophy.

Keywords: Carnap, Logical Empiricism, American Progrmatism, Values

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