



尼采及海德格尔哲学研讨会摘要和论文

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哲学、宗教与后现代主义

Philosophy, Religious and Postmodernism

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后现代主义在以下十个方面与现代主义形成鲜明的对照：这些对照可以多于10个，也可以少于10个。下列每组对比中，前者是后现代特征，后者为现代主义特征：

后现代主义与现代主义 (postmodernism and modernism)

客观性与主观性 (objectivity and subjectivity)

碎片与整体 (fragmentation and totalization)

个别与一般 (particular and universal)

它者与自我 (other and self)

相对与绝对 (relative and absolute)

多元与一致性 (pluralism and uniformity)

情绪与理智 (passion and intellect)

两可与清晰 (ambiguity and clarity)

意见与真理 (opinion and truth)

三位后现代哲学家:

列维纳斯 (Emmanuel Levinas 1906-1995)

利奥塔 (Jean-Francois Lyotard 1924-1998)

德里达 (Jacques Derrida 1930-)

三位后现代神学家:

泰勒 (Mark Taylor 1945-)

沃德 (Graham Ward 1955-)

马里昂 (Jean-Luc Marion 1946-)

以上后现代主义者并未解决我们时代神学与哲学的全部问题, 但他们值得我们聆听, 也有些教训值得我们吸取。

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On Thinking Nietzsche as a Philosopher, On Reading Heidegger as Poet

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To call Nietzsche a philosopher, rather than a poet or poet-philosopher, and, indeed, to say of him, as Heidegger did, that Nietzsche knew “what philosophy is,” ^[1] says a great deal. For it counters the traditional way of reading Nietzsche, emphasizing that, for Heidegger, more than Kant or Hegel, more than Aristotle or Plato, Nietzsche shows us what philosophy can be. By contrast, reading Heidegger as a poet promises to do much less. Indeed, and on the face of it, emphasizing the poetic quality of Heidegger’s philosophic voice gives us what is no more than a softer or gentler name for that same philosophical obscurity notoriously associated with his writing.

Reading Heidegger as a poet in a context that would also reclaim Nietzsche’s thinking as philosophy could seem capricious were it not for Heidegger’s own reminder that “poetry and thinking belong together.” ^[2] Proximity, nearness, belonging together, these are all words for the relationship Heidegger finds between poetry and thought, all words corresponding to the aim of inclination, which is for the Greek philosophers of nature and for the poet Hölderlin another word for love.

If philosophy, as the love of wisdom, involves thinking and thought has knowledge as its object,

then insofar as the defining character of human nature is to seek to know, all human beings can be said to be philosophers *in nuce*. Hence Aristotle begins his *Metaphysics* with the assertion that “All men by nature desire to know.”^[3] Nevertheless, the desire for knowledge and the love of wisdom are not the same and a philosopher is a lover of wisdom. Thus, in a lecture presented ten years after the end of World War II in Normandy on the topic, *What is Philosophy*, Heidegger reminds us that when we use the word philosophy we inevitably speak Greek, recalling that it was Heraclitus who first

“presumably coins the word *philosophos* [φιλόσοφος].”^[4] The lover of wisdom is like the lover of anything, in the same hierarchical cadence of love familiar to us from both Plato and Aristotle —

“like *philarguros*, loving silver, like *philotomos*, loving honor.”^[5] Thus an “*aner philosophos* is

hos philei to sophon, he who loves the *sophon*.”^[6] For Heidegger, such love, as harmony, understood in the cosmological way Heraclitus speaks of the physical meaning of love, is an accord with the *sophon*. This for Heraclitus is expressed by saying “*hen panta* (one is all).” Heidegger continues:

“The *sophon* says — all being is in Being ... being *is* Being.”^[7] This is the that of *thuamazein* — the sheer that that things are which is the beginning of philosophy in astonishment or wonder. But for Heidegger, the love of the *sophon* (“the being in Being”) is from its inception almost immediately lost, in that it becomes striving (*orexis*), philosophy becomes a sundered longing for the *sophon*. “Because the loving is no longer an original harmony with the *sophon* but is a particular striving *towards* the *sophon*, the loving of the *sophon* becomes ‘*philosophia*.’ The striving is

determined by Eros.”^[8] But ancient Greek *Eros* and *philia* (eros and love) are two different if affine things.

Heidegger holds that philosophy is exemplified by a particularly provocative relation to thought and he turns to Hölderlin in his lecture course *Was heißt Denken?* to trace the relation between thinking or philosophy and love. Reflecting on thought and poetry, Heidegger claims that poetry, as

its “standing in itself,” in the “beauty” of its word, must be seen as “its own truth.”^[9] For Heidegger, this self-standing in the truth “does not exclude but on the contrary includes what we

think in the poetic word.”^[10] The poet’s word as Heidegger reads it is drawn from the center of a

poem by Hölderlin entitled *Socrates and Alcibiades*^[11] — “Who the deepest has *thought*, *loves* what is most alive.” Heidegger’s reading stresses thought and love as the two words are placed side by side, “the two verbs, ‘*thought*’ and ‘*loves*’ form the center of the line. Inclination reposes in thinking.”^[12]

Inclination for Hölderlin — or love, for Heraclitus (and Empedocles) — is a vulnerable and impermanent disposition: a harmony, which needs to be held, tuned in being, or it vanishes.^[13] We begin by talking about love and find ourselves talking about longing or yearning, eros not love.

Giorgio Agamben has written about the tempting topic that is love for Heidegger (and it is a seductive topic not only because the French philosopher Luce Irigaray also writes about Heidegger, but because Heidegger goes so far as to claim that — outdoing Nietzsche for sheer provocation — “the essence of eros is nothing erotic.”) Agamben refers not to the later Heidegger’s reflections on the love of wisdom as above, but begins instead with *Being and Time* by noting that apart from Pascal and Augustine, the theme of love is hardly mentioned. Given, so Agamben claims, Heidegger’s familiarity with Max Scheler’s views on the preeminence of love (and hate) and considering (this is his trump card) the circumstantial romantic involvement of Heidegger and Arendt, attested in a backwards look from a letter Heidegger wrote to Arendt later in life, Agamben contends that “the writing of *Being and Time* had thus taken place under the sign of love.”^[14] Agamben’s enthusiasm is admirable,

particularly as Nietzsche once chastized philosophers for what he called their “lack of love.”

[15] But, like most philosophers who concern themselves with love, Agamben assumes that he, like everyone, already knows what love is. For Nietzsche, this presumption excuses us from learning how to love (as Descartes critiques the common conviction concerning “good sense,” whereby “every one thinks himself so abundantly provided with it” [16] one thinks to forego the acquisition of rules for the direction of thought). Heidegger himself does ask about love in his discussion of philosophy. In the philosopher’s love for what Heidegger calls the *sophon* — being in Being — Heidegger finds that from the beginning the disposition of love turns to desire. The philosopher becomes a scholar, aspiring to wisdom; worse, for Heidegger (in what he called cybernetics and what today can be seen as cognitive science), the philosopher becomes a man of science, calculating practical knowledge, a calculation of security that is for Heidegger and for Nietzsche no different from the calculation of the man of faith. [17]

To inquire philosophically into the love of wisdom, we turn to Heidegger as poet.

Although Heidegger writes about poetry, and literary critics engage his interpretations with unabated vigor, Heidegger himself is not read as a poet. Nor does Robert Bernasconi do so even when giving a reading of one of Heidegger’s poems but, and arguably, actually, more importantly, seeks instead to hear what Heidegger says, adverting to Heidegger’s silence as “a language whose words have already broken.” [18] To listen to Heidegger’s silence is to attend to the articulation of the needful connection between saying and thinking, so that, as Heidegger reads Parmenides, for his own part, in the musical space of the punctuation marks Heidegger adds for our eyes, so literally transposing a voiced break that can only be heard in ancient Greek: “saying speaks where there are no words, in the fields between the words which the colons indicate.” [19] Silence speaks between the word — between the lines: it echoes as the unsaid in what is said.

Referring to Heidegger’s poem, *Sprache*, Bernasconi recalls the poem-question “when will words again be words?” [20] Heidegger’s answer is given in the highest tone: “when they bear us back to the place of ancient owning (*uralter Eignis*) where the ringing of stillness calls.” [21] These words are Heidegger’s own but we can barely read them as poetry. As I emphasize a musical or sounding reading, such a reading entails that we hearken to what is said, as Heidegger — and as anyone who has to do with poetry — will tell us to do. Thus as beautiful as “ancient owning” is as the translation of *uralter Eignis*, [22] this impeccable rendering cannot invite us to hear what Heidegger says with the words *uralter Eignis* because to read Heidegger, like Nietzsche, like Hölderlin, we need to read German. [23] Like any language, the foreign can only be mastered in order to return us to what is native to us, as both the poet Hölderlin and the linguist philosopher [Wilhelm] von Humboldt have differently emphasized in the spirit of eighteenth-century hermeneutic reflection. [24] Given this poetic, hermeneutic limitation, to read Heidegger’s *Sprache*, to read the poetic word *uralter Eignis*, we need to be able to catch a resonant, metonymic reference to the penumbra of sounding words that echo in the word as word: *eignen* [fit, suit attempt] as much as *eigen* [own, ownmost] and *Ereignis* [event, happening, occurrence]. And, perhaps one even ought to hear *Eigentlichkeit* [authenticity], as *Eignis* in Heidegger’s 1972 poem may recall the key word of his 1927 masterpiece.

In a letter to me, Reiner Schürmann notes the difficulty of reading Heidegger on language, as on poetry and thought, as the need for a critical familiarity with German. Thus for Schürmann, we are advised to learn not only German but Greek where Schürmann recommends that we recognize the necessity of Heidegger’s claim concerning the “inner” affinity of Greek and German.

Interlude: Nietzsche and Heidegger: The Politics of Reading

To talk about Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche, it is important to note that Heidegger does not merely refer to Nietzsche (as a symbol) and that Heidegger does not simply quote Nietzsche but in the way that Heidegger read Hölderlin, Heidegger *reads* Nietzsche. This kind of reading might seem to have been widespread. The physicist, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, recalls "When I was young, everyone *read* Nietzsche." ^[25] This prefatory recollection served von Weizsäcker as an apology or an excuse for writing on Nietzsche but the same comment betrays him (and others who write on Nietzsche or Heidegger, or even Hölderlin) because there have been political questions associated with reading Nietzsche from the start and there have certainly been political problems associated with reading Heidegger. If the British could name the first Great World War, "Nietzsche's War," ^[26] a more notorious association is made between Heidegger and the causes of Nazism and hence with the Second World War. Now although the connection of philosophy with two World Wars and hence with the course of world history (i.e., as thinkers who either inspired or singularly failed to prevent political movements like fascism and Nazism or events like the Holocaust) is a captivating perspective — it flatters any philosopher who supposes that philosophy might work this way — it is wholly tendentious.

^[27] Philosophy is not merely traditionally defined as the discipline that "bakes no bread" but is *essentially* useless — and hence beyond price or value for the whole of Western philosophy. This alienation from the practical and the worktasks of the day means that Hegel only looks for the flight of the owl of Minerva at dusk. It is a weak corollary to note that the energies of philosophy have declined to the extent that today's philosophers no longer propose, as Karl Marx once proposed, to transform the world. Instead they seem reduced to the challenges of what Nietzsche criticized as moraline thinking, i.e., delineating the ethical liabilities of others. ^[28] This decline in philosophical ambition is, of course, part and parcel of what Nietzsche meant by nihilism or decadence but it is important to emphasize that for Nietzsche himself such moraline thought does not correspond to the praxical concern that asks the Kantian question: *What should I do?* or the Schopenhauerian: *How can I help?* or *How can I minimise the suffering of others?* Instead, moraline thought asks: *Who is to blame?* Moraline thought thus connects Nietzsche and Heidegger with fascism and this kind of thinking is endemic to readings of Nietzsche and Heidegger. ^[29] I cannot correct this tendency here, but in the second half of this short essay I shall turn to thought and poetry as an alternative way to approach the question of what philosophy can do, in Heidegger's sense of the question which asks what philosophy might be able to do *with us*.

Nietzsche as Thinker

If I mean to read Heidegger as a poet, Heidegger for his own part seeks to avoid reading Nietzsche as such. Instead, Heidegger means "to take Nietzsche seriously as a thinker" ^[30] in his 1951-52 Freiburg lecture course, *Was heißt Denken?* Following the thought-provocation essential for thinking, throughout his study, to the annoyance of scholarly ears, Heidegger writes again and again that what is "most thought provoking is that we are still not thinking." ^[31] The word for this "lack of thought" Heidegger finds in Nietzsche's "simple, because thoughtful words, 'The wasteland grows.' " ^[32] *Die Wüste wächst*. And Heidegger emphasizes Nietzsche's next reflection on the consequences of nihilism, " 'Woe to him who hides wastelands within.' " (WD 30) Not a matter of negative judgment or pessimism, it is "that which gives us food for thought, which is what wants to be thought about." (WD 30) Such things are not merely sombre matters but the thought of love and joy

“and beautiful and mysterious and gracious things give us food for thought.” (WD 31) In calling things to mind in all that belongs to thought about them, “what is most thought provoking — especially when it is man’s highest concern — may well be also what is most dangerous. Or” — as Heidegger here asks us to reflect — “do we imagine that a man could even in small ways encounter the essence of truth, the essence of beauty, the essence of grace — without danger?” (WD 31) Thus to think about what is called thinking or what provokes thoughtfulness is to engage in thinking about danger. Here, Heidegger’s reflections take him to Nietzsche as the ultimately dangerous thinker: “I am no man,” Nietzsche wrote, “I am dynamite.” ^[33]

There is an important sense in which, unlike Hölderlin or Pindar or any other poet, but like Kant, and as a philosopher, even as Nietzsche claims to invert Plato, Nietzsche remains in thrall to Plato and thereby to Aristotle. Thus Nietzsche turns within the orbit of Western metaphysics as the culmination of Western thought. What is important to observe about this compulsion is that it is not a mistake that could/should be corrected but a matter of perspective, which is also to say that thinking with all the means at its critical disposal cannot overcome this confinement. At the conclusion, we will be able to return to the question of Nietzsche’s critique of Western reason.

When Heidegger cites Nietzsche’s pronouncement, “The wasteland grows ...” (WD 50), borrowing this dictum from Nietzsche’s sardonic fourth (and appended) part of his *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Heidegger, claims both that these words express Nietzsche’s heart (“Nietzsche put all that he knew” into them) ^[34] and that of all philosophers, Nietzsche is “the representative of traditional thinking who is closest to us in time.” (WD 55)

For Heidegger, as the traditional thinker closest to us, what Nietzsche sees is “the necessity of a change in the realm of essential thinking.” (WD 57) Reading Nietzsche as a philosopher, we are not only to “refer everything in his thought that is still unthought back to its originary truth” [WD 54]), but we are to see him as the one thinker who “sees clearly that in the history of Western man something is coming to an end.” (WD 55) This transition Heidegger names with a word from Hölderlin,

“*das Gefahr*” — the *danger*, (a term he also uses in his essay on technology). ^[35] This threat is today the totalizing domination of Western, perfectly technological humanity as the measure and definition of all that is and it is what Heidegger names the “end of philosophy” — in a very different sense than the oddly Hegelian sense intended by Frances Fukuyama when he speaks of the “end” of history. For Heidegger, the end of philosophy “proves to be the triumph of the manipulable arrangement of the scientifico-technological world and of the social order proper to this world.” ^[36] It is in this humanistic context that Heidegger recalls Nietzsche’s anti-philosophical (arch-philosophical) definition of the human as (the non-exclusively rational) and (not specifically) political animal. “Man,” Nietzsche writes, and as Heidegger quotes him, “is the *always yet*

undetermined animal.” ^[37] Citing the limits of the physical and psychological sciences, as the limits of cosmology and metaphysics, such an undetermined being must find a bridge “to that nature by which man can overcome his former nature, his last nature.” (WD 59) This bridge is, of course, the *Übermensch*, which Heidegger reads not in terms of race but mere verticality, sheer transcendence.

Nietzsche’s critique of subjectivity and therewith his critique of intentionality — the knowing consciousness of the knower who knows, as this may be addressed to Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, and Husserl — addresses language in the poetic sense so important for Heidegger. Language is thus what speaks us: thoughts come when they, not the thinking subject, are moved to come. As the most radical and most individually free thinker of our time, for Heidegger, Nietzsche “neither made nor chose his way himself, no more than any other thinker ever did. He is sent on his way.” (WD 46) As the thinker of thinking, thinking what is called (or calls, sends us to) thinking, Nietzsche’s reflection on subjectivity as Nietzsche critiques the notion of the subject is the patent reason Heidegger engages Nietzsche as he does in *Was heißt Denken?* As in the associative couple, *Denken/Dichten*, thinking becomes a kind of poetizing. With Nietzsche’s observation — that a thought comes when it wants — thinking becomes a species of the same kind of enthusiasm or inspiration that is poetry and which, for Heidegger, works to transform thought as *Dichtung*. This way of conceiving thought yields

a kind of love or a cross over between thinking and poetry: “a secret kinship” [*eine verborgene Verwandtschaft*].^[38]

Heidegger as Poet: The Relation Between the Poetry and Music/Silence of Language

Heidegger is not typically denied the title of philosopher as Nietzsche is. Nor is he named a poet as Nietzsche has been. A mystic, yes; a theologian, yes, but not a poet — if only because, we are told, Heidegger writes too poorly for that — his “bad” writing seems obvious, *Es liegt*, as the Germans say, *auf der Hand*. And yet it can be seen that Heidegger does not write poorly (or unclearly) if we attend to the poetry — the music or the style — of Heidegger’s own writing. By proposing that one read Heidegger as poet, I do not pretend that Heidegger is to be read as a real or actual poet, especially not in the high foundational significance of *wirklich* — the meaning Heidegger gives to being a “real poet” in his *Introduction to Metaphysics*.^[39]

To read Heidegger as a poet means only that in the same way that Nietzsche’s style is decisive for his thought, Heidegger’s style determines what he says and it is whether we have or can develop an ear for that style that will determine whether we can hear what he says or merely find it unclear or “badly” done.

As thinker, Heidegger is consigned to use language to understand the essence of poetry and language and thought, as of being itself. But the philosopher as writer is subject to the readings of the critics and their judgment has been harsh. Thus George Steiner concludes of Heidegger’s expressive gifts in his own 1991 preface to his book on Heidegger, “Words failed Heidegger and, at a pivotal stage in his life and work, he failed them.”^[40] Nevertheless, Steiner adverts to what I call the musicality of Heidegger’s expression or voice in a strikingly literal and surprisingly phenomenological way: emphasizing (countering Derrida) the “central *orality* in Heidegger’s teaching and concept of the enterprise of serious thought,”^[41] explaining this diction as that of a specifically poetic or lyrical kind: “I have found that passages in Heidegger which are opaque to the reading eye and stony on the page come to more intelligible life, take on a logic of an almost musical kind *when they are read aloud*.”^[42]

Heidegger’s poetic voice is plain as he writes, “Language speaks by saying, this is, by showing. What it says wells up from the formerly spoken and so far still unspoken saying which pervades the design of language. Language speaks in that it, as showing, reaching into all regions of presences, summons from them whatever is present to appear and to fade.”^[43]

Heidegger is not unaware that when he writes “Language itself is language,” his style of writing can leave him open to the charge of unclarity. As Heidegger observes, “The understanding that is schooled in logic, thinking of everything in terms of calculation and hence usually overbearing, calls this proposition an empty tautology. Merely to say the identical thing twice — language is language — how is that supposed to get us anywhere?”^[44] Heidegger answers this simple question with even more simplicity. He agrees with the accusation, admitting “But we do not want to get anywhere.”^[45] An advocate of releasement [*Gelassenheit*] and hence the liberating *uselessness* of philosophy, Heidegger nevertheless could expect philosophy utterly to transform us: “granted that we cannot do anything with philosophy, might not philosophy, if we concern ourselves with it, do something *with us*”?^[46]

I have elsewhere argued that a particularly resonant interpretive style or musical concinnity, that is, the ability to read as a singer sings, reading as a musician reads (with one’s ears),^[47] is

indispensable for reading Nietzsche as philosopher — and not merely as cultural provocateur or to use the language of a past generation, a “poet-philosopher.” Here, I have been arguing that a philosophical reading of the Heidegger who links poetry with thinking must be poetically accented, or attuned as Heidegger preferred to say. A poetic and musical attunement is required to read the Heidegger who took continual pains to remind us that we are “still not thinking.” Such reminders punctuate or interrupt the rhythm or poetic seduction of Heidegger’s texts and we are called to a different music than that often sounded by Heidegger’s most sincere commentators. Where Heidegger can speak of the nearness of thinking and poetry, the saying or ringing of the same that is said in silence is the inherently musical silence of Heidegger’s favourite emphasis: the *cæsure*.

To sketch this with an abbreviated illustration, the later lecture course *Was heißt Denken?* not only offers an acoustic resonance in the German of the title — an allusiveness which cannot be heard in the English, *What is Called Thinking?* — but exemplifies the work’s stylistic advance. I have already noted that it also turns reflexively on a reading of Nietzsche, where Heidegger writes (in a fashion which would inspire Derrida’s stylistic appropriation of the same trope in *Spurs*), “We ask: what is called thinking — and we talk about Nietzsche.” ^[48]

Beyond what Heidegger names “one-track [or academic] thinking,” Heidegger’s strategy in his style of writing is sustainedly paedagogic: he provokes as the effect of a deliberate shock, as a claim dropped contrary to expectations, running against the grain of ordinary academic discourse. This strategy famously backfires (it leads to frustration at one extreme, and violent denunciation at another) but I argue that it can also teach the forbearance necessary for poetic renunciation or thoughtful attention. The three point strategy (provocation, intensification, return) works against what Heidegger regards as the ordinary tendency of scholarly thickness: one-sidedly dogmatic

statements heard and perceived as such by thinkers locked into “one-track thinking.” ^[49] In this serially musical strategy, Heidegger does more than remind us that we “still need an education in thinking,” ^[50] as Nietzsche emphasised we need to learn to think, read, love. And part of such an education in thinking, as Heidegger takes it from Nietzsche, will be learning to listen, in a musical key, to what is said and to what is unspoken. ^[51] These are the silences Heidegger asks us to hear.

Reflecting on the paratactic framing of Parmenides’ gnomon — “needful: the saying also thinking too: being: to be.” Heidegger illuminates this same ringing silence: “We call the word order of the saying paratactic in the widest sense ... For the saying *speaks* where there are no words, in the field between the words which the colons indicate.” ^[52] For Theodor Adorno, the same paratactic character captures the modern essence of a-tonal music as well as Hölderlin’s poetry. ^[53] Adorno is far from Heidegger’s defender but his suggestion offers us a way to approach a hearing of the serial spareness of Heidegger’s reflection on the participial construction of “thinking” and “being,” taking both together (altogether against traditional readings of Parmenides) to catch the mutual relation, the backwards/forwards *movement* of the participial form as musical.

Once serialism is counted in place of the paratactic tact of Heidegger’s reading of Parmenides, the answer to what is called thinking may be sounded forth: “Thinking means: letting-lie-before-us and so taking-to heart also: beings in being.” ^[54] One can repeat: And so taking-to-heart also, also.

As an atonal tonality, a modern or musically serialist (rather than a classicist) reading of the philosophical text can teach us to interrupt our own always “already-knowing.” In this interruption, we literally take a step back, and in this way, but only as a sheer and fading possibly, we may yet come to hear Heidegger’s resonant word, as the *melos* of the appropriative event.

Expressing the musical way in which we might be so appropriated or caught up into the *melos* of *Ereignis*, “the melodic mode, the song which says something in the singing” is the frame of song, arraigned as what lets be, what “lauds,” all present beings, allowing “them into their own, their

nature.” ^[55] These are the words of song: “*das Lied das singend sagt*,” sung between mortal experience and mortal converse when Hölderlin promises in his poem *Friedensfeier*: “...but soon we shall be song.” “...*bald sind wir aber Gesang*.” ^[56]

Conclusion

Regarding Heidegger as a kind of poet, as I have sought to do, his play with language may be seen as opposed both to the received sense of philosophy and to the received use of language as a mere playing. As poet, as a “mere poet,” as just and only and no more than a poet through whom what is said is said, what Heidegger writes is gainless, and that in the highest sense. Thus Heidegger suggests that rather than attempting to attain to something by means of or with philosophy — doing things with words or theory in the pragmatic or praxical sense — we might, like Nietzsche, make the effort to allow philosophy or thought “to *do* something *with us*.” And, in Nietzsche’s case, to regard Nietzsche as Heidegger proposed to do: to read him as a thinker in the most rigorous sense is to read his critical writing on thinking, as a critique of logic and scientific rationality. Such a critique examines the rational foundations of logic and rationality itself as a means of knowing the world to be known. Such a radical critique is turned upon reason even as means of knowing the knower. In this way, Nietzsche’s thinking offers a critique of reason: simply or purely and as such. And it is in this properly Kantian sense that we are also to understand Nietzsche’s own avowed ambition to doubt more radically than Descartes. But when and if we can do this, we find, as Heidegger did to his own ultimate frustration as a philosopher, that Nietzsche’s project may well undermine or destroy the project of thinking. When you begin from the critical proposition that an instrument of criticism (rationality) cannot as such be turned upon itself (this is the critique of critique as Nietzsche dares to pose this question) and if what you are doing is fundamentally reflexive, *critical* thinking, the result is an unsustainable project as such and on its own reflexive, fully critical terms. Philosophy in this sense reaches an end — not a culmination.

And yet it may belong to the nature of philosophy as a useless, ultimately vulnerable and unsustainable passion, that it not succeed: perhaps, assuming recourse to Greek rather than Latin, we can hear passion as a *pathos*, an inclination, a “being attuned to [*Stimmung*].” ^[57] Consummation is the death of desire and possession is the end of love. But the love of Being in being, as Heidegger speaks of philosophy, could turn out to be neither desire nor need and so require neither satisfaction nor fulfillment but rather as what Heraclitus calls the hidden attunement, philosophy itself would be the harmonious variance of Pindar’s *πικλῖα*, ^[58] exemplifying, at least on Hölderlin’s reading, the tension of a fragment he notoriously mis- or over translates from Heraclitus as “the one differentiated in itself” *ἐν διαφέρον ε αὐτῷ* — (*das Eine in sich selbst unterschiedene*), ^[59] that is, attuned to the music of the heart, the music of life, but above all attuned to the singular possibility of attunement itself: the backstretched connexion.

Heidegger, Nietzsche and Biologism

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In this paper I reexamine Heidegger’s defence of Nietzsche against the charge of biologism in *THE WILL TO POWER AS KNOWLEDGE*. I reject that suggestion that this gesture is best understood as part of Heidegger’s attack on National Socialism, a suggestion that Heidegger himself promoted after the end of the Second World War. By locating Heidegger’s treatment of Nietzsche’s biologism both within the context of Heidegger’s discussions of biologism over a twenty year period and within the context, more generally, of the discussions of Nietzsche’s biologism by Heinrich Rickert and Alfred Baeumler, I provide the basis for understanding Heidegger’s discussion as part of his more general effort to establish a double reading of Nietzsche as a metaphysician. That is to say, Nietzsche on Heidegger’s reading escaped biologism by thinking metaphysically in the double sense of thinking the Being of life

and yet doing so in a way that held that thinking within the confines of Western metaphysics in Heidegger's sense of the term.

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Nietzsche

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Within a few years of his death in 1900, Friedrich Nietzsche was widely recognised as a thinker and writer of genius, a devastating critic of religion, an acute diagnostician of the cultural ills of Europe, and a master of German prose. It was later – first among continental European philosophers, then among English-language philosophers – that the originality of Nietzsche's treatments of perennial questions in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophical psychology and ethics was appreciated. By the end of the millennium, it was clear that no other nineteenth century thinker had so decisively shaped the contours of contemporary philosophical discussion. This 'professional' appreciation did not eclipse the earlier reputation, for much of the excitement in reading Nietzsche owes to an interplay between philosophical speculation and diagnosis of the parlous modern condition of humanity. Nietzsche is sometimes treated as a 'playful', unsystematic thinker revelling in 'masks' and contradictions. In this paper, a different view is taken. Although not written in a systematic style, the works of Nietzsche's mature years articulate a cohesive general position, one that, arguably, flows from convictions expressed in his very early essays. While this paper will focus on Nietzsche's contributions to philosophy, to the relative exclusion, therefore, of more 'empirical' ones to psychology, sociology and history, no sharp distinction is intended here. Nietzsche himself certainly denied such a distinction.

1. Life and Writings

Another sharp distinction Nietzsche denied was that between someone's philosophy and their life. 'Every great philosophy', he wrote, has been 'the personal confession of its author' (BGE 6). Since any great philosophy will 'command and legislate', will 'make and create' concepts, not just 'accept [them] as gifts' (WP 409), its author must be something of an outsider – an eagle rather than a starling (WP 989) – uncomfortable with the intellectual habits of his times. Certainly Nietzsche's life was, in the main, closer to that of the eagle than the starling.

Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900) was the son of a Lutheran pastor who died when Friedrich was only four. Educated at Germany's best known school, the Schulpforta, and at the universities of Bonn and Leipzig, the precocious Nietzsche became a Professor of Classics in Basel at the age of twenty-five. The years at Basel were marked by intoxication with the writings of Schopenhauer and with both the music and personality of Wagner – influences which accelerated Nietzsche's disillusion with academic scholarship. Illness and the hostile reception of his first book, *The Birth of Tragedy*, further induced him to abdicate from university life. For twelve years, the pattern of Nietzsche's life was one of lonely wandering – from hotel to hotel, in the Swiss mountains or Northern Italy – occasionally punctuated by intense, usually difficult meetings with friends. (He ended relations with Wagner in 1876, appalled by the philistine atmosphere at the Bayreuth festival and by the gushing religiosity of Wagner's last opera.) In 1888, Nietzsche's health and mind collapsed, the result of excessive work and perhaps of syphilis either inherited or contracted through, possibly, his sole sexual encounter. For the remainder of his life, Nietzsche was a vegetable, a childlike man nursed by his mother and sister.

It is familiar to divide Nietzsche's writings into 'early', 'middle' and 'late' periods. The most substantial 'early' works are his reappraisal, imbued with a Schopenhauerian vision of a blind cosmic 'will', of Greek thought and art, *The Birth of Tragedy*, and a number of *Untimely Meditations* critical of contemporary culture and education. Attention, however, is now deservedly paid

to some unpublished sketches of the 1870s in which Nietzsche develops a distinctive, radical account of the relation between thought or language and the world. During the ‘middle’ or ‘positivist’ period, in works such as *Human, All-Too-Human*, Nietzsche’s primary concern is the more ‘scientific’ one of exposing, often with wit and venom, the facts of human psychology which, he believed, would both explain and discredit the pretensions of religion, metaphysics and art to reveal an ‘eternal’ realm of ‘absolute truth’.

The ‘late’ period, during which Nietzsche develops such famous notions as ‘eternal recurrence’, ‘will to power’, ‘perspectival knowing’, and ‘the Overman (Übermensch)’, begins with the later sections of *The Gay Science* and *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. While that latter work – a philosophical fantasy woven around the life of an imaginary wandering sage – may be Nietzsche’s literary masterpiece, its main themes are made clearer by the two great works which shortly followed, in 1886–7, *Beyond Good and Evil* and *On the Genealogy of Morals*. The writings of the final year of lucidity, such as *The Antichrist* and *Ecce Homo*, while full of perceptive material, are marred by shrillness and excess, symptoms of Nietzsche’s impending descent into madness.

Throughout his career, Nietzsche wrote notes and plans for books that did not materialise (his *Nachlass*). Commentators differ on the weight to be put upon these writings, especially those from the 1880s subsequently assembled by Nietzsche’s sister under the title *The Will to Power*. In this paper, and in opposition to some recent commentaries, the immensely interesting material found in those notes is freely drawn upon. Where there are tensions with the published works, I do not pre-emptively settle the issue in favour of the latter.

2. ‘Catastrophe’

Like other nineteenth century thinkers, including Marx, Nietzsche thought that western civilization was at a critical juncture, indeed that it was facing a ‘catastrophe’ which he called ‘the advent of nihilism’ (WP Preface). The symptoms of the crisis were various, even anomalous: political anarchism, revolutionary socialism, world-weary apathy, indiscriminating tolerance, vulgar hedonism, religious hypocrisy, and so on. All these, for Nietzsche, were symptomatic of the erosion of beliefs which had, for centuries, given ‘meaning’ to civilized life. In a famous passage, he wrote that ‘God is dead ... we have killed him’ (GS 125. cf. Z Prologue 2). Enlightenment rationalism, the natural sciences and modern psychology, with their ‘cultivation of “truthfulness”’ (WP 3), had made it increasingly difficult to maintain religious belief and, therefore, to subscribe to moral values which presupposed the existence of God.

By ‘the death of God’, however, Nietzsche has much more in mind than the erosion of specifically religious beliefs and values. God is only an especially vivid instance of a being imagined to exist in a ‘true world’ set against an ‘apparent’ world of everyday sense-experience. Other instances would be Plato’s ‘forms’ and Kant’s ‘things in themselves’. ‘The advent of nihilism’ spells the loss of belief in any such ‘higher’ or ‘true world’ and, consequently, in the ‘ascetic ideal’ which has grounded our hitherto ‘highest values’ on the nature of that world – on the will of God, say, or ‘the Form of the Good’.

Despite the catastrophic upheavals it occasions, Nietzsche largely welcomes this ‘war on ... a true world’ (WP 583), since it is one waged by ‘truthfulness’ on illusion. He welcomes it, moreover, despite his appreciation of just how radical it must be. To begin with, it is a war which must eventually be waged against many of those – including scientists – who are busily dispelling the old illusions. This is because they too are guilty of setting up a ‘true world’ – of natural laws, particles, and so on – set against, and allegedly underlying, an ‘apparent’ world of ‘becoming’. Indeed, it must be waged against all those ‘articles of faith’ – including ‘bodies, lines, planes, causes and effects, motion and rest’ – without which all of us, and not just scientists and philosophers, must find it hard to ‘endure life’, so engrained are they in our familiar ways of thinking and speaking (GS 121). For Nietzsche, these ‘articles of faith’ are as much ‘fictions’ as God or platonic ‘forms’. Second, the war cannot be ended by hitting upon new beliefs even remotely analogous to the discredited ones. If nihilism is to be overcome, and life reaffirmed and invested with meaning, this will be because human beings are able to dispense with ideals of the kind hitherto embraced. Whether they can do this and still ‘endure life’ is uncertain. So, therefore, is our

future history.

To understand how Nietzsche arrives at his perception of the modern ‘catastrophe’, we need, first, to grasp both why he concurs in the ‘assassination’ of the illusion of ‘the true world’ (§ 3), and how he explains our proneness to this illusion (§ 4). Second, we need to appreciate why Nietzsche thinks that science, despite – or because of – its urge to ‘truthfulness’, falls victim to the same illusion, and to understand how he tries to exonerate his own ‘truths’ from such a criticism (§ 5). Special attention must be paid, third, to religion and morality (§ 6): for it is here that the illusion has both its origin and most damaging impact. We will then be in a position to revisit Nietzsche’s vision of the modern condition and the prospects for ‘overcoming’ it (§ 7).

3. Concepts, World, and Life

The confluence of two lines of thought resulted in Nietzsche’s total rejection of ‘the true world’ – of any structured, ‘objective reality’ deemed to exist independently of human concerns, judgements and valuations. The first of these is already visible in his earliest essays, where he argues that any account we can give of the world is indelibly ‘anthropomorphic’. There can be no reason to suppose that the concepts and judgements employed to describe the world capture its antecedent, objective lay-out, since these are the outcome of various humanly-wrought ‘transferences’ or ‘metaphors’. In particular, it is we, not Nature, who divide the flux of sensory experience into classes or species, such as leaves or dogs – something we do by imposing a ‘sameness’ among the data which they do not themselves possess. ‘Every concept arises from the equation of unequal things’ (PT, p.83). That these, but not those, objects fall under a certain concept, is due to us, not to the pre-given structure of reality. This ‘nominalist’ or ‘constructivist’ view inspires Nietzsche’s much-quoted remark that ‘truths are illusions which we have forgotten ... metaphors that have become worn out’ (PT, p.84). So habitual have our concepts become that we imagine them, and the judgements which employ them, to record the objective lay-out of the world. That is an illusion, and none of those judgements is true, therefore, in the traditional sense of corresponding to the way things objectively are.

The formation and use of concepts is not, then, due to the demands of the world. It owes, rather, to practical human interests – in organizing the relative chaos of experience, in predicting and controlling the course of experience. For the young Nietzsche, these claims were compatible with the postulation of ‘things in themselves’: it’s just that, as Kant rightly emphasized, we can have no knowledge of what these are like. In a second line of thought, however, the mature Nietzsche comes to reject the very intelligibility of things in themselves, of a domain of reality inaccessible to human beings. ‘The “true world” finally became a fable’, he writes, with the move from the Kantian view of it as ‘unattainable’ to the recognition that it is ‘superfluous’ – that, indeed, the very contrast between a ‘true’ world and a merely ‘apparent’ one must be abolished (TI IV). If the ‘apparent’ world of leaves, dogs and people contrasts with anything, this is the ‘chaos of sensations’ which we have brought to order, to something we can cope with, in that ‘apparent’ world. It cannot contrast with some more ‘real, truly existing’ order of things, for no sense can be made of such an order. This is because the very meaning of terms like ‘real’ and ‘exist’ is tied to what ‘concerns us’, what has ‘efficacy’ for us, what engages with our life and experience (KGW VIII 1.5.19). The question earlier allowed, ‘what of the world would still be there’ if the ‘human head’ through which it is viewed were ‘cut off’ (HAH 1, 9), is now proscribed.

As these remarks suggests, Nietzsche’s first line of thought did not expire. He continues to emphasize the manner in which our concepts are actively ‘constructed’ or moulded by us in keeping with our interests and practical concerns. For example, the concept of punishment is really a ‘whole synthesis of “meanings”’ in which has ‘crystallized’ a whole ‘history of [the] employment [of punishment] for the most various purposes’ (GM II 13). To suppose that concepts could mirror an independent reality is to ignore their subjection to ‘form-giving forces’ at work in our ‘fundamental ... activity’ (GM II 12), their role in a ‘general economy of life’ which Nietzsche comes to equate with ‘will to power’ (BGE 23, WP 675).

Nietzsche’s ‘abolition’ of ‘the true world’ means that he is, in recent parlance, a robust ‘anti-realist’, who denies that there is a way the world anyway is independent of human interests, perspectives and judgements. Some commentators (for example, Clark, 1990 & 1998) suggest that, in his

late works, Nietzsche retracted this position and embraced a ‘commonsense realism’ which rules out only a ‘metaphysical realism’, according to which there may exist a reality closed to ‘any possible knower’. This suggestion, however, requires one to ignore many late remarks in the unpublished notes, such as ‘we can comprehend only a world that we ourselves have made’ (WP 495). It also requires one to suppose that his prolonged criticisms of realistic conceptions of truth and knowledge – ones of which, incidentally, he thinks ‘commonsense’ is guilty – were levelled against a position which, arguably, almost no one has ever held (see Poellner 1995). If ‘commonsense realism’ is the view that there are true statements which correspond to a reality independent of human perspectives, it is one which Nietzsche consistently rejected.

Nietzsche’s rejection of ‘the true world’ indeed raises the question of the status as ‘truths’ both of perfectly acceptable everyday statements, such as ‘It’s raining’, and of the philosophical claims which he himself advances. Nietzsche does not want to deny the availability of truth and knowledge in some sense of those terms. His relatively sketchy remarks on this question will be considered in §5. One reason his remarks are sketchy is that he is less interested in this question and, hence, in the analysis of truth, than in the question of why people value truth (see Pippin 1998). Why, especially, have they needed the illusion of a ‘true world’ for their beliefs to correspond to? To understand Nietzsche’s answer to that question, we turn to his philosophical psychology.

4. Psychology and ‘Genealogy’

Nietzsche’s account of human psychology is doubly important. First, it mounts a robust attack, often prescient of Wittgenstein, on a traditional, entrenched conception of mind. Second, it plays a key role in explaining the illusion of ‘the true world’. Attack and explanatory role are closely connected, since it is Nietzsche’s view that the conception he rejects is itself a model instance of ‘the true world’ illusion. Hence, understanding why people are so attracted to the mistaken conception of mind will aid in understanding people’s proneness to the broader illusion. If, in particular, we can account for belief in a substantial mental ‘subject’, we will have done much to explain the view that reality consists of substantial objects distinct from ‘the medley of sensations’, since ‘it is only after the model of the subject that we have invented [that] reality’ (WP 552).

The mental subject is, in fact, Nietzsche’s central critical target. Whether referred to as a subject, self, ego, I, mind or soul, it is ‘a fable, a fiction’, the product of a ‘crude fetishism’ which postulates some entity as the hidden cause of thoughts, feelings and actions (TI VI.3, III.5). To suppose that there must be a doer ‘behind’ the deed, a thinker ‘behind’ the thought, is like supposing that the lightning is something distinct from its flashing. These wrong suppositions, Nietzsche remarks, are encouraged by verbal forms like ‘I did/thought/felt X’ or ‘The lightning flashed’, which tempt us to postulate a substantial subject corresponding to the grammatical subject.

Nietzsche’s rejection of the self, subject or ego as ‘only a word’ (TI III.5) registers his ‘nominalist’ hostility, akin to Hume’s, to thinking that there must be some entity in common to, or causing, the diverse thoughts, feelings, and actions attributed to a person. More importantly, he thinks that the notion of self or subject has become irretrievably invested with wrong-headed conceptions of what human beings are like. It is not only philosophers like Descartes, but educated commonsense, that conceive of a person as being, essentially, a rational, conscious (and self-conscious), self-directing agent possessed of free will, only contingently connected to a body. Nietzsche rejects this whole conception. People hardly ever act rationally, in the sense of acting for reasons – these being, typically, ‘rationalisations’ after the event which ‘cause nothing’. Neither reason nor conscious thought plays anything like as large a role in bringing about behaviour as does ‘the nervous system’ (WP 529, 476, 526). More generally, there is no ‘helmsman’ serving as the ‘directing force’ behind our behaviour (GS 360). As for self-consciousness, far from being an essential property of human beings, it is something which ‘developed only under the pressure of the need for communication’ (GS 354). Self-reflective concern owes to the practical need to let others know of one’s condition, and hence presupposes the development of language. Freedom of the will, to which our notion of self or subject is especially in hock, is another fable or fiction (TI VI.3),

incompatible with an honest recognition – itself at odds with the traditional conception – of the inseparability of mental and bodily life. ‘Body am I entirely’, proclaims Zarathustra, and ‘soul is only a word for something about the body’ (Z I.4).

Nietzsche does allow for the possibility of certain individuals achieving what deserve to be called freedom, self-direction and, hence, selfhood. Precisely because this would be an achievement, however – a rare and difficult one, at that – it is wrong to depict the actual lives of ordinary human beings as those of free, self-directing selves. Why, then, is this depiction so entrenched? Nietzsche will use the resources of the philosophical psychology he pits against the traditional one to supply an answer.

The psychology or, as he sometimes prefers, ‘physio-psychology’ which Nietzsche recommends is a ‘minimalist’ one which seeks to understand all ‘doing and willing’, believing and valuing, in terms of a single ‘universal and basic instinct’ (WP 675). At one level, a person is a ‘multiplicity’ or ‘social structure’ of various drives, instincts and affects, but all of these may be subsumed under the ‘universal instinct’ for ‘life’ which Nietzsche calls ‘will to power’ (BGE 12, 23) – an ‘instinct’ manifested in growth and expansion, in overcoming obstacles, in adaptation to circumstances, and so on. All judgements and evaluations are ‘in the service of’ and ‘expression(s)’ of will to power (WP 675).

Nietzsche’s ‘physio-psychology’ is at the centre of his ‘genealogical’ account of the illusion of ‘the true world’. For while genealogy – ‘the attempt to show us how we have become what we are, so that we may see what we might yet become’ (Ridley 1998, p.8) – also incorporates reflection on the roles of, say, historical processes in bringing about beliefs, it is clear that, for Nietzsche, these roles are not autonomous. The historical developments to which he alludes, such as ‘the slave revolt’ in morality, are themselves explicable in terms of ‘physio-psychology’.

Nietzsche’s genealogy is intended, not only to explain beliefs and evaluations, but to break people’s attachment to them. It can do this, despite the fact that ‘the question of [their] origin ... is not at all equivalent to their critique’ (WP 254). From *Human, All Too Human* on, a prominent theme is that implicit in many beliefs and evaluations is a further belief about their origins. Especially in the case of our ‘highest concepts’ – moral and religious ones, say – the implicit conviction is that ‘the higher may not grow out of the lower’ (TI V.4). To demonstrate that such concepts are not the products of reason or intuition, but develop out of something as humble or ‘shameful’ as natural needs, is therefore bound to discredit them.

The ultimate target of Nietzsche’s genealogy or ‘physio-psychology’ is the whole illusion of ‘the true world’. Since, as we have seen, the entities with which people populate that world – God, atoms, Forms, and so on – are modelled on the substantial self or subject, debunking the latter will strike a major blow at the larger illusion. So what is the genealogical explanation of belief in the self or subject? For Nietzsche, it is no accident that the properties with which the self is invested are ones of moral significance – free will, self-direction, and the like. Freedom of the will – that ‘foulest of all theologians’ artifices’ – is concocted so that ‘men ... might be judged and punished’ (TI VI.7). The image of ourselves as rational ‘helmsmen’, by separating us from mere animals, is integral to moral esteem (GS 360). The traditional philosophical psychology Nietzsche attacks is, in short, a requirement of morality. Hence we can only understand Nietzsche’s explanation of the illusion of ‘the true world’, including the illusion of the self or subject, by attending to his genealogy of morality (§6). It is there that his ‘physio-psychology’ of drives, affects and will to power does its corrosive work.

5. Science, Perspective and Power

The term ‘physio-psychology’ may suggest that, for Nietzsche, the proper antidote to ‘true world’ metaphysics is a natural scientific account of the world. Certainly, he admires conscientious scientists for their respect for the evidence of the senses and their commitment to ‘truthfulness’.

‘Hurray for physics!’, that it teaches us to observe, he proclaims in *The Gay Science* (340). Four sections later, however, he writes that people with ‘faith in science’ in fact ‘affirm ... another world than that of life, nature, and history’, and thereby ‘deny... this world, our world’ (GS 344). Science, it emerges, is the latest form of the illusion of ‘the true world’, of ‘faith in the

ascetic ideal itself' (GM III.24). The scientist, no less than the theist, is incapable of accepting 'our world' of 'chaos' and 'becoming' as the only one and opposes to it a more 'real' world of Being – one populated, not by gods, but by forces, substances, laws of nature, and so on.

Nietzsche is an 'instrumentalist' with respect to such theoretical entities. They 'simply don't exist' (GS 112), being at best 'regulative fictions' required for certain purposes, such as predicting the course of experience, but in no way explanatory of experience. Physics is 'only an interpretation ... of the world (to suit us ...) and not a world-explanation' (BGE 14). If it were recognized as such, there would be no objection: indeed, it is an 'interpretation' which may be 'imperative for ... machinists and bridge-builders' (ibid.). Not only, however, does the ascetic ideal impel people to think that science is explanatory of experience, they privilege scientific descriptions over all others. That is a terrible 'prejudice' whose effect is to reduce the world to something 'essentially meaningless'. Music, for instance, gets reduced to what can be 'counted, calculated, put into [the] formulas' of mathematical physics (GS 373).

Since faith in science, like belief in the self and free will, is a product of the ascetic ideal, with its relegation of 'our world', explanation of it belongs, ultimately, to the genealogy of morality. With the scientific 'will to truth', we 'stand on moral ground' (GS 344), since this is the breeding-ground for the ascetic ideal and the illusion of 'the true world'. Before turning to that, however, we need to discuss the problems which Nietzsche's attitude to science poses for his own claims about the world and human beings. Related problems loomed in §3 as a result of Nietzsche's denial of the existence of truth in the traditional sense of correspondence with 'objective' facts. Those problems become more acute when he writes that 'there is ... only a perspective "knowing"' (GM III.12) and that 'facts are precisely what there is not, only interpretations' (WP 481). Everyone, not just physicists and theists, is advancing only interpretations from a certain perspective.

For some critics, the claim that there are only perspectives or interpretations is plain paradoxical. If true, it is either false or no better warranted than any other claim – since it itself expresses just one more perspective or interpretation. This criticism misses its mark. When Nietzsche calls a judgement perspectival, he does not mean that it is mistaken, but that it is not true in the sense of corresponding to reality. And that a theory or judgement is an interpretation does not preclude there being reasons to prefer it, in certain contexts at least, over a rival one (see Nehamas 1985). The physicist's interpretation, recall, may be 'imperative' for 'bridge-builders'.

If it is wrong to charge perspectivism with paradox, so it is, at an opposite extreme, to construe it as the uncontentious epistemological claim that knowledge presupposes some standpoint, that knowers must have some cognitive interests. For Nietzsche, the standpoints and interests which it is impossible to transcend are practical, 'all too human' and 'biological' ones. That these are presupposed by all enquiry is far from truistic. Moreover, Nietzsche persistently connects his perspectivism with metaphysical assertions to the effect that any structured world – any facts – of which sense can be made is one 'invented' or 'made'. Perspectivism is of a piece with his anti-realism.

Nietzsche is often understood to regard his own claims as perspectival interpretations which are true in the sense of being superior on pragmatic grounds to rival ones. Many of his remarks support this reading. He says of his doctrine of will to power, 'supposing that this also is only interpretation ... well, so much the better' (BGE 22). And there are many passages in *The Will to Power* where he urges that it is 'value for life' which is the 'final determinant' of truth in the only viable sense which remains once the traditional notion is abandoned (WP 493). Even in the case of logical and mathematical propositions, 'their utility alone is their "truth"' (WP 514).

If this is Nietzsche's position, it is not an obviously incoherent one. But his perspectival account of the sciences still poses a real problem. This is because his own 'physio-psychology' looks like a scientific theory. Now, science (psychology and biology included) inquires into the relatively ordered empirical world which, for Nietzsche, is the 'product' of the drives, affects etc. subsumed under our will to power. The problem is, how can one explain the very existence of an ordered world on the basis of phenomena which belong within it? Nietzsche is aware that one cannot:

it is absurd to propose that ‘the external world is the work of our organs’, of anything investigated by physiology or biology, for then our organs, as ‘part of this external world ... would be – the work of our organs!’ (BGE 15).

If coherence is to be maintained then, as Heidegger urges (1987, p.46), Nietzsche cannot be ‘thinking biologically’ about our drives, instincts, and ‘life’. That these are not the processes studied by the biological sciences is supported by descriptions of them as, *inter alia*, ‘interpreting’ and ‘having perspectives’ (WP 643, 581). The ‘ruling drives’ which comprise our will to power are not natural processes, but belong, as Heidegger puts it, to ‘the praxis of life’ (1987, p.72). They are the basic, purposive activities without which intelligent thought and action are impossible – those which ‘impose upon chaos’, through schematizing, simplifying, ordering, ‘subduing’ data and the like, the ‘regularity and form’ required by the ‘practical needs’ of all but the crudest kind of human existence (WP 515). It is the impositional, ordering character of this praxis which invites the label ‘will to power’. The drives etc. subsequently investigated by biology and physiology belong, not to this ‘form-giving’ praxis, but to the natural order which is its ‘product’.

A snag with this interpretation is that while Nietzsche sometimes equates will to power with ‘life’, in other places he speaks of it as present ‘in all events’ (GM II 12), as the ‘innermost essence’ of the world at large (WP 693). (In so doing, he partly resurrects the position, inspired by Schopenhauer, of *The Birth of Tragedy*.) A possible way to explain this proclamation of a ‘cosmic’ will to power is the following. ‘The total character of the world’, he writes, is one of ‘chaos’, in that it lacks, ‘in itself’, the ‘arrangement’ into objects, species, causal processes and so on which are a ‘human contribution’ (GS 109). Still, the ‘chaos’ is a relative one, for the world must display that degree of ‘direction’ and ‘organization’ (WP 561) which makes it possible for the concepts and schemas we impose to gain any purchase (see Schacht 1983, pp.194–9). If we are to characterise, however inadequately and metaphorically, this quasi-chaotic organization of ‘forces’, it can only be by ‘employ[ing] man as an analogy’ (WP 619), by invoking the terminology of power – of will, subjection, and indeed force itself.

If this is right, then Nietzsche’s own metaphysics is ‘only interpretation’ or ‘only perspectival’ in a special way. It is not a rival, on the same level, to perspectives he rejects, such as the religious and ‘mechanistic’ interpretations of the world. Unlike these, it is not guilty of the illusion of a structured, ‘true world’ of ‘Being’. On the other hand, Nietzsche recognizes that the metaphors which the characterization of the world as will to power invokes might ‘eventually seem unsuitable’ and ‘too human’ (BGE 22). Nietzsche’s characterization is ‘only interpretation’ to the degree that he does not exclude the possibility of more fitting and resonating metaphors.

6. Morality and Religion

The domain to which Nietzsche most resolutely applies his ‘physio-psychology’ of will to power is religious morality. This is partly because, as noted, the various metaphysical illusions he exposes, such as the self or ‘faith in science’, turned out to ‘stand on moral ground’. It is also because, in Nietzsche’s view, it is Judaeo-Christian morality whose emergence was the decisive event of western culture and whose atrophy is the primary reason for ‘the advent of nihilism’.

A genealogy of morality is made imperative by the impossibility of concurring in people’s own estimate of their moral judgements as statements of moral fact. ‘[T]here are altogether no moral facts’, only a ‘moral interpretation’ of phenomena (TI VII.1). The need, then, is to explain how, from a ‘pre-moral’ condition of life, properly moral interpretations emerge. ‘Properly’ needs emphasizing, since Nietzsche distinguishes between a broad, thin notion of morality as, roughly, ‘obedience to ... law or custom’ (HAH 1, 96), and the narrower, richer notion now suggested by the term ‘moral’. Morality, in the latter sense, comprises several components missing from the thinner notion: a concern for the motives of actions more than for the actions themselves; an emphasis on conscience and a sense of guilt; a determination to hold responsible, blame and punish; a premium on ‘disinterested’, altruistic actions; the idea that moral demands are universal, binding on all human beings as such; and the aim of minimizing suffering.

Nietzsche has his objections to each of these components. For example, the universal prescription

‘This is how everyone should act’ ignores both the the ‘rank-order’ of human beings and the unique context of each action (GS 335). Again, moral blame presupposes the untenable concept of free will. Crucially, however, he also has a central criticism of the whole package – of morality itself. It is ‘against life’ (GM III 13), ‘directed against ... the instincts of life’ (TI V.4), ‘the morbid softening ... through which ... “man” finally learns to be ashamed of all his instincts’ (GM II.7). In explaining how morality proper emerges from morality qua custom or mores, genealogy must also explain, therefore, the apparent paradox of ‘life [turning] against life’, of an institution which, like everything human, is in thrall to ‘basic instincts’ coming to be directed against them.

Nietzsche’s genealogy takes the form of an historical reconstruction in which the decisive event is ‘the slave revolt in morality’ against the ethical codes of the ‘masters’ or ‘warrior-nobles’ who have hitherto dominated the ‘slaves’. The revolutionary result was that ‘pre-moral’ conceptions of good, right and duty were hijacked and transformed by the ‘weak’ in accordance with an ‘ascetic ideal’ successfully promoted by those friends and exploiters of the weak, the ‘ascetic priests’. After the revolt, for example, the pre-moral term ‘bad’, which the warrior-nobles had earlier applied to those ‘inferior in nature’, is given the moral meaning of ‘evil’ and applied by the slaves to their erstwhile masters (GM I.11).

One motive for the slave revolt is obvious: resentment against masters whose natural aggression, especially when external enemies were lacking, turned towards the slaves themselves. The slave’s advantage in persuading his oppressors to subscribe to such virtues as humility and charity is apparent. This, however, can hardly explain the success of the revolt – the masters’ self-emasculatation – and anyway, Nietzsche argues, ignores a deeper dimension of the slaves’ resentment. This is their rancour towards themselves, the result in part of directing inwards an impotent resentment ‘denied the true reaction, that of deeds’ (GM I.10), and in part of self-loathing. The latter is due to a sense of inferiority with respect, especially, to the power exercised by the nobles of ‘creation and imposition of forms’, of determining how things should be called and actions valued (GM II.17).

The genius of that ‘repulsive caterpillar’, the ascetic priest, is to convert this corrosive, inner resentment into something ‘joyful’. He does so by inventing and successfully marketing two related dualisms: between the mundane world and the ‘true world’ of God, and between material existence and that of the immortal soul. The first distinction is elaborated so as to ‘devalue’ and deny serious point to ‘our earthly reality’ (EH IV.8), and to construe suffering as something deserved, through ‘original sin’. This strategy, it might seem, could hardly alleviate the slaves’ suffering, but in a virtuoso display of speculative psychology, Nietzsche argues that it does. For people ascetically fixed on an ideal, divine realm, the tribulations of an earthly life now perceived as a ‘mistake’ become trivial. Moreover, it was never ‘suffering as such but the senselessness of suffering’ which was unbearable, and it is precisely the idea that there is ‘any such thing as senseless suffering’ which Christianity has ‘abolished’ (GM II.7).

The second dualism, with the promise it affords of the soul’s immortal beatitude, reinforces the ascetic ideal’s devaluation of the earthly, and serves in two further ways to bolster the weak. The identification of the person with an inner self or soul facilitates a doctrine of equality, since overt differences in strength and beauty between masters and slaves may now be dismissed as superficial. The way is open for principles of equal human rights, of Kantian ‘respect for persons’ as such. Second, the soul is made the locus of a freedom of the will which is deployed, not only for the purpose of holding the masters culpably responsible for their deeds but, more subtly, to erase the slaves’ sense of inferiority. If they behave meekly and unaggressively, this is not because they are weak, but because they have chosen so to behave. It is as if, Nietzsche observes, lambs were to convince themselves that their difference from birds of prey consists in electing not to predate (GM I.13).

Nietzsche’s story of the emergence of morality proper via the dualisms, illusions and ideals promoted by ascetic priests is of a complexity that no brief account can accommodate. It is, in sum, the story of ‘life turned against life’. In this, for Nietzsche, there is no paradox. All human life is will to power, whose ‘natural’ expression is creative control of, ‘form-giving’ imposition on, the world. Among ‘botched and bungled’ people denied such expression, the will must be ‘sublimated’ into other strategies, ones which ‘devalue’ the kinds of expression of which such

people are incapable. If, in toto, the religious morality of the ascetic priests and their clientèle, the weak, represents a net 'diminution of life', it has nevertheless been an expression of life – of their life.

7. Overcoming Nihilism

That final point indicates a certain ambivalence of Nietzsche's towards the erosion of religious morality, for he recognizes the genuine benefits it has brought to 'the herd' – indeed, to all of us, since its civilizing effects have been responsible for 'the superiority ... of men over other animals' (GM I, 6). Certainly he does not advocate a return to the mores of the warrior-nobles who, for all their courage and absence of rancour, were 'stupid' and 'barbaric'.

On balance, nevertheless, Nietzsche welcomes the demise of religious morality, 'the end of its tyranny' over those capable of rising above the herd (WP 361) and the abolition of the 'true world' illusion which has sustained it. This is despite the upheavals this demise must cause, the entrenchment of the 'true world' illusion in new forms (notably 'faith in science'), and Nietzsche's prediction, in darker moods, that nihilism will last for the foreseeable future. This will not be the 'active', and transitory, nihilism of bomb-chucking revolutionaries, but something more enduring and depressing – the 'passive', 'decadent', 'sickly' nihilism of people without ideals and purpose, indeed without will. At least the 'active' nihilist willed something, if only something negative and destructive, and it is better that 'man will nothingness than not will' at all (GM III 28). The truly 'nauseating' spectre is that of the 'maggot-men', 'little men', or 'last men' of Zarathustra's Prologue, with their easy-going hedonism, liberal tolerance of all opinions and tastes, 'thickly padded humanity' (TI IX 37), and lack of commitment to any 'decisive and hard' Yes or No – men for whom the only sin, perhaps, is to think anything a sin.

This remarkable anticipation of a 'postmodern' climate of thought is sometimes countered, or accompanied, by Nietzsche's confidence in the emergence, if only as the occasional 'lucky hit' (GM I 12), of a 'redeeming' kind of person in whom nihilism and decadence are overcome. Like the 'last man', and unlike the ascetic priest, this redeeming type will be without 'articles of faith', liberated as he is from the illusion of a 'true world' of values there to be discovered. But like the ascetic priest, and unlike the 'last man', he will be committed to values and ideals, albeit ones which are 'moraline-free' and 'created'. As such, this 'Overman', as Nietzsche sometimes calls the redeeming type, will indeed be 'new, unique, incomparable', for never previously have people attempted, let alone successfully managed, to live with commitment to ideals of which they recognize themselves to be the sole source. Where faith in a 'transcendental' source has atrophied, so, as with the 'last man', has any sense of meaningful purpose.

Nietzsche nowhere paints a detailed portrait of the Overman (or his near-relatives – the 'higher type', 'sovereign individual', 'free spirit', and so on). After all, 'there has never been an Overman' (Z II.4), and since the Overman creates his own values, indeed 'creates himself', no blueprint of his life can be prepared in advance. Nevertheless, we are told of some of the qualities the Overman must have if he is to be the 'supreme type' of human being through maximally embodying will to power. To begin with, he must, as the name suggests, overcome, for in 'the degree of resistance ... continually overcome' is a measure of 'freedom understood ... as will to power' (WP 770). Unlike the ascetic priest, what the Overman overcomes are not our instincts and 'ruling drives', but the ascetic ideal itself and other obstacles to the expression of those drives. Second, his attitude to life as a whole must be that of the 'Yea-sayer', of unqualified affirmation, to the point indeed of celebrating the thought of 'eternal recurrence', of life – one's own included – 'return[ing] to you, all in the same ... sequence' innumerable times (GS 341. cf. Z III.2). This is because the ultimate exercise of power is control of the past, 'to recreate all "it was" into a "thus I willed it"' (Z II 20), which, given eternal recurrence, is something one can indirectly do in the sense of willing past events to reoccur. (Whether Nietzsche regarded eternal recurrence as a plausible cosmological hypothesis, and not simply as a thought experiment for testing people's strength of affirmation, is much contested. See, eg, Danto 1965.)

Finally, the redeeming human type must possess the 'great and rare art' of '“giving style” to one's character', in the specific sense of incorporating everything in his or her life – drives, affects, values, ideals – into an 'artistic plan' (GS 290). To be weak is to be disintegrated, torn

apart, without a centre. To be powerful is to achieve, like Goethe, ‘totality’, an integration of ‘reason, senses, feeling, and will’. It is because Goethe ‘disciplined himself to wholeness’ that he can be said to have ‘created himself’ and to have approximated, at least, to the Overman (TI IX 49). In effect, the Overman, an ‘artist of his life’, combines the two great ‘art drives of nature’, Dionysian and Apollonian, vividly depicted in Nietzsche’s first book (BT 1). Like the Apollonian artist, the Overman gives form and structure to his life, but like the Dionysians, with their insight into the ‘primal oneness’ of the world, this is done in full recognition that ‘all is redeemed and affirmed in the whole’ (TI IX 49), that forms are imposed by the ‘form-giver’. This is why ‘style’, hence power, hence the redeeming type of human being, are possible only in the wake of the deaths of God and the illusions of an already structured ‘true world’. Whether such types will be a few ‘lucky hits’ in a world dominated by ‘last men’, or whether they can be ‘bred’ in sufficient number to bring about the demise of nihilism too – this is an issue Nietzsche leaves to the future to decide.

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尼采与科学

Nietzsche and Science

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自1949年以来, 中国大陆哲学界关于尼采的正统观点是, 他“公开拒绝科学”, “反对理性主义”。本文认为, 尼采并不拒绝科学, 也不完全否定理性。理由是: (1) 尼采曾认真研究科学。(2) 在1876-1883年间, 他强调实证科学, 有许多赞颂科学的言论。(3) 他虽然一再反对把科学理论等同于真理, 但他仍认为科学是人类生存所必需。(4) 尼采更认为, 哲学应该建立在科学的基础之上。他宣扬“上帝死了”, 永恒轮回, 超人, 求力意志, 都以进化论、能量守恒原理、点原子论为依据。(5) 他的透视主义认识论, 也不完全否定理性, 只是认为, 人的认识, 除了理性, 也不排斥情感、直觉、灵感等非理性因素。

但是, 尼采坚决反对唯科学主义。他反对把科学等同于客观的、绝对的真理; 反对把求真作为人生的最高目标。他反对为科学献身的苦行主义, 主张快乐的科学。他不同意科学万能, 因为科学不能解决人生的意义问题, 价值问题。他反对为科学而科学的颓废的虚无主义, 主张为人生而科学。

尼采的本体论是变幻不息的力量量的世界, 这比较符合现代物理学量子场论的世界图像。但他赋予力量量以求力意志, 提倡泛意志论, 这反映了他的时代局限性。他的透视主义认识论, 得到现代科学的支持, 是一种比较全面并具有巨大包容性的认识论。他的谱系学方法, 历史的方法, 对研究宇宙、天体、地球、生命、思维、人类、社会的起源与发展都是十分有用的。

Since 1949, the orthodox viewpoint of the Chinese philosophical circle about Nietzsche was that, he “publicly reject science”, “oppose rationality”. I think, Nietzsche did not reject science and not negate rationality completely. My arguments are: (1) Nietzsche did study sciences seriously. (2) From 1876 to 1883, he emphasized positive sciences, and wrote a lot words to praise sciences. (3) Although he time and again opposed to identify scientific theories with truths, he still held that sciences were necessary for human existence. (4) Nietzsche held further, philosophy must be

based on sciences. He advocated “the God is dead”, Eternal return, Übermensch, Will to power, all these were based on the theory of evolution, the principle of conservation of energy, and the point atomic theory. (5) His perspectivist epistemology did not completely negate rationality, what he held was that, the factors effected human cognition, except rationality, also included irrational factors such as emotion, intuition, inspiration, etc.

Nevertheless, Nietzsche was firmly against Scientism. He opposed to identify sciences with objective, absolute truths; opposed to look the will to truth as the highest aim of human life. He opposed the asceticism of devotion to sciences, advocated the gay science. He disagreed with that science was omnipotent, since science could not solve the problem of values, the meaning of human life. He opposed “science for science” as the decadent nihilism, and advocated “science for human life”.

Nietzsche's ontology was the ever-changing world of power quanta, this is comparatively correspondent to the world picture of modern physics (quantum field theory). But he endowed power quanta with will to power, advocated pan-voluntarism, owing to the limitation of his time. His perspectivist epistemology is supported by modern sciences, and seems more comprehensive and inclusive. His methodology of genealogy is useful to the research on the origins and developments of cosmos, stars, earth, life, mind, human being and societies.

尼采 (Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, 1844–1900) 是德国19世纪的大哲学家, 他也是语言学家、音乐家和诗人。尼采的哲学, 在20世纪上半叶, 对中国产生了积极的影响。就在他逝世后两年 (1902年), 梁启超就称马克思和尼采的思想是“今之德国最占势力之两大思想”。以后, 哲学家王国维、蔡元培、胡适等都对他有所评介。中国新文学运动的旗手鲁迅、郭沫若、茅盾都深受尼采的思想和文学风格的影响。^[1] 在1949年以后, 中国大陆的官方意识形态对尼采取全盘否定的态度, 认为尼采的哲学是“反动资产阶级公开无耻的反人民、反民主的强盗哲学”、“法西斯思想的先驱”、“公开拒绝科学, 宣扬神秘主义”、“反对理性主义”。^[2] 尼采哲学的研究长期成为禁区。1980年以后, 在改革开放、解放思想政策的影响下, 人们又开始了对尼采的研究, 甚至形成了尼采热。但都偏重在尼采的哲学、美学以及尼采对中国新文学的影响方面。对尼采对科学的态度和观点很少涉及。而《中国大百科全书》(哲学卷) 仍认为尼采是“反理性主义的典型”。^[3]

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其实, 纵观尼采一生, 他并不“拒绝科学”, 也不完全否定理性。理由如下:

1. 他曾认真学习当代的科学。在他任教巴塞尔大学期间 (1869–1879), 他曾向学校图书馆借阅过大量自然科学和人类学书籍, 以弥补自己实证知识的不足。^[4] 他对迈尔 (R. Mayer, 1814–1878) 的能量守恒原理、达尔文 (C. Darwin, 1809–1882) 的进化论和博斯科维奇 (R. G. Boscovich, 1711–1787) 的力学和原子论都很了解。
2. 在尼采学术工作的第二阶段 (1876–1883), 他强调实证科学, 有许多赞颂科学的言论。例如, 他写道:

“人要想得更深刻, 感觉更敏锐, 比其他动物站的更高——与世界的真正本性更为接近, 这只有通过科学。” (《人性的, 太人性的》, § 29)

“科学精神基于对它的方法的洞察, 如果失去了科学方法, 一切科学成果都不能阻挡迷信与胡说再度取得胜利。” (《人性的, 太人性的》, I, 1: 9)

“‘回到科学! 回到科学的自然和自然性!’——也许, 这种声音实际上揭开了一个时代的序幕, 对于这个时代来说, 科学的‘野蛮的、丑陋的’地方将是它最美的地方, …” (《曙光》, § 427)

“对于事物的任何真正的知识, 哪怕是最微不足道的知识, 都会给心灵带来某种喜悦, 而随着科学的发展, 这种喜悦正源源不断地向我们涌来。…哪怕是最丑的现实的知識也是美的, …” (《曙光》, § 550)

“科学的最终目的是要给人创造尽量多的快乐和尽量少的痛苦吗? …事实上, 人们借助科学既可以促进这个目的, 又可以促进另一个目的, 科学的力量一方面剥夺了人的欢乐, 使人变得更冷酷, 更呆板, 更克欲, 也许科学正因为这力量今天才广为人知, 人们发现它是个伟大的痛苦制造者; 但另一方面, 人们也发现科学的反作用力, 这力量是无可估量的, 它必将照亮欢乐的新世界!” (《快乐的科学》, § 12)

“在科学的明晰、严格的要素中, 人们有了他的全部力量; 在这儿他能够飞翔!” (同上, § 293)

“我们要成为…创造自我的人! 为了当创造者, 我们必须成为物理学家。迄今一切价值评估和理想全都建立在对物理学的无知和违背物理学的基础上, 所以, 我们要向物理学欢呼致敬! 更要向强迫我们钻研物理学的诚实欢呼致敬!” (同上, § 335)

根据这些言论, 怎么可以说尼采是“公开拒绝科学”呢?

3. 在尼采学术工作的第三个阶段（1883-1889），他反对把科学理论等同于真理，但他仍认为科学是人类生存所必需。他写道：

“最虚假的判断（包括先验综合判断），对我们来说是最不可缺少的；如果不承认逻辑的虚构，不用纯粹由人类发明的绝对并自我同一的世界来衡量实在，不用数字对世界作持续的篡改，人类就无法生存。”（《超善恶》，§ 4）

在谈到原子论时，尼采也说：“为了理解世界，我们就要能够计算它，为了能够计算它，我们就要找到恒久不变的原因：因为我们在现实世界中找不到这种恒久不变的原因，我们就为了我们自己而发明它们——即原子。”（《求力意志》，§ 624）

他还说：“我们为了自己安排一个我们能在其中生活的世界——假设了物体、线、面、原因与结果、运动和静止、形式和内容；没有这些信仰的条目，现在就没有人能够坚持生活！但这并不意味着一切都被证明。生活不是论据；因为错误也可以是生活的条件之一。”^[5]

4. 尼采认为，哲学应该建立在科学的基础之上。他曾说：“现在所有的科学都在为哲学家未来的使命进行准备工作，而哲学家的使命就是，他们必须解决价值的难题，必须确定各种价值的档次。”（《论道德的谱系》，I，§ 17）而他的一些哲学命题确实是建立在当时的科学基础之上的。

例如，他宣称“上帝死了！”“要重估一切价值”。那么，“究竟是什么战胜了基督教上帝呢？是科学的良知和理智的纯洁。”（《快乐的科学》，§ 357）

他多次把永恒轮回与能量守恒原理相联系。例如，他写道：“能量守恒的原理要求永恒轮回。”（《权力意志》，张念东等译，2000年版，462页）

他的超人学说也以进化论为依据。他说：“直到现在，一切生物都创造了高出于自己的种类，…你们愿意返于兽类，不肯超越人类吗？”（《查拉斯图如是说》，I，序，§ 3）而人要成为超人，也需要利用科学和建立在科学基础上的现代技术。

尼采的求力意志世界图像则以能量守恒原理和博斯科维奇的动力点原子理论为依据。^[6]

5. 尼采也不反对理性。他认为，人认识世界是通过科学的透视、感情的透视和哲学的透视（其中又分为批判的透视和建构的透视）。他认为，科学的透视和哲学的透视中的批判的透视都要以理性为主导。他只是认为，除理性之外，也不要排斥情感、直觉、灵感等非理性因素吧了。（参见[5]，p. 72）

所以，说尼采拒绝科学，反对科学、反对理性是缺乏根据的。

二

但是，为什么会有人认为尼采是拒绝科学和反科学的呢？这可能是因为尼采坚决抨击唯科学主义，反对把科学等同与客观真理和绝对真理，把追求科学真理作为人生的最高目标，不承认科学万能。因为，在尼采看来，科学不能解决价值问题。

尼采说：“真理是什么？是一堆可边的隐喻、转喻、拟人化，简言之，是一堆人类关系，它们被诗意地修辞地提高、翻译、修饰，由于长期使用，一个民族便以为它们牢不可破，奉若神明，具有约束力；真理是那样一些幻想，人们已经忘记它们是幻想了；是那样一些隐喻，它们已成为陈词烂调并丧失了感性力量，是那样一些金币，它们已磨损了压纹，现在只能当作金属而不再是金币了。”（《偶像的黄昏》，84，参见[5]，p. 98）

尼采认为，科学同艺术一样，是虚构，是幻想，是约定，是谎言；只是科学不像艺术那样诚实，不承认自己是虚构、幻想和约定罢了。（参见[5]，pp. 12-13）

他还说：“究竟什么是人的真理？——不可驳到的谬误便是。”（《快乐的科学》，§ 265）

“‘真理’：按照我的思维方式，它未必是谬误的对立面，在多数场合，只是不同谬误彼此之间的一种关系。譬如说，一种谬误比另一种更古老，更根深蒂固，甚至也许是不可铲除的，因为我们这类有机生物离开它就不能生存；相反，对我们来说，其他谬论误不是这样作为生存条件起支配作用，毋宁说，用这样一来一类的支配标准来衡量，是可以被排除和‘驳倒’的。”“真理是一种驳不倒的假说”（《求力意志》，§ 535）尼采认为，真理与谎言、谬误是连续的，就像画家的色彩一样，只有程度的差异。（参见[6]，p. 12）尼采认为，科学是对世界的主观解释，而不是客观的描述。他写道：“事实并非就是事实，只是解释。”（《求力意志》，§ 481，参见[6]，p. 204）

尼采的这种独特的否定真理的真理观是与他的世界观相联系的。他的求力意志的世界不是固定不变的存在（Being），而是变幻不息、自相矛盾的生成（Becoming）。正如赫拉克利特所说，“同一事物既是是，又是非，总是处在直接的现实性和内在潜有的变换的对立矛盾之中。所以形式逻辑中的同一律和无矛盾律“只适用于我们创造的、虚构的本质性”而不适用于真实的世界。（参见[5]，pp. 4-5）人的语言中的概念是通过抽象和简化，舍弃变动的具体事物的个性和多样性而形成的，也不符合真实的是事物。所以，尼采说：哲学家跳不出“语言之网”，“逻辑是语言镣铐中的奴隶”。（参见[6]，p. 10）所以，在尼采看来，科学理论既不符合真理符合论的标准，也不符合真理融贯论的标准。科学之所以为人类所必需，就是因为它有用。但是尼采并不真正反对求真。他认为，“大智者”的“求

力意志”就是“求真意志”。《如是说》，自我超越）

尼采的真理观也与他透视主义认识论相联系。他说：“有各式各样的眼睛。…因此就有各式各样的‘真理’。因此，也就没有真理。”（《求力意志》，§ 540，[6]，p. 26）他还说：“世上只有透视的看，只有透视的认知：我们愈是允许更多的情感来谈论我们的事物，我们愈是善于让更多的眼睛、各种各样的眼睛去看同一事物，我们关于此事物的‘概念’，我们的‘客观性’就愈加全面。”（《论道德的谱系》，§ 12）在尼采看来，所谓“客观”并不是超越一切透视，相反是综合了一切透视，是一切透视的总和，也就是从各个视角、各个层面观察结果的总和。但因为我们将归根到底摆脱不了人类特殊的透视，所以，严格说来，对世界的客观描述在事实上是不可能的。尼采还指出，科学家、理论家从苏格拉底那里继承了“一种不可动摇的信仰：认为思维凭借因果律的引线，便可能达到存在只深不可测的渊源，思维不仅能够认识存在，而且能变革存在”，（《悲剧的诞生》，§ 15）认为这样就能认识外观之下的“本真世界”。尼采认为这只是一种幻想，而且他也反对有一个与外观世界相脱离的所谓的“本真世界”。他换说：“这种崇高的形而上学的设想，像本能一样伴随着科学，而且屡屡引导科学到达它的极限。”（同上）

尼采研究了科学的谱系。他指出科学的前导是神话、巫术和炼金术。他认为，由于巫师、占星家和炼金术士先于科学，“他们怀着一腔热望最先对种种隐秘的、被禁止的力量产生探索的渴求和兴趣”，科学才得以产生和壮大。（《快乐的科学》，§ 300）当哲学家和自由的心灵听到“老上帝已死”的消息，他们又鼓起爱知者的全部勇气，冒着重重危险，向着空前“开放的海洋”起航。（同上，§ 343）尼采指出，基督教认为“上帝即真理，真理是神圣的”，（同上，§ 344）尼采认为，科学不要把自己等同于神圣的绝对真理，使自己成为新的宗教范式；而应该向开放的知识海洋不断进行新的探索。

所以，尼采反对唯科学主义，反对把科学等同于绝对的、客观的真理，等同与基督教的上帝。反对把追求科学真理作为人生的最高目标。他不承认科学万能，因为科学不能解决价值问题，即人生的意义问题。他把什么是科学真理的问题改为问：“为何要科学？”“为何要真理？”他认为，科学应该是为了人生的快乐。

所以，尼采也反对为上帝献身的基督教苦行主义，也反对为科学献身的苦行主义。他曾把科学家描绘为一个躺在泥塘中、被水蛭咬得鲜血直流的人，他研究水蛭的脑，而对其他一无所知。（《如是说》，水蛭）尼采主张“快乐的科学”，认为“科学的最终目的是给人创造尽量多的欢乐”，而不是“剥夺人的欢乐，使人边得更冷酷、更呆板、更克欲”。（《快乐的科学》，I，§ 12）他说：“苦行主义理想诱导着去…仇恨人类、甚而仇恨动物界，甚而仇恨物质；苦行主义理想诱导它憎恨感官，憎恶理性本身；诱导它畏惧幸福和美丽；诱导它要求摆脱一切外观、变化、成长、死亡、愿望甚至于摆脱追求本身。”（《论道德的谱系》，第三章，§ 28）

尼采也反对“为科学而科学”的颓废的虚无主义。因为科学不仅不能回答人生的意义是什么，它也不能解决它自身的价值问题，它也不能对艺术作出恰当的评价。尼采说：“假定人们衡量音乐的价值，是根据从它那儿算出了多少数字，多少可以用公式来套，那么，对音乐进行如是‘科学’的评价是何等荒谬啊！那样做究竟对音乐领悟、理解和认识了什么呢？什么也没有！…”（《快乐的科学》，§ 373）尼采召唤人去创造价值，要“热爱命运”，以便同偶在搏斗：“我们要一步一步地同偶然这个巨人搏斗，迄今，荒谬和无意义依旧在支配着全人类。”（《如是说》，给予的道德）

尼采主张，科学要为人服务，为人类的幸福与快乐服务。科学不顾一切，无止境地追求真理，这种动力必须受到艺术的驾驭。科学作为一种文化，必须接受文化的医生—哲学—的诊治。（参见[5]，p. 14）

三

1. 尼采的本体论是求力意志的世界。他说，在变幻不息的力量子的世界中，“除了力量子，没有别的东西，力量子与所有其他力量子之间存在着张力的关系，它们的本质就在于与所有其他量子的关系，在于它们对所有其他量子的‘作用’。”（《求力意志》，§ 635）力量子通过结合、排列或组织，可以形成小到原子、分子，大到星体、星系这样的事物。（参见[6]，pp. 39-42）他的这些观点，比较符合现代物理学的量子场论的世界图像。但他赋与世界万物以求力意志，这里他就没有运用谱系学方法，没有想到生命、意志也是从没有生命、意志的世界中产生的。在尼采的时代，当时还没有信息科学、分子生物学、自组织理论等等，对生命、思维、意志的起源还很缺乏研究。所以，他有这种思想，也是不足为怪的。

2. 尼采的认识论是透视主义。它的要点是：（1）认知者的知识状态是认知者的本性与被认知者的本性相互作用的产物。（2）不同的物种以不同的方式表象世界。（3）概念并不反映实在。主体、客体、物、因果等等概念不是由实在导出，而是加给实在的。（4）语言的结构和机制对建构我们关于世界的观念施加了影响。（5）我们用逻辑建构我们的世界观念。无矛盾律是一个解释的原理，它规定我们接受哪种解释。（6）社会地位对认知有影响，特别是对社会的认识。奴隶和主人的认知就有差异。（7）历史地位的影响。（8）群体（种族、民族、性别等等）都影响其透视。（9）个人因素的影响，例如，健康或疾病、身体强弱、昏迷或清醒都对如何解释世界有影响。（[5]，pp. 72-73）相对论表明，人的观察依赖于他所在的参照系的运动状态。量子力学表明，人对微观对象的观察依赖于他所使用的仪器。我们要了解一个具体的人，分子生物学家研究他的基因组，生理学家研究他的组织和器官以及它们的运行，心理学家研究他的心理，社会学家研究他的社会地位和行为，…这些不同层面的透视，对了解这个具体人都是必要的。现代科学的发展日益显示了透视主义认识论是一种比较全面并具有较大包容性的认识论。

3. 尼采喜欢运用谱系学的方法。他探讨过道德的谱系、科学的谱系、宗教、知识、逻辑等等的起源。他不同意真与假、善与恶、美与丑、主观与客观、本质与现象等等的二分法，反对把它们看作是截然对立的两极，而宁可看作是一种连续的谱系。他的谱系学方法、历史的方法，在研究宇宙、天体的起源与发展，地球的起源与发展，生命的起

源与发展, 思维、意志的起源与发展, 社会的经济、政治、文化等等的起源与发展都十分必要的。因为在这些事物的起源与发展中, 都存在着突变的因素, 有一些突现的事件。这些都不是用一个复盖律加上一些边界条件就可以加以说明和预测的。

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尼采“一切价值重估”的思想是一种现代方法论

Nietzsche's Idea of "Revalue Everything" Is a Kind of Modern Methodology

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本文拟认为, 尼采思想可以转换为方法论; 不论其形上学、美学、诗学及其艺术, 也即他的方法。因为尼采创生的思想不是“观念”或为着观念, 而是揭示生命真谛, 使生命充盈强大、改造人类和世界的“武器”。实际上他的全部思想也可谓他的全部方法。现代世界产生了尼采, 尼采的思想和方法当是现代世界的一种含义和方法。其中, 尼采的“一切价值重估”思想, 构成现代科学论、认识论的一种方法; 也是历史认识论、社会认识论的一种方法, 更是文化哲学及其发展的内在逻辑动力或方法; 还是人类自身不断超越、升华的客观环节或方法。因为科学范式的不断演进、更新, 实质是不断批判、否定或重估旧范式的结果; 人类对历史、社会、文化及自身认识的不断深化及其超越, 实际上即是对原有这些观念或价值不断重估或批判、否定及其创新之果。欧洲中世纪被欧洲科学复兴的近代否定以及近代又被现代发达的资本主义否定, 实际上是欧洲人价值观念不断“重估”或批判、否定、创新的外在性表征或显现。中国改革开放时代的出现同时也是对旧有传统价值观念的“重估”或批判、否定、创新之必然。在一定意义可以说, 这个世界是由思想领导着, 或由多种多样的价值观念领导着。总之, 人类发展和社会进步实质是人类价值观念不断进行自我重估、批判、否定和创新的一系列思想文化活动与实践活动。故尼采思想从其实质考察皆可转换为方法论。尼采思想方法论构成现代人类和社会进步不可失缺的精神财富。具体说:

1 尼采哲学的真谛在于高扬人类生命价值; 无论其权力意志说还是超人理论, 旨在使人类和世界进入一个积极、健康、向上发展的正确方向: “我的毕生工作是为人类准备一个伟大自觉的时机、、、、那时, 人类将不再受偶然事件和教士的支配, 将会第一次提出整个人类的原因和理由问题。这个毕生工作是下述观点的必然结果, 这个观点是说, 人类并没有走上他们所愿意走的正确道路, 它根本没有受到良好的治理, 完全处在那趋于否定、堕落和颓废等神圣价值之下”。(尼采:《瞧! 这个人》, 中国和平出版社, 1986年版, 第72页) 因此尼采说, 关于道德价值起源问题就成了他研究的最重要的问题, 因为这决定人类的未来。实际上尼采不是不要道德或道德虚无主义者, 他否定的只是否定人类生命意志、假借“圣者”、“基督”名义实则压抑、摧残人类自然生命, 使人消极颓废、丧失人的尊严和特性的奴隶道德。“以往我们被要求去相信, 所谓在根本上, 一切事物都是处在最好的情况中, 而圣经则确保我们得到神圣的指导以及俯视人类命运的智慧。可是当我们回到事实的真相时, 我们便发现, 我们所有的, 是阻遏可怕事实的意志, 而这种可怕事实则保持相反的情形, 这个事实告诉我们, 一直到现在, 人类处在最坏的情况中, 人是被那些不适当的东西所支配, 被那心理上弄巧成拙的人所支配, 也就是被那些所谓“圣者”所支配——那些谋害世界和诋毁人类的人。利他主义被视为绝对价值而“自利”主义则到处遭到敌视, 我们要在这个事实中为下述事实找出一个决定性的证明, 即教士(包括那些伪装教士, 哲学家)不但在某种固定宗教范围内已变为主人, 同时, 颓废道德, 虚无意志已被视为道德本身了”。(同上书, 第73页)

2 尼采“一切价值重估”的价值意蕴, 在于全面深刻反思人类创造的全部文化包括欧洲基督教文化及其道德价值观念, 对人类生存意志的种种压制、迫害抑或造成的灾难, 从而使生命意志萎缩、人格卑微、道德颓废、人种退化, 使人类不但不能实现自我超越, 甚至今天的人类“比任何时候具有更多的猴性”。所以“一切价值重估”就是对西方二千多年传统价值观念的反思、批判、否定或颠覆; 尼采借查拉图式特拉之口呼出“上帝死了”, 就是宣告统治西方人的心灵几千年的基督精神的倒塌; 因为基督教道德是颓废道德, 使人不成为其人。而尼采要以人自己的精神或自我精神或个人主义取代非道德压抑人生命力的基督教精神或旧价值观念。这是新时代、新人类、新价值观。

3 中国五千年文化虽然博大精深, 但糟粕也在其中。鲁迅谓这种糟粕是“吃人的文化”。而儒学文化从根本上来说是维护封建统治者的文化, 故这种文化的特性是以维护封建特权或等级制为其宗旨的。所以, 这种文化的内在特质是“颂”的文化, 缺乏批判否定性特质。所以, 尽管身子进到社会主义了, 但在文化深处或人们意识深处, 仍然遗留浓重的封建主义东西。孙中山说, 在中国人的思想中推翻满清专制, 当于推翻现实中百个、千个满清统治之艰难。尼采价值重估的思想和方法论, 应当成为我们今天进入新时代, 复兴中华, 使民族融入世界浩浩荡荡之现代化大潮之一思想利器, 即“拿来主义”为我所用是也; 使“颂”的文化中有悲剧精神, 有危机意识, 有批判、否定性文化基

因, 如是, 才能创新。

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Nietzsche on Religion, Metaphysics and the Contemporary World

Mark Hammond

To address the various themes of this conference my paper, *Nietzsche on Religion, Metaphysics and the Contemporary World* will analyze the following quotes by Nietzsche:

[1] [“The Chinese ... seem to have produced their Confucius and Lao-tse

under the influence of this ancient classic of law, [Manu’ s book of laws ... This ... priestly codex of morality based on ... the idea of caste... supplements my views on religion in the most remarkable way. I confess to having the impression that everything else that we have by way of moral lawgiving seems to me an imitation and even caricature of it.”] (*Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche*, Ed Christopher Middleton, pg. 297-8.)

[2] “The means employed by the lust for power have changed, but the same volcano continues to glow ... and what one formerly did “for the sake of God” one now does for the sake of money, that is to say, for the sake of that which now gives the highest feeling of power and good conscience. *Daybreak*, 204.

[3] [“The interests of tutelary government and the interests of religion go hand in hand together, so that when the latter begins to die out the foundations of the state too are undermined ... The prospect presented by this certain decay is, however not in every respect an unhappy one: the prudence and self interest of men are, of all their qualities, the best developed; if the state is no longer equal to the demands of these forces then the last thing that will ensue is chaos: an invention more suited to their purposes than the state will gain victory over the state.”] [Private companies will step by step absorb the business of the state: even the most resistant remainder of what was formerly the work of government (for example its activities designed to protect the private person from the private person) will in the long run be taken care of by private contractors. Disregard for and the decline and death of the state, the liberation of the private person (I take care not to say: of the individual), is the consequence of the democratic conception of the state; it is in this that its mission lies.”] *Human All too Human*, 472.

There is a two-fold importance of these quotes to my paper. First because each quote touches directly on a central theme of this conference:

1. Nietzsche on Religion,
2. Nietzsche on Metaphysics
3. Nietzsche and the implications his philosophy has for the contemporary world.

The second reason these quotes are important is because contained within each of them is one key idea that figures in my argument: [1] contains the key idea of the caste system. [2] contains the key idea that people now do for the sake of money what they formerly did for the sake of God. [3] contains the key idea that God’ s death is accompanied by the decline of democracy and the emergence of private contractors i.e. multinational corporations as being of fundamental importance in defining society.

I conclude my paper by addressing a final theme of this conference, Nietzsche on Science. For when the abovementioned key ideas are seen in relation to both the human genome project, and Zarathustra’ s teaching of the *ubermensch*, the picture to emerge is this; we are only just beginning to understand the implications that Nietzsche’ s philosophy has for the contemporary world. Specifically why Nietzsche regarded the question of value as a question of first rank philosophical importance; for in a world of declining democracy where multinational corporations are merging evermore with the science of genetic engineering, the question, What does it mean to value? might just

be answered by the type of human beings that these multinational corporations pressure scientists into engineering.

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海德格尔对尼采的诠释

Heidegger' s Interpretation of Nietzsche

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一. 海德格尔虽然在《存在与时间》里也引证了尼采《不合时宜的考察》关于三种历史学的观点,但前期海德格尔并未对尼采作专门研究,尼采研究乃是后期海德格尔的兴趣:

1. 1936—1940年海德格尔共有5个学期专授尼采哲学,计:1936—37年冬季学期“尼采:作为艺术的权力意志”;1937年夏季学期“尼采在西方思想中的形而上学基本位置:同一物的永恒回归”;1938—39年冬季学期“尼采的第二个不合时宜的考察”;1939年夏季学期“尼采关于作为知识的权力意志的学说”;1940年第二个三分之一学年“尼采:欧洲虚无主义”。

2. 1941—42冬季学期原准备开授尼采课程撰写了“尼采的形而上学”,但后改授荷尔德林诗,此稿作为《海德格尔全集》第50卷于1990年发表。

3. 1943年海德格尔曾在小范围内作了题为“尼采的话‘上帝死了’”讲演,此乃是对其1936—1940年5个学期尼采讲座的提示。

4. 1950年“尼采的话‘上帝死了’”发表于《林中路》中。

5. 1954年出版的《讲演与论文集》中收入“形而上学的克服”和“谁是尼采的查拉图斯特拉”。

6. 1961年《尼采》两卷本出版,系1936—1940年5个学期讲稿和1941—42年准备讲稿的汇合集。第一卷有“作为艺术的强力意志”、“同一物的永恒回归”、“作为知识的强力意志”;第二卷有“同一物的永恒回归与强力意志”、“欧洲虚无主义”、“尼采的形而上学”、“对虚无主义的存在历史之规定”、“作为存在历史的形而上学”、“作为形而上学的存在历史之纲要”和“回忆形而上学”。

7. 《海德格尔全集》除第50卷外,尚有5卷关于尼采的:第43卷《尼采:作为艺术的权力意志》、第44卷《尼采在西方思想中的形而上学基本位置:同一物的永恒回归》、第46卷《尼采的第二个不合时宜的考察》、第47卷《尼采关于作知识的强力意志的学说》、第48卷《尼采:欧洲虚无主义》。

二. 海德格尔研究尼采的中心意图不是为研究而研究,而是为了“超越尼采”,他关心的不是尼采所写出来的哲学或思想,而是尼采所没有说出的东西,他在“尼采的话‘上帝死了’”里曾这样说过:“对尼采的形而上学的深入思考成了一种对现代人的处境和位置的沉思……而任何这类方式的沉思,如果不只是空洞的鹦鹉学舌的报告的话,都超出了所沉思的东西”(《海德格尔选集》,下卷,第764页)。海德格尔的尼采研究一个根本出发点是反对他之前的尼采解释,即那种认为尼采只是文学家或者文化批判者,即使说他是哲学家,也只是称他为生命哲学家。海德格尔认为这是一种误解,他坚决将尼采与亚里士多德关联起来,认为尼采是西方形而上学传统中最后一位形而上学家,他曾这样说过:“很长一个时期,在德国哲学讲座中普遍有这样一种想法:尼采不是一个严格的思想家,而是一个所谓的‘诗人—哲学家’;尼采既然不属于那种只思考抽象概念、只思考和生命脱节的阴暗事物的哲学家,所以我们不妨称他为‘生命哲学家’。这个已经风行了一段时间的称号事实上会引发一个问题,好象哲学是为死人所设的,或者哲学基本上是多余的事物。这种对哲学的贬低充斥在那些热切欢迎尼采作为生命哲学家的人所表述的意见中,最终也排斥了抽象思考的地位。对尼采的这种普遍判断根本是错的”(《尼采》,第1卷,第13—14页)。他之所以特别强调尼采是形而上学家,除了说明尼采是形而上学的终结者外,主要是为了严肃地把尼采作为思想家来对待,他曾说道:“说我们要沉思尼采的形而上学,这并不是说,我们现在除了考虑他的伦理学、知识论和美学之外,也要并且首先要考虑他的形而上学,而只是意味着,我们试图严肃地把尼采当作一个思想家来对待,而思想对尼采来说也就是:把存在者作为存在者表象出来”(《海德格尔选集》,下卷,第764页)。

海德格尔这种关于尼采的解释是基于他的诠释学观点。海氏的诠释学观点,正如他的后继者伽达默尔所表述的:

解释不是更好理解 (Besserverstehen)，而是不同理解 (Andersverstehen)。海德格尔在上述文章里写道：“任何一种解释不但必须获取文本的内容，它也必须不加注明地把从它自己的内容而来的某种东西加给文本，而不是固执于文本。门外汉总是把这种添加与他所认为的文本的内容相比较，觉得它是一种穿凿附会的加入，并且指摘它是任意独断——门外汉固然有他自己的道理罢。但是，一种正当的解释对文本的理解决不会比文本的作者对文本的理解更好些，而倒是不同的理解。不过，这种理解必定是这样的，即它切中了被解释的文本所思考的同一东西”（《海德格尔选集》下卷，第767-8页）。按照海德格尔的观点，尼采的中心思想实际上并没有在他的著作中出现，或者说，这种思想在他的著作中只是以一种还未成为思想的、没有得到明确阐明的方式出现，因此只有通过我们的努力，通过诠释学以及一种“不同的理解”，我们才能对它有意识。不过，这里我们要注意的，是他所谓“切中了文本所思考的同一东西”，当海德格尔说出作者进行不同的理解，决不是说完全离开文本随意发挥，而是说要切中文本所思考的同一东西，这同一东西即海德格尔和伽达默尔所强调的“事物本身”，表示诠释学的解释具有真理成份。

三. 尼采的思想自称为是虚无主义，“虚无主义”这一名称所表示的是一个为尼采所认识的、已经贯穿于此前几个世纪并规定着现在这个世纪的历史性运动。尼采把对虚无主义的解释总括为一个短句“上帝死了”。我们知道，“上帝死了”是尼采在1882年于《快乐的知识》第3卷里首次表达的。按照海德格尔的看法，正是随着这部著作，尼采“开始走上他的道路，去形成其形而上学的基本立场”（《海德格尔选集》，下卷，第768页）。

在海德格尔看来，“上帝死了”这句话实际说的是二千年西方历史的命运。上帝尽管指基督教的上帝，但无疑它也是超感觉世界或永恒世界的象征，因此上帝死了，就表示超感觉世界没有作用了，没有生命力了。上帝死了，就是指形而上学终结，尼采把他自己的哲学曾看作是对形而上学的反动。

但是，按照海德格尔的观点，尼采的哲学本身同样也如其所反对的形而上学一样，仍属于他所反对的东西的本质之中。尼采从“上帝死了”引申出虚无主义，他说：“如果作为超感性的根据和一切现实的目标的上帝死了，如果超感性的观念世界丧失了它的约束力，特别是它的激发力和建构力，那么，就不再有什么东西是人能够遵循和可以当作指南的了。上帝死了这句话包含着以下断言：这种虚无展开自身。虚无在此意味着：一个超感性的、约束性的世界的不在场。虚无主义，一切客人中最可怕的客人就要到来了”（同上书，第771页）。因此海德格尔解释尼采的话“上帝死了”，其意就是要阐述尼采所理解的虚无主义。在他看来，尼采的形而上学“不是对虚无主义的超越”，而是“对虚无主义的最终介入”，通过这种介入，“虚无主义首次完全地成为自身”（《尼采》）。

正如尼采一样，海德格尔对虚无主义的理解，不同于一般的理解，虚无主义并不是一种否定的遁入一无所有的虚无之中，而是指一种历史性运动。他写道：“虚无主义是一种历史性的运动，而并不是何人所主张的何种观点和学说。虚无主义在西方民族的命运中以一种尚未为人们所认识的基本过程的方式推动了历史……从其本质上来看，毋宁说，虚无主义乃是欧洲历史的基本运动”（《海德格尔选集》，下卷，第772页），因此，在他看来，“虚无主义不只是当代的一个现象，也不只是19世纪的产物”（同上）。海德格尔认为，由尼采的话“上帝死了”所判定的虚无主义时代实际上揭示了人类精神生活的无根状态，加之技术所造成的人类生存的灾难性现实。

按照海德格尔的观点，虚无主义的本质领域和发生领域乃是形而上学本身，因为按照海德格尔，形而上学是这样一种历史空间，在其中命定要发生的事情是：超感性世界，即观念、上帝、道德法则、理性权威、进步、最大多数人的幸福、文化、文明等，必然丧失其建设性力量并且成为空无所有，虚无主义的本质就存在于形而上学本身之中。按照海德格尔的看法，由于人们（包括尼采）没有把虚无主义认为是形而上学本身的一种历史性运动，从而把虚无主义的结果看作虚无主义本身或看作虚无主义的原因，即把虚无主义的现象当作虚无主义本身，结果本身也逃不出形而上学的桎梏。海德格尔写道：“尼采的解释——即把虚无主义解释为最高价值的废黜和一切价值的重估的过程——是一种形而上学的解释，而且是在强力意志的形而上学意义上的解释”（同上书，第803页）。

四. 按照海德格尔的看法，整个西方形而上学的历史完全建立在赫拉克利得和巴门尼德之后所产生的哲学偏向，前苏格拉底哲学家曾开辟了存在论 (Ontologie) 思考，然而后起的希腊哲学家却偏离这一方向，转而思考“存在者” (Seiende)，海德格尔曾用“存在者状态” (ontisch) —“存在状态” (ontologisch) 的本体论差别来说明西方形而上学的历史，他说：“自西方思想史肇始以来，人们实际上一直在对存在者的存在进行思考，而却未对存在作为存在的真理进行思考，真理不仅没有被视为一种可能的思想经验，而且，显而易见，西方思想作为形而上学还无意中把这种拒绝隐蔽起来”（《尼采》第3卷，189-190）。因而对于海德格尔来说，整个西方形而上学的历史就是一部存在遗忘史。海德格尔曾用 Vorhanden (现成在手) 和 Zuhanden (使用上手) 的区分，把形而上学称之为现成在手东西的学问。这种形而上学历史始于亚里士多德、经中世纪、笛卡尔、康德和黑格尔一直到尼采为结束，因此尼采代表了西方形而上学的完结。形而上学思考的特征是其对象是存在者和存在者整体而不是存在；途径是存在者或存在者整体的存在方式；重点是肯定式的真理本质。按照海德格尔的观点，尼采哲学的几个观点都可以说是具有形而上学特征的：

1. 强力意志 (Wille zur Macht) — 存在者的存在的本质和根据，正是西方形而上学“存在遗忘”传统的产物：作为强力的意志，也是追求强力的意志，但不是追求外在的权力、功业，而是不断的自我充盈、自我充实，海德格尔说：“意志之为意志，意欲超出自身，从而必然同时超过自己，支配自己”。尼采说强力意志就是“存在的最内在的本质”，这里所谓存在，实指存在者整体，正如亚里士多德的从潜能到实现的能力一样，强力意志成为存在者的

存在本质和根据。海德格尔认为“强力意志”这一名称正表示尼采最后的哲学基础，这种哲学可称之为强力意志的形而上学。

2. 永恒回归 (Wiederkunft) — 存在者整体的本质是强力意志，而存在者整体的存在方式则是同一物的永恒回归 (ewige Wiederkunft des Gleichen)，即有限的存在者在无限的时间内不断返回自身。尼采反对柏拉图的两重世界说，认为只有强力意志在不断回归。尼采攻击从苏格拉底以下的所有存在思考方式，反对以知识作为终极说明方式，但他自身又陷入存在者的存在方式思考之中。

海德格尔试图把强力意志和永恒回归结合在一起，以此来完成统一的尼采的思想，他认为尼采的形而上学中，强力意志代表存在者的存在，而永恒回归则代表存在者的多样性，这两个概念“从现阶段濒临历史终结的形而上学的角度来看是同一个思想”（《尼采》3，163）。

3. 价值重估 (Umwertung aller Werte) — 形而上学的肯定式的真理本质。尼采由虚无主义引出“最高价值的自行废黜”和“对一切价值进行重估”，从而认为真理作为一种条件，乃是价值，由于意志只能根据对持存的东西的支配来意愿，所以真理就是从强力意志之本质而来对这种意愿来说必然的价值。海德格尔特别赞赏尼采这一句话“我们有艺术，我们才不致毁于真理”（《强力意志》，822）。但是因为“尼采从来没有做生存论的哲学思考，而是做了形而上学的思考”（《海德格尔选集》，下卷，第802页），从而陷入形而上学的真理本质，因为在这里，真理不意味存在者的无蔽状态。

4. 超人 (Ueberschensch) — 存在者的整体存在中所开展出的人类行为。虚无主义，即“最高价值的自行废黜”，被克服了，一个作为强力意志而存在的人类出现了，此为超人。“超人”就是根据由强力意志所规定的现实性并且对这种现实性来说才存在的人，海德格尔说：“强力意志的完满主体性是‘超人’的本质必然性的形而上学起源”（《尼采》，3，230）。按照海德格尔的看法，尼采这种超人思想同样也是形而上学，因为它从存在论上思考存在者之为存在者。存在对于尼采乃是蔽而不见的。

过去形而上学以超感性领域对感性领域的优越性，尼采反其道而行之，以感性领域对超感性领域的优越性，但在海德格尔看来，尼采对形而上学的这种倒转实际上只是把形而上学倒转为它的非本质，超感性领域成了感性领域的一种不牢靠的产品，而随着这样一种对它的对立面的贬低，感性领域却背弃了它自己的本质，从而仍被他所颠倒的事物本身所决定。例如，尼采把存在构想为一种价值，即构想为由强力意志或为强力意志所提出与强加的一种观点，而价值显然又是一种无意义的幻想，“一种化为乌有的实在性的最后的烟雾”，从而尼采把存在的遗忘带到了其顶点。海德格尔说：“对超感性领域的废黜同样也消除了纯粹感性领域，从而也消除了感性与超感性之区分。这种废黜超感性领域的过程终止于一种与感性和非感性这区分相联系的既非-又非。这种废黜终结于无意义状态”（《海德格尔选集》，下卷，第763页）。由此，海德格尔从对尼采上述思想的分析，最后得出尼采的形而上学“也许是形而上学的最终阶段，因为就形而上学通过尼采而在某种程度上自行丧失了它本已的本质可能性而言，我们不再能够看到形而上学的其他什么可能性了。形而上学由于尼采所完成的颠倒还只不过是倒转为它的非本质了”（同上书，第763页）。

五. 从海德格尔的尼采解释中可看出，海德格尔已进入这样一种精神境界，他需要超出形而上学的思维方式。按照他的观点，形而上学探讨存在者存在的原因，认为唯有原因才使存在者在场，他说：“形而上学以设定原因的表象方式思考存在者”（Die Metaphysik denkt das Seiende als das Seiende in der Weise des begründenden Vorstellens），因而“探讨存在者原因的形而上学的特点是，它以在场者为出发点，从其在场性（Anwesenheit）方面来设想这种在场者，并从在场者的原因着眼把它描述为有根据的在场者”（《思的事情》，第62页）。尼采以权力意志为存在者原因的颠倒了的柏拉图主义正是这种形而上学的最后形式。按照海德格尔的观点，我们与其从在场性方面来设想在场者，不如说从敞开状态（Offenheit）来开启存在者，敞开是思辨之思的前提。海德格尔把敞开状态看作开显（Lichtung旧译澄明），他认为开显才显示在场者。Lichtung 来源于 lichten，lichten 意指在森林中砍去一片树木使其物敞开显露出来，这里敞开的原因不是光，相反，光倒是以敞开为前提。在开显中，一切在场者与不在场者都得以显示，存在者只有借助于敞开状态才能在场。海德格尔的尼采解释事实上乃是海德格尔自己哲学的阐明。

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Nietzsche's Challenge to the Sovereign Subject: Implications for Political Theory

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One of the most influential aspects of Nietzsche's thought is the strong criticism he makes of any metaphysical theory of agency. Nietzsche links the positing of a doer behind the deed a doer who would be sovereign over the meaning of his actions to Christianity and its interest in finding meaning beyond rather than within the world. In this paper I shall explore how Nietzsche's challenge to the sovereign subject has been taken up in political theory. Mark Warren and Judith Butler, both clearly influenced by Foucault's deployment of Nietzschean themes, link the non-metaphysical account of agency to ways of interpreting the power of social and political institutions, Butler focussing particularly on the normalisation of social identities and Warren on how a worldly understanding of agency affects political images of freedom. Jean-Luc Nancy, on the other hand, is closer to Heidegger, and offers a political theory that seeks to address the problem of nihilism by articulating the ontological conditions for finding meaning within the world rather than beyond it. Nancy deploys Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics to develop Heidegger's account of Dasein as Mitsein, and argues that only when we have an adequate account of the social as a fundamental ontology of being-with will we be able to go beyond ways of political theorizing that implicitly or explicitly derive their force from metaphysical interpretations of the subject.

What do these developments of Nietzsche's thought contribute to contemporary political questions of the nature of democratisation, globalisation and resistance to insidious forms of power? And what might Nietzsche who professed himself, with good reason, to contain multiplicities have made of these developments of his thought?

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说明与解释

Explanation and Interpretation

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1、说明与解释的对峙

泰勒(Charles Taylor)和温奇(Peter Winch)认为说明与解释的本质的区别是自然科学与人文社会科学两种文化分裂的根源与关键所在。泰勒提出, 自然科学与人文社会科学之间存在着本质的区别。泰勒认为, 人文社会科学是解释性的科学。温奇批评了自然科学方法应用于人文学科的可能性,

因为人的行为是受规则支配的(rule-governed), 是“有意义的行为”(meaningful behavior)。

2、说明的普遍性

尽管有许多限制, 但是在伦理学和经济学人文社会科学的实践中, 早已普遍使用了说明方法, 普遍原则同样可以在人文社会科学领域中发挥重要的作用例如功利主义求乐避苦原则、经济人的假设等等。亨普尔认为说明是具有普遍性的, 不仅存在于自然科学, 而且在人文社会科学中也存在, 并且给出了历史学中说明的模型。库恩和罗蒂等都强调自然科学与人文社会科学之间并无本质上的区别, 只存在着不同具体学科成熟与否的程度的差别。

3、解释的普遍性

同样, 在自然科学领域中也无法回避解释的需要。波兰厄、库恩、M·海塞、罗蒂等都从不同的角度充分论证了在从事自然科学研到活动中, 在不同视角和语言中进行相互转换、翻译、理解的必要性。笔者也发现了在自然科学研究中存在着自然观假定。

4、说明的功能

说明的基本特点是在一套固定的语言框架中, 建立所研究现象间的联系, 其主要功能是预测与操控现象, 伽利略的科学研究方法论和海德格尔的科学观充分揭示了自然科学的之倚重说明与自然科学操控性的内在联系, 这就解释了为何说明对于一致共识如此渴望。

5、解释的功能

而解释则更强调不同语言框架和不同语境的相互对话和理解, 其主要功能在于教化, 在于改变作为研究主体的人类自身, 这就解释了为何解释的开放性和无限性不是一种局限, 反而是人类所追求的结果, 这也是人文科学为什么更强调解释的原因。

但解释和说明是相互补充和相互依赖的, 对对象的操控与对自身的教化是不可分割的, 而解释与说明的之间更加深刻的关系是值得我们进一步深入探索的。

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阿佩尔对海德格的解读

Karl-Otto Apel' s Interpretation of Heidegger

李红

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海德格在1928年的《康德及其形而上学问题》中谈到了先验的问题, 阿佩尔深深地着迷于海德格的论述, 他在1949年提交的博士论文题目是“存在与认识: 对海德格哲学的认识论解释”, 副标题为“从先验认知人类学角度的解释”。阿佩尔对海德格哲学的研究伴其一生, 到目前为止, 他一共写过四篇关于海德格的文章, 其中两篇是和维特根斯坦进行比较。在阿佩尔看来, 海德格的哲学进路并不是对康德的先验哲学的继续, 尤其是在他转向“存在的历史”概念之后更是如此。我们可以从以下两个方面来看阿佩尔对海德格的解读。

首先, 阿佩尔认为, 海德格在分析世界中此在的前结构时改造了康德先验哲学的进路, 海德格对此在的前结构的揭示回答了有关世界意义构成的可能性条件的先验问题, 因此, 海德格试图将他的基础本体论看作是对康德的先验哲学的彻底化。

其次, 在阿佩尔看来, 海德格准先验地解释原初时间的尝试是失败的, 而且海德格在其哲学“转向”之后就取消了先验哲学。阿佩尔认为, 海德格在《存在与时间》中改造康德先验哲学失败的原因在于, 海德格引进了一个新的真理概念。从阿佩尔对海德格哲学的批判性分析可见, 一方面, 在先验哲学是否需要改造的问题上, 阿佩尔认为海德格改造康德先验哲学的路径还是正确的, 因为纯粹先验意识不能解释生活世界中预设在所有认识中的意义的前理解的建构性。另一方面, 海德格有关意义、世界理解的时间性和历史性的预设并不能够回答康德有关客观有效性的可能性条件问题, 因此不能令人满意地回答理解的主体间有效性问题。因此, 一方面海德格在当代哲学背景中改造康德先验是必要的, 但另一方面他的改造却是不成功的。

尼采文化哲学及其后现代意蕴

Nietzsche' s Cultural Philosophy and Its Postmodernist Implication

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尼采从历史哲学的层面出发, 试图以酒神精神和日神精神的对立、融通、互动透析古希腊悲剧的诞生与陨落, 进而扩展到对整个西方文化的解读。他以宣扬“上帝死了”的方式预示了西方传统文化的终结, 在力主“重新估定一切价值”的文化反思中, 高扬“超人”哲学和“强力意志”力图开启一种新的西方文化价值向度。因而, 尼采的文化哲学, 并不

是对西方文化的静观默察,而是一种动态的文化解构学与积极的文化建构学。后现代主义者尤其是福柯、德勒兹、德里达等人之所以重视尼采,正是因为尼采文化哲学中渗透着的解构之维与建构之思契合了后现代主义这一场广义上的文化哲学运动的内在精神要求。后现代主义者企图在高扬尼采,尤其是尼采文化哲学中潜蕴的后现代精神过程中再次展开对西方传统文化包括一般意义上西方现代哲学中,诸如理性、人、性欲、知识、权力、意志、存在等象征符号的整体颠覆,以期贯建一种更为合理的西方文化样式,重塑一种更为健康的西方文化心理,重新开拓一条更为光明的西方文化道路。

论海德格尔真理观

On Heidegger's View of Truth

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传统哲学把真理定位于认识领域内,从亚里士多德开始,真理被定义为命题(判断)同它的对象的符合,而且判断是真理的源始处所。传统哲学的“真理符合论”给自身留下无法完满解决的难题。海德格尔力图解决传统形而上学的“符合真理论”在对传统形而上学的批判中,把真理问题定位于本体论意义上的真理,他从对此在的生存状态的分析和追问真理,真理是存在意义上的真理,传统形而上

学遗忘了存在,也就遗忘了真理。在海德格尔看来,真理的源始处所不是判断而是进行揭示的。真理是存在本身的展现、澄明,是从遮蔽状态走向无遮蔽状态。艺术作品、技术等是真理存在的发生方式。海德格尔真理不是凭空产生,而是有其深刻的理论来源,海德格尔例数柏拉图之后的形而上学使真理离开了古希腊真理的原意,而他力图抛开传统形而上学的目的就是回到真理的源始处所——古希腊真理。师承胡塞尔的他用现象学的方法把真理看做一个发生过程,一个敞开性过程。海德格尔做为20世纪的伟大思想家,其真理观思想是时代精神的反映,在二战的现实大背景下,他把此在(人)认为是真理的展开状态,此在在真理中,此在是真理的评判标准。而此在又是由主观的情绪(畏、烦)而来体现的。海氏把此在(人)的主体地位突现出来,结束主客二体的局面,这是值得肯定的一面:但是他过于突出此在(人)的地位,以“此在”做为真理的评判标准,以主观的情绪代替真理内容的客观性,这是我们要用马克思主义的立场、观点来加以批判的。

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海德格尔的“此在”的生存论分析和马克思的“现实人”的实践论分析

Heidegger's Existential Analysis on "Dasein" and

Marx's Practical Analysis on "Actual Person"

陆剑杰

Lu Jianjie

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海德格尔在《存在与时间》一书中提出了一个问题:“我们应当在何种存在者身上破解存在的意义?”他找到了这种存在者,这就是他称之为“此在”的人,理由是:“除了其它的存在的可能性外,(此在)还是能够发问存在的存在者”。海德格尔对“此在”作了详尽的生存论分析。海德格尔以哲学史上的“存在”论为出发点,作了对“此在”的人学分析。但早于他的马克思创造了实践论的科学世界观。他在《德意志意识形态》中说:旧的哲学从天国降到人间,他和恩格斯的哲学则从人间上升到天国。他们以“从事实际活动的人”为出发点,对现实的人作了实践论分析。现实人的实践论分析和“此在”的生存论分析,对这两种分析的关系很值得我们去研究。

海德格尔强调“此在”的原始的基本结构是“在世界之中存在”即“在世”。他对“客观世界”论提出了批判,认为没有一个世界以及这个世界的存在能否证明,这个问题只能由“此在”提出。因此,世界的本质是随“此在”的在而展开的。就人们所论的世界只能是人在其中生活的世界来说,道德格尔的“在世说”自有其合理性。但马克思对现实人的实践论分析和由此而形成的世界观显然更具合理性。他提出“现实世界”的范畴,把它界定为人在其中生活,并以人的感性劳动和实践的创造活动为基础的世界。这样的界定,既是实践论的,又是唯物论的。

海德格尔指出:“此在”的开展性表现为现身、领会和说话三环节,其关键是“领会”;而所谓“领会”是说:“此在”对它自身的“在”有所能,按它所是的可能性来在。他认为:可能性是“此在”的最本质特征,“可能性”范畴是“此在”论的最重要范畴。正因为如此,“此在”的活动过程是按照自己的可能性来“筹划”、“选择”的过程。应该说,海德格尔实际上强化了可能性范畴的主体性,而这正是我国的马克思主义哲学论著中普遍地忽视的。其实,马克思的实践论是实践地认识世

界、又实践地改造世界的哲学理论。为了成功的实践,必须充分认识对象世界被改造的可能性和人作为主体能改造世界的可为性(主体可能性),并从而作出选择、进行筹划、付诸行动。海德格尔的“此在”分析,有助于我们校正对马克思哲学的阐释,也就有助于我们超越海德格尔的“此在”论。

海德格尔对“此在”的生存论分析指明:“此在”是一种“共在”。因为“共在”,“此在”就形成了“畏”和“烦”的整体结构。我们可以把这种存在结构论看成是“此在”的体验,但它的客观内容正是人在现实世界中遇到的矛盾。“烦”从根本上说是“此在”把可能性变成现实,从而超越自身的意向,是在实现这意向时遇到的与世内在者、与“共在”他人的复杂关系。

马克思在对现实人的实践论分析中得出人学结论,人的本质在其现实性上是社会关系的总和,在这个“总和”中既包括人与其实践环境即人与自然界的关系,又包括人与他人在实践中的关系,并且是这两种基本关系间的关系。此外,我们还要在“历史”和“命运”的问题上研究海德格尔和马克思的关系。结论:马克思的实践论——“实践的人论”和“人的实践论”,是科学的世界观和人学观。海德格尔的“此在”的生存论分析虽同时具有抽象的、思辨的特点和非理性的意味,它在潜有的意义上是接近实践论的,研究海德格尔,吸收其潜有的合理成分,能够帮助我们丰富和发展马克思的哲学。

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Nietzsche's Suprahuman Aesthetic

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This paper examines Lou Andreas-Salome's interpretation of Nietzsche's suprahuman being (Ueberschmensch) in her book Friedrich Nietzsche in his Works. Andreas-Salome explicates Nietzsche's concept of art in relation to his representation of the suprahuman being. There is a recurrent contradiction in Nietzsche's philosophy: on the one hand, he presents the suprahuman being as a promissory paragon – an overcoming of the human; on the other, he criticizes the belief in progress and in the betterment of humankind – referring to our ineluctable “human, all-too-human” characteristics. In light of this inconsistency, Andreas-Salome's work is illuminating. She shows that Nietzsche's concept of the suprahuman being is closely bound up with his concept of art; more specifically, his presentation of the emergence of a suprahuman being is modelled on artistic creation. She resolves the contradiction between Nietzsche's call for a suprahuman being and his insistence on our inescapable humanness. In addition, she addresses the incongruity between his call for the creation of new values and his emphasis upon his own values.

The paper begins with a brief examination of Nietzsche's analysis of decadence, then considers his critique of Christian moralists and, especially, Christian ideals. Andreas-Salome delineates Nietzsche's call for a radical break with all of these, elucidating Nietzsche's emphasis upon the drives. She then examines Nietzsche's depiction of beauty and artistic creation in *The Birth of Tragedy* and *Twilight of the Idols*, arguing that these depictions provide him with his model for the emergence of the suprahuman being. Andreas-Salome illustrates that Nietzsche's suprahuman being, unlike the ideals of traditional morality, involves not merely be an imitation of an idealized image, but a consciously created artistic image. Nietzsche's theory of art is not, Andreas-Salome suggests, just one aspect of his philosophy; it also underlies other aspects of his thought, such as his conception of the emergence of the suprahuman being.

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无蔽的敞亮

——浅析海德格尔关于艺术真理性的认识

On Heidegger's Thought of Art Truth

牛 军

Niu Jun

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摘要:

真理与艺术似乎是两个毫不相干的两个概念。但海德格尔以自己独特的真理观, 和对艺术问题的深刻思考, 令人信服的阐释了艺术与真理的关系。在他那里, “真理”不再是传统的“符合论”, 无论是知与物还是物与知的符合。而是“揭示着的存在”。艺术, 也不再是人所直面的审美对象, 而是人本真的生存本身。

迄今为止, 人们一直认为艺术是与美有关的, 而与真理毫不相干。在美的艺术中, 艺术无所谓美, 它之所以得到此名是因为它产生美。相反, 真理倒是属于逻辑的, 而美留给了美学。而海德格尔对艺术问题的探索, 却令人信服的阐释了艺术与真理的关系。

一、海德格尔的真理观

真理, 历来是哲学家努力思索的主题之一, 从亚里士多德以来, 不知有多少哲学家费尽心思揭示真理的奥秘, 提出种种理论。海德格尔对传统的真理观进行了梳理归纳, 并在对其进行批判的同时, 提出了自己的真理观。

海德格尔用三个命题来描述传统的真理观: (1) 真理的“处所”是陈述(判断)。(2) 真理的本质在于判断同对象相符合。(3) 亚里士多德是这种真理观的鼻祖。

这种传统的符合论真理观, 两千多年以来, 一直被认为是无可非议的经典。但是到了海德格尔那里却受到了巨大的挑战。海德格尔指出: “把真理标画为‘符合’是十分普遍而空洞的。”

所谓符合论真理观, 或者是事情与陈述的符合, 或者是陈述与事情的符合, 前者是物与知的符合, 后者是知与物的符合, 但无论何种符合在理论上都是不正确的。其一, 我们说某某东西与某某东西符合, 是指某某东西与某某东西具有一种关系的形式, 因此一切符合都是关系, 但并非一切关系都是符合, 真理虽然也表现为一种关系, 但并不意味着符合。其二, 所谓判断(命题)包括两个方面: 判断的心理过程和判断所指的内容。就后者而言, 这种符合涉及到观念上的判断内容和判断所及的东西之间的关系, 那么, 符合本身按其存在方式是指观念上的还是实在的呢? 我们应怎样去把握观念上的存在者和实在的存在者之间的关系呢? 由此, 必定要求给予两者符合的证明。“当认识证明自己为真的认识时, 自我证明保证了认识的真理性。从而, 符合关系就一定得在现象上同证明活动联系起来才能映入眼帘。”海德格尔举例说, 我们设想一个人背对墙上说出一个真的陈述: “墙上的像挂歪了”。然后他转过身去看到(知觉到)斜挂在墙上的像。在这里, 什么使知觉得到了证明? “那就是: 陈述中所指的东西, 即存在者本身, 如此而已”。就是说, 这一陈述既不在表象之间进行比较, 也不在表象和物的关系之间进行比较, 证明涉及的不是认识与对象的符合, 不是心理东西与物理东西的符合, 而在于陈述所指的, 即存在者本身, 作为同一的东西显示出来。所以, “证实意味着: 存在者在自我同一性中显示。证实是依据存在者的显示进行的”。于是, 海德格尔得出结论: 一个命题是真的, 它意味着存在者本身揭示存在, 展现存在者, 让人看见存在者。“真理就根本没有认识 and 对象之间相符合那样一种结构”。把判断看作是真理的处所的传统看法是错误的。

其三, 在中世纪, 以创造主上帝来保证物与知的符合。物与知的符合不是指对象符合于我们的认识, 而是基督教神学的信仰, 即受造物之所以存在, 只是因为作为受造物符合于上帝预先设计好的观念。“作为物(受造物)与知(上帝)的符合的真理保证了作为知(人类的)与行(创造的)符合的真理。本质上, 真理无非是指协同, 也即作为受造物的存在者与造物主符合一致, 一种根据创世之规定的符合”。(1)到了近代, 摆脱了神学创世秩序之后, 上帝为“世界理性”所代替, 为此真理的正确性用不着特别证明。在这种不证自明性支配下, 事情的真理意味着现成事物与其合理性的本质概念的符合。“于是, 真理之本质的公式就获得它的任何人都可以立即洞明的普遍有效性”。可见, 上帝以“世界理性”保证物与知的符合。

什么是真理呢? 海德格尔从两个层次回答这一问题: 真理与存在的关系, 真理与此在的关系。与传统的真理观不同, 海德格尔认为, 真理必须理解为“揭示着的存在”。其意思是说, 存在者通过自身的开展、展示、显现出存在者的存在意义, 使存在从遮蔽到无蔽状态, 这便是存在的真理。所以真理总是从存在者那里挣得的, 存在者从晦暗状态中被“揪出来”, 这种揪出来“仿佛是一种劫夺”。海德格尔对真理作如此理解, 是从古代对“真理”一词的原始意义而获得的。他象早期希腊哲学家那样, 把“真理”理解为“存在者的无蔽状态”。海德格尔接着又指出: 把“真理”定义为揭示状态和揭示存在, 也并不是单纯的字面解释。因为揭示本身要以生存论为基础, 就是说, 揭示活动首先要有进行活动的揭示者, 因此真理的另一层意义, 要从生存论角度去考察最原始的真理现象。“揭示活动是在世的一种存在方式, ……世内存在者成为被揭示的东西, 只在第二位意义上它才是‘真的’。原本就‘真的’, 亦即进行揭示的, 乃是此在。第二位意义上的真说的不是进行揭示的存在(揭示), 而是被揭示的存在(被揭示状态)”。这段话告诉我们: 作为被揭示的存在, 即从晦暗到无蔽状态的存在, 这只是第二位意义上的真理, 还有第一位意义上的真理, 即进行揭示的, 这就是此在。更明白地说, 海德格尔讲的真理, 乃是指此在展开状态中的存在。

为什么这样说? 这与海德格尔存在论的一个基本观点有关。在他看来, 存在者不能代替存在, 以往哲学家之所以遗忘了存在, 是因为混淆了存在与存在者的区别, 以存在者代替了存在。但是存在总是通过存在者显示出来, 在诸多

存在者中只有“此在”能够充当这一角色。因为“此在”与其他存在者相比具有优先地位。从存在状态来说,其他存在者所要表达的是它的本质属性,即它是什么,例如石头、树木等。此在则不同,其要表达的不是什么本质,而是“去存在”,即不是已经规定的现成的东西,而是可能性的存在。此在既能领悟自己追问自身的存在意义,而且还领悟和追问其他存在者的存在意义。“此在”,是指人的存在,对真理的领悟要由人来完成。

在海德格尔看来,真理是存在的无蔽状态,是揭示着的存在,是存在的敞亮,是人对世界的领悟。

海德格尔对于艺术与真理关系的思考是从对艺术本性的考察入手的。

二、艺术的本性

海德格尔关于艺术问题的探索是以对存在问题的思考为基础的,为了解答艺术所是,他把艺术所是的问题转换为艺术何以显现的问题,断言:“艺术在艺术品中现身。”(2)也就是说,艺术的本性只有在艺术品中才能得到显现,就象存在只有通过存在者才能得到澄明一样。

海德格尔关于艺术真理性的思考集中体现在《艺术作品的起源》一文中。在此,海德格尔探讨了艺术的本质、真理以及真与美的关系。

艾布拉姆斯在《镜与灯》中提出著名的“艺术作品四要素说”,认为每一件艺术作品必然包含“作品、艺术家、世界、欣赏者”四个要素,这种理论认为,“作品”总是由“艺术家”创造的,它们总是要以不同的方式来反映包括艺术家在内的那个“世界”,而且作品早已包含了“欣赏者”,因为作品是为他们写的。海德格尔则指出这种流行的观点中包含着一个循环论证:“艺术家是艺术作品的本源,艺术作品是艺术家的本源。”(2)如果要问什么是艺术家,我们会说,创作了艺术作品的人就是艺术家;如果要问什么是艺术品,我们会说,艺术家所创造的作品就是艺术品。显然这是在兜圈子,原因在于艺术的本质蔽而不明。

海德格尔指出,当我们追问艺术的本质时,必然会再次陷入循环论证。一方面,我们要追问“艺术的本质”,另一方面,我们又不得不从“艺术作品”出发,不知道什么是艺术,从何断定什么是艺术作品?海德格尔认为“艺术——艺术作品”的循环论证,是“艺术家——艺术作品”的深层结构。我们别无选择,必须进入这一循环,从艺术作品那里追问艺术的本质,否则,就会陷入形而上的飘渺。

任何艺术作品首先是作为“物”而呈现在我们面前的。“如果我们从这些作品的未经触及的现实性角度去观赏它们,同时又不自欺欺人的话,就必将看到,这些作品就是自然现存的东西,与物的自然现存并无二致。一幅画挂在墙上,就象一支猎枪或一顶帽子挂在墙上。一幅油画,比如说凡高那幅描绘农鞋的油画吧,就从一个画展,周游到另一个画展。人们运送作品,就象从鲁尔区运出煤炭,从黑森林运出木材一样。战役中的士兵把荷尔德林的赞美诗与清洁用具一起放在背包里,贝多芬的四重奏被存放在出版社的仓库里,就象地窖里的马铃薯一样。”(3)

海德格尔认为,艺术作品的物的因素仿佛是屋基,作品的其他因素建立在它的基础之上。这种物的因素归属于“大地”,具有自我归闭的特点,并且他惟有保持在自我归闭的状态才显现自身。

海德格尔对物的因素的探索表现在三个方面。首先,他分析了三种流行的规定物性的方式:第一种规定把物作为特征的集合,此规定对一切存在者都有效,没有把物性的存者和非物性的存在者分开。第二种规定把事物为感觉的复合。此规定显然是基于笛卡尔的存在就是被感知的论断,它没有达到对事物的亲近,相反把视线从物转向人的感觉。然而,比所有感觉更接近我们的是现实的具体的物。第三种规定把物作为有形的质料,它建基于功用性和制造性之上,只适合于器具的基本本性,而纯然之物则意味着使用和制造特性的排除。

其次,他论述了物本身的自我归闭,无从敞开的特征。他认为,当我们沉浸与物的无遮蔽的现身,执着于物的自身所是时,原来朴素无华的物以其自身特性和居于自身的无所促迫,以其排他的和关闭的特征,最顽强地躲避思想,物是其所是,它沉默于它的遮蔽状态之中。一双农鞋,农妇穿着它,迈步于一望无际的田野,当农妇越少想到它,甚至根本不去看它,它就越真实地遇到了鞋子的本性和所是。一石头给我们以沉甸甸的感觉,但是拒绝对它的任何穿透,当我们把它击碎以了解其所是时,它却从不敞开自身,反而移同样笨拙的压力和碎片的块状。

第三步,海德格尔着重分析了一个普通器具——农鞋,但是这不是一双农鞋的实物,而是梵高的一幅油画中的鞋。通过对器具——画中鞋的考察,物的所是敞开了。物归属于大地,并在人所建立的世界中得到保存,此世界使物从遮蔽进入无蔽,进入存在的一种敞亮之中。“从鞋具磨损的内部那黑洞洞的敞口之中,凝聚着劳动者步履的艰辛……这鞋里回响着大地无声的召唤,显示着成熟谷物的宁静的馈赠,表征着大地在冬寒荒芜田野里朦胧的冬冥……这器具归属于大地,大地在农妇的世界里得到保存,正是在这种保存的归属关系中,器具才得以存在于自身之中,保持着原样。”(4)这就是说,作为一器具的农鞋的所是被揭示出来了,或者说被拉入了存在的敞亮之中。农鞋归属于大地,并保存于农妇的世界中,在存在的敞亮之中,它还关涉着万物整体所是的显露。

在分析了作品的物性之后,海德格尔把作品的本性界定为世界的建立与大地的显现以及在世界和大地的抗争中真理的发生。这不同于传统反映论对于作品本性的认识。反映论认为作品的本性在于它是生活的反映。海德格尔认为作品的本性即让存在者在其自身存在中达到显露或现身。“比如一座希腊神庙”,它并不描摹什么。“它单朴地置身于巨岩满布的岩谷中。这个建筑作品包含着神的形象,并在这种隐蔽状态中,通过敞开的圆柱式门厅让神的形象进入神圣的领域。贯通这座神庙,神在神庙中在场。身的这种现身在场是在自身中对一个神圣领域的扩展和勾勒。但神庙及其领域却并非漂浮于不确定性中。正是神庙作品才嵌合那些道路和关联的统一体,同时使这个统一体聚集于自身周围;在这些道路和关联中,诞生和死亡,灾祸和福祉,胜利和耻辱,忍耐和堕落——从人类存在那里获得了人类命运的形态。这些敞开的关联所作用的范围,正是这个历史性民族的世界。出自这个世界并在这个世界中,这个民族才回归到它自身,从而实现它的使命。”(5)

海德格尔是从三个方面来探索艺术的本性的。第一,作品建立了世界。“单这个世界是什么呢?”“世界并非现存的可数或不可数的、熟悉或不熟悉的物的纯然聚合。但世界也不是加上了我们对这些物之总和的表象的想象的框

架。世界世界化,它比我们自认为十分亲近的那些可把握的东西和可攫住的东西的存在更加完整。世界决不是立身于我们面前能让我们细细打量的对象。只要诞生和死亡、祝福与亵渎不断地使我们进入存在,世界就始终是非对象性的东西,而是我们人始终归属于它。在此,我们的历史的本质性的决断才发生,我们采用它,离弃它,误解它,重新追问它,因为世界世界化。”(6),因此,海德格尔所谓的作品建立世界,其具体含义即作品给出或增予一种敞开,并把此敞开建立于大地之上,从而万物从中显露。

第二,作品显现了大地。“作品让大地成为大地。”(7)与世界相反,大地的本性是自我归闭,凭其天性不可穿透,无从敞开。“只有当它尚未被揭示、未被理解之际,它才显示自身。因此,大地让任何对它的穿透在它本身那里破灭了。”色彩在闪烁,然而,一旦我们以波长计量它时,那色彩早就查无踪迹了。海德格尔所谓作品显现大地的含义就是:作品让大地作为不可解释者,自我归闭者进入敞开之境,展现其纯然的样子和无限变化的形态。

第三,作品允诺了世界和大地的抗争。“世界是在一个历史性民族的命运中单朴而本质性的决断的宽阔道路的自行公开的敞开状态。大地是那永远自行锁闭者和如此这般的庇护者的无所促迫的涌现。”“世界与大地的对立是一种争执。”(8)“由于作品建立一个世界并制造大地,故作品就是这种争执的诱因。”(9)作品允诺世界和大地的争执,是因为世界必须建立在大地的基础之上,但它的本性要求敞开,不允许任何遮蔽,因此它又试图超越大地。然而这一超越又不可越离大地的视界。大地依赖于世界的敞开,它只能现身于世界之中,而非别处,但它作为自我归闭者,又试图反过来超越世界,让世界进入自身,并对其永久地守护。这是一场永无休止的抗争,作品允诺并纵容这一抗争。在抗争中存在者显露了,而古希腊人把存在物的显露定义为真理,因此在抗争中,真理也就发生了。海德格尔对古希腊人的真理观表示赞同,确认真理即存在物的无蔽。无蔽即显露、照亮和澄明。同时,无蔽又是一种遮蔽,它保持着与自身的荒诞对立。因为当它敞开了在的一种显现方式,同时也就遮蔽了在的其他诸种显现方式。正如海德格尔所说:“澄明,并非一刻板的舞台,伴随着永远的启幕。”(10)敞开、遮蔽与存在同在,与真理共沉浮。

世界和大地的抗争属于敞开和遮蔽的冲突,这是来自本源的冲突。真理就是作为这种敞开和遮蔽的斗争而发生的。由于正在作品的作品存在中,无论是世界的建立还是大地的显现都处于澄明和遮蔽的冲突中,同时在此冲突中,在者整体达于显露,因此真理在作品中就产生了。

进一步,海德格尔认为作品的被创造性存在于真理的本性之中,真理的本性是敞开和建立,作品的被创造的存在指构成作品本身的形象或结构形态。通常,我们认为作品的形象是一般性和个别性的统一,它是反映世界的一种方式。而在海德格尔这里,形象不是反映什么,它本身就是处于开放状态中的世界,它敞开了万物所是和自身的本真存在。

海德格尔是从作品与纯然之物和器具的区别这个方向去思考作品的被创造性的。首先,由于作品毕竟不同于那纯然自足的在者,它属于被创造的存在,只有凭借创造,存在物才能进入澄明和遮蔽的冲突之中。创造需要技艺,古希腊人用*techné*指称技艺和艺术。海德格尔借助辞源学发现,*techné*一词既不指称技艺,也不指称艺术,它与实践活动相反,是认识的一种样式。认识意味着把握存在者的显露。因此,*techné*即让存在者现身。正如海德格尔所说:“去创造即导致某物出现,作为显现的事物,作品成为作品乃是真理形成和繁盛的一种方式,它全然依据真理的本性。”真理作为敞开、无蔽,它是一种开放的开放性。次中包含了澄明与遮蔽的原处抗争。这种抗争实质上是一种敌对的、统一的相互归属的关系。开放性是在自身的天性,因为在者是一种在敞开形态中显现自身的力量。此开放性属于存在,存在则凭本性让开放性开放。由此说来,真理的本性乃是在开放的在者之中建立自身。而真理的建立即存在物的显现,让显现就是创造。因此,海德格尔说:“作品的被创造性意味着真理的存在的确立于形象。”(11)

其次,作品的被创造的存在也不同于器具的被制作的存在。器具把大地作为质料耗用,为了大量地制作,不惜侵占和掠夺大地,同时器具还把大地作为质料闭死在其有用性之中,大地不再显现,诸神也隐退了。作品的形象作为被创造的存在则让大地自由并返回自身,让它以守护在其规律之中的自我归闭者、自我退隐者自由地现身。因此,作品的被创造性是作为作品的一部分从中凸现出来。而器具的被制作性则不是凸现,它消失于其有用性之中。

海德格尔认为,在作品中所发生的真理中的停留,最终让作品成为作品,这种停留就是对作品的守护。这与我们所说的欣赏有点类似,但海德格尔反对欣赏,因为欣赏把作品视为对象,把欣赏者作为主体,这种主客二分法遗忘了存在本身,因为无论主题还是客体都是在者,作为在者之根源的存在却在主客二分法是范围之外,主客二分法只涉及在者如何,而不涉及存在如何。此外,守护不剥夺作品的独立性,而欣赏则是一种艺术商业化行为,它是对艺术作品的评判,而不是对他的领悟。

海德格尔具体论述了守护的含义和守护的必要性。他认为,艺术作品将我们带入,自身的开放性中。这就改变了我们日常与世界和大地的关系,也抑制了我们平常的观念和评价,从而让我们停留在作品自身所敞开的领域。这种停留就是守护。“守护作品意味着站到作品中产生的存在者的开放中去。”(12)守护是一种认知,一种保存意愿的认知,认知是作为观看的决断,“意愿是生存的自我超越的严肃决断,它将自身投入作品时,展现自身进入存在物的敞开之中。依此方式‘在于其中’走入了规律,守护作品作为认识是严肃地立于作品中发生的真理的超常的可畏之中。”(13)这就是守护的意义。此外,他还认为,没有人对作品的守护,作品将不能进入存在。作品的被创造性使作品成为一自足的存在,为了进入存在的敞亮之中,作品保持着对守护者的永恒呼唤。作品一诞生,就处于对守护者的期待和恳求之中。

在经过了一步步严密的思索之后,海德格尔将艺术的本性界定为真理将自身投入作品。他认为,艺术的本性在作品的被创造的存在中作为所是的敞开而发生,这实际上意味着保存。因此,艺术的本性即真理的自身投入作品。而

“真理,作为所是的澄明和遮蔽,在被创造中产生,如同一诗人创造诗歌。所有的艺术作为让所是的真理出现的产生,在本质上是诗意的。”(14)这就是说,诗意即让敞开在所是之中发生,这是真理之光的普照。诗意源于创造的本性,并让万物作为它自身出现或登场。由此可见,艺术的诗意本性就是真理的建立,而建立只有在守护中才是现实的。海德格尔认为建立具有三方面的意义。其一,建立作为赠予。真理作为在者的敞开,它揭示了一陌生的神奇的世

界,这是自由的赠予。其二,建立作为基础,真理作为存在物的显现,是一种创造,是开放的开放性在作品中的创造性保存,在创造中,真理将自身作为形象设入作品,此形象栖息于自我归闭的大地。这是一种基础铺设的建基,是所是的整体作为所是本身在敞开性中的建基。其三,建立作为开端。开端作为一跳跃,总是领先,它在自身之中已包含了潜在的结局,也包括了陌生的和超常的遮蔽的丰富性,这是一种诗意的发现。

综上所述,海德格尔的艺术理论引我们深思。通常,我们把艺术作为现实的模仿、反映,作家情感的表现。而海德格尔在“思”的深入中,提出艺术不模仿什么,相对与作品来说,作家无足轻重,“他差不多象条过道,在创造过程中为了艺术品诞生而牺牲了自己。”(15)这就确立了艺术的独立自足性。继而以此作为出发点来界定艺术之所是,认为艺术是被创造进入存在的,它是存在显露自身的一种特殊方式,它就是真理,艺术与真理原本同一。由此,海德格尔启发我们重新认识艺术:艺术不再是人所直面的审美对象,而是人本真的生存本身。

(1)《论真理的本质》,见《海德格尔选集》(上),上海三联书店,1996年版,第216页。

(2)《诗 语言 思》,文化艺术出版社1991年版,第22页。

(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)《艺术作品的本源》,见《海德格尔选集》(上),上海三联书店,1996年版,第239、254、262、265、267、269、270页。

(10)(11)(12)(13)(14)《诗 语言 思》,文化艺术出版社1991年版 第22、58、61、64、67页。

(15)《人 诗意地安居》,上海远东出版社1985年版,第100页

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遭遇“存在” ——浅析海德格尔的真理观

On Heidegger' s View Point of Truth View

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摘要:

在西方传统哲学中,真理被经典地表述为“观念和实在的相符”。海德格尔对此提出了质疑。并在深入的追问中,提出自己的真理观。他从“基础存在论”出发,提出了建立在“此在”分析基础上的生存论的真理观,以对传统的真理观进行匡正,寻回“存在”的真正意义。在他看来真理乃是无蔽的敞亮,真理的本质乃是自由。

在西方哲学传统中,哲学自始就被解释成“爱智”,即关于智慧之学,因此真理问题自始也是一个令西方哲人极为关注的课题,其地位和重要性不亚于本体、本质之类所谓本体论问题。“哲学本身被规定为,‘真理’的科学”。

(1)尤其是笛卡儿以后的近代哲学,更是把真理(所谓普遍必然的知识)作为哲学追求的终极目标。

传统西方哲学关于真理的认识,多种多样,但就真理应是“正确”或“正确性”的这一点,却是各家学说所公认的。其最经典的表述方式是,真理乃“观念和实在的相符”。而海德格尔从“基础存在论”出发,提出了建立在“此在”分析基础上的生存论的真理观对传统的真理观进行匡正,以寻回“存在”的真正意义。

一、追问“符合论”真理观的可能性前提

海德格尔指出:传统的真理观可以用三个命题描述出来。“对于真理本质的传统看法和关于真理的首次定义的意见,可以用三个命题描述出来。1.真理的‘处所’是命题(判断)。2.真理的本质在于判断同它的对象相‘符合’。3.亚里士多德这位逻辑之父既把判断认作真理的源始处所,又率先把真理定义为‘符合’。”(2)这种传统的符合论真理观,两千多年以来,一直被认为是无可非议的、不可更改的经典,甚至已经成为流俗的通识,是不证自明的。但是海德格尔却在“思”的深入中,对此提出了质疑,并直截了当地说:“把真理标画为‘符合’(adaequatio)是十分普遍而空洞的。”

海德格尔进一步指出:通行的真理概念以符合为其根本特征。什么是“符合”呢?使真实成为真实的东西始终就是符合。“‘真理’,这是一个崇高的、同时却已经被滥用了的、几近晦暗不明的字眼,它意指那个使真实成其为真

实的东西。” (3)

而“真实”又有两种情况：事实的真实和陈述的真实。

通常我们说一个事实是真的，这不仅适合于人，也适合于物。这种解释试图把真实与实在等同起来，可是“假金也是某种现实的东西”，我们要不然就根本不会受假金的骗。如果我们在事实中把真实与实在等同起来，那么这就是说，我们对事实有了一个确定的看法。当事实和这个看法相符时，我们就认为它是真的，即“这是名符其实的”，它是它应该是的东西。

陈述通常也包括真或假。“当一个陈述所指所说与它所陈述的事情相符合时，该陈述便是真实的。甚至在这里，我们也说：“这是名符其实的”。但现在相符的不是事情(Sache)，而是命题(Satz)。” (4) 在第一种情况中是事物的符合，而这里是陈述的符合。

符合本身可以从两方面来理解：“真实的东西，无论是真实的事情还是真实的命题，就是相符、一致的东西。在这里，真实和真理就意味着符合(Stimmen)，而且是双重意义上的符合：一方面是事情与关于事情的先行意谓的符合；另一方面则是陈述的意思与事情的符合。”

传统的真理定义是：真理即物与知的符合，它已包含了这种双重解释。因为符合可以指物与知相符合，也可以指知与物相符合。但是陈述的真理要成为可能，必须有对事物的特定的看法，以便陈述真理能与事实真理联系起来。这两种真理中，真理都被看作“以……为准”，事物以先行意见为准，命题以事物为准。真理与正确性被等同起来。

“真理的两个本质概念始终就意指一种‘以……为取向’，因此它们所思的就是作为正确性(Richtigkeit)的真理。” (5)

在两种真理本质概念中，物与知的符合，更为基础。它建立了知与物符合的前提。而事物与对事物的先行之见的符合，并不是符合人类的理智。海德格尔考察了“真理概念的流俗公式的最切近的(中世纪)起源”，得出以下结论：“作为物与知的符合的真理并不就是后来的、唯基于人的主体性才有可能的康德的先验思想，即‘对象符合于我们的知识’，而是指基督教神学的信仰，即认为：从物的所是和物是否存在来看，物之所以存在，只是因为它们作为受造物(ens creatum)符合于在intellectus divinus即上帝之精神中预先设定的观念，因而在观念上是正当的(正确的)，并且在此意义上看来是‘真实的’。就连人类理智也是一种受造物。作为上帝赋予人的一种能力，它必须满足上帝的观念。但理智之所以在观念上是正当的，乃由于它在其命题中实现所思与必然相应于观念的物的符合。如果一切存在者都是‘受造的’，那么人类知识之真理的可能性就基于这样一事情：物与命题同样是符合观念的，因而根据上帝创世计划的统一性而彼此吻合。作为物(受造物)与知(上帝)的符合的真理保证了作为知(人类的)与物(受造的)的符合的真理。本质上，真理无非是指协同(convenientia)，也即作为受造物的存在者与创造主的符合一致，一种根据创世秩序之规定的‘符合’。” (6)

海德格尔在这里并非是为这种解释辩护，相反，他意在指出：中世纪何以会相信“符合”的不证自明性；这种把真理当作符合的解释在中世纪之后还被保存着，不同的是造物主由世界理性取而代之。“神学上所构想的创世秩序为世界理性(Weltvernunft)对一切对象的可计划性所取代。世界理性为自身立法，从而也要求其程序(这被看作‘合逻辑的’)具有直接的明白可解性。命题真理的本质在于陈述的正确性，这一点用不着特别的证明。……同样，事情真理也总是意味着现成事物与其‘合理性的’本质概念的符合。” (7) 更为重要的是，甚至在这以后，把真理当作符合的解释仍然被保留下来，并获得了一种几乎绝对的正确性，人们却忘记了最初支持这种解释的理由。

传统的真理观念，通过把事实真理还原为陈述真理，从而来说明真理的不证自明性。通过上述细致的分析，很明显，传统的真理观并不触及事情的实质。符合的不证自明，显然是建立在中世纪神学难醒的虚幻迷梦中的。海德格尔对传统真理观的不证自明性给予当头一击。

二、“陈述”并非真理的处所

究竟何谓符合呢？首先，我们可以谈论两个事物之间的符合。如果，两个事物具有相同的外观，那么它们就彼此相符。但它们并没有成为一个东西，而各自是其所是。它们的共同点就是外观上的同一。但真理问题，指的是另一种符合，即陈述与事物之间的符合。

可是陈述与事物这样不同的两件“东西”怎么会相符呢？试举一命题为例：这间房子是大的。房子是由石头建成，而命题却根本不是物质的东西。我们可以在房子里居住，我们可以租赁也可以购置，而对命题来说这一切都不可能。那么在何种意义上我们可以说符合呢？当命题对房子作出陈述时，不同于房子的命题何以能与房子相符？这当然不是说，命题变成了房子，相反，如果命题要陈述某物，它还必须是命题。显然，这里命题和事实的相符意味着一种特定的关系。海德格尔把这种关系称为“表象”关系。

在这种关系中，陈述以事物为基准并说出事物在这种关系中的情况。这里表象并非心理学上的意义，并不是指一种特定的意识活动，具有如此这般的结构。具体来说，海德格尔所理解的“表象”是“使某物作为对象而处于对立关系中。”“这里，在不考虑所有那些‘心理学的’和‘意识理论的’先行之见的情况下，表象(Vorstellen)意味着让物对立而为对象。” (8)

这种情况是如何发生的呢？在这里海德格尔试图为我们揭示遭遇和理解存在者的神秘现象。陈述者要把事物表象为对象，事物必须能够显现自己，它必须进入这样一个境界，这个境界海德格尔称之为敞开境界，我们也可以称之为无蔽境界。海德格尔在这里特别提出要消除一种误解，即认为这种境界是由主体(表象者)来创造的，存在者如何显现自身也取决于表象着的表象者。敞开境界并不是由表象者创造的，相反，表象者自身也必须置身于这种敞开境界中。这样就出现了表象者与被表象者的关系，海德格尔理解为“关联”(Verhalten)。关联的显著特征就是：“它

持留于敞开域而总是系于一个可敞开者（Offenbares）之为可敞开者。”（9）

海德格尔把关联称做持驻于敞开之中的关联（offenstandig verhalten），因为在他看来，问题是在关联中能够遭遇存在者，而之所以可能，是因为关联居于敞开之中，同时它自身对其在那里所遭遇的对象，即可敞开者也敞开着。可敞开者就是在场者，就是面向此在显现自身的存在者。当然我们不能这样看，似乎存在者都已出场，我们所需做的就是牢牢地把握住它们或者注意这种敞开持驻性是如何按照关联的方式发生变化的。关联不是一种消极的被动接受，相反，正是在关联中并通过关联，敞开持驻性才得以维持。“任何作业和动作，所有行动和筹谋，都处于一个敞开领域之中，在其中，存在者作为所是和如何是的存在者，才能够适得其所并且成为可言说的（sagbar）。”（10）

如果陈述依从并适应一个自身呈现的敞开着的存在者，这种陈述就切中了这个存在者。它由此说出了这种自我呈现者的情况。这样，如果陈述从存在者本身中得知说的指示，它就以存在者为基准。“如此这般指引着的言说便是正确的（即真实的）。如此这般被言说的东西便是正确的东西（真实的东西）了。”（11）

陈述并不是一种万能的工具，通过它我们可以把握存在者，相反，陈述依赖于我们的敞开持驻性，因为只有在此在的敞开持驻性的基础上存在者才能从根本上显现自身，我们才能够从存在者本身那里获得指示，去说有关存在者的情况。陈述的标准必须来自存在者本身。我们不能简单苛求存在者，不能将某物强加于它迫使它接受。

这里出现了展开一个新的真理问题的转折点，这个真理问题超出了一直坚持到现今的传统看法。因为，如果各种陈述都依赖于此在敞开持驻性的可能性，依赖于他的关联活动的敞开持驻性，那么，这种敞开持驻的关联活动就“必然具有更为源始的权利而被看作真理的本质了”。（12）这样“真理的处所是陈述”之说，便被攻破了。

从而传统的真理观，在思的深入中，暴露了自身的迷乱和“不证自明”表象下的虚弱。

三、真理的本质乃是“此在的展开状态”和“自由”

海德格尔在对传统真理观进行批判之后，从正面阐述了他的“基础存在论”的真理观。

首先要指出的是，海德格尔并不是否认有着传统意义上的认识和真理，而只是怀疑这种认识和真理的源始性。他并不一概反对传统哲学关于“思维和存在是同一”的这一结论，但海德格尔所主张的同一是指“此在”的原初状态，而不是主、客体的同一。这一点是我们理解海德格尔真理观的关键。

海德格尔认为，认识、领会、理解等等，都是“此在”在世的一种方式，即领会着自身以及存在的意义向来已是此在的一种基本规定。因此，离开“此在”来谈论存在、真理为何，都是毫无意义的。海德格尔指出：“此在一向已经在外滞留于一向已被揭示的世界的前来照面的存在处。……对被认识的东西的觉知也不是说先有出征把捉然后带着赢获的猎物转回意识的‘密室’；而是：即使在觉知的收藏和保持中，认识着的此在依然作为此在而在外。”（13）只要此在在世，无论其怎样存在，世界总已在它自身中这样或那样地得到揭示了。明确的或绝对的知识是此在的已有所视的存在方式的一种变式，当然，“这种新的存在的可能性，可以独立地组织起来，可以成为任务，可以作为科学承担起对在世的领导。但是，认识并不首先创造出主体与一个世界的‘commercium’（交往）……认知是此在植根于在世的一种样式。”（14）换言之，传统哲学所谈论的认识和真理，都已经远离了世界的源头，尤其执着于主体和客体的二元分裂，因此种种学说和理论实际已远离真理。因此，海德格尔力图确立“此在”之源始地位而追溯真理之源。

什么是真理？海德格尔对此问题的回答可以分为两个层次：真理与存在的关系，真理与此在的关系。

海德格尔指出：哲学自古就把真理与存在相提并论，巴门尼德、亚里士多德就是如此。在海德格尔看来对真理的追问就是对原始存在的追问。“源起于这样一种追问的存在之思，自柏拉图以来就被理解为‘哲学’，后又被冠以‘形而上学’之名”。

与传统的符合论真理观不同，海德格尔认为，真理必须理解为“揭示着的存在”。其意思是说，存在者通过自身的开展、展示，显现出存在者的存在意义，使存在从遮蔽到无蔽状态，这便是存在的真理。所以真理总是从存在者那里争得的，存在者从晦暗状态中被“揪出来”，这种被揪出来“仿佛是一种劫夺”。海德格尔对真理做如此理解，是从古代对“真理”一词的源始意义中获得的。“真理”的原意应是“这样那样得到了揭示的存在者”，而说追求真理，则应被解说成“把存在者从晦蔽状态中取出来而让其在无蔽状态（揭示状态）中来看。”（15）

海德格尔接着又指出：揭示本身要以生存论为基础。因为揭示活动首先要有进行活动的揭示者，没有揭示者就没有揭示活动，因此真理的另一层意义，要从生存论角度去考察最原始的真理现象。“揭示活动是在世的一种存在方式，……世内存在者成为被揭示的东西，只在第二位意义上它才是‘真的’。原本就‘真’的，亦即进行揭示的，乃是此在。第二位意义上的真说的不是进行揭示的存在（揭示），而是被揭示的存在（被揭示状态）”。这段话告诉我们：作为被揭示的存在，即从晦暗到无蔽状态的存在，这只是第二位意义上的真理，还有第一位意义上的真理，即进行揭示的，这就是此在。海德格尔讲的真理，最原始的真理，乃是指此在展开状态中的存在。

为什么这样说？这涉及到海德格尔存在论的一个基本观点。在他看来，存在者不能代替存在，以往哲学家之所以“遗忘”了存在，原因就在于混淆了存在与存在者的区别，并以存在者代替了存在。但是存在总是要通过存在者来显现，在诸多存在者中只有一种特殊的存在者才能充当这个角色，这就是“此在”（Dasein），因为“此在”与其他存在者相比具有优先地位。从存在状态来说，其他存在者所要表达的是它的本质属性，即它是什么，例如凳子、石头、树木等。此在则不同，其要表达的不是什么本质，而是“去存在”，即不是已经规定的现成的东西，而是可能性的存在。海德格尔为了更鲜明地表达此在这一特性，他特地用“生存”一词称呼此在的存在，以与表达现成的、已规定好的“实存”区别开来。而且，此在在存在论上与其他存在者不同，它既能领悟自己追问自身的存在意义，而且还能领悟和追问其他存在者的存在意义。海德格尔正是从“此在”的角度来考察真理的本质的。他提出了：“此在在真理中”。“如果我们从最源始的意义上领会真理，那么真理属于此在的基本机制”。（16）

这样,海德格尔首先为自己的真理观设立了一个基本前提:“此在由展开状态加以规定,从而,此在本质上在真理中,展开状态是此在的一种本质的存在方式。唯当此在存在才‘有’真理。”(17)

于是,“唯当此在在,存在者才是被揭示被展开的,唯当此在在,牛顿定律,矛盾律才在,无论什么真理才在。”(18)此在倘若根本不在此,世界整体因而不是作为被领会着同时又被揭示着的向着存在而在,任何真理也都不曾在。另一方面,此在根本不存在以后,世界整体又将复归于沉寂。

海德格尔还指出:“真在这种揭示着的存在是此在的一种存在方式,……揭示活动本身的生存论基础首先指出了最原始的真理现象。”(19)因此,海德格尔关于“真理乃是此在的展开状态”这一观点就与此在本身的源始性休戚相关。此在只要存在着,它就这样那样地揭示着,展开着,所以此在一定在真理中,也就是说,在某种展开状态中。说此在存在和说真理存在简直就是一回事。

此在不仅展开着,同时也总因被抛入筹划着的烦恼而走向沉沦。这涉及到了海德格尔的又一个核心论点,即此在同样源始地在真理和不真中,这又缘自海德格尔关于此在之本真状态和非本真状态的描述:此在只要存在,就不仅展开着同时却也闭锁着。不只于此,此在首先和通常地沉沦着,也就是说,此在首先和通常地生存在不真中。海德格尔关于真理和非真理的论述将在第四部分加以说明。

在《论真理的本质》一文中,海德格尔对早期的真理观又有丰富和发展。他提出:“真理在本质上乃是自由”。

(20)自由也是西方哲学的母体之一,把自由归结为人的本性几乎已成为传统哲学家的共识。海德格尔则不同,他从存在本体论角度重新阐释了自由。他指出:自由是让存在者成为其所是,“自由便自行揭示为让存在者存在(das Seinlassen von Seindem)”(21)。他这里所说的让存在者成其所是,让存在者存在,从字面上看,好象有冷漠、疏忽等消极的意思,其实并不是这个意思,而是指存在者就各其自身那样公开出来,存在者自身是什么就显现什么,使存在者置身于敞开状态之中。他说:“让自在,即自由,本身就是展开着的,是绽出的。着眼于真理的本质,自由的本质显示自身为进入存在者之被解蔽状态的展开”。(22)

由于海德格尔是从源始意义上来阐释“真理”的,真理是从遮蔽到解蔽状态,即去蔽之意。由此可见,真理的本质与自由的本质是完全吻合的。由此海德格尔很自然的得出:“真理在本质上乃是自由。”

四、真理和非真理的关系

关于“非真理”,以及非真理与真理的关系的理论,是海德格尔真理观不同于传统真理观又一个重要特征。上文已经指出海德格尔在《存在与时间》中从源始意义上说,此在在真理中,又不在“真”中,《论真理的本质》一文关于“非真理”的理论,可以说是前者的进一步引申。

海德格尔指出:我们通常总是执着于单个的,可敞开的存在者,而恰恰没有注意存在者整体。这就是说,存在者整体正好被遮蔽着。在“让存在”本身中我们同时也参与每存在者和存在者整体的遮蔽。“让存在自身本也是一种遮蔽。在此之在的绽出的自由中,发生着对存在者整体的遮蔽,存在着(ist)遮蔽状态。”(23)

如何把握遮蔽状态?思究竟能否把握遮蔽状态?“从作为解蔽状态的真理方面来看,遮蔽状态就是非解蔽状态(Un-entborgenheit),从而就是对真理之本质来说最本己的和根本性的非真理(Un-wahrheit)。”(24)各种去蔽活动只有在遮蔽的基础上才能进行。此在通过让存在者存在而与遮蔽状态发生联系,当然,对他来说,遮蔽状态本身还是遮蔽的。这就是海德格尔所说的神秘(Geheimnis)。“‘让存在’——即让存在者整体存在——是解蔽着又遮蔽着的,其中发生着这样一事情:遮蔽显现为首先被遮蔽者。”(25)这就是说,对存在者整体的思遇到了遮蔽性,并把它当作真理的源始本质也就是当作非真理来理解。尽管遮蔽状态是所有去蔽活动的基础,然而,通常,亦即在传统中,我们总是过分固执于被去蔽者,以至遮蔽状态本身(神秘)倒被遗忘了。遮蔽只是神秘,并没有因为被遗忘而变得软弱无力。相反,这种遗忘的负作用表现在,人紧紧抓住“通行之物”不放,同时表现出一副将存在者绝对掌握在手的样子。这样存在着的此在就是固执的(in-sistent),他固执于直接呈现于前的存在者,并毫不含糊地反对各种追问使所有去蔽活动成为可能的企图。我们已经尝试通过生存来把握此在的敞开状态,而现在海德格尔说,生存的此在同时也是固执的。在固执中人就有了迷误的可能。“人离开神秘而奔向方便可达的东西,匆匆地离开一个通行之物,赶向最切近的通行之物而与神秘失之交臂——这一番折腾就是误入歧途(das Irren)。”(26)“迷误是原初的真理之本质的本质性的反本质(Gegenwesen)”(27)这种原初本质显示为遮蔽状态意义上的非真理。因为迷误源于真理的本质,因此人能够从这种迷误出发向着本质迈进。

最后我们引用海德格尔的一段话作为结语,在这段话中,海德格尔对整个探索过程进行了总结。“我们眼下所阐述的尝试使真理之本质的问题超越了流俗的本质概念中习惯界定的范围,并且有助于我们去思索,真理之本质的问题是否同时而且首先必定是本质之真理的问题。但在‘本质’这个概念中,哲学思考的是存在。我们把陈述之正确性的内在可能性追溯到作为其‘根据’的‘让存在’的绽出的自由,同时我们先行指出这个根据的本质开端就在于遮蔽和迷误之中。这一番工作意在表明,真理之本质并非某种‘抽象’普遍性的空洞的‘一般之物’,而是那种独一无二的历史所具有的自行遮蔽着的唯一东西;这种独一无二的历史乃是我们所谓的存在的‘意义’的解蔽的历史——而长期以来,我们已习惯于仅仅把所谓存在当作存在者整体来思考。”(28)

海德格尔在众人“习以为常”之处,开始了思考,并不断的追问着。在“思”的指引下,为我们展开了探索真理新的领域。

(1)、(2) 海德格尔:《存在与时间》,三联书店2000年版,第245、246—247页。

(3) 海德格尔:《海德格尔选集》上卷,上海三联书店1996年版,第214—215页。

(4) 海德格尔:《路标》,商务印书馆2000年版,第208页。

(5)、(6) 海德格尔:《海德格尔选集》,商务印书馆2000年版,第216页。

(7)、(8) 海德格尔:《海德格尔选集》,商务印书馆2000年版,第217、219页。

- (9)、(10)、(11)、(12) 海德格尔:《路标》,商务印书馆2000年版,第213页。
(13)、(14)、(15)、(16)、(17)、(18)、(19) 海德格尔:《存在与时间》,三联书店2000年版,第73、73、252、254、260、260、253页。
(20)、(21)、(22) 海德格尔:《海德格尔选集》上卷,上海三联书店1996年版,第225、222、223页。
(23) 海德格尔:《路标》,商务印书馆2000年版,第220、222页。
(24)、(25) 海德格尔:《路标》,商务印书馆2000年版,第223页。
(26)、(27)、(28) 海德格尔:《路标》,商务印书馆2000年版,第226、227、230—231页。

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近代以来西方哲学中“物”的概念

——从康德、胡塞尔到海德格尔

The Concept of “Thing ” in Western Philosophy
from Kant Husserl to Heidegger

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“对物之物性的解释贯穿了西方思想的全过程”(海德格尔语)。本文主要撷取康德、胡塞尔、海德格尔这三位哲学家对“物”的概念的解释,对近代以来西方哲学“物”的概念的发展沿革进行了历史考察,并从物本身、人一物关系两点对此进行了讨论

引 论

在海德格尔看来,一部西方哲学史或西方思想史,就是一部自希腊源头的退化史。对存在的遗忘伴随着对存在者是其所有的寻根究底之追问,从而构成西方形而上学的历史。而存在者,不论在哲学史的视野中曾展示何种形态、种类、意义,其核心却是物(英文something,德文das Ding),简单地说,即是我们日常生活中与之交道的这些可感事物:一张桌子、白皮肤的某个人、飞鸟,……因此,考察西方哲学中“物”概念的沿革,无疑具有概观西方哲学发展脉络与旨趣的意义。然而,这又是个异常繁难的任务。历史上的某些经典著作家,尤其是古希腊的著作家,其思想本身十分繁杂且多存在前后矛盾之处,因此对他们的物概念之考察也十分困难。如柏拉图,我们可以把前期思想中的现象世界之具体可感事物当成物,但这里的物不论内涵及外延均与后期思想中的物有异。又如亚里士多德,其作品卷帙浩繁,几乎涉猎了现代学科各门类,但作为哲学考察对象的物却不易断定。我们可以把《范畴篇》中提出的第一本体认作是物,因为它指称“个别事物”,但亚氏在《形而上学》中却放弃了这一观点。但即使如此,亚氏仍是本文根本无法回避的人物,他的“物”思想为以后“物”思想之发展奠定了基调。限于文题及篇幅,在此不妨将其提纲式地简述如下。物与关于它的知识(归根结底是认识)相对立。笼统地说,物只是这一个或那一个具体的可感事物,而知识则包括范畴、述词、种属、原因等形式。物是承担着属性、关系、表述、定义的载体,它本身就其所是而言不增不减、不多不少,也不因属性等的变化而变化,而后者,则力求以事物之真理与事物相符合,并以是否符合作为判别真理与谬误的界限。尽管在亚里士多德那里追求物与知识的同一,但由于表述事物时不可避免的普遍性,使得它们与其说是同一还不如说是对立。但不论人们是否了解物的那个内在确定的“是什么”,物的实存则不容置疑,它永远以一个“是什么”的姿态站立在追问者的视野中。有了上面的叙述,我们的考察便可以从康德开始,经过胡塞尔到海德格尔为止。倘把西方近现代哲学看作是一个内在一致连续的谱系,那么这一考察也当然地具有相对自足的意义。

一、康德:概念构造对象

我们说的“物”,在康德那里有一个对应的概念:对象。一般认为,对象即是人的思想或行动指向的人或事物,但康德的对象则意指自在之物感染我们而产生的现象^[1]。为此,先要了解康德关于自在之物的主张。

在《未来形而上学导论》第三十二节中,康德说:“事实上,既然我们有理由把感官对象仅仅看作是现象,那么我们就由之而承认了作为这些现象的基础的自在之物,虽然我们不知道自在之物是怎么一回事,而只知道它的现象,也就是只知道我们的感官被这个不知道的什么东西所感染的方式。理智由于承认了现象,从而也就承认了自在之

物本身的存在, 并且因此我们就可以说, 把这样的东西表现为现象的基础, 也就是说, 它不过是理智存在体, 这不仅是可能容许的, 而且是不可避免的。”^[2]在《导论·附释二》中说: “作为我们感官对象而存在于我们之外的物是已有的, 只是这些物本身可能是什么样子, 我们一点也不知道, 我们只知道它们的现象, 也就是当它们作用于我们的感官时在我们之内产生的表象。因此无论如何, 我承认在我们之外有物体存在。”^[3]这两段话清楚不过地表明: 物体本身的存在是不容置疑的, 但它本身是什么样子我们则不得而知, 因为它给予我们的只是现象。在康德的先验哲学体系中, 自在之物更多是“理智存在体”, 因此并未给予过多的关注(也正由于此, 我们不把存在之物看成是物, 因为它是经验不能达到的。相反我们只认取它的现象为物)。倒是自在之物呈现给我们的现象如何成为被概念构造的对象, 才是他关注的重点。我们已经知道, 亚里士多德主张物与认识相符合的观念, 因果关系等不过是物的属性, 认识的任务就是去揭示它们。但亚氏开辟的这一传统遭到休谟的根本怀疑。结果是, 感觉与联想或说心理主义再也不能成为必然性认识的根据, 这就促使康德在经验之外寻求必然性的根据, 从而确认出一些先天的因素, 如时空的纯直观形式、先验逻辑范畴等, 通过它们对后天的感觉质料进行综合, 使其具有客观有效性与普遍必然性。用康德的话说, 就是“概念使对象可能”。

在此对概念如何使对象成为可能作一简略的描述。关于自在之物, 我们不得而知, 但它毕竟作为现象的基础为我们的感觉提供了表象, 这些表象在未经我们先天的直观形式与纯粹知性范畴整理之前, 充其量不过是一堆杂乱无章的感觉材料而已。对知觉表象用先验范畴进行综合, 借助范畴形成恰当的联结形式或说统一意识, 这就是判断, 由此才得到关于现象是什么的认识。但这样的判断, 如何证明自己的普遍必然性和客观有效性呢? 康德认为, 正是纯粹理智概念的综合作用, 才使一个判断摆脱经验判断和知觉判断的陷阱, 成为一个经验判断, 当纯粹理智概念先天地保证表象的联结普遍有效时, 也同时保证了其客观有效性, 这二者是“可以互相换用的概念”, 从而认知的对象随着判断的客观性而成立。康德说: “客体既然给我们的感性提供表象, 当这些表象的联结被理智概念规定成为普遍有效时, 它就通过这个关系而被规定成为对象, 并且判断就是客观的了。”^[4]

康德源于理性的范畴使自在之物的杂乱现象呈现出秩序, 其结果便是对象。现象与对象其实只是一句话的两个说法, 因为凡是可能经验的对象都是现象。反过来, 可能经验的现象便是对象, 在康德的先验哲学体系中, 二者似乎并无大的区别。但跳出这个体系看, 二者仍有理论上区分的意义, 也就是, 现象更多侧重自在之物(客体、本体)的一面, 而对象则侧重人内在的先验构造能力。事实上, 康德将物称作“对象”, 正是强调它不过是人的主观认识活动的产物。它不是单纯与认识主体相对峙、显示它的种种属性并有待认识去符合的东西, 而是依赖人用范畴去规定的东西。这样一来, 关于物的客观性的观念被彻底动摇了, 它不再是提供给我们知识、观念的载体, 而成了不依赖我们的知识、观念就无法成立的东西。如果说在康德以前是“对象使认识可能”的话, 现在则是“认识使对象可能”了。

康德的先验哲学不愧是一场“哥白尼式的革命”, 这已被历史所证实。但对认识究竟需要什么样的先天根据这一问题, 康德的先验范畴的回答仍显空洞和教条。胡塞尔, 正是从这里开始了他的哲学研究的起点。

二、胡塞尔: 意识构造对象

康德从传统逻辑的判断形式中引申出范畴, 又把这些范畴提高到规则的高度, 从而成为对象何以可能的根据。但这一根据至少有如下弊病: 一是作为根据的范畴只具有形式性, 即只提供规则, 这套规则未必能整合不同的现象(质料); 二是范畴体系的有限封闭性忽视了这一点, 即先天范畴本身就是历史性的产物, 因此在种类、数量及内涵与构造方式上就应是开放的, 人类在建构认识对象的进程中, 同时也在建构认识主体自身。

正因为如此, 康德的后继者胡塞尔, 才提出了意识构造对象的主张。这一主张与他的现象学还原及直观明证性的现象学方法密切相关。如果说在康德那里, 主要是对先验范畴的关注的话, 那么在胡塞尔这里, 则是借现象学的先验还原法, 直接还原到纯粹主体上去, 通过对认识本质的研究来解决认识意义、主客关系等问题。为此, 不仅需要借以获得个体明证性的先验还原, 更需要借以获得一般对象本质的本质还原或本质直观上去, 这正是胡塞尔现象学的根本任务。为达到这个任务, 胡塞尔区分了两种内在: 实在的内在, 即个别的意识活动和感性材料, 它的特点是因人而异, 体现个别性; 一般内在, 指在本质直观中可观察到的思维的一般本质和意向对象, 即思维对象本身。这种划分使现象学的研究扩展到了绝对被给予性的领域, 在此基础上, 胡塞尔提供了他的意识构造对象的理论^[5]。

现象学研究现象, 而纯粹现象的总和即意识。在《现象学的观念》中, 胡塞尔划分意识的双重结构, 他认为: “在所有意识中, 都具有其作为诸因素的总和的实在内容, 这些因素在实在的意义上构成这思维现象, 另一方面, 它具有意向对象, 这对象根据其本质形成的不同被意指为是这样或那样被构造的对象。”^[6]相应地, 意识便有了意识活动(显现)和意识对象(显现物)的区分。在认识活动中, 实在内容具有如同实在的内在一样的因人而异的性质, 正如一棵植物在不同知识背景的人眼中呈现出不同意义一样。而意向内容如一般内在一样, 一致地给予关于植物的共同感受: 绿的、硬的。可以看到, 前者与主体的意识因素密切相关, 因此具有主观性, 而后者则相反地具有客观性。对象的构

成,正是主、客观因素在意识明证的把握中生成的过程。在这一过程中,对象“在其中展现出来并且在其中作为‘存在着的’明证地被给予”[7],也即获得在直观中显现自己。

由此看来,“意识构造对象”告诉我们关于物(对象)的印象是:不论对象的构造有多少种样式,也不论被构造的对象是什么,都不能无视物与意识,或说对象与认识的关系。“首先需要了解,根本问题必然在于认识 and 对象之间的关系……一般对象只存在于它与可能认识的相互关系中”[8]。不论这一关系多么“奇特”,都是现象学的根本任务,即把握对象在意识中如何构造自身的规律。胡塞尔的“物”的特征似乎全在于此:将某物立义为某物,也就是通过把杂乱的感觉材料(实在内容)通过意向内容给予的意义,统一成为一个对象并对我显现出来,意识在自身中构建意识对象,然后把这个对象看作是外在于意识的自在的客体。我们看到,意识构造对象,即是意识原物地通过意义的给予使一个不曾有的物显现出来[9],这与康德哲学中那个以自在之物为基础的对象具有根本的区别,可以说,胡塞尔的物是发生建构的结果,而康德的物则是结构建构的结果。胡塞尔的物中凝结了意识主体赋予的各种活泼意义,而康德的物相比则显得呆板、被动而缺乏活动性。

三、海德格尔:“在世界之中存在”

虽则胡塞尔的学生海德格尔曾被称作是“现象学的孩子”,但他们二人的哲学却在很多方面显示出深刻的差别。海德格尔继承的只是“面向事情本身”的现象学方法,他高标独立,对西方哲学的形而上学思维方式进行了彻底清理,从存在者中抽身回到对存在的运思之中,开辟了现代哲学的新时代。在他的思想历程中,正是通过对西方哲学传统的“物”的概念进行批判,确立了把物置于“在世界之中存在”(In-Der-Welt-Sein)的立场。

在《艺术作品的本源》中,海德格尔区分了近代西方哲学三种对物的解释。一是把物当作潜伏于众属性之下的承担者,二是把物当作诸感觉的集合,三是把物看作质料与形式的结合。海德格尔指出,第一种看法是从物的概念出发,而且它表达在语言的所谓构造中,句子的结构跨入了物的结构,仿佛是物的结构的镜像似的,这是根据理性的原则推演出来的,因而受控于理性,它支配物,惟理性是从。海德格尔认为,这种对物的界定不可能触及物本然的、独立自主的和立足于自身的状态,相反,它只是用概念的条理化在其表达过程中将物的物性特征遮蔽[10]。

对于第二种解释,海德格尔认为,这种概念会使我们再一次茫然若失,因为物的物性存在要比所有的感觉更接近我们。他举例说:“我们在屋子里听到敲门,但我们从未听到听觉的感觉,或者哪怕是纯然的嘈杂声。为了听到一种纯然的嘈杂声,我们必然远离物来听,使我们的耳朵离开物,也即抽象地听。”[11]对此他评论道:“对物的第一种解释仿佛使我们与物保持着距离,而且把物挪得老远;而第二种解释则过于使人们为物所纠缠了。这两种解释中,物都消失不见了。”[12]

第三种解释认为物是形式与质料的结合,这可看作是前两种解释的统一。海德格尔称形式与质料的区分是一种概念图式,是一种“概念机器”,它使得一切相反的概念可以归类于其中:理性—非理性、逻辑—非逻辑、主体—客体[13]。

这三种对物的解释互相结合,从而加强了它们内在的扩张趋势。海德格尔批评道:“于是,从此产生出一种思维方式,我们不仅根据这种思维方式专门去思考物、器具和作品,而且也根据这种思维方式去思考一般意义上的一切存在者。这种久已流行的思维方式抢先于有关存在者的一切直接经验,这种先入之见阻碍着对当下存在者之存在的沉思。结果,流行的关于物的概念就阻碍了人们去发现物之物因素、器具之器具因素;当然也就阻碍了人们对作品之作品因素的探究。”[14]这样便造成了存在的遗忘,人的遗忘,世界的遗忘,遗忘是地地道道的遮蔽。海德格尔因此呼唤:“与物的无蔽照面”,这即后来讲的物“在世界之中存在。”

“在世界之中存在”是由德文词In, Der, Welt, Sein加上连字符造出的复合词,简称“在世”。海德格尔以此来揭示此在的存在状态,或此在的基础结构和本质性机制,从而反对近代哲学形而上学对人和世界的双重遮蔽,恢复人和世界的本真面目。“在世界之中存在”有三个不可分割的环节,即“世界”之所以为“世界”、“谁”在世界之中以及“在之中”意味着什么。根据回答,我们看到了此在与世界发生的休戚与共的一元性关联,从而这世界也就成了我们洞悉海德格尔物的学说的基础。

在《物》中,海德格尔受荷尔德林的启发用“四大”来规定世界,这“四大”即:天、地、人、神,又称世界的

四维或四极。“这样看来,世界就不再是一个单质的公开场,而是具有其内部结构的。无论在何种世界,无论在何种意义体系里,总有着这四大组建着这世界”^[15],根据他的说法,任何一物都是这四大聚集。事实上,“物挽留四大”,“物召唤四大”,并且也召唤受限制者(被物化者、有条件者)即我们^[16]。物的到来,并非人的制造,然而没有人的警醒,物也不会到来,这种警醒首先要求我们从形而上学的表象思维中退步抽身。

于是,天、地、人、神四维一体的世界“绝不是站在我们面前让我们仔细打量的对象,只要生与死、祝福与诅咒不断将我们引入存在,世界就永远是我们所从属的、非对象性的东西。”^[17]我们据此也可以说,物也不是站在人之外供人认识的对象、客体,它毋宁是人在世界之中存在的伙伴,是人在世界之中存在的家,与人的生存发生着意义上的密切关联。它也绝非生成之物,而始终与人的此在生存状态同形共在。“在世界之中存在”意味着,没有孤立的人,也没有孤立的物,世界之中的物已是彼此在在先理解并释义的物,它在此在的释义中释放出来展现自身。

四、简短的结论

在上面梳理的基础上,不妨将它们所体现的近代以来西方哲学的“物”的源流作一总结:

其一,就物本身来说,从亚里士多德到海德格尔,体现了独立自足的物到非独立自足的物的变化。在亚氏那里,物是众多属性的承担者,它的存在并不依赖其余存在者。但随着西方哲学进入近代时期,这一概念就遭到了怀疑,在康德和胡塞尔那里,物本身成为只有依靠主体的概念或意识才能建构的东西,而在海德格尔这里,每一物的存在都体现了天、地、人、神的聚集,它与世界处于真正的统一结构中。

其二,从人一物关系看,从亚氏到海德格尔反映了对对象之知到存在之思的变化^[18]。海德格尔之前的哲学,均在不同程度上把物看作是供人观察、感知、分析以获取知识的对象,看作是满足人类欲望的质料的总和,因而人与物构成外在性的关系,这一关系反映出人类中心论的狭隘立场。海德格尔在很大程度上扭转了这一路向,使物成为与人的此在生存性命攸关的伙伴,值得依赖和共处又赋予我们存在之思的源泉,人与物跨越了外在性的壁垒而建立起内在的关联,真正体现了人与天地万物的相通相融。

“物”的概念的变化,也向我们描绘了一条西方哲学的历史轨迹,毕竟海德格尔曾说:“对物之物性的解释贯穿了西方思想的全过程。”^[19]这一过程,被称为古代与近现代哲学之分,理性主义与非理性主义之分,本质主义与非本质主义之分……不一而足,它们都从各自的角度合理地揭示了西方哲学的历史形态之变异与延展。

注 释:

[1][2][3][4]康德:《未来形而上学导论》,庞景仁译,北京:商务印书馆,1978,197,86,50,65。

[5][6][7][8]胡塞尔:《现象学的观念》,倪梁康译,上海译文出版社,1986。译者的话,62-63,57,64。

[9]倪梁康:《现象学及其效应》,北京:三联书店,1984,184。

[10][11][12][13][14][16][19]孙周兴编译:《海德格尔选集》,上海:三联书店,1996,243-245,246,247,247-248,251,1182,241。

[15]陈嘉映:《海德格尔哲学概论》,北京:三联书店,1995,279。

[17][18]转引或参考魏敦友:对象之知与存在之思——论海德格尔存在论区别的意义,《德国哲学》(十六),北京大学出版社,1997。

Nietzsche and the Problem of Philosophy

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In Nietzsche's later work the problem of the possibility of philosophy presents a significant interpretive and practical dilemma. One fundamental aspect of Nietzsche's work is the attempt to undermine the idea of the absolute, as a source of value, meaning and truth, and (and this is surely

as important) to tease out the traces of this idea in our philosophising. Nietzsche is thus one of those (accompanied, for example, by Wittgenstein) who has given us the means to complete the Kantian project of moving beyond metaphysical realism and a representational understanding of meaning.

However, along with the gift comes a paradox. For Nietzsche's diagnosis seems to make it clear that desire for the absolute is intrinsic to the practice of philosophy - that in important respects, philosophy just is the (hopeless) attempt to frame or discover overarching, contextless objectivity. Furthermore, Nietzsche's analysis of philosophy is accompanied by a recognition and critique of the nihilism that arises in reaction to the collapse of absolutism.

If philosophy is unavoidably absolutist, and if the avoidance of philosophy/absolutism is nihilism, what next? Can we continue to do philosophy in a new way? Alternatively, can we reject philosophy while avoiding nihilism? I will suggest that we can find (in Nietzsche) a resolution which involves the continuation of philosophy, not through a 'new way of thinking' (as it is sometimes put), but through understanding philosophy as a process without a subject. That is, understanding philosophy as a practice which does not involve a *moment* which is the resolution of the paradox at all, but which is a process, involving the continual crisis of its paradox (which we might see as a constitutive paradox).

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The Tragic Ethos and the Spirit of Music

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Prepared for the conference on Nietzsche and Heidegger

in Beijing, September 2002

Abstract

Nietzsche claims to have understood the origins of Greek tragedy in the "spirit" of music. Yet it would appear that it could have known very little about Greek music. I seek to understand what Nietzsche means by the "spirit of music" in terms used by Max Weber in his discussion of the spirit of capitalism. I argue that the *Birth of Tragedy* is properly read as an argument against Aristotle's notion of tragedy. Drawing upon work done by Professor Babich and others, I argue that Nietzsche found his understanding of spirit of music in tragedy in his knowledge of the Greek language. I then show that precisely this understanding of music has political consequences and that Nietzsche drew them.

Irrationalism is an escape from rationalism that does not liberate, but entangles itself still more in rationalism, because it arouses the belief that the latter is overcome by a simple negation, whereas it has in fact become more dangerous because it is disguised and can continue its course with impunity.

Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*

I know how to lead the lovely dithyrambic song

Of lord Dionysos, my wits thunderstruck with wine.

Archilochus, fragment 120

While no noble born Greek would want to be Phidias, they would want to be Archilochus.

Nietzsche, WKG III₂ p, 258^[61]

As a methodological foreword: what is mean by “spirit” as in “the spirit of music”? One of the other most famous uses of the concept “spirit” occurs, as one knows, in Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Weber writes as follows:

The attempt to give anything like a definition of *Geist* brings out certain difficulties that are in the very nature of this type of investigation. If any object can be found to which this term can be applied with any understandable meaning, it can only be a ... complex of connections associated in historical reality, which we unite into a conceptual whole from the standpoint of the cultural significance. Such an historical concept ... cannot be defined according the formula *genus proximum, differentia specifica* (in English, demarcated), but must gradually be *composed* (komponiert) out of the individual parts that are taken from the historical reality to make it up. Thus the final and definitive concept cannot stand at the beginning of the investigation but must come at the end.^[62]

Weber is here clear that a “Geist” is itself a construct, designed for the purpose of elucidating a complex of historical events. It is not invented, but *composed* [Weber italicizes the word] - put together in order to make sense possible. In his 1886 critique of his first book Nietzsche writes that he sought to raise the question of the status of science (Wissenschaft) by looking at science from the perspective of art (and of art from that of life).^[63] In doing so, he was raising the question of how one might make a broad historical cultural phenomenon (such as the significance of the Greeks for Western modernity) comprehensible. He found this in the “spirit of music.” The elaboration - the composition - of the “spirit” of [Greek] music thus is the essential part of his discussion of Greek tragedy.

We would do well to take seriously Weber’ s warning about the nature of “Geist.” We need to grasp the historical reality; the connections; the process by which they are united. How might music allows this? This is a question mostly left unattended. For instance, in James Porter’ s recent *The Invention of Dionysus*, an essay on the *Birth*, the word music does not even make the index. Nor does Peter Euben’ s *The Tragedy of Political Theory* mention music.^[64]

My questions are the following:

1/ What was Nietzsche trying to accomplish in writing the *Birth of Tragedy* and what is its political importance?

2/ Why did Nietzsche think the spirit of [Greek] music to be essential to his enterprise, especially when next to nothing was directly known about Greek music?

3/ What is the importance of an understanding of tragedy for politics?

1/ What was Nietzsche trying to accomplish in writing the *Birth of Tragedy* and what is its political importance?

In the *Poetics*, Aristotle had argued that the key to tragedy was the moment of *anagnorisis*, that moment at which the protagonist recognized himself for whom or what he is. Thus, for Aristotle, in the *Oedipus Tyrannos*, this moment of insight into origins is the catalyst that leads Oedipus to blind himself. We can be known to ourselves, Aristotle seems to argue, and the purpose of tragedy is to produce self-knowledge. Additionally, for Aristotle the effect on the audience was to have contemplated the awe-ful and to have been purged from the effects of that emotion. Theater is, one might say, here good for you and Aristotle was after all concerned to defend it against Plato’ s critique. Oedipus returns home, finally, and is let in. From self-knowledge - seeing oneself -- there is to occur a purification of both the hero and the audience.

Peter Euben reminds us in his book on Greek tragedy that Nietzsche had noted in the preface to the *Genealogy* that “we are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge.” Nietzsche’s point, I believe and have argued, is that claims to self-knowledge are in the end self defeating, that the purpose of philosophy should not be self-knowledge (“knowing how one knows”), at least not if we mean by self-knowledge the self knowing the self. If knowledge is perspectival, as Nietzsche avers, then that means at least that final and definitive knowledge of oneself – or one’s identity, as we call it – is not only not possible but that to pursue it is harmful, even nihilistic. There were already clues in Sophocles: Oedipus, after all, does everything one could expect anyone of ability to do in solution to the problem of the plague. He delegates; he decides; he constantly tries to find out what he needs to know, asking one hundred and twenty-three questions in the course of the play (out of the one hundred and ninety-nine) and despite the fact that he is warned four times (once by the shepherd, once by Teirisiyas, and twice by his wife-mother, Jocasta) *not* to pursue knowledge, he insists. Had he not, had he remained in Corinth, he would not have killed his father and married his mother – but then we would not have had tragedy. Philosophy, as we shall see, requires tragedy: all is maculate. It produces not self-knowledge but acknowledgment – a form of acceptance.

The important recognition here is that the *Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music* has as its first focus not, in the end, Wagner, nor the rebirth of German culture (although those are not foreign to it) but an *Auseinandersetzung* with Aristotle as to the significance of tragedy. Aristotle, after all and as Nietzsche points out, had written the *Poetics* well after the zenith of Athenian tragedy, during a period in which the art was in decline, as was the polis that was its principle subject of concern. In the *Gay Science*, he notes that Aristotle “certainly did not hit the nail on the head when he discussed the ultimate end of Greek tragedy.” ^[65]

For Aristotle the end of tragedy was *katharsis*, an understanding of purification that he understood in terms borrowed from medicine where Hippocrates had used it to refer to the clearing off of morbid humors^[66] and which he had employed in the general sense of purification. In point of fact, the *Birth* is an argument against the Aristotle and the claim that tragedy produces self-recognition (anagnorisis) and in favor of the claim that it produces *Verwandlung* (transformation) or *Verklärung* (transfiguration). Indeed, Wilamowitz in *Zukunftsphilologie*, his vitriolic response to the *Birth*, had already noticed this implicit but ubiquitous opposition to Aristotle in a footnote. (Wilamowitz puts it in a footnote probably because it was so obvious – and to him so silly – that it was not worth carrying on about).^[67]

For Nietzsche, the self is not found at home, so to speak, but achieved; the picture is not that of turning around but of a path, a kind of growth such as that accomplished in the *Oedipus at Colonnus*. Successful tragedy for Nietzsche constitutes the sealing of a change not so much in what one is but in the naturalness by which one is able to deal in one’s life and history with the historically evolving conditions that affect a culture.^[68]

What the audience learns in Nietzsche’s anti-Aristotelian understanding is not that Oedipus suffers from *hamartia* – a “tragic flaw” from which he needs to be cleansed – and that we should be careful of hubris, but that there is no crime, that Oedipus did everything that could be humanly expected of him and that it was still pointless.

The paradox (for us at least) is that Nietzsche sees this process as joyful. In *The Birth of Tragedy* he writes: “The cry of horror or the longing moan over an irretrievable loss are intoned from the highest joy.”^[69] Nietzsche’s analysis here (see GT 16) reflects his nuanced understanding of Schopenhauer: music permits the annihilation of the individual and thus a release from the pain of individuation. Tragedy – as music-drama – arrived at the same thing, which is why the wisdom of tragedy is that in terms of suffering it is best not to have been born (see *Oedipus at Colonnus*). What is central to his understanding of tragedy is that this realization of the world presents itself as a source of passion and joy, not of despair. Calling our attention to this as a problem already was

Hölderlin:

Viele versuchen umsonst das Freudigste freudig zu sagen

Hier sprich endlich es mir, hier in der Trauer sich aus.

Many have tried in vain to express with joy the most joyful,

Here at last it speaks to me, here from tragedy. ^[70]

The poem is entitled *Sophocles*, a title that requires the translation of *Trauer* as tragedy.

2/ Why did Nietzsche think grasping the spirit of [Greek] music to be essential to his enterprise, especially when next to nothing was directly known about Greek music?

What is it that Nietzsche hoped to learn from his study of the birth of tragedy from the spirit of music? To ask this is to ask what he thought he knew about Greek. A few preliminary remarks are in order here. In the midst of notebooks in which he recorded among other things youthful poems, homework, the bombardment of Sevastopol during the Crimean War, and a plan for a system of fortifications, the young Nietzsche wrote the following:

God has given us music ... so that we may be led by it upwards. ... The musical art often speaks to us more insistently than does poetry with words and seizes the most secret folds of the heart. ^[71]

We know that Nietzsche was a musician; we know that he sought to discover the origins of Greek tragedy in the spirit of music. That music was important to Nietzsche is always acknowledged but rarely examined even though Nietzsche is clear that the experience of music provided both a paradigm of philosophical activity and an insight into the workings of a healthy culture.

An opening comes with remembering how grandiose Nietzsche thought possible the consequences of the experience of music. This was the theme of the *Birth*: tragedy, the activity by which the Greeks constituted themselves as Greek, was born of the spirit of music. Music made Greece of the tragic age possible. And this is true not just in Greece. In a letter to Rohde on December 21, 1871, he writes: “When I think to myself that if only a few hundred of those of the next generation could take from music what I take, well then I would await a completely new culture.” ^[72] Revealing though this is as to the power the Nietzsche saw in music for a cultural revolution, we still need to ask what it is about music to which Nietzsche responded to in this manner.

A second theme comes with the reminder that he sees music as central to our acknowledging our commonalty with others. In a more direct way in *Dawn of Day*, he asks “how is it possible to know another.” ^[73] He answers: “[Music] is that which reveals to us most clearly what masters we are in the rapid and subtle divination of feelings and empathizing (*Mitempfindung*). For, though music is a copy (*Nachbild*) of a copy of feelings, it nonetheless and in spite of this degree of distance and indefiniteness often makes us participants in those feelings.” Music here is a sign and emblematic of the process by which we come to understand an other, but it is an understanding in which we “participate” in feelings with others. Music is also testimony to the power we have to do so (“what masters we are”), a power of which we apparently are in need of recalling. The important point here, however, is that music provides for Nietzsche a foundation of commonalty - of that which we have in common with some other and of which we have a share.

One could spend (and someone should) a long time investigating the genealogy of this idea. Such an experience of music as Nietzsche claims requires the developments that take place in the late XVIIIth and early XIXth century. ^[74] The claim of the possibility of such experience goes back to debates in XVIIIth century France over the status of melody and harmony and the relation of music to

language, especially national languages,^[75] where Rousseau plays a key role in the development of the aesthetics which were to eventually become Nietzsche's.^[76] The link between Rousseau's musical theories and Nietzsche goes musically through Gluck, Beethoven, Weber, Schumann and Wagner and theoretically (inter alia) through Schlegel, Schopenhauer and Wagner.^[77] For instance, in *Opera and Drama*, Wagner writes: "In drama we must become knowers through feeling." Later, he will oppose "older poetic speech" to the "speech of modern daily life."^[78] His *Art and Revolution* makes the same point as had Rousseau and as would Nietzsche about the parallels of (eventual) modern opera and Greek drama. As Lacoue-Labarthe remarks about this whole development: "The metaphysics of the language at work here is ... basically Rousseauist."^[79]

But if music was so central to Nietzsche, what could he claim to have known about Greek music? The few fragments of reconstructed Greek music that we possess give no clear indication of how they sounded, how they were played, and so forth. All the extant Greek music fits easily in somewhat suspiciously adapted versions onto one CD - and little of the material we now have was available to Nietzsche. Nietzsche asserts that tragedy springs from music and, in the Greek context, effectuated a cultural transformation in the citizenry-spectators. A potential sub-title to the *Birth* from the fall of 1870 reads: "Considerations on the ethical-political significance of musical drama."^[80]

To grasp this, some linguistic considerations are in order. Greek *mousike* refers to a vastly wider range of human activities than does our "music."^[81] The "little" Liddell and Scott refers to *mousikóV* as a "man of letters, a scholar, an accomplished person." From this it follows that whatever is meant by music in Greek, it must refer to not only a much wider range of activities than "music," but also to an integration of those activities one with the other.

As Thrasybulos Georgiades notes, *mousike* denotes an ongoing activity and a "musical education" is only possible though "musical activity."^[82] *Mousike* thus carries no implication of a tension between music and the (non-artistic) world. The world of *musike* was not apart from the world. Warren Anderson remarks, "the Greek term designates ... oral training in poetry ... that had do so long been the means of transmitting the values and precepts of Greek culture."^[83] Plato says in the *Laches* that "A true musician has in his own life ... a harmony of words and deeds arranged."^[84]

In this the Greek notion of music cannot be understood apart from the Greek language. Ancient Greek was tonal—much of what we represent by accents marks corresponded to differences in pitch. Syllables are more or less fixed in length in relation to meter and, as Georgiades notes, could neither "be extended nor abbreviated."^[85] Anyone who has studied ancient Greek knows that there are a myriad of devices whereby meter is ensured.^[86] As West notes, "melody has a basis in an intrinsic feature of the [Greek] language. In every word there was one syllable which was given prominence of the others, not by stress (as in English and modern Greece) but in raised pitch."^[87] Ancient authors such as Aristoxenus speak of the "melody of speech" and quite a bit later Halicarnassus indicates that the stress was a rise in pitch on the order of a fifth. Indeed, the use of pitch stress seems to have continued in official documents throughout the Byzantine Empire.

One may assert then that words - the spoken tongue -- in Greek were more like the equivalent of notes in a musical score than is the case in modern Western languages and that in such a language the clear-cut distinction of music and speech is a false one. From this it follows that the separation of language from music - something that Rousseau lamented and the source of his praise of languages

“more musical” than French – was a political disaster in that it permitted an instrumental rather than communal use of language. Examples in antiquity abound. One of the reasons for Socrates’ complaints in the *Phaedrus* about writing has to do with the separation that it makes possible between what we must understand as music and text. In the *Clouds* Aristophanes in his parody of Euripides has the latter ridiculously multiplying syllables inside one word – thus implying that the tragedian wrongly separated music and language for effect. What was lost is the music of common speech. As Babette Babich notes, “because of [the] doubly aspected engagement of attentive articulation, ancient Greek presupposed a community and possessed a community-building power nearly impossible to imagine today.” ^[88]

It was thus *from his knowledge of the Greek language and philology* that Nietzsche was able to determine the spirit of music that was manifest in the language of Greek drama. Furthermore, the concern with music means, given the point made above by Babich, that the investigation that Nietzsche undertakes of the birth of tragedy from the spirit of music is an investigation of *what makes a community or culture possible* and it locates this possibility in a conception of music radically different from our own conceptions. But this is not an exercise in lamenting a lost language. Aside from the fact that Nietzsche knew Greek exceedingly well (even if, as David Allison once remarked, he knew no noumenon), the *Birth of Tragedy* starts with the specific assertion that the dynamics of apollonian and dionysian are or were available across the entire ancient world, “from Rome to Babylon.” While tragedy will be the specific and central Greek accomplishment, the dynamics that make it possible are human qualities, not only in the ancient world but, as Nietzsche makes clear in his mingling of references, also in ours. Thus he moves from Lucretius to Hans Sachs in four lines in section one; a bit later he will write “just as animals now talk and the earth gives milk and honey,” thereby conflating the *Bacchae* and *Exodus*, or, more accurately calling attention to the fact that *Exodus* and the *Bacchae* have the same sense of the availability of the Dionysian. ^[89] In section 6 he will remark, as if it were established, that the union of Apollo and Dionysos is “widely distributed among all peoples.”

But how does Nietzsche determine the spirit of (Greek) music? The first thing to note about this problem is that the *Birth* is written under the spirit of compulsion. Take the following phrases from chapter 24, taken almost at random.

We had cause to draw attention...

[W]e believe we have observed... and consequently we were obliged to recognize...

[T]his experience of being compelled to look...

One could repeat a similar exercise throughout the book. Nietzsche is telling us that his understanding on the “spirit of music” that bears the apollonian upwards is an understanding that he *had to arrive* at to explain his experience of Greek tragedy. The book is a kind of deduction of what has to be the case for him to have the experiences he has. But the deduction here proceeds from a response to that which cannot be put into words, namely music. Thus the knowledge that Nietzsche has of Greek tragedy has the form that it assumes precisely because it is knowledge of music: we will know that we have understood the origins of tragedy when we understand it in such a way that the actions of the tragedy make perfect, unquestionable, sense. The compulsions under which the *Birth* is written are compulsions that derive from his clarity about the feelings that Greek drama arose in him. For such a compulsion to happen, however, we have to be clear about what our feelings are. We recognize here the problem that Nietzsche attributes to Euripides and Socrates, that they were unable to have, or rather to acknowledge, the feelings that tragedy arose in them, feelings that deriving from music exceeded any capacity to be spoken of or represented.

To compose the spirit of Greek music, Nietzsche undertakes what might at first seem a strange discussion. He inserts into the beginning of the *Birth* of a discussion of the seventh century BC soldier-poet Archilochus (the warlike servant of the Muses, Nietzsche calls him). In his Basel lectures, *Introduction to the tragedy of Sophocles*, Nietzsche had argued that tragedy grew out of lyric folk song, not out of epic. He differentiates Greek tragedy from that of contemporary Germany

by remarking that the former was addressed to listeners, i.e. was, like music, for the ear, whereas in the present world it is all for the eyes, i.e. is spectacle. Tragedy grew from the music of the dithyramb which, says Nietzsche, is “folksong and in fact especially from that of the lower classes. Tragedy has always contained a pure democratic character, as it springs from the people.”

[90] It is from this “dionysian-apolloian Archilochus, the first musician known to us, that a new artistic development emerges, the gradual development of the folksong into tragedy.” [91] The word dithyramb (and iambic), let it be recalled, possibly derives for the word *amb* which means something like dance or step, and *arsis* and *thesis*, the basic terms of Greek metrics, refer to the raising and lower of the foot in rhythmic time. We still speak of feet in poetry.

This is a more complex claim than might be supposed. The claim that Archilochus had anything to do with music took the full force of some of the nastiest pages in Wilamowitz’s excoriating review of the *Birth*. [92] While contemporary scholarship tends rather to confirm Nietzsche’s claims about the musical and strophic quality of Archilochus’ work, [93] the (still today somewhat) standard version of the evolution of Greek literature is that it grew from the epic to the lyric and thence to the drama, and that this evolution represents a move towards self-consciousness. Such is the basic argument of the work, of, for instance, Werner Jaeger, Bruno Snell, and Hermann Fränkel. These authors in turn were, consciously or not, merely repeated the analysis that Hegel had given in the “Spiritual Work of Art” section of the *Phenomenology*. [94] This view, however, is hard to maintain in the face of the work done by Lord and Parry, from which we have to recognize that the first lyric poetry that we possess is merely that: the first that we possess, and that there must have been an entire tradition of lyric poetry that was as old as anything else, *including epic*. [95] There can thus be no talk of a linear evolution from epic to lyric if the two are co-ancient.

Nietzsche, whose sense of aesthetic necessity was extraordinary, shares the more recent, non-evolutionary understanding. Hence the first mistaken aesthetic claim that he needs to dispose of is the claim that poetry such as that of Archilochus (which “always says ‘I’”) is merely “subjective.” Rather he argues that it makes a claim about the world as it is, not merely from a single stand point. (It thus prepares the way for the deindividuation and joy of tragedy noted above). Nietzsche, who had clearly discussed these questions with Wagner, turns here to an unimpeachable source – Schiller – whom he cites as writing to Goethe that before he composed poetry he had within and before him not “a series of images, with his thoughts ordered in a causal sequence, but rather a musical pitch.” [96] (GT 5) The German word translated here as “pitch” is *Stimmung*, which also means “mood,” and that is indeed the perfectly correct translation in both Kaufmann’s and Speirs’s versions. Schiller insists however that it is a *musikalische Stimmung*. A musical pitch would function like a “tuning-fork” as Nietzsche later notes in *Twilight of the Idols*, as that is a criterion of correctness.

Central here is Nietzsche’s understanding of the emotional state in which Schiller found himself. In an early essay that remained unpublished, “On Words and Music”, Nietzsche argues that it is precisely the emotional states that our experience of music affords us that give rise to the suspension of the tension between subject and object that is the source of what he will call the Dionysian. What music does, according to Nietzsche, is to release us from the association of emotion (here *Affekte*) with representations. A complete freedom from such association is what he will term frenzy or *Rausch*. [97] In an early draft he writes:

What does music do? It removes experience from the will. It contains the common forms of all incidents of desire: it is throughout symbolism of the drives, and as such completely and universally comprehensible in their simplest forms (beat, rhythm). It is thus more general or common than each individual experience: thus

it is more understandable for us that each individual experience: music is thus the key to drama.” ^[98]

Nietzsche next notes that the lyric poet is identical to the musician. Nietzsche argues that the suffering of the lyric poet – a real-life reality for Archilochus – disindividuates the poet and that “he produces a copy of this primordial unity as music.” He produces it however as verse, as a metaphor (*Gleichnis*), thus visible, or at least apprehendable. First the artist gives up his subjectivity (in fact it was always imaginary); then he produces a “metaphorical dream-image,” ^[99] i.e., as an apollonian expression (not as a “representation”).

What is essential in Nietzsche analysis is what happens to the supposed “subject.” He writes: “The images of the lyric poet ... are nothing but the poet himself, merely as various objectifications of him, as it were, which is why he can say ‘I’ as the moving center of that world. Yet this ‘I’-ness is not the same as that of the waking, empirical-real human being, but rather the only ‘I’-ness that truly exists at all ... Now let us consider the poet as he catches sight of himself amongst these copies, in his condition as non-genius... In truth Archilochus, the passionately inflamed, loving and hating human being, is nothing but the vision of the genius itself.” ^[100]

The lyric poet is thus released from the will, that is, from the necessity of form. “Where the subject is an artist, it is already released from the individual will and has become, as it were, a medium....” Here in the fifth chapter of the *Birth*, Nietzsche continues, in terms that echo Emerson’s notorious passage on the transparent eyeball, “In this condition he resembles miraculously, that uncanny image of fairy-tale which can turn its eyes around and look at itself; now he is at one and the same time subject and object, simultaneously poet, actor, and spectator.” The folk-song is tragedy in embryo. In a note from the period of the *Birth* we find: “The folksong [is] Dionysian. The lyricist does not give us raging passion but a monstrously strong Dionysian will, which externalizes itself in an apollonian dream.” ^[101] Indeed, in the fragment quoted as epigraph, Archilochus seems to present himself as *exarchos*, as the leader of the chorus and an inscription at the shrine to Archilochus on the island of Paros makes reference to his skill as the leader of dionysian song. ^[102]

Without denying the central debt that Nietzsche owes to his philosophical predecessor, it is worth noting here that already this early in the *Birth*, Nietzsche is seeking partly to differentiate himself from Schopenhauer. Not only does he do so explicitly, but he does so precisely in his argument against Schopenhauer’s claim that lyric poetry is the most subjective expression of poetry, only a “half art.” For Nietzsche on the contrary it is fully realized art. ^[103] It is thus the case for Nietzsche, as it was for Rousseau and will be for, for instance, Alban Berg, that melody is the primary quality of music. ^[104] Why so? Nietzsche focuses on the particular construction of the folk-song. “Melody is the primary and general element which can therefore undergo several objectifications in several texts. ... Melody gives rise to poetry, and does so over and over again, in ever new ways; this is what the strophic form of the folk song is trying to tell us.” The words that are sung/spoken are words that correspond in each strophe to a melody, a melody that springs in the case of folk song and tragedy from “the artistic drive in nature.” It is thus precisely from the Greek text that Nietzsche thinks that one can recover Greek music. What this means is that the grasping of the spirit of music is a grasping of the possibility of creation, a creation that is for and of oneself, where one is “simultaneously poet, actor and spectator.” In a discussion of the parallel development of Greek music and philosophy, Nietzsche can write: “Die Musik freilich nur aus ihrem Niederschlag als Lyrik uns bekannt. – Music is of course only known to us from its expression as lyric.” ^[105] One might adduce here the testimony of Jacques Taminiaux in his *Le théâtre des philosophes*: “Music is exalted and exalting, characterized by the rupture of the principle of individuation in the “unending melody,” and by the rupture of the principle of rationality in “a harmony that emerges from the conflict of opposites... By metamorphosing the loss of individuation in a melody and simultaneously metamorphosing the loss of rationality in harmony, music reveals that just

as the will destroys individuals and transgresses the order and measure that make up the sphere of representation, it also justifies and redeems itself.” [\[106\]](#)

Nietzsche is quite clear that the relation of word to music is different in folk song and tragedy from that in epic. “One has only to think more deeply about the linguistic difference in color, syntactic construction, and lexical material between Pindar and Homer to grasp the significance of this opposition.” (GT 6). In Homer, language imitates the realm of appearances; in folk song and tragedy it imitates the world of music, which imitation appears, Nietzsche says, as will. It cannot *be* will, but appears *as* will, i.e. as the desire to give form. As Nietzsche remarks in *Richard Wagner in Bayreuth*, echoing a passage in Wagner’s essay “On Musical Criticism,” “the soul of music now wants to create for itself a body,” that *mousike* “reaches out ... to gymnastics.” [\[107\]](#) Here gymnastics has the sense of a training of the self, a self understood not just “physically,” to use an opposition that is very un-Greek. This is a centrally important theme in Nietzsche, though rarely noticed. Though it cannot detain us here, Nietzsche’s account of the stages of his own — the stages of his self-discipline — is best given in the 1886 prefaces he adds to each of his pre-Zarathustra works. [\[108\]](#)

3/ What is the importance of an understanding of tragedy for politics?

I noted above that Nietzsche argues that “the soul of music now wants to create for itself a body,” that *mousike* “reaches out ... to gymnastics.” The music of which Nietzsche seeks the spirit has the quality of wanting to acquire form. On the one hand Nietzsche calls attention to the fact that we tend to *want* to give a verbal account of our experience of music, to “speak in images (*Bilderrede*).” None of these images are anything other than a particular appearance, an appearance that we are both aware of as appearance and at the same time accept. Such is the achievement of Wagner, who “has forced music back into its primordial state in which it hardly yet thinks in concepts and in which it is still poetry, image feeling... Every word of these dramas has to be able to be sung.” [\[109\]](#) Thus Wagner, “as the first to recognize the inner deficiencies of the spoken drama, presents every dramatic event in a three fold rendering, through words, gestures, music. The music transmits the fundamental impulses in the depths (*Innern*) of the persons represented in the drama directly to the souls of the listener... Language retreats from rhetorical expansiveness to the consistency (*Geschlossenheit*) and power of an expression of feeling (*Gefühlsrede*).” *Music, I might say, is the expression of that for which we have not words yet feel compelled to express. In the compulsion to achieve meaning, it becomes a cultural force.* It has the quality it has because, Nietzsche argues, of the existence (and thus our experience of) dissonance and thus our desire to find consonance. The joy one takes in tragedy – recall the Hölderlin quote – can be “grasped in a uniquely intelligible and direct way in the wonderful significance of musical dissonance.” [\[110\]](#) Nietzsche will in fact assert that in human form, dissonance *is* a human being. [\[111\]](#)

Lydia Goehr has written: “The purely musical... came to serve most explicitly in the context of German romanticism as a repository for all that which could not be captured by a philosophical theory constrained solely by the authority of reason. {it} served as a general metaphor symbolizing a repository for all that was unknowable by ordinary cognitive or logical means.” [\[112\]](#) So also the gist of Nietzsche’s accusation against Socrates was his refusal to acknowledge that which Nietzsche insists he knew, that there is, as Nietzsche put it in the *Birth* 14, a “realm of knowledge from which the logician is exiled.” Nietzsche here takes over and makes historical the claim that Wagner had made in *Opera and Drama*, namely that we can become “knowers through feeling.” [\[113\]](#)

What has happened to require this new vision of music as *cognition* in the realm forbidden to rationality? Nietzsche is quite explicit. “The history of music teaches that the healthy development of Greek music in the early Middle Ages suddenly was most strongly hemmed in and limited

as one went back to antiquity with learned theory and praxis. The result was an unbelievable narrowing of taste: in the continuous opposition to the alleged tradition and natural hearing one arrived at a situation in which music was no longer composed for the ear but for the eye. The eyes were to admire the contrapuntal skill of the composer: the eyes were to recognize the expressiveness of the music.” ^[114] What is wrong with this development? Nietzsche’s argument rests not upon the distinction between a noumenal and phenomenal world (nor the related one in Schopenhauer), even if at times his vocabulary — as he later argued — seems to be Kantian. Rather it rests upon the capacity of the listener to be moved, that is to experience oneself in the music. (Thus the audience for tragedy saw itself transformed before its own eyes). This can only be grasped if we are able to allow ourselves its experience. Thus late in the *Birth*, Nietzsche writes: “I may not desist ... from urging my friends to make another attempt and ... to consider a single example from our shared experience... I cannot appeal to those who use the images of the events onstage and the words and passions of the *dramatis personae* in order thereby to get closer to a feeling for the music; for people like this do not have music as their mother tongue... Rather I can only appeal to those who have a direct affinity with music ... who relate to things almost exclusively through unconscious musical relationships.” ^[115]

If on the one hand it is in the nature of music to want to acquire form — even if this must always remain an unrealized endeavor — it is also on the other in the nature of music to want to ground a particular community, a particular polity. Thus Nietzsche is not primarily (or should I say “only”) interested in the self-possessed creative individual, but also in the collective. David Allison, in his marvelous and long awaited *Reading the New Nietzsche*, refers to this as a process of “disindividuation.” ^[116] That it is, but it is important to note that one does not thereby lose oneself completely. Nietzsche gives a description of those who can respond to music, the prerequisite for being a true audience member. Such ability first requires, paradoxically, the sense of an involved distance or objectivity from one’s own world. Nietzsche writes of an audience that, helpless in its seats, is, like the chorus on stage, unable to affect the course of the dramatic action and will thus not “run up and free the god from his torments.” As spectators, the audience is in the same inactive dionysian state as is the chorus on stage. Nietzsche writes that while spectators the audience can overlook (*übersehen*) the whole world of culture — with both senses intended. Then:

“The proceeding (*Prozess*) of the tragic chorus is the dramatic proto-phenomenon: to see oneself [as embodied in the chorus- TBS] transformed before one’s very eyes [as member of the audience —TBS] and to begin to act as if one had actually entered into another body, another character.” ^[117] It is thus, he argues, that tragedy effects a cultural transformation in the citizenry-spectators.

We can see here why Nietzsche is concerned to correct the standard view of Archilochus as a “subjective” poet who spoke only from the “I.” The effect of Greek tragedy (and thus music) is to annihilate the distinction between subjective and objective and to place one besides oneself — the literal meaning of ecstasy. Indeed, “the willing individual” (who cannot be an audience member in Nietzsche’s sense of audience) “can only be considered an opponent of art.” ^[118]

Nietzsche had hoped that the *Birth of Tragedy* would affect two audiences at the same time. The first was the community of German scholarship. Nietzsche proposed in the *Birth* a new understanding of the origins of tragedy, and by implication a new understanding of Greek history and identity. The second was the German public and German culture in general, a public that, as he made clear in the lectures on education, required a more direct certainty in matters of culture. The combination of both would recover what he calls “a people, a *publicum*.” ^[119]

It is the spirit of music that makes tragedy possible that is at the source of what one may call, even and especially in Nietzsche, the democratic element of Nietzsche’s political thinking. A reading of the *Untimely Meditations* makes it clear that for Nietzsche the capacity to be moved by an exemplar is available to all. While the purpose of culture is the production of what he calls “genius” one should tread slowly here. Genius is a term that Nietzsche almost certainly here takes

from Emerson, in whose style the *Considerations* are written. Emerson writes: “To believe in your own thought, to believe that what is true for you in your private heart is true for all – that is genius.” ^[120] And already in “The American Scholar” Emerson had noted that genius was “the sound estate of everyman.” ^[121] Genius, we find in Nietzsche, is used interchangeably with what he calls (still in *Schopenhauer as Educator*) “the furthering of the emergence of true human beings.” ^[122] One’s own voice is the voice of genius. I am reminded of a phrase in Mark Twain’s notebooks, “All of us have music and truth inside but most have a hard time getting it out.” ^[123]

The architectonic for this had been laid in the *Birth* itself. The intention of the book is to provide a test by which contemporaries may determine if they are able to become truly cultured, i.e., hold life and knowledge in a continuing beautiful tension. Nietzsche writes:

Whoever wishes to test himself completely accurately (*recht genau*) as to how closely related he is to the true aesthetic member of an audience or rather belongs to the community of Socratic-critical persons, has only to examine honestly the feeling with which he receives the wondrous spectacle present to him on stage: does he feel offended in his historical sense, relying as it does on strict psychological causality, does he benevolently concede that it is intelligible to the childish, but alien to him, or does he feel something else. ^[124]

Nietzsche continues this passage with a quiet justification of the mixture of modes with which he has shaped the *Birth*. He thinks in the *Birth* to have found a way around the nihilism of contemporary culture by using knowledge and science against itself, as it were. If we have become historical-critical beings, then Nietzsche will show us that it is precisely this quality that will permit us to move to a new level of aesthetic understanding. Nietzsche thus did hope for a role for traditional scholarship in his project. The reception of the book, not only by Wilamowitz, but by Ritschl and others, as merely romantic inspiration and prophetic utterance of a scholar lost to Wagnerism was thus disturbing not just to his wounded pride and tarnished reputation, but to the possibility of his whole project.

What disturbed Nietzsche the most about the reception of the *Birth* was that it brought home to him how unmusical the experience of the world and what passed for philosophy had become. The loss of this ability to experience – to be an audience – to be in acknowledgement – Nietzsche finds the passive more difficult to achieve than the active -- has been in Nietzsche’s understanding, a disaster for philosophy. In *The Case of Wagner* he writes: “Has it been noticed that music liberates the spirit? Gives wings to thought? That one becomes more of a philosopher the more one becomes a musician? – the gray sky of abstraction rent as if by lightening; the light strong enough for the filigree of things; the great problems near enough to grasp; the world surveyed as from a mountain.”

^[125] It is clear here that what music gives is distance on the world of appearance, the distance that Nietzsche instantiates as “overlooking,” the distance that makes *theoria* possible, allows us the ecstasy of being besides our self, and requires that we be always in the end unknown to ourselves. For Nietzsche, music provides access to the realm about which one can only remain silent, about which we must nonetheless speak, while recognizing that every word is an injustice and never final.

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语言与存在——对海德格尔语言哲学的理解

Language and Existence—The Understanding of Heidegger’s Language Philosophy

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一、语言与存在的关系

“究竟为什么在者在而无反倒不在？”这是海德格尔在《形而上学导论》一书中的第一句话。海德格尔认为，对存在的研究和探讨，就在于回答“究竟为什么在者在而无反倒不在？”这一最根本的问题。海德格尔认为，这一问题包含着丰富的内容。首先，它所揭示的，是人对存在的发问。海德格尔认为，从现象学的角度来看，这是进入研究存在的正确途径。在《存在与时间》中，海德格尔用此在这一术语来称呼，“这种存在者，就是我们自己向来所是的存在者，就是除了其它可能的存在方式以外还能够对存在发问的存在者。我们用此在这个术语来称呼这种存在者。”在《形而上学导论》中，他说：“不过，唯有一种在者，即提出这一问题的人，总是不断在这一追问中引人注目”。

其次，海德格尔认为，在这句话中，还包含着对存在的认识。存在是什么，海德格尔认为，存在是一个最空洞和抽象的词。存在这个词最终只是一个空洞的词。它意指非现实的，不可把握的，非真实的。“它的含义是一种非现实的迷雾。当尼采称象在这样的最高概念为气化实在的最后一道青烟时，他最终是完全正确的”。所以从这个意义上说，存在就是无。当然这无指的并不是不存在，它是从抽象的意义上来说的。

再次，语言同存在有什么关系，海德格尔认为关系非常密切。在这里海德格尔最想了解的就是在存在变成了气这一过程中，语言究竟起了什么作用。他的这段话最有代表意义。“在我们看来，询问在的问题与询问语言的问题在最中心处相互交织在一起。因此，可以看出，当我们现在要着手在其作用上摊出在变成了气这一所谓事实时，我们不得不从对语言的思考开始，这决不仅是一个表面的偶然事件”。

二、语言与存在的遮蔽

海德格尔认为，西方哲学的发展，自古希腊以后，实际上就是一部遗忘存在的历史。反映在对语言与存在的把握上，就是对在变成了气这种事实的误解。在他们看来，既然在是飘忽不定的、空洞的概念。那就最好不要谈存在。而应关注特殊的在者。这样一来，存在这一空洞的概念就填满了。然而问题解决了么？海德格尔认为没有，“撇开在而归附特殊的在者，这条指示却表现出：这条指示嘲弄了它自己还不晓得在是怎么回事。因为，只有当我们而且要看我们怎样已经辟头就从在的本质领会着在的时候，那个多方提到的特殊在者才能作为这样一个在者敞开在我们面前。”另外，海德格尔认为，在对在变成了气这一事实的误解过程中，语言当然指传统意义上的语言，也起了遮蔽的作用，这集中体现在对语言的错误的认识和把握上。传统的语言学的观点在谈到语言时，只把它看作工具，其功能就在于使用和被使用。正是在这一过程中，语言和存在最原始的关系被遮蔽了。海德格尔认为，现在“仅还只有极少数人有能力看穿当今的此在对语言的这种错误关联和无所关联的全部意义。”

三、语言与存在的显现

海德格尔对存在的认识就是对在变成气这一过程的正确认识。他认为对存在的发问和领悟是一种状态，正是在这种状态中，存在得以显现，反映在语言与存在的关系上，就是存在借助于语言得以显现。在这个过程中，语言发挥了非常重要的作用。海德格尔认为，如果没有存在这个词，“那就根本没有任何语言了”。

如何把握在变成气这一过程，海德格尔认为，按传统的思路肯定行不通。传统语言观认为，语言是对事物的反映，但用这种观点解释存在变成气这一事实肯定不行。因为，“在这个词在其每一变形形中对其所指说的在本身发生的关系根本不同于语言中其他一切名词和动词对其所指说的在者发生的关系”。

海德格尔认为，在变成气这个过程实际上是对在的领悟的过程，这里所说的气指的是一种对存在领会、发问的状态。“这股气把对在的领会指向一个确定的视野，这一番理解都是从这个视野来满足心愿的”。“在”的意义就是以当今与在场、坚持与持久、停留与出现这个圈子来划出自己的界限。而这个过程是要借助语言来完成的。

尼采道德谱系学与资本主义精神谱系

Nietzsche's Moral Genealogy and the Capitalist Spirit Genealogy

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尼采在《论道德的谱系》一书中运用谱系学方法研究人类的道德价值体系问题，揭示了人类欲望结构、心态结构与道德价值体系的内在二关系，阐述了主人道德与奴隶道德的生理学、心理学、社会学根源。这一研究思路对现代资本主义精神的研究有重要启示。松巴特曾强调盈利欲与资本主义精神的关系；韦伯则强调作为天职的工作欲与资本主义精神的关系；马克思·舍勒从尼采的道德谱系学受到启示，他不否定盈利欲、工作欲的作用，但更进一步地揭示了

怨恨心态与资本主义精神价值体系的内在关系:宗教一形而上学的绝望以及对世界和文化日益强烈的怨恨和对人的根本不信任,摧毁了一切团契共同体,最终把人的一切联结纽带引向对在的法律契约和利益结合。这就是资本主义精神的实质。顺着这一思路,刘小枫进而揭示了源于怨恨心态的资本主义精神不会因社会主义革命运动或国家民主主义的社会政策而没落,并指出怨恨心态与社会主义精神的关系。就民族关系而言,追求社会正义、社会平等、社会和谐的精神既是民族的翻身理念,更是消灭人剥削人的制度、实现天下为公的社会重构理念。作者认为源于怨恨心态的资本主义精神和社会主义精神在全球化背景下,仍然会对各个民族的道德价值体系的发展演变产生重要作用,为各个民族在政治、经济、文化领域的竞争和互动提供精神动力。

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试谈尼采的哲学观

On Nietzsche' s Viewpoint of Philosophy

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有人说,不了解尼采就不可能了解当今西方哲学思潮、文艺思潮和社会思潮,而尼采是作为一个活生生的、真实的人从事哲学活动的,他把他的个性完全融到他的哲学里,因此,从他对哲学的看法和观点就能够对尼采本人窥见一斑。尼采在多部作品中都直接或间接地谈到了“哲学”,他认为,哲学以探求人生意义为目的,人生是哲学的对象,赋予人生以意义就是哲学的使命。尼采哲学观的根本出发点是认为任何一种哲学与从事哲学思考的人的个性不可分离,他从一个美学问题即悲剧的起源问题开始其哲学活动,而美学仅仅是他思考人生问题的特殊角度,他早期从审美状态的分析提出酒神精神,后来又由酒神精神到强力意志,都是为了给人生意义问题提供一个解答。本文就将这位伟大的哲学家对哲学本身所做的说明和所持见解整理成文,并力求做出客观、全面的评价,以求更加符合实际地了解尼采、了解尼采观点中所体现的时代精神,也更为深入地了解当今西方哲学思潮和社会思潮。

海德格尔对胡塞尔现象学批判原理的继承与发展

——现象学从认识论到存在主义本体论的过渡

Heidegger' s Inheritance and Development of Husserl' s Phenomenology

魏久尧

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文章认为,海德格尔存在主义哲学的创立标志着胡塞尔现象学发展到一个新阶段。在海德格尔哲学中,现象学真正由认识论过渡到存在主义本体论,其直观方法所包含的经验与先验的矛盾最终被圆满地解决了。与此同时,海德格尔一贯地坚持并发展了胡塞尔所创立的关于理性、科学的批判概念和原则,将认识批判原理发展、改造为存在批判原理。

海德格尔的存在语境观

Heidegger' s Viewpoint of Existential Context

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海德格尔是存在主义的代表人物和哲学解释学的奠基者。从语境的观点看,存在主义是语境论的。他的存在语境观主要表现在以下三点:

1理解语境。传统观点认为理解是主体人的意识对客体的内容、性质、意义等的认识，完全是主体性的东西。海德格尔认为理解是“此在”和“在”之间最本质的关系，是人的认识活动的基础，它是先验的和前意识的。只要“此在”在，它就理解“在”，理解是“此在”的本体论条件，因为只有理解“在”，才有“此在”，才有此在的认识活动。

理解具有前理解或前结构，它包括“前者”、“前见”和“前设”。前有指预先有的文化习惯；前见指预先有的概念系统；前设指预先有的假定。在他看来，人们对事物的理解不是从虚无开始的，特定的文化背景、社会背景、传统观念、风俗习惯，特定时代的知识水平、精神状态、物质条件等都已存在，这就是“前有”。理解者置身于前有之中，无法摆脱，不能选择。人们对事物的解释不仅依赖“前有”，也需要预先有一个概念系统和前设的假设。三者共同构成理解的基础。他说“无论何时，只要某事物被解释为某事物，解释就将本质地建立在前有、前见和前设的基础上。解释决不是在预设地把握呈现在我们前面的东西。”

2 语言语境。在他看来，真正的语言与存在直接相关。存在是语言的存在，存在在语言中显现。从某种意义上讲，存在就是语言，语言就是存在。“存在”在人的“思”中形成语言，语言是存在之家，人以语言这家为家，“思”的人们和创作的人们是这个家的看家人。换句话说，人以“思”所求的存在的意义，只有在语言中去把握。而诗是真正的“思”，诗创造了一种追问存在的语言，因而解释者以“思”的方式通过诗的语言去把握世界的意义。

3生态语境。为了克服现代技术带来的危机，恢复人类与自然的本真关系，海德格尔构造出“天——地——神——人”四重整体的语境化结构来对抗现代技术的“座架本质”。在他看来，物是“天——地——神——人”四重整体语境化结构的汇集地，物之物化就是物的集聚。物是神圣的，它之中集聚着天、地、神、人四重整体，而天、地、神、人没有高低贵贱之分，彼此平等、共处、亲密、和谐。这样，海德格尔就以四重生态语境消解了“人类中心主义”和“技术决定论”。

从海德格尔的技术哲学看生态技术的确立

The Construction of Ecological Technology

from the Viewpoint of Heidegger's Philosophy of Technology

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技术在人类生活以及自然改造中起着什么样的作用呢？海德格尔在哲学上作了深入的探讨。他认为，传统的技术的工具性和人类学的规定是正确的，但不是真实的，没有揭示出技术的本质。通过对技术的历史学和词源学的考察，海德格尔认为，技术是世上万物的一种解蔽方式。只不过古代技术和现代技术的解蔽方式是不同的。前者是与艺术、科学等是紧密联系的，而且是统一的，是自然状态的解蔽，反映了自然理性，是天地神人的四重统一体；而现代技术对自然的解蔽是通过座架进行的。所谓座架就是“现代事物作为持存物在而自行解蔽的方式”。它是技术的本质。通过座架，技术促逼着自然，对自然强行索取；对在场者加以限定，即摆置，使自然齐一化、效用化、对象化，对自然进行了谋算和估价；通过订造，即生产，使得自然失去对象的独立性，成为持存物。总之，通过座架的作用，自然失去了本性，处于非自然的状态，成为人的对立面。不仅如此，海德格尔还认为，在技术的作用下，文化的东西，如科学、艺术、宗教、政治等等已经不再是决定性地形成历史的力量，它们都不可避免地因技术的展现而去蔽，显示其本质。如海德格尔就认为，现代科学所提供的物的图景就是数学化的图景，数学化是对物之特性的筹划，筹划的特征是设置，这点与技术支配的预置特征相同。因此，技术作为座架支配着现代科学的展开。如此一来，技术在把自然展现为持存物的同时，也使人自身生存方式发生了实质性的变化，人变成了持存物而失去了它的本真存在。这是技术危机的实质。要走出这样的危机，海德格尔认为要走向“思”与“诗”，也就是一要“向着物的泰然处之”，二要“对于神秘的虚怀敞开”，在深思中觉悟，成为存在者的看护者，最终走向“诗意的生存”。

海德格尔对技术的本质的揭示有一定道理，对于人们认识技术对人类生活和对自然的影响也有重要意义。但是，海德格尔没有看到技术的科学、社会、伦理、政治意涵，也就是没有看到这些因素对技术的“促逼”。实际上，技术对自然和人类生活的影响是在科学原理的基础上，在人们伦理价值的引导下，在人们追求利润的市场经济的背景下完成的。要走出技术的危机，就要坚持技术价值论；不仅要和技术自身进行分析批判校正，而且还要对影响技术形成和应用的其它因素进行考察分析批判。实际上，技术并非自主的，它并非科学、艺术、政治等的支配力量。技术应用的科学基础的不完备性——科学对自然的祛魅以及所获得的是自然的局部性的规律，技术开发和应用的经济导向的利润合理性和生态不合理性、人类中心主义的价值观念等是造成技术应用破坏自然的最根本的原因。要走出技术的危机，就要在考察分析、批判、校正技术开发、利用的社会背景下，给出技术应用的正确背景以保证技术的正确应

用。

而且, 海德格尔虽然指出了技术应用使自然处于非自然的状态, 但是, 他试图通过“诗”与“思”, 而走向自然和人类的本真存在——自然的状态是行不通的。实际上, 在科学从天然自然走向大自然系统的过程中, 在环境伦理学的引导下, 在环境经济学的具体实施过程中, 我们完全可以建构与自然生态系统本真状态相一致的生态技术。这样的生态技术的应用既能够保证自然的自然状态, 也能够为人类经济发展和社会进步服务。这是我们走出生态危机和技术危机的必要而有效的道路, 是我们的必然选择。

语言与存在——对海德格尔语言哲学的理解

一、语言与存在的关系

“究竟为什么在者在而无反倒不在?” 这是海德格尔在《形而上学导论》一书中的第一句话。海德格尔认为, 对存在的研究和探讨, 就在于回答“究竟为什么在者在而无反倒不在?” 这一最根本的问题。海德格尔认为, 这一问题包含着丰富的内容。首先, 它所揭示的, 是人对存在的发问。海德格尔认为, 从现象学的角度来看, 这是进入研究存在的正确途径。在《存在与时间》中, 海德格尔用此在这一术语来称呼, “这种存在者, 就是我们自己向来所是的存在者, 就是除了其它可能的存在方式以外还能够对存在发问的存在者。我们用此在这个术语来称呼这种存在者。” 在《形而上学导论》中, 他说: “不过, 唯有一种在者, 即提出这一问题的人, 总是不断在这一追问中引人注目”。

其次, 海德格尔认为, 在这句话中, 还包含着对存在的认识。存在是什么, 海德格尔认为, 存在是一个最空洞和抽象的词。存在这个词最终只是一个空洞的词。它意指非现实的, 不可把握的, 非真实的。“它的含义是一种非现实的迷雾。当尼采称象在这样的最高概念为气化实在的最后一道青烟时, 他最终是完全正确的”。所以从这个意义上说, 存在就是无。当然这无指的并不是不存在, 它是从抽象的意义上来说的。

再次, 语言同存在有什么关系, 海德格尔认为关系非常密切。在这里海德格尔最想了解的就是在存在变成了气这一过程中, 语言究竟起了什么作用。他的这段话最有代表意义。“在我们看来, 询问在的问题与询问语言的问题在最中心处相互交织在一起。因此, 可以看出, 当我们现在要着手在其作用上摊出在变成了气这一所谓实时, 我们不得不从对语言的思考开始, 这决不仅是一个表面的偶然事件”。

二、语言与存在的遮蔽

海德格尔认为, 西方哲学的发展, 自古希腊以后, 实际上就是一部遗忘存在的历史。反映在对语言与存在的把握上, 就是对在变成了气这种事实的误解。在他们看来, 既然在是飘忽不定的、空洞的概念。那就最好不要谈存在。而应关注特殊的在者。这样一来, 存在这一空洞的概念就填满了。然而问题解决了么? 海德格尔认为没有, “撇开在而归附特殊的在者, 这条指示却表现出: 这条指示嘲弄了它自己还不晓得在是怎么回事。因为, 只有当我们而且要看我们怎样已经辟头就从在的本质领会着在的时候, 那个多方提到的特殊在者才能作为这样一个在者敞开在我们面前。” 另外, 海德格尔认为, 在对在变成了气这一事实的误解过程中, 语言当然指传统意义上的语言, 也起了遮蔽的作用, 这集中体现在对语言的错误的认识和把握上。传统的语言学的观点在谈到语言时, 只把它看作工具, 其功能就在于使用和被使用。正是在这一过程中, 语言和存在最原始的关系被遮蔽了。海德格尔认为, 现在“仅还只有极少数人有能力看穿当今的此在对语言的这种错误关联和无所关联的全部意义。”

三、语言与存在的显现

海德格尔对存在的认识就是对在变成气这一过程的正确认识。他认为对存在的发问和领悟是一种状态, 正是在这种状态中, 存在得以显现, 反映在语言与存在的关系上, 就是存在借助于语言得以显现。在这个过程中, 语言发挥了非常重要的作用。海德格尔认为, 如果没有存在这个词, “那就根本没有任何语言了”。

如何把握在变成气这一过程, 海德格尔认为, 按传统的思路肯定行不通。传统语言观认为, 语言是对事物的反映, 但用这种观点解释存在变成气这一事实肯定不行。因为, “在这个词在其每一变异形中对其所指说的在本身发生的关系根本不同于语言中其他一切名词和动词对其所指说的在者发生的关系”。

海德格尔认为, 在变成气这个过程实际上是对在的领悟的过程, 这里所说的气指的是一种对存在领会、发问的状态。“这股气把对在的领会指向一个确定的视野, 这一番理解都是从这个视野来满足心愿的”。“在”的意义就是以当今与在场、坚持与持久、停留与出现这个圈子来划出自己的界限。而这个过程是要借助语言来完成的。

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语言:区分与道路 -- 海德格尔语言思想研究

Language: Distinguish and Road

—the Study of Heidegger's Language Philosophy

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语言问题一直是海德格尔思想(尤其是其晚期思想)中至关重要的问题,它既密切地关联着海德格尔的存在问题,也关切着思想自身。在中期,语言是存在的家园,在晚期,语言甚至是存在和思想的规定和根据。但技术语言和语言的技术化正损害着思,这主要表现在,作为技术本质的座架,限制与规定了语言科学,语言科学是语言逻辑化与技术化的产物,它限定了语言。在技术时代,语言受技术之驱迫,步入了形式化、数学化和符号化的轨道,语言具有了单一性、精确性与齐一性特征,失却了原初的纯粹性,从而有可能导致语言生命力的衰竭。针对这一危险,海德格尔基于对流俗语言观的批判,揭示了技术语言以及语言的技术化之弊及其原因,进而力图把以诗意语言为代表的传统语言与技术语言区分开来,并用诗意语言去克服技术语言,以确保语言的纯粹性与生命力。在海德格尔那看似循环的语言道路公式中,蕴涵了独特而深邃的语言思想和对人类生存的极大启示。

海德格尔论真理

Heidegger on Truth

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将存在问题与真理问题看作海德格尔思想的双重主题,不一定能够赢得所有人的认同,但有一点可以肯定,真理问题的确与存在问题一样贯穿于海德格尔思想之始终。当然,将存在问题与真理问题紧密联系在一起,这并不是海德格尔的创见,因为在古典哲学中就一向如此了。然而就问题的问法、深入的层面(维度)和解决问题的思路而言,海德格尔都与古典哲学家们大相径庭:存在问题被回溯到了存在论乃至基础存在论中,真理问题亦是作为存在论而不是认识论或本体论的问题来讨论的,这就使海德格尔深入到了问题的本源之中,而所有这一切都与现象学有着千丝万缕的联系。例如海德格尔将西方哲学中的真理概念追溯到希腊语中的 $\alpha\lambda\epsilon\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha$,亦即“无蔽”或“解蔽”,显然具有现象学的色彩。我们当前的问题亦与现象学有关。

众所周知,与现象学相遇,是海德格尔获得解决存在意义问题的方法与思路的关键。夸张地说,没有现象学,就没有海德格尔。然而,胡塞尔孜孜不倦梦寐以求的目标是严密精确的科学,海德格尔则不仅始终对科学持保留态度,而且在其思想中始终具有浓厚的神秘主义因素。我的粗浅之见是,胡塞尔(部分地包括前期海德格尔)追求的是现象学意义上的现象的显现,而海德格尔(尤其是后期海德格尔)更关注的由显现所引发的东西,因而在其思想中始终存在着解蔽(显现)与遮蔽(隐匿)之间的内在张力。

不恰当地说,胡塞尔的现象学试图通过一系列的现象学方法最终清晰地直观实事本身,而他所欲通达的境域或维度则具有“构成性”的意义。显然,关于构成性的思想是海德格尔始终坚持的,至于清晰性就难说了。在某种意义上说,海德格尔使用现象学方法的目的并不在于直观的清晰性,他所理解的构成性的境域亦不是“显现一无蔽”的,而是“隐匿一掩蔽”的。

海德格尔与胡塞尔之间的分歧——如果我们称之为分歧的话——比较突出地体现在海德格尔的真理学说之中。海德格尔在《存在与时间》中已经提出了真理之解蔽与遮蔽的问题,不过在那里真理之为“解蔽”主要是Dasein本真地绽出的结果,而“遮蔽”则基本上是由Dasein非本真在世所造成的。此后不久,海德格尔的思想发生了“转向”,这一转向体现在《论真理的本质》、《柏拉图的真理学说》和《艺术作品的本源》等一系列的讲演之中,而且都与真理问题有关。在这一系列讲演之中,给人突出印象的是“非真理”概念的提法和内涵的变化。由此,海德格尔不是像古典哲学那样“向上”追求显现的光明,而是“向下”深入更加本源的境域,希图通过存在者的解蔽一显现,牵引出存在一真理的发生。

海德格尔哲学与现象学之间的关系是一个非常复杂的问题,在此我想求教于诸位专家学者的是,海德格尔是不是在重大问题上“偏离”了现象学的路线?现象学本身是否包含着海德格尔思想尤其是后期思想的思路?

To regard the problem of being and the problem of truth will not be acknowledged by all people. But what we can confirm is that the problem of truth permeated from beginning to end as the problem of being in Heidegger's thought. To connect these two problems together is certainly not his original

idea; it is a usual practice in classic philosophy. But there are huge differences between Heidegger and classic philosophers concerning with the way of questioning, dimension of exploring and approach of solving the problem. That is, the problem of being was traced back to the ontology or even the fundamental one, while the problem of truth was also dealt as that of ontology rather than epistemology, which led Heidegger to penetrate into the origin of the problem. All of these are connected with the phenomenology. For instance, Heidegger traced the notion of truth back to the aletheia in ancient Greek philosophy, which is a phenomenological approach. The problem here is also concerned with phenomenology.

As we know, the encounter with phenomenology is the key point in Heidegger's method and approach in solving the problem of being. It is plausible that no phenomenology, no Heidegger. But what Husserl seeks all his life is to obtain the strict and accurate science, while Heidegger not only had some suspicions of science but also had some mysterious elements throughout his thought. My opinion is, what Husserl (partly including early Heidegger) seeks is the phenomenological presence of phenomenology, but what Heidegger (especially later Heidegger) concerned with is what arouses by way of the presence; therefore there is a kind inner tension of aletheia (presence) and letheia (concealment) throughout his thought.

Improperly speaking, Husserl's phenomenology tries to clearly intuit the fact itself through a series of phenomenological methods and the horizon he intended to reach had 'constructive' significance. Obviously, the notion of constructiveness is what Heidegger stuck to all his life, but it is not so certain as to clarity. In a certain sense, the aim of using phenomenological method is not the intuitive clarity. The constructive horizon he understood is 'concealment' rather than 'presence' or aletheia.

The diversity, if it is, between Heidegger and Husserl embodied prominently in Heidegger's theory of truth. The relationship between phenomenology and his philosophy is a very complicated problem. What I discussed here is whether Heidegger 'deviated' the route of phenomenology and whether phenomenology itself contains Heidegger's thought especially the later.

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HUMAN FREEDOM AS AUTHENTICITY OF BEING

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Abstract:

We are ontologically free when our existence is authentic. However, this freedom is not what we can voluntarily choose to have because it is given to us as a gift. What we can strive for is not the gift itself but the readiness for receiving it. So our freedom of will and choices lies in preparing ourselves for the gift. This work of preparation in Heidegger's earlier writings is Dasein's wanting-to-have-a-conscience and in his later ones is Dasein's non-willing. The later view implies that a willing Dasein is unfree because willing itself indicates the inauthenticity of his Being.

I. Freedom in the Domain of Will

In Plato's Gorgias, Socrates and Callicles had a discussion on human freedom. Callicles holds that freedom implies no constraint. A free person is someone who satisfies his every desire and nothing holds him back. Socrates, on the other hand, argues that a person like this is unfree because he is not a ruler of himself but a slave of his pleasures and desires. One can only be free when one is in control of oneself, namely, one's passions and desires. On this view, a person is free when he exercises his free will, that is, when his choices and actions are determined by him, his real self, rather than by his desires or passions that are factors alienated from him. This seems to say that freedom is a sort of property that we can lose or possess. For instance, when I am debating with

myself on whether or not to A. I should reason in the following way: A-ing will satisfy my desire D, but D is a desire that I wish I do not have. So if I A, A-ing will be caused by D instead of me. Therefore, when A-ing, I will lose my freedom and become unfree. But if I refrain from A-ing, I will keep my freedom and stay as a free agent. But is this model an adequate theorization of our experiences of freedom in life? It seems to me that a particular action can make the agent practically, morally, or even aesthetically good or bad, right or wrong, but will not make him either free or unfree. Freedom does not lie in our choices because it is not something at our disposal. Rather, it is a mode of life or a way of Being. Some particular actions can be free actions in light of a free Being and can be unfree when the agent's Being is disguised. This free way of being a human is the most fundamental freedom that we can have and also the precondition of any other derivative talk of freedom. Strictly speaking, a free person is not someone who possesses freedom but rather is possessed by freedom, because freedom is not a property that can be appropriated by us, but a mode of Being that can manifest itself through us. Martin Heidegger writes about the relation between freedom and us as follows:

... human caprice does not then have freedom at its disposal. Man does not "possess" freedom as a property. At best, the converse holds: freedom, ek-sistent, disclosive Da-sein, possesses man... (BW, 127)

For Heidegger, the most fundamental freedom for human being is authentic existence. When we are existing authentically, the Being of our being will disclose itself to us and manifest itself through us. This disclosure and manifestness will set us free to be who we already are. In this essay, I will first introduce Heidegger's conceptions of authenticity and inauthenticity and then discuss his notions of resoluteness and releasement.

II. Freedom as Authentic Being

By "Dasein," Heidegger means the "entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being" (SZ, 7). Dasein's Being is to be distinguished from beings that Dasein meets in the world. Traditional Western ontology has been concerned with 'What are beings as beings?' and has ignored being as such. 'Beings,' translated from German word *das Seiende*, means 'things,' 'the existent,' 'the entity,' or 'entities,' which is different from 'to be.' When we say something is, we mean it occurs in the world or it manifests itself in the world. So 'Being' is the manifestness of 'beings' and 'beings' are something that is manifest. Heidegger holds that to ask 'What are beings as beings?' is a wrong start to investigate human existence, because it will lead us to classify human beings as things (i.e. animals, substance, etc.) This way of thinking conceals many possible ways and senses in which a being can be, especially be an authentic Dasein.

Inauthenticity of Being

(1) The phenomenon of inauthenticity

Heidegger analyzes the existence of Dasein in his everyday life to bring into view who Dasein is most of the time. In his everydayness, Dasein is tacitly conceived either as things or equipment. The character of things is their substantiality or "objective presence," which is denoted by term "present-at-hand." The character of equipment is its usefulness or "readiness-to-hand," which is denoted by term "ready-to-hand." When Dasein is taken as present-at-hand, he is typically understood as 'I,' 'self,' or 'subject.' When he is taken as ready-to-hand, he appears as things that can be used to serve certain purposes.

Our investigation of the 'who,' Heidegger suggests, ought to start with Being-in-the-world which is a "basic state of Dasein by which every mode of its Being gets co-determined" (SZ, 117). We encounter Others in our everyday life: the apartment I am living in is rent from its owner; the apple I am eating was planted by a farmer; the cars parking on the street are the properties of other people. Others appear to me as ready-to-hand and presence-at-hand although they are neither of those. Since Dasein understands himself in terms of the world and meets Others "at work," that is, in their Being-in-the-world, Dasein has the tendency to be absorbed in the world of his concern, that is, "in its Being-with towards Others - it is not itself." Who could it be when the Being of

Dasein is found as everyday Being-with-one-another?

The answer is “they” [das Man]. The Being of Dasein “has been taken away by the Others” (SZ, 126). Others or “they” are not anyone particular but the public environment that is ready-to-hand. Heidegger remarks,

We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they [man] take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the ‘great mass; as they shrink back; we find ‘shocking’ what they find shocking. The “they”, which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness. (SZ, 127)

When Dasein’s Being is taken away by the “they,” it loses its character of always being mine and becomes one of the “they.” One important existential characteristic of the “they” is averageness, which is vividly described by Heidegger as follows:

Thus the “they” maintains itself factually in the averageness of that which belongs to it, of that which it regards as valid and that which it does not, and of that to which it grants success and that to which it denies it. In this averageness with which it prescribes what can and may be ventured, it keeps watch over everything exceptional that thrusts itself to the fore. Every kind of priority gets noiselessly suppressed. Overnight, everything that is primordial gets glossed over as something that has long been well known. Everything gained by a struggle becomes just something to be manipulated. Every secret loses its force. This care of averageness reveals in turn an essential tendency of Dasein which we call the “levelling down” [Einebnung] of all possibilities of Being. (SZ, 127)

Dasein’s Being is obscured and covered up by the ways of Being for the “they.” The averageness of the “they” prescribes what Dasein can be or can do. It suppresses everything that is distinguishes himself from public standards because individuation will disturb the tranquilization that is well prepared for Dasein by the “they.” The reassurance of publicness seduces Dasein to fall into its manipulating snare and makes him believe that the average understanding of its self and the world is not only accurate but also satisfactory. The fundamental way of Being has been glossed over and replaced with something that has been familiar for the public. Thus everything becomes an object of manipulation and appears to be accessible to everyone.

Dasein surrenders himself to the “they” and lets the “they” take over his life. Whenever Dasein needs to make a choice or a decision, he lets the “they” decide for him. He never takes responsibility of his own Being because he drifts along the publicness and never faces the possibilities that are uniquely his own. In this way, “everyone is the other, and no one is himself.”

Dasein also understands his existence by listening to other’s judgments about him and by comparing himself with others. What he should care about but always ignores are the possibilities that are not for anyone else but uniquely and solely for his own finite self. In everydayness, Dasein loses his authentic self to the “they” and becomes dominated and enslaved by the “they.” In order to draw his Being back to his ownmost self, Dasein needs to let his Being disclose itself in its unique way and this disclosure will clear away the concealments and obscurities of Dasein’s inauthentic existence.

When Dasein’s Being is concealed, he understands time inauthentically. Since he regards himself as presence-at-hand, namely, a thing, he takes himself to have the character of thingness, that is, an infinite being who lives in an infinite series of now-moments.

(2) The falling of Dasein

When Dasein understands himself as a thing, that is, either as present-at-hand or ready-to-hand, he is “completely fascinated by the ‘world’ and by the Dasein-with of others in the ‘they’ ” (SZ, 176). Heidegger calls this mode of existence the “falling” of Dasein. In falling, he has fallen into the world and fallen away from his Self. In other words, falling is a disowned way for Dasein to be his Self. Idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity are the three characteristics of Dasein’s falling.

Idle talk is groundless talk nurtured by average understanding. It shows the “possibility of understanding everything without previously making the thing one’s own.” Heidegger points out that “it not only releases one from the task of genuinely understanding, but develops an undifferentiated kind of intelligibility, for which nothing is closed off any longer” (SZ, 169). Idle talk is not a form of deception, but nonetheless covers up the genuine understanding of what is being talked about. Therefore, “by its very nature, idle talk is a closing-off, since to go back to the ground of what is talked about is something which it leaves undone” (SZ, 169). How one understands and interprets the world and oneself is dominated by this average understanding promoted by the idle talk. Any discovery, inquiry and disputation is to be suppressed or held back because idle talk guarantees a familiar world that has been completely interpreted.

Curiosity is a tendency and eagerness to see. It is not “confined to seeing, but expresses the tendency towards a peculiar way of letting the world be encountered by us in perception” (SZ, 170). Everyday Dasein seeks restlessly to see novelty and constantly changing encounters. He never dwells anywhere and does not concern himself with what is being seen, but with seeing itself. By being distracted constantly, “Dasein lets itself be carried along solely by the looks of the world” (SZ, 172). Just like for idle talk, nothing is not understood; for curiosity, nothing is closed off.

Dasein’s everyday Being-with-one-another and his own Being has shown the phenomenon of ambiguity. Heidegger writes,

When, in our everyday Being-with-one-another, we encounter the sort of thing which is accessible to everyone, and about which anyone can say anything, it soon becomes impossible to decide what is disclosed in a genuine understanding, and what is not. (SZ, 217)

(3) Why is Being inauthentic?

First, it is because we are craving for security and gratification. This craving encourages us to understand ourselves as objects that are either presence-at-hand that are in need of gratification and security or ready-to-hand that can be exploited in a world that is dominated by exchange-relations. Once we see ourselves as enduring objects, we do not have to bear the truth any more that we are mortal beings. It reassures us and provides us with some illusory sense of security at the price of being unable to see things as themselves but to regard them either as threatening or gratifying. Meanwhile, we regard our Being as an object that can be used or manipulated as a means to obtain certain ends. This mode of existence prevents our Being to manifest itself and as a result our existence becomes inauthentic.

Secondly, it is because we have the tendency to fall. Dasein’s fundamental tendency is not to own himself but to lose himself to the “they.” He tends to turn away from himself and get completely absorbed in the activities that he is engaged with the “they.”

Authenticity of Being

(1) Authenticity of Being

The authentic Being of Dasein is not a different order of Being, but a modification of the inauthentic one. Heidegger says,

Authentic Being-one’s-Self does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has been detached from the “they”; it is rather an existentiell modification of the “they” – of the “they” as an essential existentielle. (SZ, 130)

The idea is that, in order to be authentic, Dasein must gather itself back from the scatteredness into the “they.” In this basic way of existing, Dasein is himself in the sense that he lets his Being be his. He makes genuine choices that are uniquely his as opposed to according to the “they.” His understanding of himself no longer results from what other people think but from his own Being that is disclosed and manifest. The authentic Being of Dasein must not be present-at-hand or ready-to-hand but conceived as care. Heidegger emphasizes that “Dasein is in principle different from everything that is present-at-hand or Real. Its ‘subsistence’ is not based on the

substantiality of a substance but on the ‘Self-subsistence’ of the existing Self, whose Being has been conceived as care” (SZ, 303).

Dasein’s authentic understanding of his Being as care is related to the authentic way Dasein experiences time. Traditional ontology tends to regard being as substance, that is, independent presence present in unlimited “now-moments”. As it is understood, time is an infinite series of ‘nows’ that has no connection with past and future. In this way, Dasein objectifies itself as an object that is eternal and static and its Being is disguised.

Another way of understanding of time is to regard time as a more original primordial time in which the Being of Dasein can be disclosed as finite and limited. In light of this understanding, Dasein interprets himself as a being that has his unique fate and telos and is open to the possibility of self-development. Only through this understanding can Dasein discover his own possibilities and devote his life accordingly. Heidegger calls Dasein’s authentic Being “temporality” which temporalizes itself. He writes,

Primordial and authentic temporality temporalizes itself in terms of the authentic future and in such a way that in having been futurally, it first of all awakens the Present. The primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future. (SZ, 329)

Time is primordial as the temporalizing of temporality, and as such it makes possible the Constitution of the structure of care. Temporality is essentially ecstatic. Temporality temporalizes itself primordially out of the future. Primordial time is finite. (SZ, 331)

The manifestness of Dasein’s Being reveals to him that his primordial time is finite. Because of the finitude of his being, he should understand his life as a whole, that is, as a unity of past, present and future, among which future is most important because both Dasein’s past and present is to be understood in terms of his finite future.

(2) Why is it free?

The inauthenticity of Being is unfree because it conceals the truth of Being and prevents it from manifesting itself freely. Dasein either constantly represses the truth and deceives himself through falling or looking at the world from a manipulative perspective, from which the wood becomes “a forest of timber,” the mountain becomes “a quarry of rock,” the river becomes “water-power” and the wind becomes “wind ‘in the sails’ ” (SZ, 70).

However, when Dasein’s Being is manifest, he is free because he becomes who he already is. His being is not prevented any more from being manifest, revealed, or disclosed. He accepts his limitations, discovers the possibilities that are uniquely his own and stops manipulating his situation. This freedom not only sets Dasein’s Being free but also all the beings in the world. The authenticity of Dasein’s Being lets everything be itself because it becomes an openness through which the Being of beings can manifest itself. In the following passage, Heidegger points out that the fundamental freedom of Dasein is “the disclosure of beings as such.”

Freedom is not merely what common sense is content to let pass under this name: the caprice, turning up occasionally in our choosing, of inclining in this or that direction. Freedom is not mere absence of constraint with respect to what we can or cannot. Nor is it on the other hand mere readiness for what is required and necessary (and so somehow a being). Prior to all this (“negative” and “positive” freedom), freedom is engagement in the disclosure of beings as such. (BW, 126)

3. To be authentic through Dread

What awakes Dasein from the tranquility of his everyday existence of falling? The answer is Dread. Dasein will experience an existential Dread when facing the truth that he is a being who does not have unlimited nows but will die at certain point in the future.

We do talk about death often in our everyday life, but most of the time the talk is a part of idle talk and curiosity which belong to a falling Dasein. We rarely confront death face to face because we

inherent all kinds of ways from our civilization to cover it up. For example, some of us who are religious believe that the deceased did not die but continued to live in another world. Others who are atheists tend to celebrate their own good luck of escaping death themselves. Both ways contribute to disguise the truth that death is inescapable and must be experienced by oneself. Concerning how thinking about death is discouraged by the publicness, Heidegger writes,

... ‘thinking about death’ is a cowardly fear, a sign of insecurity on the part of Dasein, and a sombre way of fleeing from the world. The “they” does not permit us the courage for anxiety in the face of death. (SZ, 254)

Moreover, our tendency to let ourselves be fascinated by a serial of infinite now-moments helps to nurture the illusion that we are infinite beings and death is forever abstract and far away.

However, once the anxiety of contemplating one’s own death is experienced by Dasein, the truth that death is inescapable and non-relational will be revealed to him. He will realize the fact that he cannot run away from death or do anything to evade it and this kind of dread will further motivate another realization of Dasein that all the things he can do something about is insignificant or irrelevant. The dread caused by the inescapability of death is worsened by its non-relational feature that forces Dasein to face its death alone. It detaches him from the publicness and breaks the illusion that he can expect to share everything with the “they.” Heidegger says, “No one can take the Other’s dying away from him. ... Dying is something that every Dasein itself must take upon itself at the time” (SZ, 240). As a result, the tranquillized self-assurance and familiarity of everydayness is broken in dread and dread brings Dasein back to itself. Heidegger remarks on Dasein’s individualization as follows:

Thus death reveals itself as that possibility which is one’s ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped. (SZ, 251)

...as Dasein falls, anxiety brings it back from its absorption in the ‘world’. Everyday familiarity collapses. Dasein has been individualized, but individualized as Being-in-the-world. (SZ, 189)

The individualization of Dasein makes him seriously consider the possibilities that are distinct from those promoted by the “they.” Heidegger writes,

...anticipation [of death] reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by concernful solicitude, but of being itself, rather, in an impassioned freedom towards death – a freedom which has been released from the Illusions of the “they”, and which is factual, certain of itself, and anxious. (SZ, 266)

Dasein’s acceptance of his finitude and his detachment from everyone else move him to face the uniqueness of his Being. This confrontation enables him to discover his deepest aspirations in life that makes it possible for him to be himself. This freedom towards death is liberation of Dasein’s Being.

When, by anticipation, one becomes free for one’s own death, one is liberated from one’s lostness in those possibilities which may accidentally thrust themselves upon one; and one is liberated in such a way that for the first time one can authentically understand and choose among the factual possibilities lying ahead of that possibility which is not to be outstripped. (SZ, 264)

In anticipating his death, Dasein recognizes that he has neglected his ownmost possibilities and promoted the possibilities that are accidentally thrust upon him by the “they.” If Dasein is here only for a limited time, he needs to be himself now.

III. Resoluteness

Wanting-to-Have-a-Conscience

Once Dasein is aware that his Being is inauthentic, can he choose to become authentic? The notion of ‘resoluteness’ in Heidegger’s earlier writings, *Being and Time*, seems to suggest that one can

become authentic through willing and choosing.

Resoluteness implies will and choice. Once I realize that my Being is lost to the “they” and I let other people decide what I should do and could be for me, I can decide to stop existing this way and resolve to start a new mode of Being, namely, an authentic one. It is “choosing to choose a kind of Being—one’s-Self” (SZ, 270).

But what can Dasein choose to do? Can he choose to exist authentically? For Heidegger, the answer is no, because authenticity is not just a personal but also an ontological event that Dasein cannot initiate. What Dasein can choose is nothing more than wanting-to-have-a-conscience, that is, a hearing that corresponds to the call of conscience which is what happens to Dasein rather than what Dasein can choose or dispose of. When Dasein’s conscience calls, he needs to understand the call in order for the call to summon him back from his existence of falling. Heidegger writes,

Hearing the appeal correctly is thus tantamount to having an understanding of oneself in one’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being – that is, to projecting oneself upon one’s ownmost authentic potentiality for becoming guilty. When Dasein understandingly lets itself be called forth to this possibility, this includes its becoming free for the call – its readiness for the potentiality of getting appealed to. In understanding the call, Dasein is in thrall to its ownmost possibility of existence. It has chosen itself. (SZ, 287)

But in the appeal, the they-self gets called to the ownmost Being-guilty of the Self. Understanding the call is choosing; but it is not a choosing of conscience, which as such cannot be chosen. What is chosen is having-a-conscience as Being-free for one’s ownmost Being-guilty. “Understanding the appeal” means “wanting to have a conscience”. (SZ, 288)

All that Dasein can do is to keep himself ready to heed the call because the calling is neither an action he can initiate nor an option he can choose. But once the conscience in fact calls and the call is understood appropriately, Dasein’s Being will manifest itself and Dasein’s existence will become authentic.

The Call of Conscience

In everyday existence, Dasein has been kept from making genuine choices and carried along by the ‘they.’ He cannot exist authentically unless he brings himself back to himself from his lostness in the “they.” Dasein’s potentiality of being authentic is rooted in his very Being. The possibility can be attested by the “voice of conscience.” It is a phenomenon of Dasein and only occurs in Dasein’s kind of Being. It occurs from time to time but not as a “universally established and ascertainable fact” (SZ, 269).

Conscience discloses to Dasein what is covered up and makes it manifest to Dasein’s understanding. It reveals itself as a call. “The call of conscience has the character of an appeal to Dasein by calling it to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self; and this is done by way of summoning it to its ownmost Being-guilty” (SZ, 269). To respond to the summon of the conscience, Dasein needs a hearing, that is, wanting-to-have-a-conscience, which is kind of choosing – choosing to let one’s authentic Being manifest itself. Heidegger calls this choice “resoluteness.”

Conscience calls Dasein in silence because it is different from the hubbub produced by the publicness. This call interrupts Dasein’s listening to the “they” and brings his hearing to Dasein himself. The call of conscience is not a vocal utterance but a silent push that is the tendency of disclosure.

As the call of conscience reaches Dasein who is ready to hear the call, it reveals the Being of the world and of Dasein himself to him. In other words, in the revelation both Dasein and the world have been understood by Dasein. The call summons Dasein’s Self to his potentiality-for-Being-its-Self, and thus does not tell him what he is to do but to tell him how he is to be. It calls Dasein forth to his possibilities that will only be revealed when the Being of Dasein is manifest. Each Dasein is given a unique way for his being to Be, therefore, the content of authentic existence is individualized and no one can become a universal ideal for every Dasein.

Dasein can resolve to have a hearing of the call of conscience, but conscience itself cannot be chosen, because it belongs to Dasein's being as care and Dasein's own being is the last thing he can will or dispose of. Heidegger writes,

Indeed the call is precisely something which we ourselves have neither planned nor prepared for nor voluntarily performed, nor have we ever done so. 'It' calls, against our expectations and even against our will. On the other hand, the call undoubtedly does not come from someone else who is with me in the world. The call comes from me and yet from beyond me and over me. (SZ, 275)

This [wanting to have a conscience] does not mean that one wants to have a 'good conscience', still less that one cultivates the call voluntarily; it means solely that one is ready to be appealed to. (SZ, 288)

The call of conscience is not the voice of God or superego. The caller is oneself and the hearer is oneself too. One can choose to be a hearer but cannot choose to be a caller. The call is not what one can voluntarily cultivate, rationally plan or emotionally prepare. It could happen even against one's expectations or will.

The Necessity and Freedom of Resoluteness

A resolute Dasein is open to a particular set of possibilities which are uniquely his own. But he would not know what they are when the truth of his being is not disclosed. The moment of disclosure will let those possibilities present themselves to him. Thus the resolute individual does not choose the possibilities but to choose to let the possibilities choose him. Once he is chosen by those possibilities, his further decisions and choices will flow naturally from his disposition. His compliance with the requirements of those possibilities become necessary and the necessity of this kind necessitates Dasein's freedom to be.

IV. Releasement

In his later writings, Heidegger tries to exclude the element of will from his conception of authenticity. In light of this new thought, we do not will to have a hearing of the call of conscience but to wait to be released through non-willing. The disclosure of Being is given to us as a gift when we do not will at all. In his "Conversation on a Country Path about Thinking," Heidegger proposes an idea that authenticity understood as releasement requires one to wean oneself from willing.

What is releasement? What will happen to a released individual? According to Heidegger, when Dasein is released, he lets things be, that is, to let beings reveal their Being. Here, he distinguishes calculative thinking from meditative thinking. When Dasein thinks calculatively, he sees things, including himself, through a manipulative perspective. In other words, he regards them as ready-to-hand. Things are not appreciated as what they are, but regarded as tools or equipment that can be used for gratification. For example, seen as ready-to-hand, the sun is the source of solar energy, the forest is timber and the sea is a world of seafood. Everything is to be manipulated for the purpose of human use. Heidegger remarks on calculative thinking as follows:

Its peculiarity consists in the fact that whenever we plan, research, and organize, we always reckon with conditions that are given. We take them into account with the calculated intention of their serving specific purposes. Thus we can count on definite results. This calculation is the mark of all thinking that plans and investigates. Such thinking remains calculation even if it neither works with numbers nor uses an adding machine or computer. Calculative thinking computes. It computes ever new, ever more promising and at the same time more economical possibilities. Calculative thinking races from one prospect to the next. Calculative thinking never stops, never collects itself. Calculative thinking is not meditative thinking, not thinking which contemplates the meaning which reigns in everything that is. (DOT, 46)

However, when Dasein thinks meditatively, things are no longer objects to be possessed or manipulated but set free to be themselves. As Reiner Schurmann describes, when Dasein is released, "the thing is freed into its own being" and a "grip is loosened, a contraction of the fingers

slackens. Apprehension turns into ease and pose.” When the thing is released from its usefulness and reliability, its thingness occurs and an object becomes a thing. For example, there are two ways of tilling the soil:

As released, we are open for the possibilities of beings. Instead of subjecting things to our will, we seek to let them be what they already are. There are two ways of tilling the soil, for example. Subjectivist man treats the earth merely as raw material to be exploited for profit; hence, he uses chemicals which dramatically improve crop “production” for a time, but which ultimately degrade the earth. Released man regards the earth as the source of life; hence, in tilling it, he takes care that the soil remains fertile and healthy. (Zimmerman, 246)

Releasement is a moment of vision which is not to be attained through one’s voluntary will but to be attained through non-willing. Non-willing has two different senses. First, it means “willingly to renounce willing.” Second, it means “what remains outside any kind of will.” Through renouncing of willing “we may release, or at least prepare to release, ourselves to the sought-for essence of a thinking that is not a willing.” That is to say, “a trace of willing” is necessary for Dasein when trying to reach the point of releasement. But this trace of willing is the will to relinquish willing that “vanishes while releasing oneself and is completely extinguished in releasement” (Zimmerman, 80).

By stop willing, Heidegger does not mean to let our sinful self-will go “in favor of the divine will” (Zimmerman, 62). Neither does he mean a passivity that “allowing things to slide and drift along” (Zimmerman, 61). Non-willing is not indifference to things, but rather, it is an attitude that suggests a “supreme interest in their Being.” For Heidegger, letting all things be, as Reiner Schurmann’s remarks, “appears as less a work of death than as a necessity for life near the origin” (Schurmann, 104). In the following discourse among scientist, scholar and teacher, Heidegger tries to express the idea that a released individual does not let things slide and drift along. The conversation goes like this:

Scientist: Someone who heard us say this could easily get the impression that releasement floats in the realm of unreality and so in nothingness, and, lacking all power of action, is a will-less letting in of everything and, basically, the denial of the will to live!

Scholar: Do you then consider it necessary to counter this possible misunderstanding by showing in what respect something like power of action and resolve also reign in releasement?

Scientist: Yes I do, although I don’t fail to recognize that all such names at once misinterpret releasement as pertaining to the will.

Scholar: So, for example, one needs to understand “resolve” as it is understood in Being and Time: as the opening of man particularly undertaken by him for openness...

Teacher: ...which we think of as that-which-regions.

Scientist: Then the nature of thinking, namely, releasement to that-which-regions, would be a resolve for the coming forth of truth’s nature.

...

Teacher: Releasement, thus composedly steadfast, would be a receiving of the regioning of that-which-regions.

Scientist: This composed steadfastness, in which the nature of releasement rests, could be said perhaps to correspond to the highest willing; but it could not. This resting in itself of releasement, which lets it belong to the regioning of that-which-regions with respect to man... (DOT, 80-1)

A released Dasein is not governed by any rules or goals, but acting freely and spontaneously. It seems that he has an “aesthetic”-like sensibility that enables him to act appropriately. His actions flow naturally and freely from his person as an integrate whole and this know-how is not a

kind of knowledge that results from an application of any theories or rules. He lets his being become openness and emptiness in which the Being of things, including himself, can manifest itself. Heidegger's later version of authenticity has strengthened the earlier one by emphasizing the idea that Dasein's freedom, authenticity of Being as releasement, is not chosen by his voluntary will but is given to him as a gift.

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海德格尔技术之思的宗旨：哲学的终结抑或哲学发展的新方向

The Tenet of Heidegger's Reflection on Technology

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从20世纪30年代开始,海德格尔对现代技术作出了大量思考。在《哲学的终结和思的任务》一文中,海德格尔道出了他对现代技术进行追问的意图:“追问通向答案之途。如若答案毕竟可得,那它就必在于一种思想的转换,而不在于一种对某个事态的陈述”⁽¹⁾。此句话表明海德格尔对现代技术进行思考的意图并不是简单的现象层面的批判,而是为了批判技术背后的哲学思维方式,在他看来,这种哲学在现时代已经进入其终结了,哲学终结之际留下的任务要由思想来完成。海德格尔的思想本身也是一种哲学,他不是想终结所有的哲学,他也不可能终结所有的哲学,海德格尔的思考意在寻找哲学发展的新方向。

一、海德格尔所要终结的哲学

《哲学的终结和思的任务》一文的题目有些令人费解,因为在人们看来,哲学是以“思”为特色的,大哲学家一般都是大思想家,海德格尔怎么能把哲学与“思”分开来呢?海德格尔在这篇文章中也提出了同样两个问题:第一,在何种意义上西方哲学已经进入了它的最后阶段?第二,在哲学终结之际,思维的任务是什么?

要回答这样的两个问题需要首先弄清楚海德格尔是在怎样的意义上来使用“终结”一词的。海德格尔并不是从“中止”、“没落”、“消亡”等消极意义上使用这个词的,他认为,不能把“终结”理解为没有继续发展,甚至理解为颓败和无能。海德格尔从词源学的意义上追究:“终结”一词的古老意义与“位置”相同,因此,哲学的终结意味着它从一个位置走向另一个位置,“哲学之终结是这样,在那里哲学之整体把自身聚集到它的最极端的可能性中去了。作为完成的终结意味着这种聚集”⁽²⁾。

海德格尔所说的哲学的极端的可能性就是形而上学，他通过对整个西方哲学史的考察与分析得出结论：哲学即形而上学。而形而上学是一种不“思”的哲学，不“思”的哲学表明，哲学发展的活力已经丧失，海德格尔所要终结的正是这样的哲学。

二、哲学何以进入其终结

海德格尔认为，哲学的终结并不在自身，哲学思维的成果凝聚在现代科学技术中，或者更确切地说，哲学终结于控制论的技术。现代技术已经发展到这样的地步：它不仅大规模地改变了自然界的面貌，而且已经无孔不入地控制了人类的行为，“控制论把语言转换为一种信息交流，艺术逐渐成为被控制的而又起着控制作用的信息工具”⁽³⁾。在现代技术中，以算计性思维方式为特征的控制论更是得到了最集中的表现。以控制论为代表的现代技术凝聚着哲学思维的成果，它们把哲学所设想的可能性付诸实现，因而成为完成哲学最为极端可能性的终点。哲学的终结和科学的繁荣是同一进程的两个方面，正是在此意义上海德格尔说：“哲学之终结显示为一个科学技术世界以及相应于这种世界的社会秩序的可控制的设置的胜利。哲学之终结意味着植根于西方欧洲思维的世界文明之开端”⁽⁴⁾。

可见，在海德格尔对哲学之终结的分析中，包含着对技术统治的批判，而技术的统治是以一种对象性的思维方式发生作用的，由此可以推导出海德格尔所要终结的是以对象性思维方式为特征的形而上学，而不是要终止哲学思考本身。这表明海德格尔看到了西方哲学所面临的危机，他试图为这种陷入危机的哲学找到新的出路。

三、思的任务——形而上学终结以后哲学发展的新方向

海德格尔认为，传统哲学执拗于存在者而遗忘了存在，这种哲学是不思的哲学，不思的哲学终结以后并不意味着我们不再需要思，问题是怎样“思”，思什么？如何才能达到这样的思？海德格尔以“思”区别于传统哲学，其实“思”仍然是一种哲学或哲学发展的新方向。

对于“思”海德格尔并没有做出确切的规定，他把“思”看作是与技术时代形而上学思维方式相对立的一种哲学思维方式。海德格尔期望通过“思”唤醒在哲学的开端处曾出现的存在之真理的原初显现，期望“思”能够引导人们走出技术时代的危险。

海德格尔认为要到达这样的“思”，首先要使思想摆脱技术的束缚。思想所要摆脱的技术的解释，是指思想本身被看作一种技术，是一种为行为和制造服务的思考的步骤。在海德格尔看来，自柏拉图以来，思想总是服务于制造，服务于对自然的算计和利用，致使思想只是关注存在者而遗忘了存在。海德格尔不认为技术时代这种遗忘存在之思是本质意义上的思，这也就是他所说的技术时代没有思想和沉思。他认为本质之思应是从技术的束缚中摆脱出来的思，而这种思应该思及存在，思及人与存在的关系。

为此，海德格尔求助于艺术，因为他在艺术中看到了生活于技术时代的人获救的希望。正如我们在前文所分析的那样，艺术可以使人超越当下在场的东西，把在场与不在场结合起来，在艺术之思中人们在再仅仅追逐于功利，这样的思才得到了升华，才思及存在。当然这并不意味着海德格尔建议人们都应该成为艺术家，艺术带给我们的教训是：通过艺术我们可以获得一种对思想的不同理解，通过艺术我们可以发现一条通向存在之路。我们可以把海德格尔所描绘的艺术的这种作用时代的到来称为“艺术文明”时代。按照海德格尔的观点，在“艺术文明”时代，在莱茵河上建造一个水坝也同样是可能的。这时技术的问题就不只是我们如何通过技术而存在的问题，而是通过技术我们是回到家中还是行进在一条远离家乡的道路上。在此问题上海德格尔的观点十分明确：现代技术使人远离自己，人已被连根拔起，而艺术的本质则是“回家”。

海德格尔对哲学终结的分析，无疑包含着对技术统治的批判，其根本意图在于寻求哲学发展的新方向。在海德格看来，西方传统的作为形而上学的哲学已陷入危机，这种始于柏拉图的形而上学曾打开了人类通向理性的道路，但是，这并不是说这种形而上学的终结意味着人类开始抛弃理性，简单地回到形而上学问题真正产生之前的古希腊哲学，而是对传统形而上学困境的超越，对理性有了更深刻的认识。作为科学的形而上学的终结使哲学不再仅仅只是人的一种单纯理性认识活动，而是人的存在方式的显现。对于哲学发展的方向，尼采曾经指出：“伟大的古代哲学家是普通希腊生活的一部分，但是在苏格拉底之后他们却形成了诸派别。”⁽⁵⁾在尼采看来，苏格拉底之后的哲学由于追求知识而脱离了人类生活。尼采推崇前苏格拉底哲学，反对传统的形而上学，其目的是要使哲学重新融入人类生活之中。同样，海德格尔的艺术和诗歌与柏拉图的理念相对立的，而与智者的活动相似。海德格尔试图通过艺术之思为哲学的发展找到新的方向，所以海德格尔所说的形而上学的终结并不是哲学的终结，而是新哲学的开端，这种新哲学试图通过对曾在古希腊哲学中原初显现过的存在之真理的发扬光大而重新把人与世界作为统一体来看待。

我们应当看到，海德格尔的“思”过于玄奥，甚至流于浪漫，这样的思虽然能够在一定程度上警示生活在技术时代的人冷静地审视其行为的可能后果，但是，这种“思”所立足的根基不够坚实。新哲学植根的土地应该是现实的

生活世界, 哲学不应是玄奥之思, 它应该对现实问题进行及时的把握与反思, 如果哲学抛弃了生活, 生活最终也会将哲学抛弃。

附件:

Appendix:

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Husserl and Heidegger

Taylor Carman

Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) was the founder of phenomenology, a philosophical movement that exerted enormous influence on European thought, especially during the first half of the twentieth century. His assistant, Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), now widely recognized as one of the most important philosophers in recent history, radically redirected phenomenology by applying it to the question of the meaning of being and the structure of human existence. It was Husserl's descriptive approach to the problem of intentionality, eschewing excess theoretical construction and metaphysical speculation, that initially inspired the young Heidegger. Yet their approaches to philosophy soon proved to be deeply at odds, in both style and substance. For whereas Husserl identifies intentionality with “pure” consciousness, or transcendental subjectivity, Heidegger traces it back instead to the pragmatic context and the temporal structure of our everyday “being-in-the-world,” which he thinks precedes the any distinction between subjectivity and objectivity. In his later writings Heidegger moves beyond anything Husserl would have recognized as genuine phenomenological inquiry, reflecting on the nature of art, poetry, science, technology, and the nihilism he came to regard as inherent in all metaphysical thinking.

1 Husserl

Edmund Husserl was born in 1859 in Prossnits, Moravia (now Prostějov, Czech Republic). He studied in Leipzig, then in Berlin, where he worked with the mathematician Karl Weierstrass. After receiving his PhD in mathematics in 1881, he attended Franz Brentano's lectures in philosophy and psychology in Vienna from 1884 to 1886 and thereupon chose to devote himself entirely to philosophy. He taught at Halle (1887–1901), Göttingen (1901–16), and finally Freiburg (1916–28), where he was succeeded by his apparent protégé, Martin Heidegger. In retirement, Husserl, who was Jewish, suffered the effects of anti-Semitic legislation for a brief period when the Nazis rose to power in 1933. He grew increasingly isolated, both professionally and personally, until his death in 1938.

1.1 Psychologism, intentionality, and categorial intuition

In his book, *Philosophy of Arithmetic* (published 1891), Husserl tried to work out an empiricist theory of arithmetical concepts by tracing them back to their psychological origins. The concept of multiplicity, he argued, is rooted in our concrete intuition of aggregates, or clusters of things. When we intuit aggregates, we group objects together in an act of ‘collective combination’. It is this mental act of combining that underlies our concept of the cardinal numbers, regardless what sorts of objects we combine; whether they are real or imaginary, abstract or concrete. Our intuitions of concrete ensembles are the most basic, however, and from them we acquire a notion of abstract wholes and the purely formal concepts *something* and *one*, as well as *multiplicity* and *number*. We understand the number *three*, for example, as a determinate multiplicity of collectively combined *ones*: ‘something and something and something,’ or ‘one and one and one’ (1970a, p. 335). The concept of number, Husserl concludes, is derived from a reflection on the mental act of combining particulars.

Late in 1894 Husserl was still working on the projected second volume of *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, but by 1896 he had abandoned the project and renounced the psychologism on which his theory rested. His change of heart was very likely prompted, at least in part, by a review Gottlob FREGE (chapter 37) wrote of the first volume in 1894. Frege objected strenuously to any blurring of the lines between LOGIC (chapter 4) and psychology, between objective

concepts and mere subjective ‘ideas’ (*Vorstellungen*). In psychologistic theories like Husserl’s, Frege complains, ‘everything is turned into ideas’ (Frege 1984, p. 197).

By 1896 Husserl began work on his first properly phenomenological treatise, *Logical Investigations* (published 1900–01). The entire first volume of the *Investigations*, the ‘Prolegomena to Pure Logic,’ is an extended refutation of psychologism. Although Husserl did not at the time mention any direct influence, he later acknowledged that ‘Frege’s significance was decisive’ (quoted in Føllesdal, 1982, p. 55), and that ‘Frege’s criticism ... hit the nail on the head’ (Spiegelberg, 1972, p. 66). All Husserl says in the Foreword to the *Investigations* is that he began to have ‘doubts of principle, as to how to reconcile the objectivity of mathematics ... with a psychological foundation for logic’, and that these doubts forced him to rethink the relation ‘between the subjectivity of knowing and the objectivity of the content known’ (1970b, p. 42). Like Frege, Husserl would now insist that the normativity of logic cannot have its theoretical foundations in psychology. For logical laws are exact, while psychological laws are inexact. Moreover, whereas logical laws are knowable *a priori* and purely by insight, psychological theory is necessarily empirical and inductive. And logic affords certainty, while psychology is always merely probable. Finally, the laws of logic yield norms governing our reasoning, while the laws of psychology are mere descriptions of causal regularities. (For Husserl’s explicit repudiation of his earlier theory of number, see his 1970b, p. 784.)

This distinction between the objective contents of logic and MATHEMATICS (chapter 11) and the subjective stuff of experience, between matters of *essence* and matters of *fact*, would figure prominently in all of Husserl’s subsequent work. Most importantly, it informs his theory of intentionality, which is the centerpiece of his mature phenomenology. ‘Intentionality,’ a technical term that Brentano imported into modern philosophy from the scholastic tradition, refers to the directedness of consciousness. Consciousness always has an accusative; it is always *of* (or *as if of*) an object. We do not just see or remember; we see or remember *something*. Intentionality, then, is the ‘of-ness’ or ‘about-ness’ of our mental states. Drawing a sharp distinction between the *ideal* contents of experience and the *real* (temporally extended) experiences themselves, Husserl now attributes the intentionality of an attitude to its ideal content, or what he calls its ‘act-matter,’ relegating its psychological character to its ‘act-quality’ (1970b, pp. 586–90). Each of these two components of an intentional state can vary to some degree independently of the other: perceptions all have the same act-quality qua perceptions, for example, though they may intend different objects (or indeed one and the same object) by means of different act-matters; so too, acts of anticipation, perception, and memory all have different act-qualities, though they may be directed toward one and the same thing in virtue of the same act-matter.

Even more significant is the distinction Husserl draws between the internal contents and the external objects of intentional acts, for philosophers have perpetuated a number of long-standing problems about the ontological status of intentional objects by conflating the latter with the former. If all consciousness is consciousness *of* something, for example, what should we say about dreams, hallucinations, false memories and expectations, and non-veridical acts generally? Do we in those cases stand in relation to ‘non-existent objects,’ as Alexius Meinong (1853–1920), who was also a student of Brentano’s, proposed? Traditional epistemology tended to obscure the phenomenon of intentionality altogether by describing mental life not as a directedness toward external objects, but as an immediate possession of, or inner confrontation with, ideas, from which we would then have to infer the existence of the external world and other minds.

Husserl’s theory undermines the indirect representative picture, for he distinguishes the ideal content that structures our awareness from the objects to which we are putatively related in virtue of that content. Intentionality is not a real external relation between the mind and objects, Husserl argues, but a mental directedness that obtains and has content whether or not the objects of our attitudes themselves exist, hence whether or not we stand in any real relation to them. It has been noted (see Føllesdal, 1969) that Husserl’s distinction between content and object bears a striking resemblance to Frege’s notions of the sense (*Sinn*) and reference (*Bedeutung*) of linguistic expressions. In this case, however, it was almost certainly not Frege who inspired Husserl, but rather such figures as Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848) and J.S. MILL (1806–73) (chapter 35), who had drawn similar distinctions.

In the Sixth Investigation Husserl argues for a notion of intellectual, or ‘categorical’ intuition, over and beyond sense perception. Perceptual consciousness involves two distinct, sometimes coinciding, intentional acts: an empty intending or signifying act, and an intuitive or fulfilling act. Perception is not wholly passive, then, since we experience our sensuous intuitions as satisfying (or failing to satisfy) our prior signifying acts, or anticipations. But not everything anticipated in our signifying acts can be given in sense perception. An act that merely signifies or intends *white paper*, say, may be fulfilled in a sensuous intuition of the white paper, but one

does not literally see its *being* white. The copula ‘is’ in the proposition ‘The paper is white’ does not itself correspond to anything given sensuously, as the expressions ‘white’ and ‘paper’ do. Nevertheless, Husserl maintains, an intention whose signifying content is that the paper *is* white can be adequately fulfilled in a non-sensuous, categorial intuition. Categorial intuitions fulfill acts whose contents include the meanings of purely formal terms like ‘is’ and ‘not,’ the logical connectives ‘and’ and ‘or,’ and quantifiers like ‘all,’ ‘some,’ and ‘none.’ Contrary to empiricists like LOCKE (chapter 29) and HUME (chapter 31), Husserl insists that our understanding of states of affairs as satisfying propositional attitudes cannot be based on a mere abstraction from our perception of sensuous particulars answering to individual ideas or linguistic terms. A higher-level intuition, he insists, affords us direct insight into the structured states of affairs in the world that make our beliefs true or false.

1.2 Pure phenomenology and transcendental subjectivity

Husserl would elaborate and modify his theories of intentionality and intuition in his middle period, which began around 1905 and culminated in his *magnum opus*, the First Book of *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* (published 1913). Husserl now no longer referred to his project as ‘descriptive psychology’, an expression he inherited from Brentano, but as ‘pure phenomenology’, which he says is an ‘eidetic’ science, a science of essences. Phenomenology thus promises to elevate philosophy beyond the mere expression of a worldview (*Weltanschauung*) and render it a rigorous science, whose watchword is, as Husserl often put it, ‘To the things themselves!’ (see 1965, pp. 96ff). By the late 1920s, Husserl had moved so far from his earlier, more strictly psychological approach to intentionality that he came to characterize phenomenology itself as a form of ‘transcendental idealism’ (1931, pp. 18–19; 1960, pp. 83–86). He regretted this terminological choice within a few years, however, complaining in 1934 that ‘No ordinary ‘realist’ has ever been as realistic and as concrete as I, the phenomenological ‘idealist’ (a word which, by the way, I no longer use)’ (letter to Abbé Baudin, quoted in Kern, 1964, p. 276n).

This TRANSCENDENTAL (pp. 00–00) phase of Husserl’s development is marked by two philosophical innovations: the ‘phenomenological reduction,’ a methodological device he hit upon in the summer of 1905; and the new conception of intentional content he formulated by 1907, which he would now call the *noema*, in contrast to the real mental act, or *noesis*. These notions identify what Husserl regards as the privileged site for any inquiry into intentionality, namely ‘transcendental subjectivity,’ or ‘pure’ consciousness, abstracted from all real psychological determinations. Husserl frequently emphasizes the radical break between our ordinary ‘natural attitude’ common to everyday life and empirical science, prior to the reduction and a reflection on pure consciousness, and the phenomenological attitude, which reveals transcendental subjectivity, which Husserl calls ‘the wonder of all wonders’ (1980, p. 64).

This methodological gap between natural (and naturalistic) cognition and phenomenological reflection mirrors an essential discontinuity between consciousness and reality. ‘Insofar as their respective senses are concerned,’ Husserl writes, ‘a veritable abyss yawns between consciousness and reality’ (1983, p. 111); he even goes so far as to say that although consciousness ‘*would indeed be necessarily modified by an annihilation of the world of physical things its own existence would not be touched*’ (1983, p. 110). Passages such as these have generated some controversy concerning Husserl’s metaphysical and epistemological commitments. But while he rejects substance dualism (1970c, p. 212), Husserl himself is frequently at pains to stress the spirit of CARTESIANISM (chapter 26) animating his philosophical orientation at large.

The phenomenological reductions and the *noema*

Husserl describes a number of different ‘reductions,’ but two in particular are central to his conception of phenomenological method: the *eidetic* reduction and *transcendental* reduction. Taken together, Husserl suggests, the two serve to identify the pure intentional content of consciousness as such, or what he calls the *noema*.

The eidetic reduction consists in ignoring real (temporal) particulars and focusing instead on general and ideal (atemporal) features of things. So, for example, one can abstract from all the other contingent properties of roses and firetrucks and grasp the redness instantiated in both. Husserl calls such general properties ‘essences’ — hence ‘eidetic’ from the Greek *eidos* (Plato’s ‘form’). So too, phenomenological reflection on consciousness abstracts from the real features of concrete psychological episodes occurring in time and concentrates instead on their ideal structures and contents (1983, p. xx).

The transcendental reduction, which Husserl also calls the ‘*epochē*’ (a term borrowed from ancient skepticism), consists in setting aside, or ‘bracketing’ out, all objects transcendent to consciousness, focusing instead on the

intentional contents immanent within it (1983, §§31-34, §§56-64). An object is ‘transcendent,’ in Husserl’s sense, if only one side or aspect of it can be immediately present to us at any one time; such things are necessarily given perspectivally, or in ‘adumbrations.’ An object is ‘immanent’ if it is given to consciousness all at once, transparently, so that no perspectival variation mediates our apprehension of it. Physical bodies and states of affairs are transcendent objects, for example, and so too are the abstract entities of mathematics and formal ontology. The contents of consciousness are immanent, by contrast, since we each have immediate, transparent access to our own thoughts and experiences.

The inward reflection of the *epochē*, then, first presents a mental state as a concrete particular, or *noesis* — including sensation, which Husserl calls *hylē* — and the eidetic reduction then sets aside its concrete psychological features in favor of the ideal intentional structures and contents it instantiates. Those ideal structures and contents constitute the *noema* of the mental state, which includes a ‘core’ of representational content, or ‘sense’ (*Sinn*), as well as the ideal ‘positing character’ in which that sense is put forward in one’s mind as either (say) perceived, judged, remembered, anticipated, imagined, or wished for. The transcendental and eidetic reductions together purport to isolate the sphere of ‘pure’ phenomenological inquiry, namely transcendental subjectivity. An analogy between the core or ‘sense’ component of the *noema* and Frege’s notion of linguistic sense (*Sinn*) finds support in Husserl’s remark that ‘the noema in general is nothing other than the generalization of the idea of [linguistic] meaning (*Bedeutung*) to all act-domains’ (1980, p. 76).

Another major shift in Husserl’s thought during this period concerns his account of the phenomenological status of the self. In *Logical Investigations* he defends a kind of ‘bundle theory,’ rejecting Kantian appeals to a pure ego, supposedly needed to unify our various intentional acts. ‘I must frankly confess,’ he writes in the Fifth Investigation, echoing Hume, ‘that I am quite unable to find this ego, this primitive, necessary centre of relations’ (1970b, p. 549). In the second edition, published in 1913, however, he retracts the denial in a footnote, writing simply, ‘I have since managed to find it’ (*ibid.*, note). While still repudiating what he calls ‘corrupt forms of ego-metaphysic,’ Husserl now considers it phenomenologically evident that pure consciousness exhibits a structure of ownership, centered around a pure, transcendental ‘I,’ which is ‘essentially *necessary*’ and remains ‘absolutely identical’ through the whole of one’s experience (1983, p. 132), but which ‘is not a piece of the world’ (1960, p. 25).

Husserl’s doctrine of the transcendental ego would later draw criticism first from Heidegger, then Jean-Paul SARTRE (1905-80) (chapter 42) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-61), all of whom felt that it violated phenomenology’s commitment to a description of experience as we actually live it, prior to all theoretical embellishment. Their common complaint is that Husserl’s notion of a pure or transcendental self constantly inhabiting all my thoughts and actions amounts to a reflective distortion of our concrete engagement with the world. When I am actively absorbed in what I am doing, no such abiding centralized ego manifests itself in my awareness. Husserl’s position is also vulnerable to Wittgenstein’s critique of solipsism in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, in the *Blue Book*, and in the celebrated ‘private language argument’ in *Philosophical Investigations*. Like Husserl, WITTGENSTEIN (chapter 39) distinguishes the embodied person from the purely formal ‘subject’ of experience; he even denies that the latter is an object *in* the world. But whereas Wittgenstein conceives of the subject as nothing more than an ideal limit or vanishing point, borrowing Schopenhauer’s metaphor of the eye that does not appear in its own field of vision, Husserl regards the pure ego ‘as something absolutely identical’ across all one’s experience (1983, p. 132). My transcendental ego, then, appears to be a kind of enduring private object, after all, internal to my consciousness. But if it remains identical, what are the criteria of its identity? Apparently there are none, at least none I can specify, even in principle, in which case one can hardly assert its persistence through time, as Husserl does.

1.3 Intersubjectivity and the lifeworld

Whether or not one can speak of a third distinct phase in Husserl’s thought, his later work at least places new emphasis on practical as opposed to theoretical attitudes, on intersubjectivity, the body, and the cultural and social constitution of what he calls the ‘lifeworld’ (*Lebenswelt*). At the same time, in his last works Husserl continues to revisit and elaborate the basic methodological principles of phenomenology.

Cartesian Meditations (based on the ‘Paris Lectures’ he delivered at the Sorbonne in 1929 and first published in French translation in 1931), for example, bears the subtitle, ‘An Introduction to Phenomenology.’ The book is far from a mere reiteration of Husserl’s previous work, however, for in the Fifth Meditation he sketches out an original account of intersubjectivity, partly in order to quell suspicions that his transcendental method entails solipsism. Husserl introduces a new reduction, a reduction to my sphere of ‘ownness’, that is, an abstraction from everything referring overtly or covertly to other selves. I then discover, in a primordial ‘here’, my own body as the unique locus of my own will and sensations. Other outwardly similar bodies occur ‘there’ in my perceptual

environment, but I neither control their movements nor locate my sensations in them. Thanks to a kind of ‘pairing’ association of those other bodies with my own body, I recognize them as linked to transcendental ego spheres of their own, which cannot in principle be given directly to me in intuition. I thus perceive them as other egos, not just objects, and I see our respective subjectivities as constituting an intersubjectivity.

Husserl is not attempting to reconstruct our actual psychological acquisition of our concept of OTHER MINDS, but instead what he takes to be the structure of our mature consciousness of others *qua* other. He also insists that the ‘pairing’ association supposedly underlying my recognition of others is not an inference, but an apperception. That is, just as I neither directly intuit nor merely infer the back sides of physical objects, but instead see them as *whole* objects *with* back sides, so too I neither intuit the inner contents of the consciousness of others nor merely infer them from a single case, my own. Does Husserl adequately describe our intentional relation to others? Is a systematic reduction to a sphere of ownness itself a plausible notion? Here too, as with the doctrine of the pure ego, the existential phenomenologists remained dissatisfied with Husserl’s account.

In 1934 Husserl began writing the text eventually published in its entirety twenty years later as *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, also subtitled, ‘An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy.’ Though the term occurs in his manuscripts as early as 1917, Husserl’s concept of the ‘lifeworld’ makes its first appearance in print in *Crisis* (the first two parts of which were published in the journal *Philosophia* in 1936). The term is roughly equivalent to ‘natural concept of the world,’ a phrase Husserl had borrowed in his lectures of 1910–11 from Richard Avenarius (1843–96), which in turn recalls the distinction he had drawn in 1907 between the natural and the phenomenological attitudes. The lifeworld is not just a collection of physical objects, but includes such things as cultural and historical artifacts and social institutions. Husserl equivocates about whether there are many lifeworlds, or only one, and about whether the term refers to the immanent subjective content of our consciousness *of* the world or to the cultural world itself in its transcendence.

Husserl sometimes draws a contrast between the lifeworld and the world as described by the sciences, particularly in the wake of the Galilean ‘mathematization of nature’ (1970c, p. 23). It is therefore tempting to assimilate Husserl’s point to the distinction Wilfrid Sellars (1912–89) draws between the ‘manifest image’ of commonsense belief and the ‘scientific image’ of advanced theory. But whereas, for Sellars, the scientific image is the only true image, and so may in principle supplant our commonsense beliefs altogether, Husserl insists on the primacy of the lifeworld, to which science itself belongs (1970c, p. 380), and to which it is forever beholden. For Husserl, that is, scientific theories acquire meaning and justification only by referring back to the world as it is given to us in ordinary experience. All ‘theoretical results have the character of validities for the life-world,’ Husserl writes. ‘The concrete life-world, then, is the grounding soil of the ‘scientifically true’ world’ (1970c, p. 131).

2 Heidegger

Martin Heidegger was born in 1889 in the town of Messkirch in Baden. He attended the Bertholdgymnasium and the Theological Seminary at the University of Freiburg, intending eventually to enter the priesthood. Having discovered the work of Brentano and Husserl, however, he chose instead to study logic, mathematics, and philosophy. He wrote a dissertation on psychologism and the theory of judgment under Heinrich Rickert (1863–1936), a Neo-Kantian, and began lecturing in Freiburg. His 1915 *Habilitationsschrift*, ‘The Doctrine of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus,’ is a study of a scholastic text since shown to have been written by Thomas of Erfurt. In 1916 Husserl succeeded Rickert at the University of Freiburg, and Heidegger became his most promising assistant. By 1919 Heidegger had abandoned Catholicism and begun lecturing on phenomenology. He was appointed professor at Marburg University in 1923, where he worked on the manuscript that would become his *magnum opus*, *Being and Time* (published 1927).

In 1928 Heidegger took over Husserl’s chair at Freiburg, and in 1933 he joined the Nazi Party and assumed the position of rector of the university. Contrary to a popular rumour, Heidegger did not ban Husserl from use of the university library, rather Husserl’s temporary suspension was the result of legislation enacted before Heidegger took office and subsequently revoked during his term. Still, after his arrival in Freiburg, Heidegger cut off almost all personal contact with Husserl and in 1941 acceded to his publisher’s demand that he remove the dedication to Husserl from the fifth edition of *Being and Time*. He resigned as rector in 1934, after less than a year in office, but never explicitly renounced National Socialism. After the war he was barred from teaching in Germany until 1951, though he was lecturing again privately by 1949, to great acclaim. He died in 1976.

2.1 The analytic of Dasein and the question of being

Heidegger was deeply impressed by the aim of phenomenology to forgo abstract theoretical constructs and get back to a concrete account of ‘the things themselves’, as Husserl had urged. Husserl, for his part, saw in Heidegger a protégé worthy of taking over and continuing his work and reportedly often said to Heidegger, ‘You and I are phenomenology’ (Cairns, 1976, p. 9). Years later he would come to realize, to his chagrin, that their respective approaches to philosophy had in fact always been profoundly at odds.

First, perhaps above all, Heidegger criticizes Husserl’s strict distinction between immanence and transcendence, between the inner and the outer: ‘there is no outside,’ Heidegger says, ‘for which reason it is also absurd to talk about an inside’ (1983, p. 66). Repudiating what he calls the ‘worldless subject’ of Descartes and Husserl (1962, p. 254), Heidegger insists that human existence is essentially ‘being-in-the-world’. Intentionality is necessarily tied to its worldly context, and the idea of isolating a sphere of pure transcendental subjectivity from all worldly objects and state of affairs by means of an *epochē* must be fundamentally misconceived.

Second, Heidegger objects to what he calls ‘the ontologically unclarified separation of the Real and the ideal’ (1962, p. 259), on which the substance and method Husserl’s phenomenology both depend. Although he reports that the doctrine of categorial intuition in *Logical Investigations* inspired some of his early reflections on the question of the meaning of being (1972, p. 78), Heidegger explicitly rejects Husserl’s theory, along with its later incarnation in the concept of eidetic insight. By maintaining instead that all forms of perception and insight are parasitic on a background of commonsense understanding, Heidegger declares, ‘we have deprived pure intuition of its priority ... Even the phenomenological “intuition of essences” is grounded in existential understanding’ (1962, p. 187). Heidegger consequently abandons Husserl’s ideal of a pure theoretical description of intentional phenomena and, adopting the hermeneutical stance of Wilhelm DILTHEY (1833–1911) (pp. 00–00), declares, ‘the meaning of phenomenological description as a method lies in *interpretation*,’ (1962, p. 61). Far from resting on pure categorial intuition or eidetic insight, Heidegger writes, ‘The phenomenology of Dasein is a *hermeneutic*’ (1962, p. 62).

Third, whereas Husserl draws a sharp distinction between phenomenology and ontology, Heidegger insists that the two are inseparable: all phenomenology has its ontological presuppositions, and ‘*Only as phenomenology, is ontology possible*’ (1962, p. 60). Indeed, Heidegger’s original conception of phenomenology cannot be understood apart from his deeper commitment to a question that remained foreign to Husserl’s thought, and indeed to much of the history of Western philosophy, according to Heidegger: the question concerning the meaning (*Sinn*) of being (*Sein*). Whereas traditional ontology concerns itself with entities, or what is (*das Seiende*), Heidegger asks what it means for anything to be. He sets out to shed light on the question by investigating phenomenologically our *understanding* of being, which is constitutive of human beings, which Heidegger calls ‘Dasein’ (literally *being-there*). The question of being, then, boils down to the question, What do we understand when we understand *that* and *what* entities *are*, including ourselves?

Modeling *Being and Time* loosely on Kant’s Transcendental Analytic in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, then, Heidegger calls his own project an ‘analytic’ of Dasein, which will constitute a ‘fundamental ontology.’ Fundamental ontology is fundamental relative to ordinary thought and traditional ontology, both of which systematically obscure and distort our pretheoretical understanding of existence. For the metaphysical tradition and common sense both tend to construe all entities as objects or substances occurring in a present moment, the horizon of the now. Heidegger, by contrast, bases his interpretation of being-in-the-world on the phenomenon of purposive, future-directed practical understanding. We understand ourselves, that is, in light of the possibilities into which we *project*, the already constituted world in which we find ourselves situated, or *thrown*, and the enduring present in which we encounter other entities. Dasein’s being-in-the-world thus has a temporal structure Heidegger describes as ‘thrown projection.’ The entities we encounter, by contrast, show up for us in the horizon of the present, either as inconspicuously ‘available’ (ready-to-hand) in our practical activity or as ‘occurrent’ (present-at-hand) as objects.

The ‘availability’ of equipment and the ‘worldliness’ of the world

In an effort to get back to ‘the things themselves’, as Husserl insisted it was the task of phenomenology to do, Heidegger deliberately focuses his analytic of Dasein not on the kind of reflective cognitive attitude that philosophers so often take as their paradigm, but on our background immersion in mundane activity.

When we see Dasein in its ‘average everydayness,’ Heidegger suggests, we see that what situates us in a world most fundamentally is not our subjective experiences or mental states, but our externally situated skills and practices. So too, the entities we typically encounter and concern ourselves with in our everyday practical activity present themselves not as ‘occurrent’ (*vorhanden*) objects, but as transparently ‘available’ (*zuhanden*) equipment, which

we rely on and take for granted in carrying out our tasks. When I grasp a doorknob or wield a hammer, I am neither perceiving nor thinking about it as an object with properties, but availing myself of it unthinkingly, skillfully treating it as an element in the overall purposive structure of the situation. Moreover, individual pieces of equipment do not just occur alongside one another in objective space and time, but instead form an organized equipmental totality, which holistically assigns the particular items their respective practical meanings.

That equipmental totality is in turn implicated in a broader intelligible network of pragmatic relations assigning tools to contexts, to tasks, to goals, and to the ultimate underlying point of what we are doing, which Heidegger calls our ‘for-the-sake-of-which’. He describes these practical relations as ‘signifying’ (*be-deuten*), and calls the entire intelligible network of signifying relations ‘significance’ (*Bedeutsamkeit*). The pragmatic structure of significance is a condition of the possibility of linguistic meaning and mental content, both of which occur only against a background of practical understanding. More generally, it is our primordial familiarity with the structure of significance that constitutes our being-in-the-world. For ‘being-in’ consists not in entertaining cognitive attitudes, but in being competently oriented and involved in intelligible situations; similarly, what Heidegger calls the ‘worldliness’ of the world is not just a sum total of objects, properties and relations, but a meaningfully structured domain of practices and institutions.

In spite of their methodological and stylistic differences, Heidegger’s account of significance in *Being and Time* warrants comparison with Wittgenstein’s idea in the *Blue Book* and *Philosophical Investigations* that linguistic meaning is tied essentially to our use of words, and with his claim in *On Certainty* that knowledge is always embedded in a particular ‘form of life’. As Heidegger puts it, knowledge or cognition (*Erkennen*) is always only ‘a founded mode of being-in’ (1962, p. 86).

The central thesis of *Being and Time* is that being is intelligible always only in term of time, and that traditional ontology from Plato to Kant (and including Husserl) has interpreted the being of all entities as occurrentness because of its fixation on the temporal present. Since Dasein’s temporality has the form not of presence but of thrown-projection, however, we cannot make sense of ourselves in terms of the metaphysical ‘CATEGORIES’ (pp. 00—00) that structure our knowledge of objects. Heidegger therefore introduces a number of fundamental concepts, or ‘existentials’, that define Dasein’s unique temporal existence.

Heidegger also maintains that our understanding of entities is mediated by an anonymous social normativity, which he calls ‘the one’ (*das Man*), a term alluding to everyday locutions describing and prescribing what is proper, that is, what ‘one does’. Heidegger maintains that *das Man* is a primitive existential structure of being-in-the-world, but he also associates it with Dasein’s tendency to lapse into an ‘inauthentic’ or disowned (*uneigentlich*) mode of existence, in which we fail to come to grips with the concrete particularity and finitude of our individual existence. To exist authentically, by contrast, is to recognize the ‘groundlessness’ of one’s being and to anticipate one’s eventual death in a mood of anxiety (*Angst*), but with an attitude of openness and resolve (*Entschlossenheit*).

2.2 The work of art and the scientific image of the world

According to Heidegger’s original plan, *Being and Time* was to consist of two parts, each comprising three divisions (see 1962, p. 64). Of the total six divisions, Heidegger wrote only the first two, at which point he abandoned the project of fundamental ontology, apparently because he came to doubt that an analytic of Dasein could in principle open the way a more general inquiry into the meaning of being. It is also plausible to suppose, however, that he abandoned the assumption that being has a unified ahistorical meaning at all, and so turned instead to a genealogical account of the successive understandings of being that have informed different epochs in the history of Western thought.

It has thus become customary to contrast the hermeneutical phenomenology of the ‘early’ Heidegger during the period of *Being and Time* with the reflections on poetry, science, technology, and the history of metaphysics, which one finds in the ‘later’ Heidegger, much as one distinguishes early and later stages in the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. The transition from the early to the later Heidegger is often referred to simply as ‘the turn’ (*die Kehre*), and its precise motives remain a subject of speculation and debate among scholars. At any rate, for whatever reason, by the early 1930s Heidegger had renounced the ahistorical system-building approach to philosophy that he inherited from KANT (chapter 32) and the neo-Kantian tradition. No longer composing ambitious treatises in the grand style, he now wrote essays and lectures, collected in volumes bearing homely titles like ‘Forest Trails’ (*Holzwege*) and ‘Pathmarks’ (*Wegmarken*). The substance and style of Heidegger’s thinking had now broken away completely from Husserl’s conception of phenomenology as a ‘rigorous science’.

In 1935, in what is probably his most influential essay, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ (1971a), Heidegger

supplements the two-fold distinction he had drawn in *Being and Time* between occurrent objects and available equipment, arguing that works of art can no more be understood as practical equipment with supervening aesthetic properties than equipment can be understood as so many bare objects with utility predicates added on. Consequently, alongside his earlier concept of ‘world’, he introduces a complementary notion, what he calls ‘earth’. Whereas transparently useful things make up the purposive structure of a world, an earth always harbors something recalcitrant and anomalous, something ordinarily hidden in everyday life, but which we constantly rely on, and which works of art bring to the fore. In instituting an open battle or ‘strife’ between earth and world, the work of art emerges as a cultural paradigm that inaugurates the history of a people. Heidegger’s examples include an ancient Greek temple, a Gothic cathedral, and (somewhat problematically) Van Gogh’s painting of a pair of shoes. Like the founding of a state, the presence of God, and genuine philosophical thinking, Heidegger says, works of art let truth ‘happen’ in their own way by disclosing the grounds and limits of intelligibility in an historical world.

Heidegger appeals here, as he does in *Being and Time* (§44), to what he takes to be the archaic meaning of the Greek word for truth, *alētheia*. In the essay ‘Plato’s Doctrine of Truth’ (written 1931–32) he argues that whereas the word originally meant ‘what has been wrested from hiddenness’ (1998, p. 171), in the cave allegory of the *Republic* it takes on the additional, by now customary, sense of ‘correctness of apprehending and asserting’ (*ibid.*, p. 177) and thereafter remains ambiguous, even in Aristotle. Heidegger later acknowledges the historical incorrectness of this interpretation, though he still insists that correspondence in fact presupposes ‘the opening of presence’ (1972, p. 70).

In the 1930s Heidegger also lectured extensively on the philosophy of Friedrich NIETZSCHE (1844–1900) (CHAPTER 40) and on the poetry of Friedrich Hölderlin (1770–1843). In Heidegger’s eyes, Hölderlin is the poet *par excellence* of the present age, whose work embodies a reflection on the nature and significance of poetry itself, and who stands as a witness to the cultural spirit and mission that Heidegger supposes the German people have inherited from the Greeks. Heidegger’s readings of Hölderlin’s poems and fragments, like his interpretations of canonical philosophical texts, are often idiosyncratic, at times plainly untenable. Nonetheless, his lectures on Hölderlin remain essential to an understanding of his thought, not least of all because Hölderlin’s poetry turns out to be the source of the concrete examples and the terminology that Heidegger invokes throughout his later work, in particular the ‘Work of Art’ essay. The origin of the WORK OF ART (pp.00–00), Heidegger concludes, is not the artist but art itself, which he says is essentially poetry, and it is Hölderlin’s poetry above all that speaks to us of the nature of poetry, and so of the meaning and prospects of art in a technological age.

In his two-volume *Nietzsche* (published in 1961, but drawing largely on his lectures of the 1930s and 1940s), Heidegger presents Nietzsche as the last great thinker of the Western metaphysical tradition, whose doctrines of the will to power and the eternal return reiterate the concepts of *essentia* and *existentia*, that is, the *what* and the *that* of entities in general. For Nietzsche, will to power is *what* everything is, while *to be* at all is to recur eternally. Moreover, Heidegger argues, Nietzsche’s thought belongs essentially to the subjectivism of modern metaphysics, though his nihilism also anticipates the ‘technological’ understanding of being that holds sway in the present age. Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche, too, is as controversial as it is original, in this case owing in part to his reliance on the miscellaneous collection of notes published posthumously, and misleadingly, as Nietzsche’s *magnum opus*, under the title *The Will to Power*. Yet Heidegger always denied that his interpretations were intended as contributions to scholarly research. Rather, his readings of philosophers and poets of the past amount to productive, if inevitably ‘violent’, confrontations and conversations with fellow thinkers. His aim, he insists, is not to ascertain objective historical facts, but to open up new paths of thinking.

Unlike art, religion, and philosophy, Heidegger contends, ‘science is not an original happening of truth, but always the cultivation of a domain of truth already opened’ (1971a, p. 62). Anticipating the social conception of science advanced decades later by Thomas Kuhn (1922–96), Heidegger argues in his 1938 essay, ‘The Age of the World Picture’, that the modern scientific image of the world is a product of rigorous research, which rests on the projection of an underlying ‘ground plan’ (1977, p. 118). The ground plan provides a kind of *a priori* schema or normative framework for the procedural, industrious character of scientific practice. Consequently, not only is our modern ‘world picture’ peculiar to us, the very idea of a world picture is a uniquely modern phenomenon, a construct of the research sketched out in advance and prescribed by an underlying plan. Strictly speaking, then, previous ages did not have world pictures different from ours, since they did not conceive of the world itself as a representation present to, indeed constructed by, an autonomous subject.

2.3 Technology and the forgetfulness of being

Modern science therefore rests on an understanding of being that differs radically from understandings operative in

the ancient and medieval worlds. For example, the ancient Greeks understood being as *phusis*, which was translated into Latin as *natura* and became our word ‘nature’, but which Heidegger interprets to mean ‘self-blossoming emergence’ and ‘opening up, unfolding’ (1959, p. 14). The Christian Middle Ages, by contrast, conceived of the world as an *ens creatum*, a made thing separated by a chasm from its maker (1959, p. 106). The metaphysics of the modern period, as we have seen, moves us to regard the world as an objective picture or representation standing over against a thinking subject.

In his 1955 lecture, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, Heidegger argues that we are now in the grip of a ‘technological’ understanding of being, defined in terms of efficient ordering, or ‘Enframing’ (*Ge-stell*), and that we treat entities in general, including ourselves, as resource material, or ‘standing-reserve’ (*Bestand*). The technological age differs fundamentally from the modern age, the age of the world picture, for ‘Whatever stands by in the sense of standing-reserve no longer stands over against us as object’ (1977, p. 17). The hydroelectric plant on the Rhine is Heidegger’s favorite example of the total but inconspicuous technological manipulation of entities, which at once flattens the world out and obscure meaningful differences. Other manifestations of our technological understanding of being include high-speed transportation and information technology, above all television, all of which collapse distances and corrode our sense of things being near or far, noble or base, important or trivial. Works of art, by contrast, disclose historical worlds and mark differences, while mundane artefacts such as a windmill, a wooden bridge, or a jug let ordinary things *be* what they are by revealing them in their local worlds, as opposed to fitting them into more and more efficient, totalizing, homogeneous orderings.

Like every historically realized understanding of being, Heidegger says, ‘Technology is a way of revealing’ (1977, p. 12). Indeed, ‘So long as we represent technology as an instrument, we remain held fast in the will to master it’ (1977, p. 32), and so fail to understand its essence as a way for entities as a whole to show up as intelligible. Unlike earlier modes of revealing, then, technology tends to conceal the fact that it is one, moreover it conceals that very concealing. As a result, our current technological world is systematically recalcitrant to the kind of meditative questioning that Heidegger celebrates as ‘the piety of thought’ (1977, p. 35). Indeed, the technological understanding of being represents the culmination of the nihilistic ‘forgetfulness of being’ (*Seinsvergessenheit*) that Heidegger thinks has fueled the metaphysical tradition since the Presocratics (1959, p. 18). What he envisions in its place, however, is neither a renunciation of our technical devices and habits nor a regression to an earlier understanding of being, but an appreciation of technology as the way things show up for us and a recognition that we are not the masters of our mode of revealing, but its witnesses. Heidegger therefore concludes the ‘Technology’ essay with Hölderlin’s gnomic declaration, ‘where danger is, grows / The saving power also’. For Heidegger, ‘precisely the essence of technology must harbor in itself the growth of the saving power’ (1977, p. 28). The saving power is what Heidegger calls the ‘freeing claim’ (1977, p. 26) that technology will make on us when we come to understand its essence as a way of revealing entities, that is, as a mode of truth, or unhiddenness (*alētheia*).

Further Reading

The best way to approach Husserl initially is to read the first few *Cartesian Meditations* and ‘Philosophy as Rigorous Science’. It has been said that Husserl is harder to read than to understand, and the lifelessness of his writing, especially in translation, makes a serious study of *Ideas I* a forbidding task. Fortunately, there are two particularly useful collections of critical essays. *Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science* (1982) contains classic articles by Aron Gurwitsch and Dagfinn Føllesdal (see especially Føllesdal’s 1969 ‘Husserl’s Notion of *Noema*’); essays by J.N. Mohanty, David Woodruff Smith, Ronald McIntyre, and Izchak Miller relating Husserl’s views to recent developments in philosophy of mind, language, and logic; and finally two papers, making no explicit mention of Husserl, by contemporary theorists of intentionality, John Searle and Jerry Fodor. The other valuable collection, covering a wide range of topics, is *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl* (1995). An excellent presentation of the Føllesdal interpretation, and an illuminating account of Husserl’s theory of time consciousness, can be found in Izchak Miller’s *Husserl, Perception, and Temporal Awareness* (1984). Bernet, Marbach, and Kern’s *Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology* (1993) is also a valuable guide, and Spiegelberg’s *Phenomenological Movement* (1982) provides a useful historical catalogue. Finally, for a brilliant close reading, and to see how Husserl’s work has influenced contemporary French thought, see Jacques Derrida’s early essays in *Edmund Husserl’s ‘Origin of Geometry’* (1989) and *Speech and Phenomena* (1973).

There are two English translations of *Being and Time*. Macquarrie and Robinson’s classic (1962) is generally excellent. Stambaugh’s more recent version (1996) is truer stylistically to Heidegger’s peculiar blend of colloquial language and neologism, but is not as accurate or reliable. The best available secondary source is Hubert Dreyfus’s commentary *Being-in-the-World* (1991), which concentrates almost exclusively on Division I of *Being and*

Time. The most thorough treatment of Heidegger's conception of temporality in Division II, but which also offers a superb account of the first half of the book, is William Blattner's *Heidegger's Temporal Idealism* (1999). There are two excellent volumes of critical essays: *Heidegger: A Critical Reader* (1992), and *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger* (1993). Stephen Mulhall's *Routledge Guidebook to Heidegger and 'Being and Time'* (1996) is a good introduction, and Charles Guignon's *Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge* (1983) and John Richardson's *Existential Epistemology* (1986) are helpful in analyzing *Being and Time* as a critique of Cartesianism. Kisiel's *Genesis of 'Being and Time'* provides a painstaking record of Heidegger's very early development, while Mark Okrent offers a provocative interpretation of Heidegger as a verificationist in *Heidegger's Pragmatism* (1988). Two particularly good studies of Heidegger's later thought are Reiner Schürmann's classic *Heidegger on Being and Acting* (1987) and Michel Haar's *Heidegger and the Essence of Man* (1993). Hugo Ott's *Martin Heidegger: A Political Life* (1993) and Rüdiger Safranski's *Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil* (1998) are both admirable biographical studies. The best account of the philosophical significance of Heidegger's Nazism, however, is Hans Sluga's *Heidegger's Crisis* (1993).

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Discussion Questions

1. What is the relation between our mathematical concept of number, on the one hand, and our perception of aggregates, on the other? Husserl observes that most people can differentiate only up to about a dozen particulars at a time without resorting to counting. Is this fact relevant to arithmetic?
2. What is the relation between logic and psychology? Do both disciplines study the way we think? Do they both describe 'laws' of thought? Do logical norms stand in need of theoretical foundations at all, whether in psychology or in some other purely theoretical discipline?
3. What is 'intentionality'? If all consciousness is consciousness *of* something, what should we say about dreams,

hallucinations, and false memories and expectations? Are such attitudes not intentional after all, though they seem to be? Are all our attitudes directed toward mental tokens internal to our minds?

4. Why does Husserl insist that a merely psychological theory of mental acts will always fail to capture the intentional content of thought and perception? Why does he distinguish the intentional content, or ‘act matter’, of a mental state from its psychological mode, or ‘act quality’? Do the two components vary completely independently of one another?

5. Why does Husserl distinguish between the content and the object of an intentional state? How does that distinction undercut potential problems about our access to the external world and about the ontological status of so-called ‘intentional objects’?

6. What is ‘categorical intuition’? Is it necessary to suppose that we can intuit anything fulfilling the signifying sense of terms like ‘is’, ‘not’, ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘all’, ‘some’, and ‘none’?

7. What is the ‘eidetic reduction’? What is the *epochē*, or ‘transcendental reduction’? How do the two reductions purport to reveal pure consciousness, or transcendental subjectivity? What is the *noema*?

8. Is all of our experience centered around a transcendental ego? What motivated Husserl’s initial denial that reflection reveals any such pure ego? What then motivated his later admission that all consciousness must be owned by an ‘I’?

9. How does Husserl describe our consciousness of other subjective selves? How do we come to understand our subjectivity as constituting an intersubjectivity? Is his account plausible?

10. What is the ‘lifeworld’? How are we to understand the sense and justification of scientific theories that depict a world radically different from the world given to us in ordinary experience? Can our ordinary experience ever be partly wrong about the way the world is? Can it be wholly mistaken?

11. What are the principal differences between Heidegger’s phenomenology and Husserl’s? Is Heidegger right to reject the distinctions between immanence and transcendence, between the real and the ideal, and between phenomenology and ontology? What does it mean to say, ‘The phenomenology of Dasein is a *hermeneutic*’?

12. How does the temporality of Dasein’s being-in-the-world differ from that of the available equipment and occurrent objects we encounter in our everyday experience? Why does Heidegger maintain that the availability of useful artefacts and tools cannot be analyzed in terms of their occurrent properties and relations?

13. How does an anxious, resolute anticipation of death allow one to ‘own up’ to one’s existence authentically? Is authenticity a good thing? Why?

14. What is a work of art? What does a work of art accomplish? Is Heidegger’s notion of ‘art’ consistent with our ordinary use of the word?

15. How, according to Heidegger, is the modern conception of the world as a ‘picture’ rooted in the projection of a systematic groundplan for rigorous scientific research? How does the normative structure of scientific practice presuppose the givenness of the world as a representation to an autonomous subject?

16. What is the ‘technological’ understanding of being? How does the technological age differ from the age of the ‘world picture’? What does it mean to treat everything as resource material, or ‘standing-reserve’? Is it wrong to do so? Is it possible to be open to technology as an understanding of being, as a way of revealing entities, while continuing to make use of technological devices?

[1] Noting “daß Nietzsche wußte was Philosophie ist”, Heidegger goes on to underscore the rarity of this knowledge. Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche* 1, (Pfullingen: Neske, 1962), p. 12.

[2] Heidegger, “Words” in *On the Way to Language*, Peter D. Hertz, trans. (San Francisco, Harper, 1971), p. 155. Originally published as *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1959).

[3] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 980a.

[4] Heidegger, *What is Philosophy*, bilingual edition, trans. Jean T. Wilde and William Kluback (New Haven: College and University Press, ND), p. 47. Text of a lecture presented in August, 1955 at Cerisy-la-Salle and published in Tübingen in 1956. Heidegger adds that this coinage would imply “that for Heraclitus *philosophia* did not yet exist.”

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] Heidegger, *What is Philosophy*, p. 49.

[8] Heidegger, *What is Philosophy*, p. 51.

[9] Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking*, J. Glenn Gray, trans. (New York: Harper, 1968), p. 19. Henceforth cited as WD.

[10] *Ibid.*

[11] Hölderlin, *Socrates and Alcibiades*. »Warum huldigst du, heilger Sokrates,/ »Diesem Jünglinge stets? Kennest du Größeres nicht? / »Warum siehet mit Liebe, / »Wie auf Götter, dein Aug' auf ihn? // Wer das Tiefste gedacht, libet das Lebendigste, / Hohe Jugend versteht, wer in die Welt geblüht / Und es neigen die Weisen / Oft am Ende zu Schönem sich. The poem in English translation is: "Why, holy Socrates, must you always adore/ This young man? Is there nothing greater than he? /Why do you look on him /Lovingly, as on a god?" // "Who the deepest has thought, loves what is most alive/ Who has looked at the world, understands youth at its height/ And wise men in the end /Often incline to beauty." Translated by Michael Hamburger in *Friedrich Hölderlin, Poems and Fragments* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980 [1966]).

[12] Heidegger, WD, pp. 20–21.

[13] Thus at the conclusion of his writing on the *Logos* fragment in Heraclitus, Heidegger writes "Once, however in the beginning of Western thinking, the essence of language flashed in the light of Being — once when Heraclitus thought the *λογος* as his guiding word, so as to think in this word the Being of beings. But the lightning abruptly vanished. No one held onto its streak of light and the nearness of what it illuminates." Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, D.F. Krell and F. Capuzzi, trans. (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), p. 78. Text originally in *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1954).

[14] Giorgio Agamben, "The Passion of Facticity: Heidegger and the Problem of Love" in Reginald Lilly, ed., *The Ancients and the Moderns* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1996), p. 210.

[15] "Ach dieser Mangel an Liebe in diesen Philosophen, die immer nur an die Ausgewählten denken und nicht so viel Glauben zu ihrer Weisheit haben. Es muss die Weisheit wie die Sonne für jedermann scheine: und ein blasser Stahl selbst in die niedrigste Seele hinabtauchen können" (KSA 7, 720–721; cf. Nietzsche's discussion of the sun in *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*, KSA 3, § 337. For a discussion of one aspect of this irony and its subtle paradox precisely with reference to love see Babich, "Nietzsche et Eros entre le gouffre de Charybde et l'écueil de Dieu: La valence érotique de l'art et l'artiste comme acteur - Juif - Femme." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*. Vol. 54, no. 211 (2000): 15–55. In English as: "Nietzsche and Eros Between the Devil and God's Deep Blue Sea: The Erotic Valence of Art and the Artist as Actor—Jew—Woman." *Continental Philosophy Review*. 33 (2000): 159–188.

[16] René Descartes, *Discourse on Method*, Part I.

[17] Thus Heidegger writes that "the collapse of thinking into the sciences and into faith is the baneful destiny of Being." *Early Greek Thinking*, p. 40. Originally published as "Der Spruch des Anaximander" in *Holzwege* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1950).

[18] Robert Bernasconi, *The Question of Language in Heidegger's History of Being* (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1985), p. 95. Bernasconi alludes to the Anglo-American poet, T.S. Eliot's *Burnt Norton* — *Words strain, /Crack and sometimes break, under the burden, /Under the tension, slip, slide, perish, /Decay with imprecision, will not stay in place, / Will not stay still*. Cited as the epigraph for his first book on Heidegger, and this attention to the breaking of the word echoes Heidegger's reflection on Stefan George's poem "Words" and the phrase Heidegger makes into the

refrain for his own essay of the same title: *Where word breaks off, no thing may be.* (“Words” in Heidegger, *On the Way to Language*, Joan Stambaugh, trans. (San Francisco: Harper, 1971), p. 139 ff. Text originally included in *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1959). George Steiner also emphasizes what he names a failure and what I call the shattering of language in Heidegger, both thetically and tacitly. See Steiner’s introduction to his *Martin Heidegger*, “Heidegger: In 1991,” (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). See my account of “Heidegger’s Silence” in C. Scott and A. Dallery, eds., *Ethics and Danger: Currents in Continental Thought* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), pp. 83–106 and my “From the Ethical Alpha to the Linguistic Omega: Heidegger’s Anti-Semitism and the Question of the Affinity Between Ancient Greek and German.” *Joyful Wisdom: A Journal of Postmodern Ethics*. Vol. I (Fall 1994) 1:3–25.

[19] Heidegger, WD, p. 186.

[20] Bernasconi, p. 63.

[21] *Ibid.*

[22] I do not think that in this translation Bernasconi anticipated its now unavoidable allusion to the translator’s barbarism of “Enowning” used to translate the subtitle of Heidegger’s *Beiträge zur Philosophie. Vom Ereignis*.

[23] This is a life-long, nearly futile and almost fatal task, as another Anglo-American poet, Randall Jarrell highlights in his wry and all-too-accurate poem, *Deutsch durch Freud*.

[24] See my “Translating Nietzsche’s Imperative: On Becoming the One You Are” in David Cooper, ed., *Nietzsche and the Art of Bildung*. Forthcoming.

[25] Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, “Nietzsche and Modernity,” trans. Heidi Byrnes, in Babette E. Babich, ed., *Nietzsche, Epistemology, and the Philosophy of Science* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), pp. 221–240. Originally published in Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, *Wahrnehmung der Neuzeit* (Hanser: Munich, 1983), pp. 70–106.

[26] See William Mackintire Salter, *International Journal of Ethics* Vol. 27, Issue 3 (April 1917): 357–379. Salter’s address was first given to the Societies for Ethical Culture in Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Chicago as well as at several colleges and universities during November and December of 1916. The war, he writes is “even called ‘Nietzsche in Action’ or the ‘Euro-Nietzschean (or Anglo-Nietzschean) War.’ ” p. 357. See also, Robert Rie, “Nietzsche and After,” *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol 13, no. 3 (June 1952): 349–369.

[27] Steiner, let it be said, is the only commentator of note who has had the moral courage to underscore this point in connection with Heidegger’s *Being and Time*: “No Nazi hoodlum, to my knowledge, ever read it or would have been capable of reading it.” Steiner, *Martin Heidegger*, p. xxiv. Steiner makes this observation in the overarching context of his claim to attend not to Heidegger’s political misdeeds but his failure to break his silence on his own deeds as regarding world history “So far as I am aware, my own little book was among the very first, if not the first, to state that it is Heidegger’s silence post-1945 rather than the opaque and pathetic rhetoric of 1933–34 which challenges our understanding.” p. xxii. In an intriguing contrast, Medard Boss reflects on the climate of negativity which clouded his efforts to engage in thoughtful with Heidegger after the war (“Serious philosophers I talked with almost always dissuaded me from any further occupation with Heidegger and his work ... Heidegger was a typical Nazi”), “Preface to the First German Edition,” *Martin Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars. Protocols — Conversations — Letters* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2001), pp. xv–xvi. Writing from a professional psychoanalytic perspective as transparently in evidence as Steiner’s viewpoint as a critic, Boss observes that there are other questions that can be raised concerning Heidegger’s overall silence, given Heidegger’s silence on the Heidegger case, *per se*. Reflecting on his post-war inquiries into Heidegger, Boss recollects “Heidegger very clearly seemed to be the most slandered man I had ever encountered. He had become entangled in a network of lies by his colleagues. ... The only remaining puzzle was why Heidegger did not defend himself against these slanders publicly.” p. xvi.

[28] The practitioners of such moralizing assessments are numerous. In the case of Nietzsche, and quite possibly setting the standard for all subsequent instances of the genre one may note Georg

Lukács, *The Destruction of Reason: Irrationalism from Schelling to Nietzsche*, trans. Peter Palmer (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1981). They range from the important and the profound (Emmanuel Levinas and Michael Theunissen) to the trivial and rather cavilling range of such recent contributions as Tom Rockmore or Richard Wolin or those appearing in the collection of essays that borrows its title from Lukács influential work, *Nietzsche Godfather of Fascism: On the Uses and Abuses of a Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002). The case of Heidegger is rather more solid: not only because it is an historical matter of fact that Heidegger actively collaborated with Nazism as Rector of Freiburg University (whereas Nietzsche for his part had been dead for some three decades before the Nazis ever came to power, but because Heidegger lived through the Second World War and did not during his lifetime and until his death in 1976 say anything to address the question of either Nazism itself or his own responsibility.

[29] See, for the persistence of such questions regarding both Nietzsche and Hölderlin, Stanley Corngold and Geoffrey Waite, “A Question of Responsibility: Nietzsche with Hölderlin at War, 1914–1946,” in Jacob Golomb and Robert Wistrich’s *Nietzsche Godfather of Fascism*, pp. 196–214.

[30] Heidegger, “The Word of Nietzsche: God is Dead” in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p 54–55. Henceforth cited as WN.

[31] Heidegger quotes Spengler, and for an English ear, seems to (but I don’t suppose that in fact he does) allude to Yeats, with the “loss of center.” Heidegger’s invocation of Spengler’s *The Decline of the West* is thus more commonly adverted to, although Heidegger cites only the title here, and goes on to talk about Nietzsche. Elsewhere, Heidegger specifically denigrates this recourse to Spengler.

[32] WD, p. 29.

[33] Nietzsche, *Ecce homo*, “Why I am a Destiny,” 1.

[34] This gives a-more-than-rhetorical tone to the citation. Beyond rhetoric, but without denying its significance in Nietzsche’s writing, Heidegger is thus able to suggest thus asks if everything enigmatic in Nietzsche might correspond to Nietzsche’s own sense of himself as “a precursor, a transition, pointing before and behind, leading and rebuffing, and therefore everywhere ambiguous, even in the same manner and in the sense of a transition?” WD, p. 55.

[35] Hölderlin’s word is from *Patmos — Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst / das Rettende auch ...* [Hamburger’s translation read: *But where danger is, grows/The saving power also.*]

[36] Heidegger’s meaning here thus echoes Nietzsche rather than Hegel. “On the End of Philosophy” in *On Time and Being*, p. 59.

[37] Nietzsche, asserts that “der Mensch das *noch nicht festgestellte Thier* ist” in *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 62; cited by Heidegger in WD, p. 58, translation slightly altered.

[38] Heidegger, *What is Philosophy*, p. 95.

[39] Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Ralph Manheim, trans. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), p. 152. [“Insofern z.B. die Dichter *nur*, aber dann wirklich Dichter, indem die Denker *nur*, aber dann wirklich Denker ... sind.” *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1953).]

[40] George Steiner, “Heidegger: In 1991,” p. xxi.

[41] Steiner, p. xiii.

[42] Steiner, p. xv.

[43] Heidegger, “The Way to Language” in *On the Way to Language*, Peter D. Hertz, trans (New York: Harper, 1982), p. 124.

[44] Heidegger, “Language,” *Poetry, Language Thought*, Albert Hofstadter, trans. (New York: Harper, 1971), p. 190.

[45] For Heidegger, the passion for novelty and the latest discoveries are distracting tendencies of the modern era and irrelevant to thought itself, especially philosophy. Thus Heidegger concludes with an equally gnomic declaration: “We would like only, for once, to get to just where we are already.” *Ibid.*

[46] Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 12.

[47] This assertion converges with (it admittedly does not follow) Jacques Derrida, *Otobiographies. L'enseignement de Nietzsche et la politique du nom propre*, (Paris: éditions galilée, 1984). For a developed account of this musical reading of philosophy, see Babich, “The Musical Style of Philosophy: Μουσική τεχνή From Socrates’ Practice to Heidegger’ s Parataxis” in Robert Burch and Massimo Verdicchio, eds., *Gesture and Word: Thinking Between Philosophy and Poetry* (Northwestern University Press: 2002) as well as my earlier reading of Nietzsche’ s musical style, “On Nietzsche’ s Concinnity: An Analysis of Style.” *Nietzsche-Studien*. 19 (1990): 59–80.

[48] Heidegger, *Was heißt Denken?*, p. 85.

[49] Heidegger, WD, p. 26.

[50] “The End of Philosophy,” p. 72.

[51] Saying “we are still not thinking” is not “tuned to a key of melancholy and despair” — even if it is not a piece of optimism. If the assertion nevertheless *seems* “tuned in a negative and pessimistic key” (WD, p. 35), Heidegger argues that that seeming is itself a result of the fact that we are still not thinking. This turns Heidegger from an attention to the keynote to the character or resonant “way in which it speaks.” Here Heidegger’ s musical allusion is overt: “‘Way’ here means melody, the ring and tone, which is not just a matter of how the saying sounds” p. 37.

[52] WD, p. 186.

[53] “Hölderlin’ s method, steeled by contact with Greek, is not devoid of boldly formed hypotactic constructions, parataxes are noticeable as elaborate disturbances that deviate from the logical hierarchy of subordinating syntax. Hölderlin is irresistibly drawn to forms of this sort. The transformation of language into a concatenation, the elements of which combine in a manner different from that of judgment, is a musical one.” Adorno, *Gesammelte Werke*, Tiedemann, R., ed., (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1970–86 [20 volumes]), Vol. 11, p. 57. Translation from the citation in Rolf Wiggershaus, *The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories, and Political Significance*, M. Robertson, trans., (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), p. 528.

[54] Heidegger, WD, p. 224.

[55] *Ibid.*

[56] Holger Schmid reads this passage productively and suggestively, taking Heidegger’ s account of ‘showing’ (*Zeigen*) as the propriative, ownmost mode of Appropriation: “als eigenster Weise des Ereignens. Diese Weise nun, in der das Ereignis spricht soll nicht Modus, sondern Melos bedeuten: ‘das Lied das singend sagt.’ ” But, Schmid continues to note beyond Heidegger’ s quiet institution of *melos* as the mode in which Appropriation speaks, that with this invocation of song in reference to Hölderlin a good deal remains to be thought: “Das zuletzt zu Denkende ist also das zu Erfahrende, ‘das Lied’ .” *Kunst des Hörens. Orte und Grenzen der hermeneutischen Erfahrung* (Köln: Bölnow, 1999), p. 124.

[57] Heidegger, “What is Philosophy,” p. 83.

[58] See William H. Race, “Negative Expression and Pindaric ΠΟΙΚΑΛΙΑ” in *Style and Rhetoric in Pindar’ s Odes* (Atlanta: Scholar’ s Press, 1990) *American Philological Association. Classical Studies*

24, p. 59ff.

[59] Hölderlin writes “das große Wort, das ἐν διαφέρον εαυτω [*das Eine in sich selbst unterschiedene*] des Heraklit — das konnte nur ein Grieche finden, denn es ist das Wesen der Schönheit, und ehe das gefunden war, gabs keine Philosophie.” Hölderlin, *Hyperion*, in *Sämtliche Werke*, Friedrich Beißner et al. ed., Große Stuttgarter Ausgabe (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1943–85), in 8 vols. Vol. 3: 81. Elsewhere I argue that Nietzsche’s reading of Pindar is from the start filtered through a simultaneous engagement with Hölderlin. See Babich, “Between Hölderlin and Heidegger: Nietzsche’s Transfiguration of Philosophy.” *Nietzsche-Studien*, 29 (2000): 267–301.

(1989) pp 989–1007.

[60] CW1 WKG

[1] 郇元宝编：《尼采在中国》，上海三联，2001年。

[2] 汪子嵩等：《欧

洲哲学史简编》，人民出版社，1972年，第200–203页。

[3] 《中国大

百科全书》（哲学卷），北京，1987年，第648–649页。

[4] 雅斯贝尔

斯：《尼采—其人其说》，北京，社会科学文献出版社，第31页。

[5] B. Babich & R. S. Cohen (ed.), *Ni*

etzsche and Science

* Throughout this paper and especially in section 2, I owe a debt to discussions with Babette Babich of Fordham University and to her paper cited in footnote 20.

[61] Citations are to Nietzsche’s text and internal division (if cited work published Nietzsche) and then Werke Kritische Gesamtausgabe (GRuyter, 1966ff) as WKG and volume and subvolume number and page number.

[62] Max Weber, *Religionssoziologie* Band I, p. 30. Translated by Talcott Parsons in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (Scribners, 1958) ,p. 47

[63] BT self-critique 2 WKG III₁ 7

[64] Best here is likely to be Georges Liébert, *Nietzsche et la musique* (Paris. PUF, 1995)

[65] GS 80

[66] e.g. Hippocrates, *Aphorisms*. 5.36,

[67] U. v Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, “*Future Philology!*” *New Nietzsche Studies* 4 (2000), p. 32 (fn 52)

[68] Se, eg PTG 1 WKG III₂ pp 302–303

[69] GT 2 III 1 p. 26: Aus der höchsten Freude tönt der Schrei des Entsetzens oder der sehnende Klagelaut über einen unersetzlichen

Verlust.

[70] Hölderlin, *Poems and Fragments*, p. 52 - thanks to Babette Babich for this reference.

[71] WKG I₁, p. 305-306

[72] Nietzsche to Rohde, 12/21/71 in Friedrich Nietzsche, *Sämtliche Briefe*. Kritische Studienausgabe. Band 3 (DTV. De Gruyter, 1986) p. 256-257. All future letters will be cited from this edition as SB and by volume number.

[73] M 174 WKG V₁, p. 131

[74] See Charles Rosen, *The Romantic Generation* especially the chapter on the “fragment.”

[75] See inter alia Catherine Kintzler, *Poétique de l'opéra français de Corneille à Rousseau* (Paris. Minerve, 1991); James H. Johnson, *Listening in Paris* (Berkeley and Los Angeles. University of California Press, 1995). See my “The Song in the Self,” *New Nietzsche Studies* I ½; “Theatricality, Public Space and Music in Rousseau,” *SubStance* 80 (xxv, 2, 1996), pp110-127; “A Language More Vital than Speech: Music, Language and Representation,” (with C.Nathan Dugan) in Patrick Riley, ed. *Cambridge Companion to Rousseau* (Cambridge. Cambridge University Press, 2001).

[76] See my “The Obstinace of Voice” (unpublished) for a consideration of this debate.

[77] Nietzsche in fact in a later aphorism of **Dawn** associates Schopenhauer and Rousseau as both “sufficiently proud to inscribe upon their existence the motto: *vitam impendere vero*. And both again — how they must have suffered in their pride when they failed to make *verum impendere vitae!* — *verum* as each of them understood it — when their life ran along beside their knowledge like a wayward bass which refuses to harmonize with the melody!” M 459 WKG V₁ p. 280. The two mottoes translate as “dedicate life to truth” and “dedicate truth to life.” For a set of brilliant aphorisms on the development of European Music see MAM ii 149-169.

[78] Richard Wagner, **Wagner on Music and Drama**, eds. A. Goldman and E. Sprinchorn (New York. Dutton, 1964), pp 189, 196

[79] Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe, **Musica Ficta** (Stanford. Palo Alto, 1994), 13; See my “The Song in the Self,” *New Nietzsche Studies*, I 1/2

[80] WKG III₃ p. 106

[81] The next several paragraphs draw directly from Babette Babich, “Μουσική τεχνή: The Philosophical Practice of Music from Socrates to Nietzsche to Heidegger,” in Massimo Verdicchio and Robert Burch, eds., *Gesture and Word: Thinking Between Philosophy and Poetry*. Evanston. Northwestern University Press. (in press)

[82] Thrasybulos Georgiades, *Musik und Rhythmus bei den Griechen. Zum Ursprung der abendländischen Musik* (Hamburg. Rowohlt, 1958) 52-53 (cited from Babich)

[83] Warren D. Anderson, *Music and Musicians in Ancient Greece* (Cornell UP, 1994) 143 (reference originally from Babich)

[84] Laches 188D

[85] Thrasybulos Georgiades, *Music and Language* (Cambridge. Cambridge UP, 1982), p. 4-5

[86] See for instances the rules in J. Pharr, *Homeric Greek* (University of Oklahoma Prss, 1985), pp. 180-194, albeit without reference to anything beyond “metrical requirements.”

[87] M.L. West, *Ancient Greek Music* (Oxford. Clarendon, 19), p. 198

[88] Op cit, p. 81

[89] Euripides carries both references and *Exodus* carries the second.

[90] Einleitung in die Tragödie des Sophocles WKG II₃ 11, 17

[91] WKG III₃ p. 193

[92] See Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Möllendorf, "Future Philology?", *New Nietzsche Studies* 4:1/2 (Fall, 2000), pp. 10-12

[93] See M.L. West, *Ancient Greek Music* (Oxford. Clarendon, 19) pp.151, 355.

[94] I am influenced here by Paul Allen Miller, *Lyric Texts and Lyric Consciousness* (Routledge. London and New York, 1994) chapter 1 and 2.

[95] Thanks to Babette Babich for making this point to me.

[96] Compare to this passage in Wagner's *My Life*, p. 603: "Returning in the afternoon, I stretched myself, dead tired, on a hard couch, awaiting the long-desired hour of sleep. It did not come; but I fell into a kind of somnolent state, in which I suddenly felt as though I were sinking in swiftly flowing water. The rushing sound formed itself in my brain into a musical sound, the chord of E flat major, which continually re-echoed in broken forms; these broken chords seemed to be melodic passages of increasing motion, yet the pure triad of E flat major never changed, but seemed by its continuance to impart infinite significance to the element in which I was sinking. I awoke in sudden terror from my doze, feeling as though the waves were rushing high above my head. I at once recognized that the orchestral overture to the *Rheingold*, which must long have lain latent within me, though it had been unable to find definite form, had at last been revealed to me. I then quickly realized my own nature; the stream of life was not to flow to me from without, but from within."

[97] This untitled in notebook essay can be found in the WKG III₃, p. 375. I owe a debt here to David Allison, *Reading the New Nietzsche*

[98] KGW III₃ p. 19: Was thut die Musik? Sie löst eine Anschauung in Willen auf. Sie enthält die allgemeinen Formen aller Begehrungszustände: sie ist durch und durch Symbolik der Triebe, und als solche in ihren einfachsten Formen (Takt, Rhythmus) durchaus und jedermann verständlich. Sie ist also immer allgemeiner als jede einzelne Handlung: deshalb ist sie uns verständlicher als jede einzelne Handlung: die Musik ist also der Schlüssel zum Drama." See also Robert Jourdain, *Music, The Brain, Ecstasy* (New York. Morrow, 1997) [also cited in Allison]

[99] Compare to III₃ 231: "Es ist Dionysus, der, eingehend in die Individuation, seine Doppelstimmung ausläßt: der Lyriker spricht von sich, er meint aber nur den Dionysus."

[100] It is thus worth remembering that in *Republic* 392d Plato associates the dithyramb with "simple" narration.

[101] WKG III₃ 231: Das „Volkslied“ dionysisch. Nicht rasende Leidenschaft macht hier den Lyriker, sondern ungeheuer starker dionysischer Wille, der in einem apollinischen Traum sich äußert."

[102] See Miller, p. 26

[103] Cite Schopenhauer WWV I, 1; see also Hans Joachim Bracht, *Nietzsches Theorie der Lytrik und das Orchesterlied* (Barenreiter. Kassel, 1993) pp 53ff

- [104] See my “Theatricality, Music and Public Space,” *SubStance* (#80, 1996). Berg: “The main thing to show – one may as well begin with the crucial point – is that the melody, the principal part, the theme, is the basis, or determines the course of this [serial music], as of all other music.” (cited from Charles Rosen, *Schoenberg*)
- [105] WKG IV₁ p. 176. Nietzsche juxtaposes Archilochus and Heraclitus but remarks at the end of the entry: “Alles Vergleichen von Personen ist schief und dumm.”
- [106] Jacques Taminiaux, *Le théâtre des philosophes* (Millon. Grenoble, 1995), p. 147..
- [107] RWB 5 WKG IV₁ p. 30; cf Richard Wagner’s *Prose Works*, vol iii, p. 71
- [108] See my “Where are we when we are beyond good and evil?” *Cardozo Law Review*, forthcoming
- [109] RWB 9 WKG IV₁ p. 58
- [110] BT 24 WKG III₁ p. 148
- [111] BT 25 WKG III₁ p. 151. What Nietzsche seems to have in mind here is something like the “Tristan chord,” that much discussed F-B-D#-G# in the third measure of the opera which controls it until the final resolution, where the oboe picks up the augmented fifth (A-F) with which the opera had opened. This is an idea that he will pursue beyond 1871 in different terms.
- [112] Lydia Goehr, *The Quest for Voice* (UC Press, 1998) p. 18
- [113] Richard Wagner, *On Music and Drama* (ed. Goldman and Sprinchorn), p. 189
- [114] WKG III₂ p. 7. “Die Geschichte der Musik lehrt es, daß die gesunde Weiterentwicklung der griechischen Musik im frühen Mittelalter plötzlich auf das stärkste gehemmt und beeinträchtigt wurde, als man in Theorie und Praxis mit auf das Alte zurückgieng. Das Resultat war eine unglaubliche Verkümmern des Geschmacks: in den fortwährenden Widersprüchen der angeblichen Überlieferung und des natürlichen Gehörs kam man dahin, Musik gar nicht mehr für das Ohr, sondern für das Auge zu componieren. Die Augen sollten das contrapunktische Geschick des Componisten bewundern: die Augen sollten die Ausdrucksfähigkeit der Musik anerkennen. “
- [115] GT 21 WKG
- [116] David Allison, *Reading the New Nietzsche* (Roman and Littlefield, 2001), p. 47ff
- [117] BT 8 WKG III₁ p 57. For a full discussion see my *Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration* (Berkeley and Los Angeles. University of California Press, 1988; University of Illinois Press, 2000), pp 161–182.
- [118] BT 5 WKG III₁ p. 38
- [119] WKG III₄ p. 12.
- [120] R.W. Emerson, “Self-Reliance, “ *Essays and Lectures* (NAL) p. 259
- [121] R.W. Emerson, “The American Scholar,” *Essays and Lectures*, p. 57
- [122] SE 6 III₁ p. 383: I give “emergence” for *Entstehung* as opposed to Hollingdale’s “production”. Delicacy in translation is essential to this essay. See Cavell, *Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome*.
- [123] See also the considerations in “Music and Words” (translated in Carl Dahlhaus, *Between*

Romanticism and Modernism (UC Press, 1980), esp. pp 110–111 or WKG III3, 375. E.g.: “Wer Gefühle als Wirkungen der Musik davonträgt, hat an ihnen gleichsam ein symbolisches Zwischenreich, das ihm einen Vorgeschmack von der Musik geben kann, doch ihn zugleich aus ihren innersten Heilighümern ausschließt.”

[124] BT 23 III₁ p. 141. For a fuller discussion see my “Aesthetic Authority and Tradition: Nietzsche and the Greeks,” *History of European Ideas*, 11 (1989) pp 989–1007.

[125] CW1 WKG

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