



著作推荐--形而上学

时间: 2004-10-15 11:31:01 来源: 逻辑与认知研究所 作者: wxf 阅读264次

转引自 http://www.formalontology.it/pathways_metaphysics.htm

Pathways to Metaphysics

Preliminary note: The purpose of these pages is to give both the beginner and the more experienced reader a brief guide to the introductory literature on general philosophy, metaphysics, ontology, phenomenology, analytical philosophy, philosophical logic and the philosophy of logic..

In its initial form the pages will contain a selection of introductory readings, with brief annotations on the content (for the most important books, also the index will be included); subsequently these will be expanded to include more specific essays on selected problems.

In the sections for beginners, preference will be given to those books more readily available. In other sections some books could be out of print; if your Library does not possess the volume, it may be possible to obtain it via interlibrary loan.

Every effort will be made to provide details that facilitate bibliographical research.

Books for beginners

- Aune Bruce. *Metaphysics: the elements*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1985.

From the Preface: "I had two principal aims in writing this book. The first was somewhat personal: I wanted to work out my views on the main problems of metaphysics. (...)

My other aim was pedagogical: I wanted to produce a systematic book on metaphysics that would be understandable by the general reader and that would be useful for students in the sort of middle-level course on metaphysics that I teach, from time to time, at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. (...)

The students attending my course are advanced undergraduates and beginning graduate students, and I wanted to have available for them a text that deals with the basic issues of metaphysics in a systematic way and that prepares them for advanced work on specialized topics. A systematic text is important, in my view, because many subjects of general interest in metaphysics, such as the mind-body problem or the perplexities about freedom and determinism, can be adequately discussed only if various issues in basic ontology are already settled, or at least understood. Of course, careful thought about

complex or derivative issues often requires one to back up and reconsider one's position on fundamentals. Still, an orderly presentation of issues is, as I see it, particularly desirable in a subject like metaphysics. The difficulty I had in writing the book is at least partly owing to the difficulty of presenting issues in an appropriate order.

Metaphysics is an ancient subject on which an enormous amount has been written. To make up one's mind about such subjects as the nature of particulars, the reality of attributes and facts, the possibility of alternative ontologies, and the nature of time, truth, and change (to name just a few), one should be familiar with the jungle of considerations that bear upon them. I have tried to help the reader gain this familiarity by discussing arguments and claims of numerous philosophers, past and present. Having lived through more than one "revolution" in philosophy, I am well aware of the attractions of finding some method that will sweep away all the problems. I now regard such methods as illusory, but the first step in applying them is, in any case, to discover what the problems are. I have done my best to describe these problems, and I offer my solutions for what they are worth. Although I am far from doctrinaire on matters of philosophical method, I cannot deny that my approach to metaphysics belongs to the tradition of analytic philosophy. The reader will quickly see, for example, that my approach to ontology owes a great deal to Bertrand Russell, but I have tried to show that Russell's approach grows naturally out of Aristotle, the philosopher who wrote the first systematic treatise on metaphysics. Since analytic philosophers influenced by Russell have relied heavily on such technical devices as the so-called existential quantifier, I have made a special effort to come to terms with those devices early in my discussion. The elements of mathematical logic should be as familiar to undergraduates as high school algebra, but they are not -- and I have therefore offered clear explanations of the few logical symbols that I introduce."

Content: Preface. Chapter 1. What is metaphysics?; Chapter 2. Existence; Chapter 3. Universals and Particulars; Chapter 4. Linguistic arguments for abstracta; Chapter 5. Changing things; Chapter 6. Worlds, objects, and structure; Chapter 7. Meaning, truth and metaphysics; Chapter 8. Appearance and reality; Chapter 9. Metaphysical freedom; Notes. References. Index.

- Hamlyn David W. *Metaphysics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1984.

From the Introduction: "My own approach to the subject might be put as follows: one way of construing metaphysics is to say that it is concerned to set out in the most general and abstract terms what must hold good of conscious beings and the world in which they live if that world is to constitute reality for them. For this purpose the metaphysician has to set out in the most intelligible form what that reality consists of, given an adequate framework of representation of what it is for something to constitute reality for someone. That will certainly entail saying something about things, their spatio-temporal framework and the persons, or at any rate selves, for whom they are things. I shall try to work out in subsequent chapters what that means.

Chapter 2 will discuss in greater detail the metaphysics of appearance and reality, and Chapter 3 the general nature of a philosophical ontology. Chapter 4 investigates the notion of substance - the kind of thing that has often been claimed as basic for ontology. I shall be concerned with the necessary features of substances and how they affect other matters such as their individuation. One commonly recognized characteristic of substances is particularity, and that will lead me in Chapter 5 to discuss the distinction

between the particular and the general and also the general problem of universals. A characteristic that is sometimes thought, although mistakenly, to belong necessarily to substance is simplicity of an absolute kind, and on that idea whole systems have been erected, particularly those of monism and pluralism (when the latter constitutes a reaction to the former). I shall illustrate that fact in Chapter 6 by reference to the monism of absolute idealism as found in Bradley and the pluralism of the logical atomism of Russell and the early Wittgenstein. I shall do that because apart from the relative unfamiliarity of these systems to some readers they afford a comparatively recent example of the opposition between monism and pluralism. They also illustrate one particular working-out of metaphysics in the style of Hegel together with a reaction to it.

I shall then proceed in Chapter 7 to an examination of the frameworks in which substances are generally taken to exist; the frameworks provided by space and time. I shall not there consider all questions that might be asked about space and time, since some such questions belong more appropriately to philosophy of science. The questions raised will be those that fit in with the conceptions of metaphysics expounded in the chapters leading up to Chapter 7. In Chapters 8 and 9 I turn to ourselves, discussing first the notion of mind and the place that the mind has in the scheme presented, and second the conception of selves or persons for whom the reality outlined is what it is. A final epilogue will put the issues in perspective and explain why certain questions sometimes discussed under the heading of metaphysics are not discussed here (which is not to say that they should not be discussed)" pp. 8-9.

Contents: Preface VII; 1. Introduction 1; 2. Appearance and reality 11; 3. Ontology 34; 4. Substance; 5. Particular and general; 6. Simple substances: monism and pluralism; 7. Space and time; 8. Minds; 9. Persons and personal identity 187; 10. Epilogue: man and nature 219; Bibliography 221; Index 226

- Loux Michael J. *Metaphysics. A contemporary introduction*. London, New York: Routledge 2002 (Second edition).

From the Preface: "Metaphysics is a discipline with a long history; and over the course of that history, the discipline has been conceived in different ways. These different conceptions associate different methodologies and even different subject matters with the discipline; and anyone seeking to write an introductory text on metaphysics must choose from among these different conceptions. For reasons I try to make clear in the introduction, I have chosen to follow a very old tradition (one that can be traced back to Aristotle) that interprets metaphysics as the attempt to provide an account of being qua being. On this conception, metaphysics is the most general of all the disciplines; its aim is to identify the nature and structure of all that there is. Central to this project is the delineation of the categories of being. Categories are the most general or highest kinds under which anything that exists falls. On this conception of metaphysics, what the metaphysician is supposed to do is to identify the relevant kinds, to specify the characteristics or categorial features peculiar to each, and to indicate the ways those very general kinds are related to each other. It turns out, however, that metaphysicians have disagreed about the categorial structure of reality. They have disagreed about the categories the metaphysician ought to recognize; and even where they have agreed about the categories to be included in our metaphysical theory, they have disagreed about the

characteristics associated with those categories and about the relations of priority that tie the various categories together. These disagreements have given rise to debates that lie at the very core of the philosophical enterprise; those debates are the focus of this book."

Contents: Preface; Introduction; Chapter One: The problem of universals I - Metaphysical realism; Chapter Two: The problem of universals II - Nominalism; Chapter Three: Concrete particulars I - Substrata, bundles, and substances; Chapter Four: Propositions and their neighbors; Chapter Five: The necessary and the possible; Chapter Six: Concrete particulars II - Persistence through time; Chapter Seven: The challenge of Anti-Realism; Bibliography; Index.

- Van Inwagen Peter *Metaphysics*. Boulder: Westview Press 2002 (Second Edition).

From the Preface to the first edition (1993): "This book is an introduction to metaphysics that presupposes no prior acquaintance with philosophy. It can be used either as an introductory textbook, suitable for an upper-level undergraduate course in metaphysics (where it would probably be supplemented by 'readings' chosen by the instructor) or as a book that the -- I hope not mythical -- 'interested general reader' can pick up and read without general guidance from an instructor. It is primarily as an aid to this interested general reader that I have included Suggestions for Further reading at the end of each chapter (but one).

Contents: Preface to the first edition IX; Preface to the second edition XIII; 1 Introduction 1; Part One: The way the world is 19; Introduction 19; 2 Individuality 22; 3 Externality 43; 4 Temporality 56; 5 Objectivity 73; Part Two: Why the world is 87; Introduction 87; 6 Necessary Being: The ontological argument 91; 7 Necessary Being: The cosmological argument 115; Part Three: The inhabitants of the world 135; Introduction 135 8 What rational beings are there 139? 9 The place of rational beings in the world: design and purpose 149; 10 The nature of rational beings: dualism and physicalism 166; 11 The nature of rational beings: dualism and personal identity 187; 12 The powers of rational beings: freedom of the will 202; 13 Concluding meditation 218; Bibliography 221; Index 225.

More advanced works

A) Introduction to metaphysics

- Körner Stephan. *Metaphysics: its structure and function*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1984

From the Introduction: "It is not the purpose of this essay to expound and to defend a particular system of immanent or transcendent metaphysics, but to inquire into the common structure and function of such systems, whether explicitly formulated, e.g., by philosophers, philosophically minded theologians or scientists, or only implicitly accepted.

Such an inquiry appears no less worthwhile than are more familiar inquiries into the common structure and function of, say, geometries, scientific theories or legal systems. It resembles them in method and should, if properly executed, counteract the tendency towards an intolerant metaphysical dogmatism without supporting a boundless pluralism. For it is intended not only to exhibit the possible variety of metaphysical systems, but also the strong constraints on it.

The essay falls into three parts. The first examines the organization - whether imposed or found - of a person's beliefs about the public world of his experience. It also considers the organization of his practical, including his moral, attitudes towards this world, as well as the nature of aesthetic attitudes and of aesthetic representation.(...)

The second part of the essay begins by illustrating the variety and function of categorial frameworks. The function of categorial frameworks consists chiefly in providing their acceptors with criteria of "meaningfulness", as opposed to mere linguistic intelligibility, of "coherence", as opposed to mere logical consistency, of "explanatory power", as opposed to mere descriptive or prognostic effectiveness. Loyalty to these criteria, which may be combined with ignorance or confusion about their origin in their acceptor's immanent metaphysics, plays an important part in the choice of theories or the direction of research. The procedure of exhibiting the actual and potential variety of categorial frameworks is endowed with some orderliness by showing that, and how, principles of immanent metaphysics may have their origin in special disciplines or regions of thought: logic; mathematics; predictive and instrumental thinking within and outside the sciences; thinking about persons and mental phenomena; thinking about social phenomena and history. (...)

Whereas the first two parts of the essay are mainly devoted to an inquiry into the static structure of systems of metaphysical beliefs, the third part inquires into their changes as a result of internal strains and external pressures. The latter are exerted by appeals to philosophical methods which are claimed to yield absolutely valid premises for the derivation of the one and only true system of metaphysics, as well as by more modest arguments which try to transfer the convictions felt by their proponents to those to whom they are addressed. An examination of these arguments, which results in rejecting arguments of the first type and in accepting arguments of the second, leads to a critique of various concepts of progress, be it progress within a system of metaphysical beliefs or progress of metaphysics itself.

Although this critique might well have concluded the essay, I thought it appropriate to add a chapter indicating in the barest outline my own categorial framework and transcendent metaphysics. It is meant to enable readers to judge how far I have avoided the danger of confusing my metaphysics with metaphysics in general." (pp. 1-4).

Contents: Preface XI; Introduction 1; Part I. On the organization of beliefs and attitudes.

1. On the cognitive organization of experience 7; 2. On the organization of practical attitudes 20; 3. On aesthetic attitudes 31; 4. Immanent and transcendent philosophy 42;

Part II. On immanent and transcendental metaphysics

5. The principles of logic as supreme cognitive principles 53; 6. On mathematical thinking as possible source of immanent metaphysics 63; 7. On predictive and instrumental thinking about nature as a possible source of immanent metaphysics 76; 7. On thinking about persons and mental phenomena as a possible source of immanent metaphysics 89; 9. On thinking about social phenomena and history as a possible source of immanent metaphysics 103; 10. On delimiting a person's immanent metaphysics 114; 11.

Transcendent metaphysics and the applications of concepts 125; 12. Transcendent metaphysics and the limits of conceptual thinking 137; 13 On anti-metaphysical errors

and illusions 149;

Part III. Stability and change in metaphysics

14. On internal strains 165; 15. On external pressures exerted by methodological and other arguments 180; 16. On metaphysical pluralism, intra-metaphysical and metaphysical progress 194; 17. Some speculations about transcendent reality 208; Summary of these 222; Index 234.

- Benardete José A. *Metaphysics. The logical approach*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press 1989.

From page 9-10: "Scholars aside, few philosophers today are prepared to say that they have anything like a very clear notion of what Aristotle had in mind when he envisioned a theory of being qua being. That what he had in mind may be assumed to be decisive for metaphysics, now as well as then, they will readily concede; but, as in the natural sciences, questions of historical scholarship are felt to lie outside the discipline proper. With that position Aristotle would have heartily agreed, given that he sharply distinguished systematic from historical considerations. If historical considerations loom large in his *Metaphysics*, that merely attests to his having been self-consciously engaged in digesting and extending the work of his predecessors into an authoritative form that would render otiose any further consideration of either them or him, at any rate once he had succeeded in launching the new discipline.

Of the two words that enter into the formula 'being qua being', the easy one to elucidate is 'qua', a gratuitous bit of Latin riding on the pristine Greek, *on héi on*, that translates simply into 'being as being', and that in the seventeenth century gave rise to the term 'ontology'. Although Kant salutes in passing 'the proud name of Ontology', he characteristically understands metaphysics to comprise the three sub-disciplines of rational (as contrasted with empirical) psychology, rational (as contrasted with physical) cosmology, and rational (as contrasted with revealed) theology, featuring respectively the soul, the world, and God. In taking ontology to be the core of metaphysics, I recognize an obligation to show precisely how soul, world, and God emerge thematically as ontological issues. A clue to understanding the role of qua in Aristotle's formula is provided by Dieter Henrich when he characterizes it as 'the particle of representation'. Metaphysics or ontology is presumably to be understood as the theory of something or other (waiving for the nonce what that might be) in so far it is represented in a certain sort of way (as opposed to others)."

Content: Introduction. Part I. 1. *Qua* 2. Relativism 3. Dialectical devices 4. Herr Krug's pen. 5. Truth 6. Ontological commitment Part II. 7. Categories 8. Relations 9. Functions 10. Predication 11. Non-existent-entities 12. Quinean poetics 13. Sets 14. Numbers 15. The myth of closure 16. Ordered pairs Part IV 17. ZF [Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory] Intuition 18. The synthetic a priori 19. Artificial Intelligence 20. Essence 21. No entity without identity Part V. Causation 23. Anti-realism 24. Love Afterword. Glossary of logical symbols. Index.

- *A Companion to Metaphysics*. Edited by Kim Jaegwon and Sosa Ernest. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1995.

The 264 alphabetically-arranged entries include contributions from many of the world's most distinguished metaphysicians. From the Introduction: "Because it is the most central and general subdivision of philosophy, and because it is among the oldest and most persistently cultivated parts of the field, metaphysics raises special difficulties of selection for a companion such as this. The difficulties are compounded, moreover, by two further facts. First, metaphysics is not only particularly old among fields of philosophy; it is also particularly widespread among cultures and regions of the world. And, second, metaphysics has provoked levels of skepticism unmatched elsewhere in philosophy; including skepticism as to whether the whole subject is nothing but a welter of pseudo-questions and pseudo-problems. In light of this a project such as ours needs to delimit its approach. In accomplishing this, we had to bear in mind the space limitations established by the series, and also the fact that other volumes in the series would be sure to cover some questions traditionally viewed as metaphysical. These considerations led to our including some such questions, which we thought would be covered more extensively in Samuel Guttenplan's *A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind*, for example, or in Peter Singer's *A Companion to Ethics*, but which should be treated in this Companion, if only briefly and for the sake of a more complete and self-contained Companion to Metaphysics. In addition, we tried to give a good sense of the sorts of skeptical objections that have been raised to our field as a whole. As for the spread of metaphysics across cultures, traditions, and regions of the world, we opted again to include some coverage of the non-western, while at the same time keeping our focus firmly on the western tradition from the Greeks to the present. What is more, even within the western tradition we needed to be selective, especially once we came to the present century."

- Harris Errol Eustace. *The foundations of metaphysics in science*. New York: Humanities Press 1965.

Reprinted London, The Humanities Press 1993.

"The task of the philosopher is thus two-fold. He must use the evidence provided by the sciences to construct a comprehensive and coherent conception of the universe, and he must examine the methods of scientific investigation and discovery and the process by which the sciences advance, in order to discern the insignia of reliability that entitle any discipline to be called by the name of knowledge-that is, science. I propose to attempt the first of these tasks as a preliminary to the second, as well as for its own sake. For until the first has been completed, we shall not be in a favourable position to undertake the search for the validating criteria of science. A descriptive account of scientific practice is not enough by itself to reveal these criteria, for description does not validate. To test the credentials of a body of knowledge it is necessary, not only to review its contents and methods, but also to understand the aim and purpose of knowledge as such, its significance and function as a form of human activity; and that involves, further, an understanding of human activity and its place in the scheme of things. Consequently, the critical examination of scientific method is inevitably made in the light of a conception of the world and of man, which must either be assumed in general or worked out in detail. But, if metaphysical presuppositions are not to be made at the outset, it cannot be gratuitously assumed; and if it is to be discovered, the only source of enlightenment that can provisionally be accepted as reliable is science itself. The aim of science is a theory of the real, or of that department or aspect of the real which is being specially studied, and the collection of these theories of departments and aspects, taken together, provide the

most carefully sifted evidence we have of what reality is like. But when this evidence is viewed together and systematized to form a single whole, our conception of each section treated separately by the sciences may well be modified in the light of its synthesis with the rest, and some features which in the special sciences are less strongly emphasized may gain new and illuminating significance.

My plan, then, is first to consider the findings of the natural sciences and to try to determine from them the sort of worldpicture with which they present us, in the hope that subsequently it will permit of a decision as to the place of the human mind and its scientific endeavour-of science itself-within the total scheme of things. For clearly science and man are part of the world which they study and cannot rightly be omitted from the scientific account of it. In this way, perhaps, a metaphysical theory may be outlined and a theory of knowledge may be approached which have some semblance of scientific stability. Epistemology is not the propaedeutic, but the final achievement of science and philosophy, and is the fruit of reflection upon all stages of knowledge, pre-scientific, scientific and (what I believe to be only an extension of the foregoing) philosophical. And knowledge itself is not the precursor but the outcome of a long and arduous development in nature, examination of the course of which should throw light upon its products." pp. 30-31

Contents: Introduction. I. Scientific philosophy 17; Part I. The physical world. II. The physical world 37; III. Relativity 41; IV. The primordial matrix 64; V. The expanding universe 85; VI. Matter and energy 109; VII. Wholeness and hierarchy 142; Part II. The realm of life. VIII. The riddle of life 163; IX. Biochemistry, natural selection and the origin of life 185; X. Organic activity 199; XI. Homeostasis and relevant variation 217; XII: Evolution 226; XIII. Mechanism and teleology 259; XIV. The philosophy of process and organism 279; Part III. Mentality. XV. Body and mind 287; XVI. Feeling 310; XVII. Consciousness 329; XVIII. Behaviour 343; XIX. Perception - I. Physiological theories 367; XX. Perception - II. Psychological theories 388; A note on memory 420; XXI. Intelligence 425; Part IV. Outline of a metaphysic. XXII. Relatedness and system 451; XXIII. Space, time and causality 469; XXIV. Mind and knowledge 483; Index of names 495; Index of subjects 500.

- Rescher Nicholas. *Process metaphysics: an introduction to process philosophy*. Albany: State University of New York Press 1996

From the Preface: "Process philosophy has in recent years become one of the particularly active and flourishing sectors of American philosophy. Though its antecedents reach back deep into classical antiquity, this doctrine as such is a creation of the twentieth century-in fact, one of its most influential and interesting contributions. As yet, however, no compact introduction to this *philosophical* approach exists-no conveniently synoptic, compact, and accessible exposition for the use of readers who would like to inform themselves regarding what process philosophy is all about. The aim of the present book is to remedy this lack. It offers a brief but nevertheless comprehensive account of the process approach in metaphysics as a systemic doctrine reaching from Heraclitus to Whitehead and beyond. (...)

Process metaphysics as a general line of approach holds that physical existence is at bottom processual; that processes rather than things best represent the phenomena that we encounter in the natural world about us. The doctrine takes a position within the

spectrum of competing following contentions:

1. Process has *primacy* over things. Substance is subordinate to process: Things are simply constellations of processes.
2. Process has priority over substance. Things are always subordinate to processes because processes inwardly engender, determine, and characterize the things there are. But processes as such transcend the realm of things since there are also substance-detached processes.
3. Substance has priority over process. The only sort of processes there are those involved in the doings and comportments of things.
4. Substance has *primacy* over process. Indeed, substance is all there is; all processes and changes are simply a matter of how things appear to certain (mind-equipped) substances.

Process metaphysics as a general line of approach holds that physical existence is at bottom processual; that processes rather than things best represent the phenomena that we encounter in the natural world about us."

Contents: Preface IX; Introduction 1; 1. Historical background 7, 2. Basic ideas 27; 3. Process and particulars 51; 4. Process and universals 69; 5. Process philosophy of Nature 83; 6. Process and persons 105, 7. Process logic and epistemology 123; 8. A processual view of scientific inquiry 139; 9. Process theology 153; 10. Process in philosophy 165; Appendix: Process semantics 175; Notes 183; Bibliography 201; Name index 211

- Jubien Michael. *Contemporary metaphysics. An introduction*. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers 1997

From the Preface: "This book treats several topics that happen to be very prominent in recent metaphysics. I hope the treatments are not only interesting in their own right, but also serve as good preparation for understanding contemporary discussions. I have tried to present a range of positions on issues, often advocating a particular view, but other times simply presenting alternatives and mentioning strengths and weaknesses. (In some cases the positions I advocate are well known and widely accepted, in others they are not.)

There is an underlying ontological and methodological theme that unites the various discussions in the book: Platonism concerning properties, relations, and propositions. I introduce the theme in chapter 1, where philosophy itself is characterized as the study (and especially the analysis) of certain general concepts, and these concepts in turn are seen as objective entities, typically Platonic properties. In chapter 3, Platonism is defended as a theoretical hypothesis that helps explain a variety of related everyday phenomena, including our ability to have beliefs about our surroundings, the capacity of our language to refer to external entities, and our ability to communicate with each other. (The postulation of these Platonic entities is likened to the postulation of quarks in physics.)

The Platonist theme appears in the remaining chapters as a methodological tool, as when we insist on knowing just what proposition is being expressed or asserted, what possessing such and such a property entails, and the like. I hope it emerges from the book that the acceptance of this Platonist ontology promotes a sharpness of focus on philosophical material in general that is not otherwise so easily obtained."

Contents: Preface IX; 1. Metaphysics 1; 2. Numbers 24; 3. Platonism 36; 4. Identity 63; 5. Is truth 'relative'? 77; 6. Color 92; 7. Determinism, freedom and fatalism 107; 8. Modality 130; 9. Things and their parts 154; 10. Is there truth in fiction? 175; 11. Cosmology 188; Index 203.

- Lowe Ernest Jonathan. *The possibility of metaphysics. Substance, identity, and time.* Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press 1998

From the Preface: "My overall objective in this book is to help to restore metaphysics to a central position in philosophy as the most fundamental form of rational inquiry, with its own distinctive methods and criteria of validation. In my view, all other forms of inquiry rest upon metaphysical presuppositions thus making metaphysics unavoidable-so that we should at least endeavour to do metaphysics with our eyes open, rather than allowing it to exercise its influence upon us at the level of uncritical assumption. I believe that this is beginning to be acknowledged more widely by philosophers as various research programmes for instance, in the philosophy of mind and in the philosophy of quantum physics-are being seen to flounder through inadequacies in their metaphysical underpinnings. For that reason, I hope that a book like this will prove to be a timely one. Because Chapters 1 and 2 partly serve to introduce themes explored in greater detail later in the book, I have not written an Introduction as such. Doing so would have involved unnecessary repetition. However, it may help the reader if I supply here a brief synopsis of the book's contents. In Chapter 1, I attempt to characterize the distinctive nature of metaphysics as an autonomous intellectual discipline and defend a positive answer to Kant's famous question, 'How is metaphysics possible?', distinguishing my own answer from that of various other schools of thought, including some latter-day heirs of Kantianism. A key ingredient in my defence of metaphysics is the articulation of a distinctive and, in my view, indispensable notion of *metaphysical possibility-conceived* of as a kind of possibility which is not to be identified with physical, logical, or epistemic possibility.

Chapter 2 is devoted to an examination of two of the most fundamental and all-pervasive notions in metaphysics-the notion of an *object* and the notion of *identity* and explores their interrelationships. In the course of this exercise a central ontological distinction-that between *concrete* and *abstract* objects is brought to the fore, my contention being that this is at bottom a distinction between those objects that do, and those that do not, *exist in time*.

Contents: 1. The possibility of metaphysics 1; 2. Objects and identity 28; 3. Identity and unity 58; 4. Time and persistence 84; 5. Persistence and substance 106; 6. Substance and dependence 136; 7. Primitive substances 154; 8. Categories and kinds 174; 9. Matter and form 190; 10. Abstract entities 210; 11. Facts and world 228; 12. The puzzle of existence 248; Bibliography 261; Index 269.

- Lowe Ernest Jonathan. *A survey of metaphysics.* Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002

From the Preface: "The conception of metaphysics that informs *A Survey of Metaphysics is*, however, a fairly traditional and still very widely shared one-namely, that metaphysics

deals with the most profound questions that can be raised concerning the fundamental structure of reality. According to this conception, metaphysics goes deeper than any merely empirical science, even physics, because it provides the very framework within which such sciences are conceived and related to one another. A core text in metaphysics written from this point of view must aim, first and foremost, to elucidate certain universally applicable concepts -- for example, those of *identity*, *necessity*, *causation*, *space*, and *time* --and then go on to examine some important doctrines which involve these concepts, such as the thesis that truths of identity are necessary and the claim that temporally backward causation is impossible. In addition, it must endeavour to provide a systematic account of the ways in which entities belonging to different ontological categories--for example, *things*, *events*, and *properties*--are interrelated. These, accordingly, are the main objectives of *A Survey of Metaphysics*. A subsidiary objective is to explain and defend the conception of metaphysics which informs the book: for students need to be aware of the many and varied opponents of metaphysics and how they may be countered.

I should emphasize that my aim in this book is to provide a survey of major themes and problems in modern metaphysics, *not* a comprehensive survey and critique of the views of major contemporary metaphysicians, much less a systematic history of the subject. Consequently, I tend not to engage in direct debate with the published work of other philosophers, past or present -- although I do refer to it very frequently and have included an extensive bibliography of mostly recent publications. Such direct engagement would have made the book considerably longer and more complex than it already is and, I think, less useful to its intended audience, who need to understand the issues before engaging in current debate or historical investigation for themselves. It should also be stressed, however, that the book is by no means narrowly partisan, in the sense of promoting my own opinions on particular issues whilst excluding mention of others. At the same time, I try to avoid bland neutrality in matters of controversy."

Contents: 1. Introduction: the nature of metaphysics 1; Part I: Identity and change. 2. Identity over time and change of composition 23; 3. Qualitative change and the doctrine of temporal parts 41; 4. Substantial change and spatiotemporal coincidence 59; Part II: Necessity, essence, and possible worlds. 5. Necessity and identity 79; 6. Essentialism 96; 7. Possible worlds 115; Part III: Causation and conditionals. 8. Counterfactual conditionals 137; 9. Causes and conditions 155; 10. Counterfactuals and event causations 174; Part IV: Agents, actions, and events. 11. Event causation and agent causation 195; 12. Actions and events 214; 13. Events, things and space-time 23; Part V: Space and time 14. Absolutism versus relationalism 255; 15. Incongruent counterparts and the nature of space 271; 16. The paradoxes of motion and the possibility of change 288; 17. Tense and the reality of time 307; 18. Causation and the direction of time 325; Part VI: Universals and particulars 19. Realism versus nominalism 347; 20. The abstract and the concrete 366; Bibliography 386; Index 396.

- *The Oxford handbook of metaphysics*. Edited by Loux Michael J. and Zimmermann Dean W. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003.

From the Introduction: "Most philosophers today who identify themselves as metaphysicians are in basic agreement with the Quinean approach to systematic metaphysics exemplified in the work of Chisholm and Lewis. Indeed, it is probably not

much of an exaggeration to say that today's crop of metaphysicians can be divided fairly exhaustively into those most influenced by the one or the other. That division is reflected in the debates discussed in the chapters that follow. Those chapters approach the field topically. Each focuses on a fundamental metaphysical issue; the aim is to provide an account of the nature and structure of the debate over the issue. But the chapters are not merely *about* metaphysics; they are also exercises *in* metaphysics with authors attempting to advance the debate over the relevant issues. The first three focus on the traditional dichotomy of universal and particular. Zoltán Szabó discusses nominalistic accounts of the phenomena central to the debate over universals; whereas Joshua Hoffman and Gary Rosenkrantz focus on Platonistic accounts of universals. E. J. Lowe closes Part I by discussing problems surrounding the individuation of particulars. Next, there follows a pair of chapters on very general ontological issues. John Hawthorne deals with the concept of identity, and Peter van Inwagen discusses the phenomenon of ontological commitment and attempts to show how the case of fictional discourse is to be accommodated.

Modal issues have been pivotal in recent analytic metaphysics. Here, the central debate has been between those endorsing non-reductive theories of modality and those insisting on reductive accounts of modal phenomena. In his contribution Kit Fine deals with approaches of the first sort; whereas Ted Sider examines approaches of the second sort. In addition, discussion of non-reductive theories can be found in Hoffman and Rosenkrantz's chapter on Platonistic theories of universals.

Part IV focuses on issues bearing on the metaphysics of time and space. One important debate on the nature of time pits what are called presentists against those who construe time as a fourth dimension on a par with the three spatial dimensions. Thomas Crisp examines presentist theorists; whereas Michael Rea discusses fourdimensionalism. In his chapter, Graham Nerlich discusses issues bearing on the debate over the status of space-time. Finally, Sally Haslanger discusses the different approaches to questions about persistence through time and their theoretical roots in the metaphysics of time.

Part V deals with a series of interrelated issues about events, causation, and physical theory. In the first chapter Peter Simons discusses recent debates about the existence and nature of events. Michael Tooley and Hartry Field each contribute a chapter on causation. Tooley focuses on broader issues about the analysis of our concept of causation; whereas Field examines the more particular case of causation in physical theory. Finally, we have a chapter by Tim Maudlin on the metaphysical implications of quantum mechanics.

The next three chapters focus on questions about the metaphysics of persons and the mental. Dean Zimmerman examines materialist accounts of persons. His chapter is followed by two more general discussions of the metaphysical status of the mental. The first, by Howard Robinson, focuses on general ontological questions about the nature and structure of perceptual and conceptual episodes. The second, by Jaegwon Kim, considers the way questions about supervenience and reduction have come together in recent attempts at providing materialist accounts of intentional phenomena. Then we have two chapters on the problem of freedom of the will. Carl Ginet examines libertarian approaches; whereas Ted Warfield discusses compatibilist accounts of freedom.

Part VII bears broadly on realism and attempts to delineate alternatives to realism. Michael Loux discusses the very influential debates over realism and anti-realism that originated with Michael Dummett and dominated the British philosophical scene in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s. Ernest Sosa considers approaches to questions about realism that have their origin in facts bearing on ontological relativity. Finally, Timothy Williamson attempts to lay out the central features of metaphysical debates over the

Contents: Notes on the contributors X; Introduction by Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman 1; Part I. Universals and particulars 1. Nominalism by Zoltán Gendler Szabó 11; 2. Platonistic theories of universals 46; 3. Individuation by E. J. Lowe 75; Part II. Existence and identity 4. Identity by John Hawthorne 99; 5. Existence, ontological commitment, and fictional entities by Peter van Inwagen 131; Part III. Modality and possible worlds 6. The problem of possibilities by Kit Fine 161; 7. Reductive theories of modality by Theodore Sider 180; Part IV. Time, space-time, and persistence 8. Presentism by Thomas M. Crisp 211; 9. Four-dimensionalism by Michael C. Rea 246; 10. Space-time substantivalism 281; 11. Persistence through time by Sally Haslanger 315; Part V. Events, causation, and physics 12. Events by Peter Simons 357; 13. Causation and supervenience by Michael Tooley 386; 14. Causation in a physical world by Harry Field 435; 15. Distilling metaphysics from quantum physics by Tim Maudlin 461; Part VI. Persons and the nature of mind 16. Material people by Dean W. Zimmerman 491; 17. The ontology of the mental by Howard Robinson 527; 18. Supervenience, emergence, realization, reduction by Jaegwon Kim 556; Part VII. Freedom of the will 19. Libertarianism by Carl Ginet 587; 20. Compatibilism and incompatibilism: some arguments by Ted Warfield 613; Part VIII. Anti-realism and vagueness 21. Realism and anti-realism: Dummett's challenge by Michael J. Loux 633; 22. Ontological and conceptual relativity and the Self by Ernest Sosa 665; 23. Vagueness in reality by Timothy Williamson 690; Index 717-724.

B) Anthologies

- *Classics of analytical metaphysics*. Edited by Blackman Larry Lee. New York: University Press of America 1984.

From the Preface: "The purposes of this book are: (1) to make available in a single volume many of the "classics" of analytical metaphysics, works by Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, and others roughly in the years 1890-1925, (2) to bring together a similar number of recent "discussions" of issues raised in the earlier papers, and (3) to provide an introduction both to metaphysics and to twentieth-century analytical philosophy. In selecting the "classics" my guiding principle has been to include works which have been most influential and which exhibit the most important themes of the movement. The papers by Frege, Russell, Moore, and G. F. Stout have these characteristics. Alexius Meinong's "The Theory of Objects" merits inclusion not only because Russell found the admission of "nonexistent objects" so repugnant, but, also, because in trying to grasp the relation between thought and reality, a number of thinkers in the analytical tradition, such as Gustav Bergmann and Panayot Butchvarov, have been so strongly attracted to Meinongian positions. The selections by F. H. Bradley are important, not because they are pieces of analytical philosophy (which they are not), but because they represent the kind of thinking against which Russell and the others reacted. All of the "discussion" articles have appeared since 1950. My aim has been to include those which are most closely allied to the "Classics" in style and in substance and which therefore show the continuity of the earlier and more recent thought. Of necessity, some excellent papers, which in every way qualify as works of analytical metaphysics, were

excluded. The ones that remain seem to lend themselves most strikingly to the thematic unity of the book. As the reader will discover, certain topics, such as the nature of identity, the existence of universals, the status of nonexistent objects, the viability of artificial languages, and the very possibility of analysis, are almost constantly the focus of concern."

Contents: Preface. Introduction. PART I. Philosophical background. 1. Gottlob Frege: On concept and object 2. Gottlob Frege: On sense and meaning 3. F. H. Bradley: Substantive and adjective 4. F. H. Bradley: Relation and quality 5. Alexius Meinong: The theory of objects PART II. Philosophical analysis 1. F. H. Bradley: On appearance, error, and contradiction 2. Bertrand Russell: Some explanations in reply to Mr. Bradley 3. F. H. Bradley: Reply to Mr. Russell's explanations 4. Bertrand Russell: The philosophy of Logical Atomism DISCUSSION: 1. Gustav Bergmann: Facts and things 2. Gustav Bergmann: Sketch of ontological analysis 3. Panayot Butcharov: The limits of ontological analysis PART III: Universals and Particulars 1. Bertrand Russell: On the relations of universals and particulars 2. G. F. Stout: The nature of universals and propositions 3. G. E. Moore and G. F. Stout: Are the characteristics of particular things universal or particular? 4. DISCUSSION: 1. H. H. Price: Universals and resemblances 2. Panayot Butcharov: The identity and resemblance theories PART IV. Identity and Individuation. 1. G. E. Moore: Identity DISCUSSION: Max Black: The identity of Indiscernibles 2. Edwin B. Allaire: Bare particulars 3. V. C. Chappell: Particulars re-clothed 4. Edwin B. Allaire: Another look to bare particulars 5. Panayot Butcharov: Identity PART V. Names and descriptions: Bertrand Russell: On denoting DISCUSSION: 1. P. F. Strawson: On referring 2. Bertrand Russell: Mr. Strawson on referring 3. Herbert Hochberg: Strawson, Russell, and the King of France PART VI. Intentionality 1. G. E. Moore: The refutation of Idealism 2. G. E. Moore: Beliefs and propositions 3. Bertrand Russell: Propositions and facts with more than one verb DISCUSSION: 1. Gustav Bergmann: Intentionality 2. Herbert Hochberg: Intentions, facts and propositions.

- *Introduction to Metaphysics: The fundamental questions*. Edited by Schoedinger Andrew. Buffalo, New York: Prometheus Books 1990.

From the Introduction: "The word 'metaphysics' is derived from the two Greek words *meta* and *physica*, and literally means 'beyond physics.' The Ancient Greeks were very much interested in understanding the workings of the world around them. Hence, in the most general of ways, they sought an understanding of physics. This is most clearly evident in their preoccupation with the notion of change. What happens, they wondered, when a log burns and turns to ashes? How is it that the color of a tree's leaves change? Answers to these and other questions led some to conclude that the world must be composed of fundamental elements, i.e., atoms (the cheek word for unbreakable units), and that the world must function according to the law of conservation of energy (though they didn't express it in this formal way). Along with their quest for an understanding of physics came the realization that an in-depth explanation of the physical workings of the world required going beyond the physical in order to explain it adequately. Concepts with no physical referents are necessary in order to account for that which is physical. Consequently, metaphysics constitutes the foundation upon which the physics qua physical rests. The notion of 'property' is a good case in point. If we were to inquire of a scientist if physical things possessed properties, he would undoubtedly respond in the affirmative.

Such a response would commit him to the existence of properties. But what is a property? The concept of a property is that of something nonphysical. A little reflection will determine that we cannot account for anything physical without making reference to its properties or characteristics. Yet when going beyond the specific properties of a physical thing to analyze the concept of a property, all reference to the particular (physical) thing disappears. At that point, we have gone beyond physics and enter the realm of metaphysics."

Contents: Introduction; Part One: The Question of Universals; Introduction; 1. Aristotle: The Categories (Chapters 1-5); 2. Peter Abelard: On Universals; 3. John Locke: Of the signification of words, and general terms; 4. George Berkeley: First principles of human knowledge; 5. D. F. Pears: Universals; 6. Renford Bambrough: Universals and family resemblances; 7. Rudolf Carnap: Empiricism, semantics, and ontology; Select Bibliography.

Part Two: The question of causation; Introduction; 8. David Hume: of the idea of necessary connection; 9. John Stuart Mill: Of the law of universal causation; 10. Bertrand Russell: On the notion of cause; 11. C. J. Ducasse: On the nature and the observability of the causal relation; 12. R. G. Collingwood: On the so-called idea of causation; 13. Roderick M. Chisholm: Law statement and counterfactual inference; 14. Richard Taylor: The metaphysics of causation. Select Bibliography.

Part Three: The question of personal identity; Introduction; 15. René Descartes: On Thinking things and the soul; 16. John Locke: The body, the soul, and the person; 17. Joseph Butler: Of personal identity; 18. David Hume: On personal identity; 19. Sydney Shoemaker: Personal identity and memory; 20. Anthony Quinton The soul; 21. P. F. Strawson: Persons; Select Bibliography.

Part Four: Introduction; 22. Alasdair MacIntyre: Determinism; 23. A. I. Melden Willing; 24. Arthur C. Danto: Basic actions; 25. Richard Taylor: Causal power and human agency; 26. Donald Davidson: Actions, reasons, and causes; 27. Alvin I. Goldman: Intentional action; 28. Andrew B. Schoedinger: Beliefs, wants, and decisions; Select Bibliography.

Part Five: Problems of Artificial Intelligence; Introduction; 29. Allen Newell, J. C. Shaw, and Herbert Simon: Elements of a theory of human problem solving; 30. Michael Scriven: The complete robot: a prolegomena to androidology; 31. Keith Gunderson: The imitation game; 32. Arthur C. Danto: On consciousness in machines; 33. Paul Ziff: The feelings of robots; 34. Hilary Putnam: Minds and machines; 35. Paul Weiss: Love in a machine age; Select Bibliography.

- *Contemporary readings in the foundations of metaphysics* . Edited by Laurence Stephen and Macdonald Cynthia. Oxford: Blackwell publishers 1998.

The basic tools and concepts of metaphysics are employed in virtually every branch of philosophy, necessitating a basic understanding of metaphysics to completely understand any philosophical work. This volume is a comprehensive survey of contemporary thought on a wide range of issues and provides students with the basic background to current debates in metaphysics.

An introductory essay by the editors offers an overview of the volume and introduces students to the major debates that are contained within the main body of the text. The collection contains classic contemporary papers on topics such as Ontological Commitment and Methodology, Possible Worlds and Possibilia, Properties and

Universals, Substances, Events, Tropes and Mathematical Objects. It also includes seven newly-commissioned state-of-the-art articles by Van Inwagen, Lycan, Bealer, Loux, Lombard, Macdonald and Field.

From the Introduction: "One of the most fundamental questions in metaphysics is which (...) metaphysical categories of entities exist.

Philosophers have differed markedly over which categories they believe to exist. In David Lewis's suggestive phrase, they have varied widely from 'All-ists' to None-ists', with None-ists accepting only the existence of actual ordinary physical objects, and All-ists accepting all manner of further category of existents (David Lewis 'Noneism or Allism?' *Mind* vol. 99: 393, January 1990, pp. 23-31). As Lewis remarks, most philosophers fall somewhat in between. Even among philosophers who accept a given category of existents, there is still room for disagreement, however. One might accept the existence of a certain kind of entity without believing that that category of entities is *basic*. For example, one might think that there are such things as states of affairs, but hold that they are nothing over and above the particular objects and properties and relations involved in them. A theorist who took this view would insist that although states of affairs form a metaphysical category, they do not form a basic metaphysical category. Taking another example, one might hold that although there are particular objects, these objects are nothing more than 'bundles' of properties, and do not constitute a category of entities in addition to the category of properties. A theorist who took this view would likewise insist that although particular objects form a metaphysical category, they do not form a basic metaphysical category. As these examples illustrate, disputes over whether or not a given category is basic are closely connected to questions about the natures of such entities. Together, these two sorts of questions -- questions about which metaphysical categories of entities there are and questions about the natures of different kinds of entities -- constitute the central questions in that part of metaphysics called 'ontology'. Ontology is plausibly viewed as the very foundation of metaphysics; and it is the focus of this Reader.

Contents: List of Contributors for State of the Art Essays. Acknowledgements.

Introduction: Metaphysics and Ontology: Stephen Laurence and Cynthia MacDonald. Part I: Methodology and Ontological Commitment: State of the Art Essay. 1. The Nature of Metaphysics: Peter van Inwagen.

Readings. 2. Descriptive and Revisionary Metaphysics: Susan Haack. 3. On What There Is: W. V. O. Quine. 4. Ontological Commitments: William P. Alston. 5. Quantifiers: Susan Haack. 6. Identity and Substitutivity: Richard Cartwright. Part II: Possible Worlds and Possibilia: State of the Art Essay.

7. Possible Worlds and Possibilia: William G. Lycan. Readings. 8. Possible Worlds: David Lewis. 9. Possible Worlds: Robert Stalnaker. 10. Ways Worlds Could Be: Peter Forrest. Part III: Universals and Properties: State of the Art Essay. 11. Universals and Properties: George Bealer. Readings.

12. On Properties: Hilary Putnam. 13. New Work for a Theory of Universals: David Lewis.

15. A Theory of Structural Universals: John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter. Part IV:

Substances: State of the Art Essay. 16. Beyond Substrata and Bundles: A Prolegomenon to a Substance Ontology: Michael J. Loux. Readings. 17. Bare Particulars: Edwin B. Allaire.

18. Particulars Re-Clothed: V. C. Chappell. 19. Another Look at Bare Particulars: Edwin B. Allaire. 20. Three Versions of the Bundle Theory: James Van Cleve. Part V:

Events: State of the Art Essay. 21. Ontologies of Events: Lawrence Brian Lombard.

Readings. 22. The Individuation of Events: Donald Davidson. 23. Events as Property Exemplifications: Jaegwon Kim.

Part VI: Tropes: State of the Art Essay. 24. Tropes and Other Things: Cynthia Macdonald.

Readings. 25. The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars: Keith Campbell. 26. Particulars in Particular Clothing: Three Trope Theories of Substance: Peter Simmons. Part VII: Mathematical Objects: State of the Art Essay. 27. Mathematical Objectivity and Mathematical objects: Harry Field. Readings. 28. Philosophy of Logic: Hilary Putnam. 29. What Numbers Could Not Be: Paul Benacerraf. Index.

- *Metaphysics: the big questions*. Edited by Van Inwagen Peter and Zimmerman Dean. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 1998.

From the preface: "With the exception of the final group of essays, all the readings are made to fall under a series of questions about 'the world'. We assume that the world includes everything that there is -- that is, all that exists. The first and largest part 'What are the most general features of the world,?' includes readings on the problem of universals, the nature of particular things and the manner of their persistence through time, rival theories of the passage of time, absolute space and incongruent counterparts, causation, and a budget of paradoxes: McTaggart's paradox, paradoxes of motion, of the infinite, of time travel, and of intrinsic change. The second, and second largest, part asks, 'What is our place in the world?'. Here are questions about the relation between the way things appear to us and the way they are (sense data, secondary qualities), personal identity (two forms of materialism, a version of Cartesian dualism, and Derek Parfit's 'Buddhism'), the nature of phenomenal experience, and free will. Part Three raises the question of 'anti-realism': Is there just one world, one complete inventory of what there is? Or does what there is vary from community to community or person to person? Part Four begins with reflection on whether there could be an answer to the question, 'Why is there a world?' -- that is, why is there something, rather than nothing? The part ends with two attempts to answer the question by appeal to a necessary being (the Deity of the cosmological and ontological arguments). The final part includes challenges to the very possibility of metaphysics from both positivist and postmodern perspectives".

Contents: Preface. Introduction: What is Metaphysics? Part I: What are the most General Features of the World?: Introduction. A. What is the Relationship between an Individual and its Characteristics? 1. Universals and Resemblances: Chapter 1 of *Thinking and Experience*: H. H. Price. 2. The Elements of Being: D. C. Williams. 3. The Principle of Individuation: an Excerpt from *Human Knowledge, its Scope and Limits*: Bertrand Russell. 4. Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory: Dean W. Zimmerman. B. What is Time? What is Space? 5. Time: an Excerpt from *The Nature of Existence*: J. McT. E. McTaggart. 6. McTaggart's Arguments against the Reality of Time: an Excerpt from *Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy*. 7. The Notion of the Present: A. N. Prior. 8. The General Problem of Time and Change: an Excerpt from *Scientific Thought*: C. D. Broad. 9. The Space-Time World: An Excerpt from *Philosophy and Scientific Realism*: J. J. C. Smart. 10. Topis, Soris, Noris: an Excerpt from *The Existence of Space and Time*: Ian Hinckfuss. 11. Some Free Thinking about Time: A. N. Prior. 12. The Fourth Dimension: an Excerpt from *The Ambidextrous Universe*: Martin Gardner. 13. Incongruent Counterparts and Higher Dimensions: James Van Cleve. 14. Achilles and the Tortoise: Max Black. 15. A Contemporary Look at Zeno's Paradoxes: an Excerpt from *Space, Time and Motion*: Wesley C. Salmon. 16. Grasping the Infinite: José A. Bernadete. 17. The Paradoxes of Time Travel: David Lewis. C. How do things Persist through Changes of Parts and

Properties? 18. Of Confused Subjects which are Equivalent to Two Subjects: an Excerpt from *The Port-Royal Logic*: Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole. 19. Identity Through Time: Roderick M. Chisholm. 20. Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis: W. V. O. Quine. 21. Identity: an Excerpt From *Quiddities*: W. V. O. Quine. 22. In Defense of Stages: Postscript B to 'Survival and identity': David Lewis. 23. Some Problems About Time: Peter Geach. 24. The Problem of Temporary Intrinsic: an Excerpt from *On the Plurality of Worlds*: David Lewis. 25. Temporary Intrinsic and Presentism: Dean W. Zimmerman. D. How do Causes Bring about their Effects? 26. Constant Conjunction: an excerpt from *A Treatise of Human Nature*: David Hume. 27. Efficient Cause and Active Power: an excerpt from *Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind*: Thomas Reid. 28. Psychological and Physical Causal Laws: an Excerpt from *The Analysis of Mind*: Bertrand Russell. 29. Causality: an Excerpt from *A Modern Introduction to Logic*: L. Susan Stebbing. 30. Causality and Determination: G. E. M. Anscombe. Part II: What is our Place in the World?: Introduction. A. How is the Appearance of a Thing Related to the Thing that Appears? 31. The Theory of Sensa: an Excerpt from *Scientific Thought*: C. D. Broad. 32. Qualities: an Excerpt from *Consciousness and Causality*: D. M. Armstrong. 33. The Status of Appearances: an Excerpt from *Theory of Knowledge*, 1st edition: Roderick M. Chisholm. B. What is the Relation Between Mind and Body? 34. Which Physical Thing am I?: an Excerpt From 'Is There a Mind Body Problem?': Roderick M. Chisholm. 35. Personal Identity: a Materialist Account: Sydney Shoemaker. 36. Dividend Minds and the Nature of Persons: Derek Parfit. 37. Body and Soul: an Excerpt from *The Evolution of the Soul*: Richard Swinburne. 38. The Puzzle of Conscious Experience: David Chalmers. C. Is it Possible for us to Act Freely? 39. Free Will as Involving Determination and Inconceivable Without it: R. E. Hobart. 40. Human Freedom and the Self: Richard M. Chisholm. 41. The Mystery of Metaphysical Freedom: Peter van Inwagen. 42. The Agent as Cause: Timothy O'Connor. Part III: Is There Just One World?: Introduction. 43. Speaking of Objects: W. V. O. Quine. 44. After Metaphysics, What?: Hilary Putnam. 45. Truth and Convention: Hilary Putnam. 46. Non-absolute Existence and Conceptual Relativity: an Excerpt from 'Putnam's Pragmatic Realism': Ernest Sosa. 47. Addendum to 'Non-absolute Existence and Conceptual Relativity': Objections and Replies: Ernest Sosa. Part IV: Why is There a World?: Introduction. A. Is There an Answer? 48. The Problem of Being: Chapter 3 of *Some Problems of Philosophy*: William James. 49. The Puzzle of Reality: Derek Parfit. 50. Reply to Parfit: Richard Swinburne. B. Does the Answer Involve a Necessary Being? 51. The Cosmological Argument and the Principle of Sufficient Reason: William L. Rowe. 52. The Ontological Argument: Chapters II-IV of the *Proslogion*: St. Anselm. 53. Anselm's Ontological Arguments: Norman Malcolm. Part V: Is Metaphysics Possible?: Introduction. 54. The Rejection of Metaphysics: Chapter 1 of *Philosophy and Logical Syntax*: Rudolf Carnap. 55. Postmodernism, Feminism, and Metaphysics: an excerpt from *Thinking Fragments*: Jane Flax. 56. Metaphysics and Feminist Theory: Excerpts from 'Feminist Metaphysics' and 'Anti-Essentialism in Feminist Theory': Charlotte Witt. Index.

- *Metaphysics: contemporary readings*. Edited by Hales Steven. Belmont, California: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning 1999.

From the Preface for Students: "Metaphysics is one of the oldest and most central divisions of philosophy, and its study is found in full flower among the Greeks of the fifth century B.C.E. The word *metaphysics* itself comes from a first-century B.C.E. edition of

particular collected writings of Aristotle, ascribed under the title *Ta Meta ta Phusika*, which means no more than 'what comes after the writings on nature' (*ta phusika*). The topics treated by Aristotle in posthumous edition became the focus of the specialty of metaphysics. Aristotle set out three main tasks in *Ta Meta ta Phusika*. The first was the study of first principles of logic and causation. The second chore was the reasoned investigation of the nature of divinity. The third was ontology: the exploration of being qua being, or intrinsic nature of existence. In the past two thousand years, the first assignment has been divided variously among logicians, philosophers of science, and scientists. The second task has become the specialized subject of the philosophy of religion. It is the third task, that of ontology, which remains to metaphysics proper today. Ontology has three primary objectives. The first is to establish the basic categories of what there is, or the taxonomy of the ultimate furniture of reality. In one respect, a kind of taxonomy is implied by the very divisions of this book, in which, for example, an entire part is devoted to one kind of thing (such as truth) and another whole part is devoted to another kind of thing (such as events). (...) The second task of ontology is to investigate the relations that hold among different types of things. (...) The third objective of ontology is to delineate the relations that obtain among things in the same category. (...) Though no single book could cover every issue in metaphysics, the volume you are holding surveys some of the most prominent topics in contemporary metaphysics. Each of the nine parts of the book is introduced by a leading scholar on the topic of that part, and each of the articles is accompanied by study questions to help you quickly grasp the key points of the article. In addition, extensive further readings at the end of each part allow you to delve more deeply.

Contents: Editor's Preface. I. EXISTENCE. Michael Burke, Introduction to Existence. Nicholas Rescher, On Explaining Existence. Derek Parfit, Why is Reality as It Is? Robert Nozick, Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing? Bibliography of Further Readings. II. REALISM/ANTI-REALISM. Simon Blackburn, Introduction to the Realism Debates. Michael Dummett, Realism and Anti-Realism. Hilary Putnam, Why There Isn't a Ready-Made World. Ernest Sosa, Putnam's Pragmatic Realism. Michael Devitt, A Naturalistic Defense of Realism. Michael Devitt, Postscript to A Naturalistic Defense of Realism. Bibliography of Further Readings. III. TRUTH. Frederick Schmitt, Introduction to Truth. Alfred Tarski, The Semantic Conception of Truth. Susan Haack, The Pragmatist Theory of Truth. Nicholas Rescher, Truth as Ideal Coherence. Paul Horwich, The Disquotational Conception of Truth. Marian David, Truth as Correspondence. Bibliography of Further Readings. IV. ABSTRACTA: PROPERTIES, NUMBERS, PROPOSITIONS. Bob Hale, Introduction to Abstracta. W.V. Quine, On What There Is. Rudolf Carnap, Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology. Alonzo Church, On Carnap's Analysis of Statements of Assertion and Belief. W.V. Quine, Meaning and Truth. Paul Benacerraf, What Numbers Could Not Be. David M. Armstrong, Universals as Attributes. Bibliography of Further Readings. V. SECONDARY QUALITIES. Edward Averill, Introduction to Secondary Qualities. David M. Armstrong, The Secondary Qualities. Paul A. Boghossian and David Velleman, Colour as a Secondary Quality. C.L. Hardin, Color and Illusion. Bibliography of Further Readings. VI. CONCRETA: EVENTS. Jonathan Bennett, Introduction to Events. Donald Davidson, The Individuation of Events. Jaegwon Kim, Events as Property Exemplifications. Lawrence Lombard, Events. Bibliography of Further Readings. VII. CONCRETA: SUBSTANCE. Ernest Jonathan Lowe, Introduction to Substance. James Van Cleve, Three Versions of the Bundle Theory. Gary Rosenkrantz and Joshua Hoffman, The Independence Criterion of Substance. Peter Simons, Particulars in Particular Clothing: Three Trope Theories of Substance. Bibliography of Further Readings. VIII.

DEPENDENT PARTICULARS, HOLES, AND SURFACES. Scott H. Hestevold, Introduction to Dependent Particulars. David Lewis and Stephanie Lewis, Holes. Roberto Casati and Achille C. Varzi. Immaterial Bodies. Roderick Chisholm, Boundaries as Dependent Particulars. Avrum Stroll, Two Conceptions of Surfaces. Bibliography of Further Readings. IX. MEREOLGY. Peter Simons, Introduction to Mereology. W.V. Quine, Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis. Mark Heller, Temporal Parts of Four-Dimensioned Objects. Peter Van Inwagen, Four-Dimensional Objects. James Van Cleve, Mereological Essentialism, Mereological Conjunctivism, and Identity Through Time. BIBLIOGRAPHY OF FURTHER READINGS.

- *Metaphysics: an anthology*. Edited by Kim Jaegwon and Sosa Ernest. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 1999.

"This *Anthology*, intended to accompany *A Companion to Metaphysics* (Blackwell, 1995), brings together over 60 selections which represent the best and most important works in metaphysics during this century. The selections are grouped under ten major metaphysical problems and each section is preceded by an introduction by the editors. Some of the problems covered are existence, identity, essence and essential properties, "possible worlds", things and their identity over time, emergence and supervenience, causality, and realism/antirealism. The coverage is comprehensive and should be accessible to those without a background in technical philosophy."

Table of Contents. Preface. Part I: Existence: 1."On What There Is": W. V. Quine. 2."Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology": Rudolf Carnap. 3."Existence and Descriptions": Bertrand Russell. 4."Referring to Nonexistent Objects": Terence Parsons. 5."Ontological Relativity": W. V. Quine. Part II: Identity: 6."The Identity of Indiscernibles": Max Black. 7."Identity and Necessity": Saul Kripke. 8."The Same F": John Perry. 9."Contingent Identity": Allan Gibbard. 10."Identity, essence, and Indiscernibility": Stephen Yablo. Part III: Modalities and Possible Worlds: 11."Modalities: Basic Concepts and Distinctions": Alvin Plantinga. 12."Identity Through Possible Worlds": Roderick M. Chisholm. 13."Counterparts or Double Lives?": David Lewis. 14."Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity": Robert M. Adams. 15."The Nature of Possibility": D. M. Armstrong. Part IV: Universals, Properties, Kinds: 16."Universals as Attributes": D. M. Armstrong. 17."New Work for a Theory of Universals": David Lewis. 18."Natural Kinds": W. V. Quine. 19."On Properties": Hilary Putnam. 20."Causality and Properties": Sydney Shoemaker. Part V: Things and Their Persistence: 21."Identity Through Time": Roderick M. Chisholm. 22."Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis": W. V. Quine. 23."Scattered Objects": Richard Cartwright. 24."Parthood and Identity Across Time": Judith Jarvis Thomson. 25."Temporal Parts of Four-Dimensional Objects": Mark Heller. Part VI: The Persistence of the Self: 26."The Persistence of Persons": Roderick M. Chisholm. 27."Persons and Their Pasts": Sydney Shoemaker. 28."The Self and the Future": Bernard Williams. 29."Personal Identity": Derek Parfit. 30."Personal Identity: the Dualist Theory": Richard Swinburne. 31."Human Beings": Mark Johnston. Part VII: Causation: 32."Causes and Conditions": J. L. Mackie. 33."Causal Relations": Donald Davidson. 34."Causation": David Lewis. 35."Causal Connections": Wesley C. Salmon. 36."The Nature of Causation: A Singularist Account": Michael Tooley. Part VIII: Emergence, Reduction, Supervenience: 37."Mechanism and Emergentism": C. D. Broad. 38."Ontological Reduction and the World of Numbers": W. V. Quine. 39."Special Sciences": Jerry A. Fodor. 40."Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction": Jaegwon Kim. 41."Physicalism:

Ontology, Reduction, and Determinism": Geoffrey Hellman and Frank Thompson. 42. "Supervenience as a Philosophical Concept": Jaegwon Kim. Part IX: Determinism, Fatalism, Agency: 43. "Defining Determinism": John Earman. 44. "Fatalism": Richard Taylor. 45. "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person": Harry G. Frankfurt. 46. "Can the Will be Caused?": Carl Ginet. 47. "Choice and Indeterminism": Robert Nozick. Part X: Realism / Antirealism: 48. "Realism": Michael Dummett. 49. "Pragmatic Realism": Hilary Putnam. 50. "Putnam's Pragmatic Realism": Ernest Sosa. 51. "Yes, Virginia, There is a Real World": William P. Alston. 52. "Morals and Modals": Simon Blackburn. 53. "Realism, Anti-Realism, Irrealism, Quasi-Realism": Crispin Wright. Index.

- *Metaphysics: contemporary readings*. Edited by Loux Michael J. New York: Routledge 2001.

"The book is a comprehensive anthology that draws together leading philosophers writing on major themes in Metaphysics. Each section is prefaced by an introductory essay by the editor which guides students gently into each topic. The book is highly accessible and user-friendly and provides a broad-ranging exploration of the subject. Ideal for the philosophy student, this reader will prove essential reading for any metaphysics course. The readings are designed to complement Michael Loux's textbook, *Metaphysics: a contemporary introduction* (second edition)."

TABLE OF CONTENTS: Introduction; Part One: Universals; 1. The Problem of Universals, Michael J. Loux; 2. The World of Universals, Bertrand Russell; 3. Universals and Resemblance, H. H. Price; 4. On What There Is, W. V. Quine; 5. The Elements of Being, David Armstrong; 6. Properties and States of Affair Intentionally Considered, Roderick Chisholm; Part Two: Particulars; 1. The Ontological Structure of Concrete Particulars, Michael j. Loux; 2. The Identity of Indiscernibles, Max Black; 3. The Identity of Indiscernibles, A. J. Ayer; 4. Bare Particulars, Edwin Allaire; 5. Three Versions of Bundle Theory, James Van Cleve, 6. A Fourth Version of Bundle Theory, Albert Casullo; 7. Bodies, P. F. Strawson; Part Three: Possible Worlds; 1. Modality and Possible Worlds, Michael J. Loux; 2. Possible Worlds, David Lewis; 3. Actualism and Possible Worlds, Alvin Plantinga; 4. Counterparts or Double Lives, David Lewis; 5. Two Concepts of Possible Worlds, Peter van Inwagen; 6. Identity and Necessity, Saul Kripke; Part Four: Causation; 1. Cause and Effect, Michael J. Loux; 2. Causality in Everyday Life and in Recent Science, Moritz Schlick; 3. Cause, A. C. Ewing; 4. Causes and Conditions, John L. Mackie; 5. Causality and Determination, G. E. M. Anscombe; 6. Causation, David Lewis; Part Five: Time; 1. Time: The A-Theory and the B-Theory, Michael J. Loux; 2. Time, J. M. E. McTaggart; 3. Ostensible Temporality, C. D. Broad; 4. Time and Eternity, Richard Taylor; 5. The Notion of the Present, A. N. Prior; 6. The Space-Time World, J. J. C. Smart; 7. The Need for Time, D. H. Mellor; 8. How Fast Does Time Pass?, Ned Markosian; Part Six: Persistence Through Time; 1. Endurantism and Perdurantism, Michael J. Loux; 2. Temporal Parts of Four Dimensional Objects, Mark Heller; 3. Identity Through Time, Roderick Chisholm; 4. Endurance and Indiscernibility, Trenton Merricks; 5. Personal Identity, Derek Parfit; 6. Survival and Identity, David Lewis; 7. Personal Identity: The Dualist Theory, Richard Swinburne; Part Seven: Realism and Anti-Realism; 1. Realism and Anti-Realism, Michael J. Loux; 2. Realism, Michael Dummett; 3. Ontological Relativity, W. V. Quine; 4. A Problem About Reference, Hilary Putnam; 5. Objectivity, Peter van Inwagen; 6. Yes, Virginia, There Is a Real World, William Alston.

新闻录入员: editor (共计 14 篇)

| [设为首页](#) | [加入收藏](#) | [联系站长](#) | [管理入口](#) |

逻辑与认知研究所版权所有 Copyright © 2001-2004 logic.zsu.edu.cn, All Rights Reserved

授权使用: 逻辑与认知研究所 程序设计: [Redcaff](#) 版本信息: [Redcaff 1.0](#)