



海德格尔 现象学的基本问题·导论

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第一节、说明和主题的主要部分

本书[1]的任务是研究现象学的基本问题, 在经过一番考察后, 进而希望能够在某种程度上解决问题。现象学必须从什么是它选定的主题和如何考察自己的对象中发展自己的概念。我们的研究致力于研究根本性的内容和基本问题的内在有条理的联系。目标是希冀对这些问题有一基本的阐释。

消极点说, 这就意味着从被称为现象学的这一现代哲学运动的现状中获得历史性的知识, 不是我们的目的。我们要处理的不是现象学而是现象学自身所处理的东西。同样, 我们也不希望仅仅是对它作注释以便能宣称现象学处理的是这个或那个主题; 本书所处理的是这个主题自身, 并且建议你们自己也去处理它, 或告诉你们如何按本书所进行的那样学着自己去。这一点不是要企图获得哲学知识而是试图自己能够或学会从哲理的角度去解释。针对基本问题的导论能够引领着达到目的。

那么, 这些基本问题自身是什么呢? 我们能确信我们所讨论的内容列出了基本问题的清单吗? 我们必须怎样抵达这些基本问题? 不是直接地而是采取迂回的方式去讨论确定的个别问题。我们必须从这些问题里筛出基本问题, 并制定他们的有条理的内部联系。此种关于基本问题的理解, 要求我们必须对——在多大的程度上‘哲学作为科学’为这些基本问题所必然要求——具有洞察力。

本书相应地分为三个部分。我们可以在开始时简要地列出如下:

- 1、向基本问题指引的具体的现象学研究
- 2、在有条理的秩序和基础之中的现象学的基本问题
- 3、对待这些问题的科学方法和现象学的观念

我们的此种探究道路将使我们从特定的个别问题到达基本问题。进而问题也就出现了, 即我们怎样去获得我们研究的起点? 我们应该怎样选择和限制这些个别问题? 是把这些留给偶然和反复无常的被动选择吗? 为了避免这种情况, 我们已经随机简单地收集了一问题, 从而就有必要作一个指向这些个别问题的导论。

可以认为最简单和最可靠的方法是由现象学的概念获得具体的个别现象学问题。因为现象学本质上就是如此; 因此它也就围绕一些如此的问题。但是, 我们首先必须获得现象学的概念。这一路线与我们协调一致。但就具体问题的限制而言, 我们根本无需一个清晰的和完全合法化的现象学的概念。实际上, 我们却需要熟悉“现象学”这个名称在现今通行的理解。确实, 在现象学的研究中, 又有了关于它的本质和任务之间不同的限定。但是, 即使这些有关现象学的本质的不同的限定能够达成一致, 所获得的现象学的概

念——一个普通的概念——是否能够指引我们选择具体问题，这一点仍是可疑的。因为我们必须先明晰今天现象学研究已经抵达了哲学问题的中心，并且由它们的可能性彰显了其自身的特质。我们必须看到，这不是事实——它是如此之微的一个事实，本书主要目的之一就是要表明：从问题的基本倾向来理解，现象学考察能够描述很少，比更明确、更根本的对于合乎科学的哲学这一观念还要少；而古代至黑格尔的哲学家们都致力于由合乎科学的哲学去认识时间且再一次无法恒定于其内部有条理的谋求。

迄今，现象学甚至在它自身的原则下被这样理解，它是作为哲学的一个科学准备，为逻辑、伦理、美学和宗教哲学的正确哲学原则准备背景。但是在将现象学视为科学这一限定中，传统的哲学原则被无保留的接受了，而没有追问是否同样的传统在问题中不再需要和它是否被现象学自身正确削减。现象学自身不是包含了这些哲学原则让渡的倒转和在它的基本趋势下伟大哲学传统的新生和更新的正确性吗？我们必须指出的是，现象学不仅是淹没于其他之中的哲学的科学，也不是为其他的一个科学的预备；实际上，“现象学”这一表述是对于一般的合乎科学的哲学方法的一个命名。

阐明现象学的观念与阐明合乎科学的哲学这一概念是同等重要的。要相信，现象学本身的内容远远没有告诉我们现象学的意义，甚至它仅告诉我们这一方法是如何被操作的。但是，它却告诉我们怎样和为什么须避免趋附于当代现象学的趋势。

我们无须从一些独断给定的现象学的概念中追溯具体的现象学的问题；相反，我们必须允许自己通过对“一般的合乎科学的哲学”这一概念的更为普遍性和准备性的讨论，抵达具体问题。我们必须在古代到黑格尔的西方哲学的基本倾向中，讨论这一问题。

在早期的古代思想中，一般的，哲学与科学的意旨是一样的。往后，个别的哲学，也即，个别的科学——医药，比如说，还有数学——从哲学中分离出来了。哲学这一称谓就指构成和包含其他所有特殊科学的科学。渐渐的，它把自己作为第一和最高的科学，或者就像在德国的理念主义时期被称作的一——绝对科学（absolute science）。如果哲学是绝对科学，那么“合乎科学的哲学”这一表达就是一道冗笔。它就意味着合乎科学的绝对科学。它完全可以简单说成是“哲学”。这已经单纯而简单的包含了科学。为什么我们还要在“哲学”这个表述之前加上形容词“合乎科学的”呢？一门科学，不是指绝对科学，按其意思来说就是合乎科学的。我们说到“合乎科学的哲学”首先是不只因为哲学的概念不仅处于危机之中，进而会否认它作为科学的单纯和简单的特质。这些哲学的概念不仅是当代的，而且伴随着自从哲学被视为科学以来的合乎科学的哲学发展而发展了。由此，哲学作为理论的科学这一点，不仅不是且不被放在第一位，而是为我们提供关于事物及其内部联系的观点、对它们的态度，以及规范和指引我们对存在和它的意义的解释这些方面以实际性的指导。哲学是关于世界和生活的智慧，或者，用今天通用的表达来说，认为哲学提供了一种世界观（world-view）。进而，合乎科学的哲学又与作为世界观的哲学相抵触。

我们必须试图更加严格地考查这一特征并且决定它是否正确或者它是否需要为其所采纳。这样，哲学这一概念对我们来说就会清楚了，使我们能够对在第一部分里我们所要处理的个别问题的选择作出评判。必须首先清楚，这些有关哲学这一概念的讨论仅是暂时的——不仅针对这一本书，也是在一般意义上暂时的，不是最终目的。因为哲学这一概念是哲学自身的最彻底和高级的结果。同样的，哲学是否有完全的可能或全无可能的问题也仅能由哲学自己来决定。

第二节、 哲学概念

哲学和世界观

在讨论合乎科学的哲学和作为世界观的哲学之间的区别中，我们可以从后一种观点开始，从“世界观”（Weltanschauung），“世界观”（world-view）开始。这一表述并不是从希腊语或拉丁语而来的翻译。没有类似于kosmotheoria那样的表述。“世界观”（Weltanschauung）是一个特殊的德语新创词；且是由哲学创造的。它首先以它本来的含义出现是在康德的判断力批判——关于世界思考的感觉中的世界-印象，以康德的话来说，世界的感觉——作为众多感觉中对自然界的简单理解的一种世界印象。歌德和洪堡

（Alexander von Humboldt）随后也是在这个意义上用这个词。上个世纪三十年代，浪漫主义者主要是谢林赋予“世界观”这一表述以新的涵义，在此影响下原先的用法消失。在《自然哲学体系手稿导言》

（1799）中，谢林说：“智力以两种相对方式起作用，要么是盲目和不自觉的，要么是自由和自觉的；它在世界观中不自觉地起作用或者是在观念世界的创造中自觉起作用。”¹这里世界观不是直接指感觉-观察而是指向智力，即使是不自觉的智力。此外，创造要素，独立的印象形成过程，也被强调。这样，这个词

就接近了我们今天熟悉的意义，一种自我-认识，像理解和解释有关存在的宇宙自觉的方式一样的有用。谢林说的世界观的简图，各种不同可能的世界观的简图形式就出现并且成型。以这一方式理解关于世界的观点，没有必要从理论性概念和科学的意义中产生。在《精神现象学》中，黑格尔说到一种“道德的世界观”。2Gorres用“诗学的世界观”来表述。Ranke说到“宗教的和基督教徒的世界观”，他的叙述有时是关于平民的世界观，有时又是悲观的世界观或甚至是中世纪的世界观。施莱尔马赫说，“它仅是我们的世界观，使我们关于上帝的知识完备。”Bismarck给他新娘写信时说：“在聪明人之中有多少奇怪的关于世界的观点呀！”从列举的世界观的形式和可能性来看，这一表述的意义是什么就越来越清楚，即它不仅是关于自然界事物混合物的概念，同时也是感觉的解释和人类存在和历史的研究。一个世界观总是包含了生活观。世界观从所有内在地包含世界和人类此在映像中形成，且再一次地，以不同的方式发生：在个别特殊情况处明白和自觉，或是为流行的世界观固有。我们在一种世界观中长大，逐渐也就为它所桎梏了。我们的世界观因环境而限定——人，家族，阶级，文化发展的等级。每一世界观由一种自然界的世界观、关于世界的概念和每一存在在任一特定时刻给予的或多或少的关于人类存在的限定的等级而来。我们必须从自然界的世界观中区别出个别形成的世界观或文化的世界观。

一种世界观不是处于其开端或在与它的用途联系中的理论知识材料。它不是简单地像认识的财产的一部分保留在记忆中。相反，它是一个有条理的信念的材料——对现今流行的生活事件进行或多或少地特别和直接地限定。一个世界观与在任一时刻给出的特殊的当代的此在的意义相联系。在这种与此在的联系中，世界观是对它的指引，也是压力下力量的源泉。世界观是否为迷信和偏见限制还是以绝对合乎科学的知识和经验为基础，或甚至，通常的，它就是迷信和知识、偏见和冷静的理智的混合物；世界观都到达同样的事，其本质不会改变。

对我们所谓的“世界观”这一表述的特征指示在这里给出了。对它的严格限定必须以另一种方式获得。在《世界观的心理学》中，雅斯培斯说“当我们说到世界观时我们意旨的是观念——在人这里是根本的和完全的，既是主观的：作为生活-经验和力量以及性格；同样也是客观的，作为一个拥有客观外形的世界。”3因为我们在研究——关于作为世界观的哲学和合乎科学的哲学——这两者区分时，最重要的是要看到世界观，在其自身的意义上，相应于思考映像和观点-形成的现实可能性，总是从人类存在之特殊现实生存中浮现，它也就为这一现实的此在而浮现。这个世界观在每一情况下，从、与、为现实此在而历时性地存在着。一个哲学化的世界观就是这样的世界观——特别地和明白地或突出地必须为哲学所得出或带出——就是说，通过理论性地思索，排除对世界和此在的艺术和宗教化的理解。此世界观不是哲学的副产物；它实际促成了一个正确的目标和哲学本身的特质。在它的概念中，哲学就是世界观哲学，哲学就是世界观。如果在关于世界的理论知识的形式中的哲学瞄准了世界的普遍性和此在的终极——从哪里来，到哪里去，世界和生命的原因——那么，它就与特殊的科学区别开来了，后者总是研究世界和此在的一个特殊领域。同样，它也从艺术和宗教的观点中区分开来，后者不是以理论观点为根本基础的。哲学把世界观的形式作为自己的目标，这看起来似乎不存在问题了。这一任务必须限定特质以及哲学这一概念。哲学，看起来是一个如此本质的世界观以至它宁愿把后一种表达视为夸大的说法而抛弃。甚至提议为合乎科学的哲学的而作的努力，在哲学看来也是一种误读。哲学化的世界观，毫无疑问必须是合乎科学的。就此也意味着：第一，必须认识不同科学的结果并且把它们用于建构世界图景和对此在的解释；第二，严格遵从科学思维的规则以合乎科学地形成世界观。在理论性的方式中的作为世界观的哲学这一概念过于异想天开地认为它自然和广泛地限定了哲学这一概念，由此也就限定了一个合适的观念：即什么是和什么将是哲学的期盼。相反的，如果哲学没有给出对于世界观的问题的满意回答，通常就会认为哲学是无关紧要的。对哲学的要求和态度是在它作为合乎科学的世界观这一观点控制下的。为明确哲学在这一任务中是成功还是失败，它的历史——即众所周知，它处理着这样一些终极问题：关乎自然，灵魂，就是说，关乎人类、上帝的自由和历史——就需为毫不含糊地证实而接受考验。

如果哲学是一个合乎科学的世界观，那么“合乎科学的哲学”和“作为世界观的哲学”之间的区别就消失了。这两者都构成哲学的本质，这样一来，实际上从根本上需要强调的就是世界观的任务。这看起来也是康德的观点，他把哲学合乎科学的特征置于一个新的基础上。我们仅需重申他在理论的和宇宙论的哲学概念中的逻辑4中的导论作出的区分即可。这里，我们转向时常引用的康德主义者们的区分——他们显然赞成在合乎科学的哲学和作为世界观的哲学之间的区分，或更确切点说，作为康德自身的证据，对他而言，哲学的合乎科学的特征是中心，并由此把哲学理解为哲学化的世界观。

如康德所说，依据理论概念或学术意义，哲学是理性训练的学说。它包含两部分：“第一，从概念而来的理性认识必需的起源；第二，这些认识的有条理的内部联系或涉乎全部之概念的结合。”这里，康德认为，学术意义上的哲学包括思考的形式原则和理性的内在联系，简单说来，对这些概念——作为必要的预想，处于我们对世界理解的潜层——的讨论限定，对康德来说，就是对自然的讨论和限定。根据理论化

的概念，哲学就是所有形式和质料之全体的基本概念和理性知识的原则。

康德以宇宙论的概念定义哲学，如他所说，哲学在宇宙论的意义上，如下：“但是在宇宙论的意义上考察哲学，它也可以被称为无与伦比地运用我们理性的科学，无与伦比地理解在不同结果之中的选择的内在原则。”宇宙论意义上的哲学所处理的是所有理性运用的目的，亦包括哲学自身所是。“因为后一意义的哲学确实是关于知识的每种用途之间的联系和人类理性最终目的之科学，在此之下，哲学作为终极，所有其他的终点都是附属的，且必须与之相结合。这一宇宙论意义上的哲学之领域可以分为以下问题：1) 我能知道什么？2) 我必须做什么？3) 我可以希望什么？4) 人是什么？”⁵最后，康德说，所有前三个问题可以集中到第四个问题中，“人是什么？”因为关于人类理性终极限定由“人是什么”的解释而来。理论意义上的哲学也与这些终极相联系。

康德对在学者意义上的哲学和宇宙论意义上的哲学的区分与合乎科学的哲学和作为世界观的哲学的区分相一致吗？是，也不是。是，因为康德对哲学这一概念中做了区分，并在此基础上，产生了关于人类存在中心的终极限定的问题。不是，因为在宇宙论意义上的哲学的任务不是在给出的意义上发展一种世界观。康德最终认为的在宇宙论意义上的哲学的任务——他没有直接地说——不是其它，而是先天知识和进而是对属于人类此在之本质自然特征的存在论上的限定，同样也是对世界观这一概念的限定。⁶作为最基本的先天知识，是对人类此在的本质自然限定，康德认识到：人是一种以其自身结果为目的的存在者。⁷如康德所理解的宇宙论上的哲学，也要处理本质自然的限定。它不是要获得确切的和现实的对纯粹现实世界和纯粹生活世界的理解；相反，它要获得的是对一般世界，一般此在，一般世界观之间的一个界限。对康德来说，宇宙论意义上的哲学与理论意义上的哲学一样具有同样的方法论特征，康德仅认识到我们不该在这里深入讨论的理性，他没有看到两者之间的联系。更明显的是，他没有看到在原初背景下构建两者的基础。我们稍后将处理这一问题。现在，就可以清楚看到，如果哲学被认为是世界观的合乎科学的建构而存在的话，就不应像康德所做的那样。康德基本上仅仅认识到作为科学的哲学这一点。

一种世界观，像我们看到的，与它的现实可能性相对应，从现实此在中彰显，它在特殊此在中的每一情形中所是的。这不能断言成是一种世界观的相对主义。在此方式下形成的世界观所叙说的，能够用命题和规则加以系统化地表述，在其意义上它与特殊的现实实存世界和现实实存的此在相联系。每一个世界观和生活观并置；就是说，它与存在-地或一些存在和存在者相联系。它设想了一个存在是某物，这是确实的。每个世界观属于每个此在，并且，就像这一此在，它在每一情况下以现实的和历史的方式被限定。对于这种世界观，有此种多样的确定性，即在每一情况下，它都遵循如此这般的此在；这样它就与实存的世界相联系，指向一个现实实存着的此在。就是因为这一确定性——就是，与存在者、与世界是其所是、与此在是其所是的联系——属于世界观的本质，即，一般而言属于世界观的形式，这个世界的形式不能作为哲学的任务。这么说不是要排除而是要包含这个观念——即哲学自身是世界观独特根本的形式。哲学能够，也可能必须指明，在其他许多事物中，一种像世界观的东西属于此在的本质特性。哲学能够也必须制定什么是世界观的结构中主要的建构。但是，它从不能发展和断定这个或那个特殊的世界观就是一些特殊的特定的世界观。哲学也不是世界观的本质形式；但，它可能与所有的世界观，甚至与那些不是理论化的，而是现实历史性的世界观，都有初步和基础的联系，

关于世界观形式不属于哲学的任务的主题是有效的，当然，仅在一哲学不以确定的方式与作为这个或那个特殊的存在者相联系，即它不设想一个存在——这样的设想下有效。这一设想——哲学不确定地与存在者相联系，能像科学所做的那样，证明合理吗？进而哲学如果不与存在者联系，而是与所有一什么是一相联系时，它给自己假定了什么？什么不是，无疑是虚无。那么，哲学作为绝对科学需要把虚无作为它的主题吗？从自然、历史、上帝、空间、数量那里分离出来的是什么呢？我们说到这些中的每一个，即使是以不同的意义，我们也是称它为一个存在。与此相连，无论理论的还是实践的，我们自己也表现为一个存在。在所有这些存在者之上是虚无。或许在统计的这些之上没有其他的存在，但是或许，像在德国理念主义那里‘有’给予（es gibt），仍有其它东西被给予。甚至，最后给予的某些东西必须被给予，如果我们能够使存在者作为存在者对我们来说是易接近了，而且我们向它表现自身；某些事，无疑的，就是必须被给予的，如果我们能够完全经验和理解每一存在者。我们却能够像这样把握存在者：即仅在我们理解某些像存在的事物时，才成为存在者。如果我们不能理解，甚至起初就是粗糙的理解，也没有概念性的把握，那么，事实上，真相继续躲离着我们。如果我们不理解现实意味着什么，那样真实就不易接近。如果我们不理解生活和活力意味着什么，我们也不能够使自己成为生活着的存在者。如果我们不理解实存和实存性意味着什么，我们自己就不能作为此在而存在。如果我们不理解永恒和坚定意味着什么，那么不变的几何性联系和数字比率对我们将是一个秘密。我们必须理解真实，现实，活力，实存性，坚定性以便能够使我们自身相应地成为真实的、现实的、生活着的、实在着的，不变的存在者。我们必须理解存在者以便我们能够生活于是其所是的世界中，且作为一个存在成为我们自身之此在。我们必须能够在所有真实存在

者的经验之前理解真实性。这种在最广泛的意义上对抗着存在者经验的关于真实或存在的理解先于存在者经验，是一特定的意义。说关于存在的理解先于所有存在者的现实经验，并不意味着我们首先需要拥有清晰的关于存在的概念以使对存在者的经验具有理论性和实践性。我们必须理解存在——存在自身不能再被称作一个存在；存在，不是作为一个存在淹没于其他存在之中，而是必须给出，实际上，在对存在的理解中给出。

第三节、 哲学作为存在的科学

现在我们可以断言存在是哲学的正确和唯一的主题。这不是我们的目的；而是重置接近生活——作为古代哲学起点——这一主题，在黑格尔的逻辑里发展为其最宏大的形式。现在我们仅仅断言存在是哲学的正确和唯一的主题。消极的说，这意味着哲学不是关于存在者而是关于存在的科学，用希腊语表述就是，存在论。我们是在最广泛的意义上使用这一表述的，而不是如经院哲学或现代哲学中笛卡尔和莱布尼茨是在狭隘的意义上使用这一表述。

现象学的基本问题的讨论与哲学是关于存在的科学这一断定和确认它怎样如其所是提供基本的证明是同等的。这一讨论必须彰显作为存在的绝对科学的可能性和必要性，并且在此研究过程中彰显自己的特征。哲学是关于存在、存在的结构和它的可能性的理论化概念化的解释。哲学是存在论的。与此相对的，世界观是一个假定的关于存在者的知识，是对存在者的一个假定的观点；它不是存在论的而是存在。世界观的形式落于哲学任务的范围之外，但并不因为哲学是处于一个不完全的地位、也不满足于对世界观的问题给出一致和普遍的有说服力的回答；实际上世界观的形式落于哲学任务之外是因为哲学在原则上不与存在者相联系。它不是因为哲学放弃形成世界观的任务而是因为一个在前的区分：即，它处理的是对存在者的每一假定，甚至是通过世界观而做的假定，必须已经本质的预想出。在作为科学的哲学和作为世界观的哲学之间作出的区分是不能维持的，不是一——像它早先看起来那样——因为合乎科学的哲学有了关于世界观的形式的主要终极，以至它必须提升至世界观哲学的水平；而仅因为一种世界观哲学的观点是难以想象的。因为它显示了：哲学——作为关于存在的科学——被假想是采纳指向存在者的特殊观点，是关于存在者的预想事物。就每一个对哲学概念和它的历史不太理解的人来说，世界观哲学的观点是一个荒谬的观点。如果在合乎科学的哲学和世界观哲学之间的区分是难以想象的，那么，另一个也就必须是不适合构想的。一旦世界观哲学被设想为哲学，这一点在原则上是不可能的，那么作为区分的形容词“合乎科学的”就不再有必要用来描述哲学了。哲学是合乎科学的在其自身的概念中就已包含了这些。历史表明，从古代以来的所有伟大哲学在根上，都或多或少地把哲学作为并且像这样的去成为——存在论。历史同样表明，这些努力失败了一次又一次，也表明了他们失败的原因。我在本书的最后两章中给出了关于这点的历史性的证明，一个是在古代哲学，另一个是在从阿奎那到康德哲学的历史中。*现在我们无须参考对哲学的特质给出的历史性证明——一个有其自身固有的特殊特征的证明。让我们在现在的研究中试着建立其自身基础之上的哲学，即哲学是作为人类自由的一项工作。凭其自身源泉哲学必须正当声明它是普遍的存在论。

另一方面，哲学是关于存在的科学这一情况保留着一个纯粹的断定。相应的，把世界观的形式从哲学任务的范围中排除也仍旧是没有保证的。我们凸显合乎科学的哲学和世界观哲学之间的区分是为了对哲学概念给出一个暂时的澄清，为的是从流行的概念中把它区分出来。这一澄清和区分，也是为了随后对具体的现象学问题的选择而做准备的，为了使选择从完全随机的现象中脱离出来。

哲学是关于存在的科学。将来，“哲学”这一表述就意味着是合乎科学的哲学而不是其他。与这种用法相一致的，所有非-哲学化的科学就把一些存在或存在者作为自己的主题，实际上这样一来，存在者在每种情况下都预先被给予了。它们预先为此所假定；它们是一个预先的假设。所有非-哲学化的科学的预想，包括那些数学，都是假定的设想。这样，为从哲学中区分出它们，我们必须称所有非-哲学化的科学为假定的科学。假定的科学处理的是与存在者或与之有关的东西；就是说，他们总是处理特殊的知识领域，比如自然界。在一个给定的知识领域中，科学的研究删去了特殊的区域：作为物理性物质性的无生命的自然界的自然界和作为鲜活的自然界的自然界。它把鲜活的自然界的领域划为一个特殊的领域：植物界，动物界。另一个关于存在者的知识领域是历史；它包括艺术史、政治史、科学史，宗教史。还有一个关于存在者的知识领域是纯粹的几何空间——由周遭世界而显示的先-理论性的空间抽象而来。这些知识领域的存在者对我们而言是熟悉的，即使在最初和最主要部分我们不能把它们与另一存在者准确和清楚地区分出来。我们当然能够总是对一些落在这些知识领域中的存在命名，称之为是实际适合于确定科学研究的暂时描述。我们总能给出，就像它所是的，从特殊知识领域而来的一个特殊存在者作为例子。历史上，这一知识领域的划分不是因一些预先形成的有关科学体系的计划而来，而是遵从于假定科学所流行的研究问题。

我们早已给出且向我们自身描绘出任一给定知识领域中的一些存在。习惯上说，我们能够思考有关它

的一些东西。这里哲学的对象是什么呢？如果我们要做这个，我们的头脑是还没准备去游泳吗？实际上，首先是我们迷惘了，我们发现自己想在稀薄的空气里抓住什么。一个存在——它是某种东西，一张桌子，一把椅子，一棵树，天空，身体，一些话语，一个行动。一个存在，是的，实际上——仅是存在？它看起来像虚无——从没有思想家像黑格尔那样说过存在和空无是同一回事。作为科学的存在哲学难道就是关于虚无的科学吗？在我们研究的开始，不要抱任何错误的希望，也不要矫饰材料，我们必须承认在存在的带领下我们自己首先要思考虚无。另一方面，我们也正是在不断地思考存在。我们认为存在仅仅如日常那样，在无法统计的情况中，要么是喧闹的要么沉默的，我们说“这是如此这般”，“另一个不是这样”，“那曾是”，“它将是”。在每一个动词的使用中，我们都已经思考了、也已经总是以某种方式理解了一个存在。我们会马上明白“今天是星期天；太阳是升起来了”。我们理解我们用来说的这个“是”，即使我们不能概念化地领悟它。这一“是”的意义仍与我们接近了。这一“是”和存在的一般的理解就是这样的一种事实，即，它使这一信条——即存在是最简单也是最自明的概念，它既不容易被影响也不需要被限定——在哲学中得以传播到今天。于是，就需对普遍意义作出判定。但是当普遍意义被视为哲学的最高判定标准时，哲学就变得可疑了。在《哲学批判的本质》中，黑格尔说：“哲学因其本质是秘密的，不是为大众的，它也不会把存在的可接受性供给大众。它是哲学仅仅因为它恰与这个理解相反，甚至更多的与‘听起来普遍的意义’相反，如此称谓的人类正确理解，实际上意味着人类存在者有限的一代人——之局限和暂时的观点。对于那一代人来说，哲学的世界就其自身而言是一个颠倒的，翻转的世界。”¹在确定什么是哲学和什么不是哲学的时候，普遍意义的要求和标准没有权力宣称任何有效性或代表任何权威。

如果存在不是最复杂和最抽象的概念，将是什么？作为一个重新提起的任务，如果获得存在的概念不是哲学最迫切的任务，将是什么？今天，当哲学研究变得就像St. Vitus的舞蹈一样不人道后，恐怕在西方文明史中没有与之相似的阶段。就算形而上学的复兴散播到了大街小巷，亚里士多德在他最重要的著作——形而上学——中所说的话早已被完全的忘掉了。“正是‘什么是存在’的问题需要从古代和现代以及未来中获取的，且需要一遍又一遍地找寻。（Kai de kai to palai te kai nun kai aei zetoumenon kai aei aporoumenon, ti to on, touto esti tis he ousia.2）如果哲学是关于存在的科学，那么首先和最后的哲学基本问题都必须是：存在意味着什么？什么使得像存在的某些东西可以被一般的理解？关于存在的理解如何可能？

第四节、存在的四个主题和现象学的基本问题

在我们接近这些基本问题之前，我们自身最好先熟悉一下以前关于存在的讨论。在本书第一部分将把一些关于存在的特征性主题作为个别的具体现象学的问题加以处理，这些主题自古代以来已在西方哲学传统中被提倡。我们感兴趣的，不是在哲学考察中获得存在主题显现的历史概况，而是要获得其有条理的根本内容。对此内容要重新批判，以便我们从它过渡到上面提到的有关存在的科学的基本问题。对这些主题的讨论同时也要求我们熟悉处理与存在相关的问题的现象学方法。我们选择了四组主题：

- (1) 康德的主题：存在不是一个实在的谓词。
- (2) 可回溯到亚里士多德的中世纪存在论（经院哲学）的主题：对一个存在的存在的建构包括（a）是什么、本质，和（b）实存或现存
- (3) 现代存在论的主题：自然之存在和理念之存在是存在的基本方式
- (4) 最普泛意义上的逻辑的主题：忽视每一存在的特殊方式，存在通过系词“是”的意义能够被指出和谈论。即，连接的存在。

这些主题初看似乎是偶然地放到了一起。再仔细看一下，它们相互之间其实紧密联系着。要注意这些主题指示了这一点，即只要所有存在科学繁荣基本问题——存在之一般意义的问题——多久没有回答；这些问题就不能被妥当给出，甚至不成其为问题。本书的第二部分将处理这个问题。一般的，对存在意义的基本问题以及由这个问题而来的问题的讨论，在它们的有条理的秩序和基础上，形成现象学的基本问题的全部来源。现在我们对这些问题的范围给出一个粗糙的轮廓。

通过什么道路我们才能获得存在之一般意义呢？如果像通常观点独断认为那样，存在是最普遍和最简单的概念的话，那么，存在意义的问题和这一概念的阐释不是一个伪-问题？规定这一概念的起源是什么，它将在什么方向得到解决？

在我们遵循朝向存在者所有行为的对存在的理解中，似是非非的存在向我们彰显。朝向存在者的行为部分地属于一个有限的存在，这个存在就是我们自身，即人类此在。属于对存在之理解的人类此在首先使得每一个朝向存在的行动成为可能。对存在的理解自身就具有人类此在所存在的方式。如果，据此此在的存在对这一存在的限定越来越原初和正确，就是说，如果限定是存在论上的，那么我们在其结构中对属于此在的存在之理解就越牢靠。既而，这一问题提出就越发清楚和不含糊，即，什么使存在之理解成为可能？也即，从哪里先行给出了一个视阈——使我们能够理解类似于存在的东西？

遵循对存在之理解而言什么是独特的，在它或它的合理性中什么被理解了，存在之理解就预想了一个对此在之分析以解决问题。这一分析展示了人类此在的结构和此在之存在的意义描述。在对此在的存在论研究中，此在之存在的原初结构的彰显是暂时性的。暂时性将使关于时间的理解和领悟在迄今的哲学中更为根本和概念化。在哲学传统中，时间仅被视为是此在原初意义之暂时性的衍生物。如果暂时性构成了人类此在存在的意义，如果关于存在的理解属于此在之存在的结构，那么对存在之理解，也必须是仅以暂时性为基础时才是可能的。进而就期望这一主题——时间是一个视阈，由时间，某种像是存在的东西变得完全合理了——的一个可能的证实。我们以时间来解释存在。这个解释是对暂时性的一种（解释）。作为经由时间而来的对存在意义的限定，存在论研究中的主体就是暂时性。

我们说存在论是存在的科学。但是存在总是一个存在的存在。存在本质上不同于一个存在和存在者。如何把握存在和存在者之间的区分呢？它的可能性如何来解释？如果存在自身不是一个存在，那么它又怎样属于存在，既然，毕竟，存在者、仅存在者是存在？说存在属于存在者意味着什么？对这一问题的正确的回答首先需要解决被认为是存在的科学的存在论的问题。我们必须能够给出存在和存在者之间的区别以便能够使像是存在的某种东西成为研究的主题。这一规定并不偶然；相反，它是存在论的、也是哲学自身首先要获得的主题。它是最初也是后来为存在论所构建的一个区分。我们称之为存在论的区分——存在和存在者之间的区分。只有做了这一区分——不是在一个存在和另一个存在之间而是在存在和存在者之间的区分，我们就首先进入了哲学研究的领域。只有采取这一严格的态度，我们才能保证自己处于哲学领域中。这样，对存在者，存在论，或一般的哲学等事物科学区分出的是严格的科学，或是翻转世界的科学。通过存在与存在者的区分，我们就由存在者的知识领域中获得存在选择这一主题。我们到达这一主题，随后超越它。我们也可称存在的科学是严格的科学，先验的科学。这不是对康德的先验概念的简单重申，虽然我们采纳了在康德那里或许仍是隐蔽的它原初的含义和它正确的倾向。我们超越存在者以抵达存在。一旦实现了这一超越，我们就无须再次屈服于一个存在，就像是在熟悉的存在后面还有另一个世界一样。存在的超越科学不处理任何流行的形而上学的问题，它要处理的是在已知存在者之后的一些存在；相反，关于形而上学的科学的概念处理的是哲学的一般概念——严格的关于存在的超越的科学，存在论。可见——当且仅当关于存在的一般意义被明确昭显时——也即，仅当暂时性如何使存在和存在者之间的区分成为可能这一点被彰显时，存在论的区分才能够澄清和明确存在论的研究。仅在这一研究的基础上，康德主义的主题——存在不是现实的断言——才能被赋予其原初的含义并且正确的被解释。

每一存在是某物；它有它的什么并且拥有存在方式的特殊的可能。在本书的第一部分，讨论第二个主题的时候，我们必须给出古代特别是中世纪存在论独断宣布的这一仿佛自明的假定——对每一存在来说它都属于一个什么和一个存在方式，本质和实存。对我们来说这一问题被提升了一——每一个存在必须且能够有一个什么，一个ti，一个存在的可能方式，这些理由是以存在自身的意义为依据的吗？即，这些理由是暂时的吗？这些特征——是什么和存在方式——有足够的力度属于存在自身吗？存在“是”与这些一致于其本质特质的特征接合吗？通过这些我们现在面对的是存在的基本接合的问题，关于共属的是什么和存在的方式以及属于两者的作为存在的一般观念的联合的必要性问题。

每一存在都有存在方式。问题是，是否存在方式在每一存在中拥有相同的特征——像古代存在论所相信的以及随后甚至到现在基本强调的那样——是否个别的存在方式是互相区别的。哪一个是存在的基本方式？有没有一个多样性？存在方式的变化如何可能，它如何能合理地给予存在的意义？我们如何能够把存在个别概念从存在方式的变化中区分开来？这些问题可以整和为一个问题——对存在意义的可能限制和存在变化的统一。

我们所处理的每一存在都能够被指出，用“它是”说出，而不考虑它的特殊的存在方式。在对存在的理解中，我们遭遇了一个存在的存在。理解首先打开或昭示或彰显像存在的某种东西。仅在对存在之理解的描述的特别彰显中，存在“被给予”。但是我们称这种彰显是具有一定真理的。在古代，它就是真理的正确内容。仅在有一昭示，即，有一真理时，存在才被给予。但是只有存在敞开，彰显，且在这种情况下，彰显自身属于此存在的存在方式时，才会有真理。对此在而言，其本质属于一个彰显的世界，由此此在彰显自身。此在，因其自身实存的特质，是“处于”真理中的，仅因为它是“处于”真理中它也就有可能“处于”非

真理中。仅在真理即此在实存时，存在才被给予。且仅因为这一原因，在有时是确定的限制中指明存在者——预设此在存在——不仅是可能的，也是必要的。我们必须整合存在和真理的内部联系的问题为——存在的真理-特征的问题。

我们就指出了四组问题，组成本书的第二部分：存在论区分的问题，存在基本形成的问题，存在的存在方式中存在意义限制的问题，存在的真理-特征的问题。这四个主题在第一部分里相应为四个基本问题。回过头来看第二部分基本问题的讨论，我们就可以更清楚的看到在主题的引导下，这些问题我们在第一部分里已经事先涉及到了，它们不是偶然有的而是由存在的一般问题的内部有条理的联系而产生。

第五节、 存在论方法的特点

现象学方法的三个基本部分

我们在第一部分和第二部分做的存在论的考察同时也向我们开启了一个视点，即进行现象学的研究的方法。这提升了存在论中关于方法的特征的问题。这样我们就进入第三部分：存在论的合乎科学的方法，现象学的观念。

存在论——也即一般哲学——的方法，使存在论与任一其它科学的方法不同，后者都是作为确定的科学来处理存在者。另一方面，它也事先给出了存在的真理-特征的分析——显示存在也是，如它曾经是，以一个存在，即以此在为基础。仅当存在也即此在的理解成立时，存在被给予。这一存在相应地在存在论研究中也优先给出。它在所有存在论基本问题的讨论中，除此以外，也在存在一般意义的基本问题中，显示自身。这一问题的苦心经营和它的答案要求对此在的一般分析。因其基本原则，存在论可以分析此在。这同时也说明存在论不能仅以纯粹的存在论的方式建立。它的可能性回指向一个存在，即，回指向——此在。存在论有一个存在的基础，这是迄今为止的哲学历史中一直反复探究的问题。比如，它最早在亚里士多德的格言那里，称为——第一科学，关于存在的科学，是神学。作为关于——大类此在的自由——的工作，哲学的可能性和限定建立于人的存在之上，从而也就具有暂时性、历史性，且实际上比其他科学具有更原初的意义。接着，在阐明存在论的合乎科学的特征时，首要的任务就是建立它的存在基础和描述这一基础自身。

其次的任务是辨认科学存在的存在论中已知的操作性的方式，这就要求我们得出存在论-先验的区分的方法论结构。在古代就已认识到，存在和它的置身于和先于存在者特定方式中的属性是一个更远古的、更原初的。通过在存在者之先的存在而给出的对此特征的表述是先天知识，apriority，更原初的存在的表述。作为先天知识，存在比存在者原初。这就意味着，先天知识、更原初和其可能性的意义，从未被澄清。这一问题甚至从未如此被提出——为什么存在的限定和存在自身必须有先天的特征以及先天如何可能。起先的，是对时间的限定，但是时间不暂时规守我们通过钟表计算而得的时间；相反，它是一个更早的属于“翻转的世界”的（时间）。这样，更原初作为描述存在的特征就为后者作为流行理解而接受了。只有通过暂时性的方法去考察存在的问题才能使——更原初的存在，先天知识，为什么和如何就与存在一起——变得清楚。存在的先天的特征和所有存在的结构都相应的要求特殊的接近和理解存在的方式——即，先天认识。

先天认识的基本成分组成了我们称为现象学的东西。现象学是对存在论方法的命名，即，它是合乎科学的方法。可以这样理解，现象学是关于一种方法的概念。这样，从一开始，它就避开了一——现象学必须断言拥有特殊内容的存在的任何主题，而是采纳了一个如此-称谓的立足点。

我们无须深入下去细说现象学在今天处理什么观念——现象学自身则部分地煽动这一点。我们需要简要地触及的仅是一个例子。或许因为我深信思想家像阿奎那和邓·司各脱也理解哲学的一些问题，甚至比当代人做的还好；有人就说我的工作是天主教的现象学。但是天主教的现象学这一概念甚至比基督教的形而上学更为荒诞。哲学作为存在的科学是在方法上从其它所有科学中基本区别出来的。方法上的区分，说，形而上学和古典哲学没有形而上学和哲学或语言学和哲学之间的区分伟大，哲学和确定科学之间区分的幅度，——形而上学和语言学的区分属于此——完全不能用量度量。存在论设想在与我们的考察的关系中，存在可以通过现象学的方法被把握和概念性地理解，但今天现象学确实带来了鲜活的兴趣，它所获得和瞄准的，西方哲学在其开始处就已作了充分的寻求。

存在被抓住且构成我们的主题。存在总是在存在者的存在，且相应的，它就首先仅在某些存在的开始处变得容易获得。这里，现象学的观点——理解必须指引自身朝向存在，但它必须以这样的方式去做——此存在的存在有可能被主题化。存在之理解，存在论的研究，总是首先和必要地指向一些存在；然而随后，以严格的方式，它被引领着从那个存在脱离，又回到它自身的存在。我们称现象学方法的这一基本部分为——从自然理解的存在到存在回归或还原的研究方法——现象学还原。我们就在其原本说法而不是它的表述存在的意图上，采纳了胡塞尔现象学的中心术语。对胡塞尔来说，现象学还原，他第一次在《纯粹现象学和现象学哲学的观念》（1913）中表述的，是一种方法，它指引现象学的视点从人类存在——他们的生活是纠缠于世界中的物和人——的自然视点回到先验的意识生活和它的纯理性的—智性经验中，其中客体作为与意识的联系被建构。对我们来说现象学还原意味着指引现象学的视点由对一个存在的理解——这应该是理解的特征——回到对这一存在的存在的理解中。像所有其他的科学的方法一样，现象学的方法相应于过程而改善和改变，在其帮助下，正确到达研究的主题。科学的方法永远不是一个工具。它一旦变为工具就失去了原先固有的特质。

现象学还原指引我们的视点从存在者回到存在远不是现象学方法的基本部分；事实上，它甚至不是中心部分。由存在者到存在的视点的这一转变同样要求我们必须把自身正确带到存在自己那里去。单纯地厌恶存在者是消极的方法论上的一个标准，这就不仅需要为正确的（方法）所补充还需要我们自身被引领向存在；它就需要指引。存在不是像一个存在那样变得容易获得。我们也不会简单地在我们面前发现它。像它所显示的那样，它必须总是以自由的反映被带到视点之中。这一反映在它的存在之先给出存在和它的存在的结构——我们称为现象学建构。

但是这一现象学的方法同样也不会被现象学建构所耗尽。我们听说存在的每一反映都于存在者的缩减徘徊回中被发现。对存在的考察由存在者获得起点。这个起点显然总为存在者的现实经验限制，在任一时刻都为现实的此在所特有的经验——可能性的范围所限制，这样，也指向哲学研究的历史。这不是说在所有的时刻、对于每个人来说，所有的存在者和所有的存在者的特殊知识领域也是同样可以接近的；并且，即使存在者在经验范围内是可以接近的，问题依旧保留，不管是在自然的还是普通的经验里，它们早已在它们特定的存在方式下被正确理解了。因此此在在它的存在中具有历史性，所以接近的可能性、对存在者解释的方式都是相互不同和变化地处于在不同的历史环境中。对哲学史的一个大概的展望可以表明，许多存在的知识领域很早就被发现了，比如自然、空间、灵魂；但是，它们仍不能在它们个别的存在中被领悟。普通的存在一般概念在古代就诞生了，它被用来解释所有存在之多样的知识领域的存在者和它们的存在样式，即使这些特殊的存在自身——以其自身的结构被表达，但仍没有形成一个问题，也无法被限定。柏拉图说看到确实与其自身的逻各斯相连的灵魂是与感觉的存在不一样的存在。但是他没有从任一其他存在或不存在的存在样式中把这一存在的存在样式区分出来。他以及亚里士多德和之后的直到黑格尔的思想家，甚至是在他们所有成功处、在他们关于存在论的研究中，都是只有一个普通的存在一般概念。甚至在我们现在认为是存在论的研究，也为它的历史状况、确定的接近存在的可能性和先前的哲学传统所限制。由哲学传统所获得基本哲学概念在今天仍旧有影响力，以至这一传统的影响几乎不被高估了。因为这一原因，所有的哲学讨论，甚至努力重新开始的最激进的哲学讨论，也为传统概念、传统视野和传统的接近角度所渗透，我们不能毫无疑问地确定我们已经从他们试图解释的存在结构和存在的知识领域中获得了原初的和纯正的提升。因此，对属于存在的概念性解释和它的结构，即对存在的还原性地建构进行一次解构——一个批判的过程其中传统的概念，首先必须使用的，从其起源处就被消解掉原先的结构。只有通过这一解构，才能使存在论能够在纯正概念的现象学方式下确信自己。

这些现象学方法的三个基本方面——还原，建构，解构——一起属于它们的内容，也必须在他们的彼此关联中获得基本操作。哲学中的建构对于解构来说是必要的，就是说，传统概念中去除—结构是在传统的历史性循环中进行。这不是对传统的否定，或视传统为一无是处；相反，它明确提示了对传统的有把握的使用。因为解构是属于建构的，同时，哲学的认识在特定的意义上，其本质也是历史的认识。“哲学史”，属于作为科学的哲学的概念，属于现象学考察的概念。哲学史不是教授哲学——提供一个机会为了获取一些合适和简单的主题以通过考试，甚或仅是为了想看看早些时候事物是怎样——偶然的附属物。哲学史的知识在其自身价值处是固有联系着的，且，哲学中的历史性认识的特殊方式使它们的对象由所有其它关于历史的科学知识中区别出来。

已描述的存在论的方法使独特的描述现象学观念作为哲学的合乎科学的步骤成为可能。我们更为具体地获得了限定哲学概念的可能性。这样我们在第三部分的研究就会带领我们回到本文的起点。

第六节、提纲（略）

[1] 本文是对《存在与时间》第一篇第三章的更细致的考察。[《存在与时间》第7版(图宾根: Max Niemeyer, 1953)序言: “《存在与时间》最早于1927年春发表在胡塞尔主编的《哲学和现象学研究年鉴》第8卷上, 同时出版了单行本。

这个第7版在内容上未做更动, 但在引文和标点符号方面重新做了检查。新编的页码与以前诸版的有些细微差别。

本版删去了一直标有的“第一部”字样。时隔四分之一个世纪, 第二部将不再补续, 否则就必须把第一部重新写过。但是, 即使在今天, 这条道路依然是必要的, 对存在问题的追问正激荡着作为此在的我们。

为了弄清这一问题, 可以参看我的《形而上学导论》, 那是在1935年夏季学期授课时的教本。它与本书的这个新版本一道由同一出版社出版。”(译文参见陈嘉映、王庆节译本“1935年第七版序言”一译者)

见海德格尔, 《形而上学导论》(Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1953), Ralph Manheim译, “形而上学导论”(New Haven: 耶鲁大学出版, 1959; Garden City, 纽约: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1961) .]

1 [In Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von]谢林: 谢林集, Manfred Schroter编辑, 第2卷, 第271页。[德语版错标为第3卷— 谢林作品起先出版时的数字。Schroter在他编辑时调整了顺序(Munich: Beck and Oldenbourg, 1927)。委托与Bavaria科学学院, 一个新的具有严格历史性的关于谢林作品的编辑正在筹备和印刷中(Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann (Holzboog), 1979-)。海德格尔引用的这一作品仍未由此版本获得。]

2 [In Georg Wilhelm Friedrich]黑格尔, Samtliche Werke, Hermann Glockner编辑, 第2卷, 第461页。[这里是Jubilee版本, 由Glockner在“已故朋友”的原初版本的基础上编辑的, 柏林, 1832-1845, 按时间重新排序(Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann (Holzboog))。初版于1927年, 海德格尔极有可能私下使用了这一版本。Glockner编辑的是一个不严格的版本。]

3 Karl Jaspers, 《世界观的心理学》, 第3版。(柏林: [Springer,]1925), 第1-2页。

4 见康德文集, Ernst Cassirer编辑, 第8卷, 第342页。[Ernt Cassirer 与Hermann Cohen, Artur Buchenau, Otto Buek, Albert Gorland, B. Kellermann合作编辑了11卷(柏林: Bruno Cassirer, 1912; 1922再版; 再编号, Hildesheim: Gerstenberg, 1973)。在由Artur Buchenau编辑的Cassirer的版本中, 康德的逻辑, 改名为康德关于逻辑的演讲。]

5 同上, 参见康德《纯粹理性批判》, B833。[习惯上, 《纯粹理性批判》第一版和第二版标明A和B。Raumund Schmidt的版本(第二版修订, 1930; 哲学书目Philosophische Bibliothek, 卷37a, Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1976), 统一了两种德文文本, 都不错, 且彼此接近。Norman Kemp Smith的翻译, 纯粹理性批判, 第二版(伦敦: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin出版, 1933)为标准。自从Schmidt 和Smith都给出了两种版本的边注。此版的引文仅给出英文标题和背景问题的参考。]

6 见康德《纯粹理性批判》, B844。

7 见康德《纯粹理性批判》, B868。[海德格尔的引用是对“Der Mensch ist ein Seiends, das als Zweck seiner selbst existiert”的简洁表达。他没有给出将它置于引文标记中, 所以可设想它不倾向于成为康德叙述的精确的再造物。在引用的这一段里, 康德没

有“als Zweck seiner selbst”、“作为它自身的终极”这样的表述。他所说的是“本质终极不是最高终极，仅能有唯一一个最高终极（在完全的理性体系里）。这样，它们既是最后终极或是意味着最后终极的附属终极。这一形式除了人的全部限定之外什么都不是，关于它的哲学就是伦理学。”我在这里把Bestimmung译为限定，亦适合。]

* 此类文章在1926年夏季学期和1926-1927冬季学期给出，本计划作为在数字上先于这里翻译的该卷的两卷出版于Marburg 大学演讲，演讲中1923-1928部分，文集集中的1923-1944部分：海德格尔，Gesamtausgabe, 卷22, Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie, 和卷23, Geschichte der a Philosophie von Thomas v. Aquin bis Kant (法兰克福: Vittorio Klostermann.)

1 见黑格尔, Samtliche Werke, Glockner编辑, 卷1, 页185-186。[引文将原文分为两点——一节在第185页的顶端, 逗号是在“Verstand”之后。短语“eine verkehrte Welt”, “一个颠倒的, 翻转的世界”, 黑格尔后来在现象学的一部分 (A, 3) 表述为“作用力和理解: 表象和超感觉的世界”。与原先的理解——翻转的世界使得由意识向自我意识, 甚至主体、理性和精神的转变成为可能——相反, 这是正确的。有趣的是, 黑格尔在1802年就用已经这样表述, 且确实是作为其所具备的哲学特性与常规科学比较的。这里, 在关于哲学性思考的特质的文章里, 海德格尔选择了于之有利的黑格尔这一早先的表述。海德格尔在此类文章中多次该表述; 见Lexicon: 翻转的世界。人们常见的说法是, “哲学的世界是一个疯狂的世界。”]

2 亚里士多德, 形而上学, book6, 1. 1028 b2ff.

附: 英文译本 [The Basic Problems of Phenomenology](#)

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The Basic Problems of Phenomenology

Introduction

Martin Heidegger (1927)

§ 1. Exposition and general division of the theme

This course sets for itself the task of posing the basic problems of phenomenology, elaborating them, and proceeding to some extent toward their solution. Phenomenology must develop its concept out of what it takes as its theme and how it investigates its object. Our considerations are aimed at the inherent content and inner systematic relationships of the basic problems. The goal is to achieve a fundamental illumination of these problems.

In negative terms this means that our purpose is not to acquire historical knowledge about the circumstances of the modern movement in philosophy called phenomenology. We shall be dealing not with phenomenology but with what phenomenology itself deals with. And, again, we do not wish merely to take note of it so as to be able to report then that phenomenology deals with this or that subject; instead, the course deals with the subject itself, and you yourself are supposed to deal with it, or learn how to do so, as the course proceeds. The point is not to gain some knowledge about philosophy but to be able to philosophise. An introduction to the basic problems could lead to that end.

And these basic problems themselves? Are we to take it on trust that the ones we discuss do in fact constitute the inventory of the basic problems? How shall we arrive at these basic problems? Not directly but by the roundabout way of a discussion of certain individual problems. From these we shall sift out the basic problems and determine their systematic interconnection. Such an understanding of the basic problems should yield insight into the degree to which philosophy as a science is necessarily demanded by them.

The course accordingly divides into three parts. At the outset we may outline them roughly as follows:

Concrete phenomenological inquiry leading to the basic problems

The basic problems of phenomenology in their systematic order and foundation

The scientific way of treating these problems and the idea of phenomenology

The path of our reflections will take us from certain individual problems to the basic problems. The question therefore arises, How are we to gain the starting point of our considerations? How shall we select and circumscribe the individual problems? Is this to be left to chance and arbitrary choice? In order to avoid the appearance that we have simply assembled a few problems at random, an introduction leading up to the individual problems is required.

It might be thought that the simplest and surest way would be to derive the concrete individual phenomenological problems from the concept of phenomenology. Phenomenology is essentially such and such; hence it encompasses such and such problems. But we have first of all to arrive at the concept of phenomenology. This route is accordingly closed to us. But to circumscribe the concrete problems we do not ultimately need a clear-cut and fully validated concept of phenomenology. Instead it might be enough to have some acquaintance with what is nowadays familiarly known by the name "phenomenology." Admittedly, within phenomenological inquiry there are again differing definitions of its nature and tasks. But, even if these differences in defining the nature of phenomenology could be brought to a consensus, it would remain doubtful whether the concept of phenomenology thus attained, a sort of average concept, could direct us toward the concrete problems to be chosen. For we should have to be certain beforehand that phenomenological inquiry today has reached the center of philosophy's problems and has defined its own nature by way of their possibilities. As we shall see, however, this is not the case - and so little is it the case that one of the main purposes of this course is to show that conceived in its basic tendency, phenomenological research can represent nothing less than the more explicit and more radical understanding of the idea of a scientific philosophy which philosophers from ancient times to Hegel sought to realize time and again in a variety of internally coherent endeavours.

Hitherto, phenomenology has been understood, even within that discipline itself, as a science propaedeutic to philosophy, preparing the ground for the proper philosophical disciplines of logic, ethics, aesthetics, and philosophy of religion. But in this definition of phenomenology as a preparatory science the traditional stock of philosophical disciplines is taken over without asking whether that same stock is not called in question and eliminated precisely by phenomenology itself. Does not phenomenology contain within itself the possibility of reversing the alienation of philosophy into these disciplines and of revitalising and reappropriating in its basic tendencies the great tradition of philosophy with its essential answers? We shall maintain that phenomenology is not just one philosophical science among others, nor is it the science preparatory to the rest of them; rather, the expression "phenomenology" is the name for the method of scientific philosophy in general.

Clarification of the idea of phenomenology is equivalent to exposition of the concept of scientific philosophy. To be sure, this does not yet tell us what phenomenology means as far as its content is concerned, and it tells us even less about how this method is to be put into practice. But it does indicate how and why we must avoid aligning ourselves with any contemporary tendency in phenomenology.

We shall not deduce the concrete phenomenological problems from some dogmatically proposed concept of phenomenology; on the contrary, we shall allow ourselves to be led to them by a more general and preparatory discussion of the concept of scientific philosophy in general. We shall conduct this discussion in tacit apposition to the basic tendencies of Western philosophy from antiquity to Hegel.

In the early period of ancient thought *philosophia* means the same as science in general. Later, individual philosophies, that is to say, individual sciences - medicine, for instance, and mathematics - become detached from philosophy. The term *philosophia* then refers to a science which underlies and encompasses all the other particular sciences. Philosophy becomes science pure and simple. More and more it takes itself to be the first and highest science or, as it was called during the period of German idealism, absolute science. If philosophy is absolute science, then the expression "scientific philosophy" contains a pleonasm. It then means scientific absolute science. It suffices simply to say "philosophy." This already implies science pure and simple. Why then do we still add the adjective "scientific" to the expression "philosophy"? A science, not to speak of absolute science, is scientific by the very meaning of the term. We speak of "scientific philosophy" principally because conceptions of philosophy prevail which not only imperil but even negate its character as science pure and simple. These conceptions of philosophy are not just contemporary but accompany the development of scientific philosophy throughout the time philosophy has existed as a science. On this view philosophy is supposed not only, and not in the first place, to be a theoretical science, but to give practical guidance to our view of things and their interconnection and our attitudes toward them, and to regulate and direct our interpretation of existence and its meaning. Philosophy is wisdom of the world and of life, or, to use an expression current nowadays, philosophy is supposed to provide a *Weltanschauung*, a world-view. Scientific philosophy can thus be set off against philosophy as world-view.

We shall try to examine this distinction more critically and to decide whether it is valid or whether it has to be absorbed into one of its members. In this way the concept of philosophy should become clear to us and put us in a position to justify the selection of the individual problems to be dealt with in the first part. It should be borne in mind here that these discussions concerning the concept of philosophy can be only provisional - provisional not just in regard to the course as a whole but provisional in general. For the concept of philosophy is the most proper and highest result of philosophy itself. Similarly, the question whether philosophy is at all possible or not can be decided only by philosophy itself.

§ 2. The concept of philosophy

Philosophy and world-view

In discussing the difference between scientific philosophy and philosophy as world-view, we may fittingly start from the latter notion and begin with the term "*Weltanschauung*," "world-view." This expression is not a translation from Greek, say, or Latin. There is no such expression as *kosmotheoria*. The word "*Weltanschauung*" is of specifically German coinage; it was in fact coined within philosophy. It first turns up in its natural meaning in Kant's *Critique of Judgment* - world-intuition in the sense of contemplation of the world given to the senses or, as Kant says, the *mundus sensibilis* - a beholding of the world as simple apprehension of nature in the broadest sense. Goethe and Alexander von Humboldt thereupon use the word in this way. This usage dies out in the thirties of the last century under the influence of a new meaning given to the expression "*Weltanschauung*" by the Romantics and principally by Schelling. In the Introduction to the draft of a *System of Philosophy of Nature*, (1799), Schelling says: "Intelligence is productive in a double manner, either blindly and unconsciously or freely and consciously; it is unconsciously productive in *Weltanschauung* and consciously productive in the creation of an ideal world." Here *Weltanschauung* is directly assigned not to sense-observation but to intelligence, albeit to unconscious intelligence. Moreover, the factor of productivity, the independent formative process of intuition, is emphasised. Thus the word approaches the meaning we are familiar with today, a self-realised, productive as well as conscious way of apprehending and interpreting the universe of beings. Schelling speaks of a schematism of *Weltanschauung*, a schematised form for the different possible world-views which appear and take shape in fact. A view of the world, understood in this way, does not have to be produced with a theoretical intention and with the means of theoretical science. In his *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel speaks of a "moral world-view." G?rres makes use of the expression "poetic world-view." Ranke speaks of the "religious and Christian world-view." Mention is made sometimes of the democratic, sometimes of the pessimistic world-view or even of the medieval world-view. Schleiermacher says: "It is only our world-view that makes our knowledge of God complete." Bismarck

at one point writes to his bride: "What strange views of the world there are among clever people!" From the forms and possibilities of world-view thus enumerated it becomes clear that what is meant by this term is not only a conception of the contexture of natural things but at the same time an interpretation of the sense and purpose of the human Dasein [the being that we are ourselves] and hence of history. A world-view always includes a view of life. A world-view grows out of an all-inclusive reflection on the world and the human Dasein, and this again happens in different ways, explicitly and consciously in individuals or by appropriating an already prevalent world-view. We grow up within such a world-view and gradually become accustomed to it. Our world-view is determined by environment - people, race, class, developmental stage of culture. Every world-view thus individually formed arises out of a natural world-view, out of a range of conceptions of the world and determinations of the human Dasein which are at any particular time given more or less explicitly with each such Dasein. We must distinguish the individually formed world-view or the cultural world-view from the natural world-view.

A world-view is not a matter of theoretical knowledge, either in respect of its origin or in relation to its use. It is not simply retained in memory like a parcel of cognitive property. Rather, it is a matter of a coherent conviction which determines the current affairs of life more or less expressly and directly. A world-view is related in its meaning to the particular contemporary Dasein at any given time. In this relationship to the Dasein the world-view is a guide to it and a source of strength under pressure. Whether the world-view is determined by superstitions and prejudices or is based purely on scientific knowledge and experience or even, as is usually the case, is a mixture of superstition and knowledge, prejudice and sober reason it all comes to the same thing; nothing essential is changed.

This indication of the characteristic traits of what we mean by the term "world-view" may suffice here. A rigorous definition of it would have to be gained in another way, as we shall see. In his *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*, Jaspers says that "when we speak of world-views we mean Ideas, what is ultimate and total in man, both subjectively, as life-experience and power and character, and objectively, as a world having objective shape." For our purpose of distinguishing between philosophy as world-view and scientific philosophy, it is above all important to see that the world-view, in its meaning, always arises out of the particular factual existence of the human being in accordance with his factual possibilities of thoughtful reflection and attitude-formation, and it arises thus for this factual Dasein. The world-view is something that in each case exists historically from, with, and for the factual Dasein. A philosophical world-view is one that expressly and explicitly or at any rate preponderantly has to be worked out and brought about by philosophy, that is to say, by theoretical speculation, to the exclusion of artistic and religious interpretations of the world and the Dasein. This world-view is not a by-product of philosophy; its cultivation, rather, is the proper goal and nature of philosophy itself. In its very concept philosophy is world-view philosophy, philosophy as world-view. If philosophy in the form of theoretical knowledge of the world aims at what is universal in the world and ultimate for the Dasein - the whence, the whither, and the wherefore of the world and life - then this differentiates it from the particular sciences, which always consider only a particular region of the world and the Dasein, as well as from the artistic and religious attitudes, which are not based primarily on the theoretical attitude. It seems to be without question that philosophy has as its goal the formation of a world-view. This task must define the nature and concept of philosophy. Philosophy, it appears, is so essentially world-view philosophy that it would be preferable to reject this latter expression as an unnecessary overstatement. And what is even more, to propose to strive for a scientific philosophy is a misunderstanding. For the philosophical world-view, it is said, naturally ought to be scientific. By this is meant: first, that it should take cognisance of the results of the different sciences and use them in constructing the world-picture and the interpretation of the Dasein; secondly, that it ought to be scientific by forming the world-view in strict conformity with the rules of scientific thought. This conception of philosophy as the formation of a world-view in a theoretical way is so much taken for granted that it commonly and widely defines the concept of philosophy and consequently also prescribes for the popular mind what is to be and what ought to be expected of philosophy. Conversely, if philosophy does not give satisfactory answers to the questions of world-view, the popular mind regards it as insignificant. Demands made on philosophy and attitudes taken toward it are governed by this notion of it as the scientific construction of a world-view. To determine whether philosophy succeeds or fails in this task, its history is examined for unequivocal confirmation that it deals knowingly with the ultimate questions - of nature, of the soul, that is to say, of the freedom and history of man, of God.

If philosophy is the scientific construction of a world-view, then the distinction between "scientific philosophy" and "philosophy as world-view" vanishes. The two together constitute the essence of philosophy, so that what is really emphasised ultimately is the task of the world-view. This seems also to be the view of Kant, who put the scientific character of philosophy on a new basis. We need only recall the distinction he drew in the introduction to the *Logic*

between the academic and the cosmic conceptions of philosophy. Here we turn to an oft-quoted Kantian distinction which apparently supports the distinction between scientific philosophy and philosophy as world-view or, more exactly, serves as evidence for the fact that Kant himself, for whom the scientific character of philosophy was central, likewise conceives of philosophy as philosophical world-view.

According to the academic concept or, as Kant also says, in the scholastic sense, philosophy is the doctrine of the skill of reason and includes two parts: "first, a sufficient stock of rational cognitions from concepts; and, secondly, a systematic interconnection of these cognitions or a combination of them in the idea of a whole." Kant is here thinking of the fact that philosophy in the scholastic sense includes the interconnection of the formal principles of thought and of reason in general as well as the discussion and determination of those concepts which, as a necessary presupposition, underlie our apprehension of the world, that is to say, for Kant, of nature. According to the academic concept, philosophy is the whole of all the formal and material fundamental concepts and principles of rational knowledge.

Kant defines the cosmic concept of philosophy or, as he also says, philosophy in the cosmopolitan sense, as follows: "But as regards philosophy in the cosmic sense (*in sensu cosmico*), it can also be called a science of the supreme maxims of the use of our reason, understanding by 'maxim' the inner principle of choice among diverse ends." Philosophy in the cosmic sense deals with that for the sake of which all use of reason, including that of philosophy itself, is what it is. "For philosophy in the latter sense is indeed the science of the relation of every use of knowledge and reason to the final purpose of human reason, under which, as the supreme end, all other ends are subordinated and must come together into unity in it. In this cosmopolitan sense the field of philosophy can be defined by the following questions: 1) What can I know? 2) What should I do? 3) What may I hope? 4) What is man?" At bottom, says Kant, the first three questions are concentrated in the fourth, "What is man?" For the determination of the final ends of human reason results from the explanation of what man is. It is to these ends that philosophy in the academic sense also must relate.

Does this Kantian separation between philosophy in the scholastic sense and philosophy in the cosmopolitan sense coincide with the distinction between scientific philosophy and philosophy as world-view? Yes and no. Yes, since Kant after all makes a distinction within the concept of philosophy and, on the basis of this distinction, makes the questions of the end and limits of human existence central. No, since philosophy in the cosmic sense does not have the task of developing a world-view in the designated sense. What Kant ultimately has in mind as the task of philosophy in the cosmic sense, without being able to say so explicitly, is nothing but the a priori and therefore ontological circumscription of the characteristics which belong to the essential nature of the human Dasein and which also generally determine the concept of a world-view. As the most fundamental a priori determination of the essential nature of the human Dasein Kant recognises the proposition: Man is a being which exists as its own end. Philosophy in the cosmic sense, as Kant understands it, also has to do with determinations of essential nature. It does not seek a specific factual account of the merely factually known world and the merely factually lived life; rather, it seeks to delimit what belongs to world in general, to the Dasein in general, and thus to world-view in general. Philosophy in the cosmic sense has for Kant exactly the same methodological character as philosophy in the academic sense, except that for reasons which we shall not discuss here in further detail Kant does not see the connection between the two. More precisely, he does not see the basis for establishing both concepts on a common original ground. We shall deal with this later on. For the present it is clear only that, if philosophy is viewed as being the scientific construction of a world-view, appeal should not be made to Kant. Fundamentally, Kant recognises only philosophy as science.

A world-view, as we saw, springs in every case from a factual Dasein in accordance with its factual possibilities, and it is what it is always for this particular Dasein. This in no way asserts a relativism of world-views. What a world-view fashioned in this way says can be formulated in propositions and rules which are related in their meaning to a specific really existing world, to the particular factually existing Dasein. Every world-view and life-view posits; that is to say, it is related being-ly to some being or beings. It posits a being, something that is; it is positive. A world-view belongs to each Dasein and, like this Dasein, it is always in fact determined historically. To the world-view there belongs this multiple positivity that it is always rooted in a Dasein which is in such and such a way; that as such it relates to the existing world and points to the factually existent Dasein. It is just because this positivity – that is, the relatedness to beings, to world that is, Dasein that is – belongs to the essence of the world-view, and thus in general to the formation of the world-view, that the formation of a world-view cannot be the task of philosophy. To say this is not to exclude but to include the idea that philosophy itself is a distinctive primal form of world-view. Philosophy can and perhaps must show, among many other things, that something like a world-view belongs to the essential nature of the Dasein. Philosophy can and must define what in general constitutes the structure of a world-view. But it can never develop and posit some specific world-view qua just this or that particular one. Philosophy is not essentially

the formation of a world-view; but perhaps just on this account it has an elementary and fundamental relation to all world-view formation, even to that which is not theoretical but factually historical.

The thesis that world-view formation does not belong to the task of philosophy is valid, of course, only on the presupposition that philosophy does not relate in a positive manner to some being qua this or that particular being, that it does not posit a being. Can this presupposition that philosophy does not relate positively to beings, as the sciences do, be justified? What then is philosophy supposed to concern itself with if not with beings, with that which is, as well as with the whole of what is? What is not, is surely the nothing. Should philosophy, then, as absolute science, have the nothing as its theme? What can there be apart from nature, history, God, space, number? We say of each of these, even though in a different sense, that it is. We call it a being. In relating to it, whether theoretically or practically, we are comporting ourselves toward a being. Beyond all these beings there is nothing. Perhaps there is no other being beyond what has been enumerated, but perhaps, as in the German idiom for "there is," es gibt [literally, it gives], still something else is given, something else which indeed is not but which nevertheless, in a sense yet to be determined, is given. Even more. In the end something is given which must be given if we are to be able to make beings accessible to us as beings and comport ourselves toward them, something which, to be sure, is not but which must be given if we are to experience and understand any beings at all. We are able to grasp beings as such, as beings, only if we understand something like being. If we did not understand, even though at first roughly and without conceptual comprehension, what actuality signifies, then the actual would remain hidden from us. If we did not understand what reality means, then the real would remain inaccessible. If we did not understand what life and vitality signify, then we would not be able to comport ourselves toward living beings. If we did not understand what existence and existentiality signify, then we ourselves would not be able to exist as Dasein. If we did not understand what permanence and constancy signify, then constant geometric relations or numerical proportions would remain a secret to us. We must understand actuality, reality, vitality, existentiality, constancy in order to be able to comport ourselves positively toward specifically actual, real, living, existing, constant beings. We must understand being so that we may be able to be given over to a world that is, so that we can exist in it and be our own Dasein itself as a being. We must be able to understand actuality before all factual experience of actual beings. This understanding of actuality or of being in the widest sense as over against the experience of beings is in a certain sense earlier than the experience of beings. To say that the understanding of being precedes all factual experience of beings does not mean that we would first need to have an explicit concept of being in order to experience beings theoretically or practically. We must understand being - being, which may no longer itself be called a being, being, which does not occur as a being among other beings but which nevertheless must be given and in fact is given in the understanding of being.

§ 3. Philosophy as science of being

We assert now that being is the proper and sole theme of philosophy. This is not our own invention; it is a way of putting the theme which comes to life at the beginning of philosophy in antiquity, and it assumes its most grandiose form in Hegel's logic. At present we are merely asserting that being is the proper and sole theme of philosophy. Negatively, this means that philosophy is not a science of beings but of being or, as the Greek expression goes, ontology. We take this expression in the widest possible sense and not in the narrower one it has, say, in Scholasticism or in modern philosophy in Descartes and Leibniz.

A discussion of the basic problems of phenomenology then is tantamount to providing fundamental substantiation for this assertion that philosophy is the science of being and establishing how it is such. The discussion should show the possibility and necessity of the absolute science of being and demonstrate its character in the very process of the inquiry. Philosophy is the theoretical conceptual interpretation of being, of being's structure and its possibilities. Philosophy is ontological. In contrast, a world-view is a positing knowledge of beings and a positing attitude toward beings; it is not ontological but ontical. The formation of a world-view falls outside the range of philosophy's tasks, but not because philosophy is in an incomplete condition and does not yet suffice to give a unanimous and universally cogent answer to the questions pertinent to world-views; rather, the formation of a world-view falls outside the range of philosophy's tasks because philosophy in principle does not relate to beings. It is not because of a defect that philosophy renounces the task of forming a world-view but because of a distinctive priority: it deals with what every positing of beings, even the positing done by a world-view, must already presuppose essentially. The distinction between philosophy as science and philosophy as world-view is untenable, not - as it seemed earlier - because scientific philosophy has as its chief end the formation of a world-view and thus would have to be elevated to the level of a world-view philosophy, but because the notion of a world-view philosophy is simply inconceivable. For it implies that

philosophy, as science of being, is supposed to adopt specific attitudes toward and posit specific things about beings. To anyone who has even an approximate understanding of the concept of philosophy and its history, the notion of a world-view philosophy is an absurdity. If one term of the distinction between scientific philosophy and world-view philosophy is inconceivable, then the other, too, must be inappropriately conceived. Once it has been seen that world-view philosophy is impossible in principle if it is supposed to be philosophy, then the differentiating adjective "scientific" is no longer necessary for characterising philosophy. That philosophy is scientific is implied in its very concept. It can be shown historically that at bottom all the great philosophies since antiquity more or less explicitly took themselves to be, and as such sought to be, ontology. In a similar way, however, it can also be shown that these attempts failed over and over again and why they had to fail. I gave the historical proof of this in my courses of the last two semesters, one on ancient philosophy and the other on the history of philosophy from Thomas Aquinas to Kant. We shall not now refer to this historical demonstration of the nature of philosophy, a demonstration having its own peculiar character. Let us rather in the whole of the present course try to establish philosophy on its own basis, so far as it is a work of human freedom. Philosophy must legitimate by its own resources its claim to be universal ontology.

In the meantime, however, the statement that philosophy is the science of being remains a pure assertion. Correspondingly, the elimination of world-view formation from the range of philosophical tasks has not yet been warranted. We raised this distinction between scientific philosophy and world-view philosophy in order to give a provisional clarification of the concept of philosophy and to demarcate it from the popular concept. The clarification and demarcation, again, were provided in order to account for the selection of the concrete phenomenological problems to be dealt with next and to remove from the choice the appearance of complete arbitrariness.

Philosophy is the science of being. For the future we shall mean by "philosophy" scientific philosophy and nothing else. In conformity with this usage, all non-philosophical sciences have as their theme some being or beings, and indeed in such a way that they are in every case antecedently given as beings to those sciences. They are posited by them in advance; they are a positum for them. All the propositions of the non-philosophical sciences, including those of mathematics, are positive propositions. Hence, to distinguish them from philosophy, we shall call all non-philosophical sciences positive sciences. Positive sciences deal with that which is, with beings; that is to say, they always deal with specific domains, for instance, nature. Within a given domain scientific research again cuts out particular spheres: nature as physically material lifeless nature and nature as living nature. It divides the sphere of the living into individual fields: the plant world, the animal world. Another domain of beings is history; its spheres are art history, political history, history of science, and history of religion. Still another domain of beings is the pure space of geometry, which is abstracted from space pre-theoretically uncovered in the environing world. The beings of these domains are familiar to us even if at first and for the most part we are not in a position to delimit them sharply and clearly from one another. We can, of course, always name, as a provisional description which satisfies practically the purpose of positive science, some being that falls within the domain. We can always bring before ourselves, as it were, a particular being from a particular domain as an example. Historically, the actual partitioning of domains comes about not according to some preconceived plan of a system of science but in conformity with the current research problems of the positive sciences.

We can always easily bring forward and picture to ourselves some being belonging to any given domain. As we are accustomed to say, we are able to think something about it. What is the situation here with philosophy's object? Can something like being be imagined? If we try to do this, doesn't our head start to swim? Indeed, at first we are baffled and find ourselves clutching at thin air. A being - that's something, a table, a chair, a tree, the sky, a body, some words, an action. A being, yes, indeed - but being? It looks like nothing - and no less a thinker than Hegel said that being and nothing are the same. Is philosophy as science of being the science of nothing? At the outset of our considerations, without raising any false hopes and without mincing matters, we must confess that under the heading of being we can at first think to ourselves nothing. On the other hand, it is just as certain that we are constantly thinking being. We think being just as often as, daily, on innumerable occasions, whether aloud or silently, we say "This is such and such," "That other is not so," "That was," "It will be." In each use of a verb we have already thought, and have always in some way understood, being. We understand immediately "Today is Saturday; the sun is up." We understand the "is" we use in speaking, although we do not comprehend it conceptually. The meaning of this "is" remains closed to us. This understanding of the "is" and of being in general is so much a matter of course that it was possible for the dogma to spread in philosophy uncontested to the present day that being is the simplest and most self-evident concept, that it is neither susceptible of nor in need of definition. Appeal is made to common sense. But wherever

common sense is taken to be philosophy's highest court of appeal, philosophy must become suspicious. In *On the Essence of Philosophical Criticism*, Hegel says: "Philosophy by its very nature is esoteric; for itself it is neither made for the masses nor is it susceptible of being cooked up for them. It is philosophy only because it goes exactly contrary to the understanding and thus even more so to 'sound common sense,' the so-called healthy human understanding, which actually means the local and temporary vision of some limited generation of human beings. To that generation the world of philosophy is in and for itself a topsy-turvy, an inverted, world. The demands and standards of common sense have no right to claim any validity or to represent any authority in regard to what philosophy is and what it is not.

What if being were the most complex and most obscure concept? What if arriving at the concept of being were the most urgent task of philosophy, the task which has to be taken up ever anew? Today, when philosophising is so barbarous, so much like a St. Vitus' dance, as perhaps in no other period of the cultural history of the West, and when nevertheless the resurrection of metaphysics is hawked up and down all the streets, what Aristotle says on one of his most important investigations in the *Metaphysics* has been completely forgotten. "That which has been sought for from of old and now and in the future and constantly, and that on which inquiry founders over and over again, is the problem What is being?" If philosophy is the science of being, then the first and last and basic problem of philosophy must be, What does being signify? Whence can something like being in general be understood? How is understanding of being at all possible?

§ 4. The four theses about being and the basic problems of phenomenology

Before we broach these fundamental questions, it will be worthwhile first to make ourselves familiar for once with discussions about being. To this end we shall deal in the first part of the course with some characteristic theses about being as individual concrete phenomenological problems, theses that have been advocated in the course of the history of Western philosophy since antiquity. In this connection we are interested, not in the historical contexts of the philosophical inquiries within which these theses about being make their appearance, but in their specifically inherent content. This content is to be discussed critically, so that we may make the transition from it to the above-mentioned basic problems of the science of being. The discussion of these theses should at the same time render us familiar with the phenomenological way of dealing with problems relating to being. We choose four such theses: Kant's thesis: Being is not a real predicate.

The thesis of medieval ontology (Scholasticism) which goes back to Aristotle: To the constitution of the being of a being there belong (a) whatness, essence (*Was-sein*, *essentia*), and (b) existence or extantness (*existentia*, *Vorhandensein*).

The thesis of modern ontology: The basic ways of being are the being of nature (*res extensa*) and the being of mind (*res cogitans*).

The thesis of logic in the broadest sense: Every being, regardless of its particular way of being, can be addressed and talked about by means of the "is." The being of the copula.

These theses seem at first to have been gathered together arbitrarily. Looked at more closely, however, they are interconnected in a most intimate way. Attention to what is denoted in these theses leads to the insight that they cannot be brought up adequately - not even as problems - as long as the fundamental question of the whole science of being has not been put and answered: the question of the meaning of being in general. The second part of our course will deal with this question. Discussion of the basic question of the meaning of being in general and of the problems arising from that question constitutes the entire stock of basic problems of phenomenology in their systematic order and their foundation. For the present we delineate the range of these problems only roughly.

On what path can we advance toward the meaning of being in general? Is not the question of the meaning of being and the task of an elucidation of this concept a pseudo-problem if, as usual, the opinion is held dogmatically that being is the most general and simplest concept? What is the source for defining this concept and in what direction is it to be resolved?

Something like being reveals itself to us in the understanding of being, an understanding that lies at the root of all comportment toward beings. Comportment toward beings belongs, on its part, to a definite being, the being which we ourselves are, the human *Dasein*. It is to the human *Dasein* that there belongs the understanding of being which first of

all makes possible every comportment toward beings. The understanding of being has itself the mode of being of the human Dasein. The more originally and appropriately we define this being in regard to the structure of its being, that is to say, ontologically, the more securely we are placed in a position to comprehend in its structure the understanding of being that belongs to the Dasein, and the more clearly and unequivocally the question can then be posed, What is it that makes this understanding of being possible at all? Whence – that is, from which antecedently given horizon – do we understand the like of being?

The analysis of the understanding of being in regard to what is specific to this understanding and what is understood in it or its intelligibility presupposes an analytic of the Dasein ordered to that end. This analytic has the task of exhibiting the basic constitution of the human Dasein and of characterising the meaning of the Dasein's being. In this ontological analytic of the Dasein, the original constitution of the Dasein's being is revealed to be temporality. The interpretation of temporality leads to a more radical understanding and conceptual comprehension of time than has been possible hitherto in philosophy. The familiar concept of time as traditionally treated in philosophy is only an offshoot of temporality as the original meaning of the Dasein. If temporality constitutes the meaning of the being of the human Dasein and if understanding of being belongs to the constitution of the Dasein's being, then this understanding of being, too, must be possible only on the basis of temporality. Hence there arises the prospect of a possible confirmation of the thesis that time is the horizon from which something like being becomes at all intelligible. We interpret being by way of time (tempus). The interpretation is a Temporal one. The fundamental subject of research in ontology, as determination of the meaning of being by way of time, is Temporality.

We said that ontology is the science of being. But being is always the being of a being. Being is essentially different from a being, from beings. How is the distinction between being and beings to be grasped? How can its possibility be explained? If being is not itself a being, how then does it nevertheless belong to beings, since, after all, beings and only beings are? What does it mean to say that being belongs to beings? The correct answer to this question is the basic presupposition needed to set about the problems of ontology regarded as the science of being. We must be able to bring out clearly the difference between being and beings in order to make something like being the theme of inquiry. This distinction is not arbitrary; rather, it is the one by which the theme of ontology and thus of philosophy itself is first of all attained. It is a distinction which is first and foremost constitutive for ontology. We call it the ontological difference – the differentiation between being and beings. Only by making this distinction – *krinein* in Greek – not between one being and another being but between being and beings do we first enter the field of philosophical research. Only by taking this critical stance do we keep our own standing inside the field of philosophy. Therefore, in distinction from the sciences of the things that are, of beings, ontology, or philosophy in general, is the critical science, or the science of the inverted world. With this distinction between being and beings and that selection of being as theme we depart in principle from the domain of beings. We surmount it, transcend it. We can also call the science of being, a critical science, transcendental science. In doing so we are not simply taking over unaltered the concept of the transcendental in Kant, although we are indeed adopting its original sense and its true tendency, perhaps still concealed from Kant. We are surmounting beings in order to reach being. Once having made the ascent we shall not again descend to a being, which, say, might lie like another world behind the familiar beings. The transcendental science of being has nothing to do with popular metaphysics, which deals with some being behind the known beings; rather, the scientific concept of metaphysics is identical with the concept of philosophy in general – critically transcendental science of being, ontology. It is easily seen that the ontological difference can be cleared up and carried out unambiguously for ontological inquiry only if and when the meaning of being in general has been explicitly brought to light, that is to say, only when it has been shown how temporality makes possible the distinguishability between being and beings. Only on the basis of this consideration can the Kantian thesis that being is not a real predicate be given its original sense and adequately explained.

Every being is something, it has its what and as such has a specific possible mode of being. In the first part of our course, while discussing the second thesis, we shall show that ancient as well as medieval ontology dogmatically enunciated this proposition – that to each being there belongs a what and way of being, *essentia* and *existentia* – as if it were self-evident. For us the question arises, Can the reason every being must and can have a what, a *ti*, and a possible way of being be grounded in the meaning of being itself, that is to say, Temporally? Do these characteristics, whatness and way of being, taken with sufficient breadth, belong to being itself? "Is" being articulated by means of these characteristics in accordance with its essential nature? With this we are now confronted by the problem of the basic articulation of being, the question of the necessary belonging-together of whatness and way-of-being and of the belonging of the two of them in their unity to the idea of being in general.

Every being has a way-of-being. The question is whether this way-of-being has the same character in every being – as ancient ontology believed and subsequent periods have basically had to maintain even down to the present – or whether individual ways-of-being are mutually distinct. Which are the basic ways of being? Is there a multiplicity? How is the variety of ways-of-being possible and how is it at all intelligible, given the meaning of being? How can we speak at all of a unitary concept of being despite the variety of ways-of-being? These questions can be consolidated into the problem of the possible modifications of being and the unity of being's variety.

Every being with which we have any dealings can be addressed and spoken of by saying "it is" thus and so, regardless of its specific mode of being. We meet with a being's being in the understanding of being. It is understanding that first of all opens up or, as we say, discloses or reveals something like being. Being is given only in the specific disclosedness that characterises the understanding of being. But we call the disclosedness of something truth. That is the proper concept of truth, as it already begins to dawn in antiquity. Being is given only if there is disclosure, that is to say, if there is truth. But there is truth only if a being exists which opens up, which discloses, and indeed in such a way that disclosure itself belongs to the mode of being of this being. We ourselves are such a being. The Dasein itself exists in the truth. To the Dasein there belongs essentially a disclosed world and with that the disclosedness of the Dasein itself. The Dasein, by the nature of its existence, is "in" truth, and only because it is "in" truth does it have the possibility of being "in" untruth. Being is given only if truth, hence if the Dasein, exists. And only for this reason is it not merely possible to address beings but within certain limits sometimes – presupposing that the Dasein exists – necessary. We shall consolidate these problems of the interconnectedness between being and truth into the problem of the truth-character of being (*veritas transcendentalis*).

We have thus identified four groups of problems that constitute the content of the second part of the course: the problem of the ontological difference, the problem of the basic articulation of being, the problem of the possible modifications of being in its ways of being, the problem of the truth-character of being. The four theses treated provisionally in the first part correspond to these four basic problems. More precisely, looking backward from the discussion of the basic problems in the second half, we see that the problems with which we are provisionally occupied in the first part, following the lead of these theses, are not accidental but grow out of the inner systematic coherence of the general problem of being.

§ 5. The character of ontological method

The three basic components of Phenomenological method

Our conduct of the ontological investigation in the first and second parts opens up for us at the same time a view of the way in which these phenomenological investigations proceed. This raises the question of the character of method in ontology. Thus we come to the third part of the course: the scientific method of ontology and the idea of phenomenology.

The method of ontology, that is, of philosophy in general, is distinguished by the fact that ontology has nothing in common with any method of any of the other sciences, all of which as positive sciences deal with beings. On the other hand, it is precisely the analysis of the truth-character of being which shows that being also is, as it were, based in a being, namely, in the Dasein. Being is given only if the understanding of being, hence the Dasein, exists. This being accordingly lays claim to a distinctive priority in ontological inquiry. It makes itself manifest in all discussions of the basic problems of ontology and above all in the fundamental question of the meaning of being in general. The elaboration of this question and its answer requires a general analytic of the Dasein. Ontology has for its fundamental discipline the analytic of the Dasein. This implies at the same time that ontology cannot be established in a purely ontological manner. Its possibility is referred back to a being, that is, to something ontical – the Dasein. Ontology has an ontical foundation, a fact which is manifest over and over again in the history of philosophy down to the present. For example, it is expressed as early as Aristotle's dictum that the first science, the science of being, is theology. As the work of the freedom of the human Dasein, the possibilities and destinies of philosophy are bound up with man's existence, and thus with temporality and with historicity, and indeed in a more original sense than is any other science. Consequently, in clarifying the scientific character of ontology, the first task is the demonstration of its ontical foundation and the characterisation of this foundation itself.

The second task consists in distinguishing the mode of knowing operative in ontology as science of being, and this requires us to work out the methodological structure of ontological-transcendental differentiation. In early antiquity

it was already seen that being and its attributes in a certain way underlie beings and precede them and so are a proteron, an earlier. The term denoting this character by which being precedes beings is the expression a priori, apriority, being earlier or prior. As a priori, being is earlier than beings. The meaning of this a priori, the sense of the earlier and its possibility, has never been cleared up. The question has not even once been raised as to why the determinations of being and being itself must have the character of priority and how such priority is possible. To be earlier is a determination of time, but it does not pertain to the temporal order of the time that we measure by the clock; rather, it is an earlier that belongs to the "inverted world." Therefore, this earlier which characterises being is taken by the popular understanding to be the later. Only the interpretation of being by way of temporality can make clear why and how this feature of being earlier, apriority, goes together with being. The a priori character of being and of all the structures of being accordingly calls for a specific kind of approach and way of apprehending being - a priori cognition.

The basic components of a priori cognition constitute what we call phenomenology. Phenomenology is the name for the method of ontology, that is, of scientific philosophy. Rightly conceived, phenomenology is the concept of a method. It is therefore precluded from the start that phenomenology should pronounce any theses about being which have specific content, thus adopting a so-called standpoint.

We shall not enter into detail concerning which ideas about phenomenology are current today, instigated in part by phenomenology itself. We shall touch briefly on just one example. It has been said that my work is Catholic phenomenology - presumably because it is my conviction that thinkers like Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus also understood something of philosophy, perhaps more than the moderns. But the concept of a Catholic phenomenology is even more absurd than the concept of a Protestant mathematics. Philosophy as science of being is fundamentally distinct in method from any other science. The distinction in method between, say, mathematics and classical philology is not as great as the difference between mathematics and philosophy or between philology and philosophy. The breadth of the difference between philosophy and the positive sciences, to which mathematics and philology belong, cannot at all be estimated quantitatively. In ontology, being is supposed to be grasped and comprehended conceptually by way of the phenomenological method, in connection with which we may observe that, while phenomenology certainly arouses lively interest today, what it seeks and aims at was already vigorously pursued in Western philosophy from the very beginning.

Being is to be laid hold of and made our theme. Being is always being of beings and accordingly it becomes accessible at first only by starting with some being. Here the phenomenological vision which does the apprehending must indeed direct itself toward a being, but it has to do so in such a way that the being of this being is thereby brought out so that it may be possible to mathematise it. Apprehension of being, ontological investigation, always turns, at first and necessarily, to some being; but then, in a precise way, it is led away from that being and led back to its being. We call this basic component of phenomenological method - the leading back or reduction of investigative vision from a naively apprehended being to being phenomenological reduction. We are thus adopting a central term of Husserl's phenomenology in its literal wording though not in its substantive intent. For Husserl the phenomenological reduction, which he worked out for the first time expressly in the *Ideas Toward a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* (1913), is the method of leading phenomenological vision from the natural attitude of the human being whose life is involved in the world of things and persons back to the transcendental life of consciousness and its noetic-noematic experiences, in which objects are constituted as correlates of consciousness. For us phenomenological reduction means leading phenomenological vision back from the apprehension of a being, whatever may be the character of that apprehension, to the understanding of the being of this being (projecting upon the way it is unconcealed). Like every other scientific method, phenomenological method grows and changes due to the progress made precisely with its help into the subjects under investigation. Scientific method is never a technique. As soon as it becomes one it has fallen away from its own proper nature.

Phenomenological reduction as the leading of our vision from beings to being nevertheless is not the only basic component of phenomenological method; in fact, it is not even the central component. For this guidance of vision back from beings to being requires at the same time that we should bring ourselves forward toward being itself. Pure aversion from beings is a merely negative methodological measure which not only needs to be supplemented by a positive one but expressly requires us to be led toward being; it thus requires guidance. Being does not become accessible like a being. We do not simply find it in front of us. As is to be shown, it must always be brought to view in a free projection. This projecting of the antecedently given being upon its being and the structures of its being we call phenomenological construction.

But the method of phenomenology is likewise not exhausted by phenomenological construction. We have heard that every projection of being occurs in a reductive recursion from beings. The consideration of being takes its start from beings. This commencement is obviously always determined by the factual experience of beings and the range of possibilities of experience that at any time are peculiar to a factual Dasein, and hence to the historical situation of a philosophical investigation. It is not the case that at all times and for everyone all beings and all specific domains of beings are accessible in the same way; and, even if beings are accessible inside the range of experience, the question still remains whether, within naive and common experience, they are already suitably understood in their specific mode of being. Because the Dasein is historical in its own existence, possibilities of access and modes of interpretation of beings are themselves diverse, varying in different historical circumstances. A glance at the history of philosophy shows that many domains of beings were discovered very early – nature, space, the soul – but that, nevertheless, they could not yet be comprehended in their specific being. As early as antiquity a common or average concept of being came to light, which was employed for the interpretation of all the beings of the various domains of being and their modes of being, although their specific being itself, taken expressly in its structure, was not made into a problem and could not be defined. Thus Plato saw quite well that the soul, with its logos, is a being different from sensible being. But he was not in a position to demarcate the specific mode of being of this being from the mode of being of any other being or non-being. Instead, for him as well as for Aristotle and subsequent thinkers down to Hegel, and all the more so for their successors, all ontological investigations proceed within an average concept of being in general. Even the ontological investigation which we are now conducting is determined by its historical situation and, therewith, by certain possibilities of approaching beings and by the preceding philosophical tradition. The store of basic philosophical concepts derived from the philosophical tradition is still so influential today that this effect of tradition can hardly be overestimated. It is for this reason that all philosophical discussion, even the most radical attempt to begin all over again, is pervaded by traditional concepts and thus by traditional horizons and traditional angles of approach, which we cannot assume with unquestionable certainty to have arisen originally and genuinely from the domain of being and the constitution of being they claim to comprehend. It is for this reason that there necessarily belongs to the conceptual interpretation of being and its structures, that is, to the reductive construction of being, a destruction – a critical process in which the traditional concepts, which at first must necessarily be employed, are deconstructed down to the sources from which they were drawn. Only by means of this destruction can ontology fully assure itself in a phenomenological way of the genuine character of its concepts.

These three basic components of phenomenological method – reduction, construction, destruction – belong together in their content and must receive grounding in their mutual pertinence. Construction in philosophy is necessarily destruction, that is to say, a de-constructing of traditional concepts carried out in a historical recursion to the tradition. And this is not a negation of the tradition or a condemnation of it as worthless; quite the reverse, it signifies precisely a positive appropriation of tradition. Because destruction belongs to construction, philosophical cognition is essentially at the same time, in a certain sense, historical cognition. History of philosophy, as it is called, belongs to the concept of philosophy as science, to the concept of phenomenological investigation. The history of philosophy is not an arbitrary appendage to the business of teaching philosophy, which provides an occasion for picking up some convenient and easy theme for passing an examination or even for just looking around to see how things were in earlier times. Knowledge of the history of philosophy is intrinsically unitary on its own account, and the specific mode of historical cognition in philosophy differs in its object from all other scientific knowledge of history.

The method of ontology thus delineated makes it possible to characterise the idea of phenomenology distinctively as the scientific procedure of philosophy. We therewith gain the possibility of defining the concept of philosophy more concretely. Thus our considerations in the third part lead back again to the starting point of the course.

(Source: *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (1954) Published by Indiana University Press, 1975. Introduction, p 1 - 23 reproduced here.)

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